Re: [ga] ICANN uses for-profit companies as "comparables" in its employee compensation
- To: ga@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, George Kirikos <gkirikos@xxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [ga] ICANN uses for-profit companies as "comparables" in its employee compensation
- From: Danny Younger <dannyyounger@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 5 Jan 2009 13:35:42 -0800 (PST)
George raises some excellent points.
It is probably worthwhile also to review the similar GAC comments on the topic:
In a context where ICANN's budget has rapidly grown from $5 million in the
2000-2001 budget year to a proposed budget in excess of $61 million for the
2009 financial year, it can be assumed than ICANN has now achieved "financial
It may now be appropriate therefore, for the ICANN community to
determine how future budgetary growth should be managed and maybe even limited
to remain in line with ICANN’s limited core mission and mandate.
ICANN's non-profit status should mean not only that it does not pay
dividends to shareholders, but also that it should not be revenue-driven as an
Safeguards must also ensure that the policy making process does not
favour revenue-generating options above those that reflect the broader public
interest and community consensus on what is needed for ICANN coordination role.
More systematic disclosure is needed on how resources are spent, and in
particular regarding contracts with consultants and other third parties.
Specific accountability and transparency rules regarding ICANN’s budget
(independent auditing, results-based budgeting, metrics, etc..) are required in
the absence of the traditional controls exercised by shareholders or membership.
Broad community discussion on possible uses of any surplus is
The PSC-led process should focus less on identifying additional sources of
income for the organization than on a more detailed, results-based and
transparent budgetary planning. A willingness on the part of ICANN’s management
to "cap" its own budget will be a strong factor in forstering long-term
confidence in the institution.
The GAC is also aware that ICANN’s current income structure creates a potential
"over-dependency" on registry and registrar constituencies. Ensuring that such
over-dependency does not lead to any suggestion of "capture" by ICANN's main
channels of funding is essential to maintaining its independence and