RE: [registrars] An Opportunity to Prove A Point - Hi-Jacked Name At GoDaddy

["John Berryhill" <john@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

>   1. Evidence of fraud

One bit of evidence might be a contact change to the domain of an applicant
in Colorado originating from an IP address in Iran.  Of course, I was not
suggesting that one data point constitute a totality of one's investigation.
However, on top of the other data, having a reason to investigate further, a
quick look at the quite neutral records of the Colorado Secretary of State,
and at such domain data as that for marriage.org, along with the
unlikelihood that a party with a definite view on the subject of marriage
would suddenly sell a domain name after 12 years to someone advertising, for
example, "extramarital dating sites", does paint a larger picture.

I believe my point was obscured by some who had not attended the recent
meeting.   My intention was to point out a definite situation in which,
regardless of one's interpretation of the policy, someone is breathing a
deep sigh of relief over the fact that the domain name is not subject to a
further registrar transfer for a while.  My comments on this particular
event appear to have been misinterpreted to some degree, since it was
suggested emphatically to me that the anti-hijacking utility of the GoDaddy
policy was some sort of fiction.

We've heard from the anti-phishing group on the subject of "fast flux" DNS
and its problems.  Having to chase hi-jacked domains name hither and yon,
suggests that there needs to be a balance between a distributed
inconvenience for many, versus a catastrophic event for a few.