Re: [council] framing the discussion on SGs and role of the Council

[Avri Doria <avri@xxxxxxx>]

On 05-Feb-14 18:43, Mike O'Connor wrote:
> <grin> i yield on the subject-line — looks good to me.
thank you.  I have trouble with longer subject lines.

> sorry this reply took so long, email got thrown overboard to cope
> with complications on other fronts
>
> OK - points of agreement (i’m really glad we agree on these two
> fundamental points)
>
> — we are not overseer of the whole GNSO
>
> — the Council is overseer of the policy process
>
> points of discussion
>
> > — SGs are self-organizing, organized with a by-your-leave from the
> >  Board, without need of further oversight.
> i need convincing on that last bit -
Well, I can try to give my reasons for this belief. As for convincing
you, my experience tells me  most people convince themselves if they are
going to be convinced.  But maybe my arguments will be useful in your
deliberations.

> there’s the possibility of trouble when there are functional
> organizations that report to nobody, not even a coordinating body.
Basic for me in the definition of a bottom-up organization: the
oversight of a group is by the group, as that is who they are
accountable to.  Now by the group I don't necessarily mean the self
selected folks who work in the SG or are (s)elected for roles, but
rather the larger set of members (in the case of a GNSO SG or C,
the appropriate population varies by group)

In ICANN we have an additional top-down wild card - the Board is
oversight for everything except maybe the Ombudsman and AOC Review teams
(a bottom-up oversight mechanism in itself)

From By-laws X.2

> > > Except as otherwise defined in these Bylaws, the four Stakeholder
> > > Groups and the Constituencies will be responsible for defining
> > > their own charters with the approval of their members and of the
> > > ICANN Board of Directors.

So that is 4 points of oversight:

Hard oversight - their word is law

- the group itself through means defined in its charter
- the SIC that pretty much does what it feels needs to be done with
theappproval of the entire Board.

Soft oversight

- the Ombudsman - in the case of a complaint of unfairness
- the ATRT - if SG/C issues or accountability and transparency were the
topic selected by the ATRT based on the community's advice, as necessary
to review in a particular cycle.

I find it hard to think of them as reporting to nobody.

> btw, none of these are do-or-die issues for me, i put them more in
> the “opportunities lost” column.
Now, I believe in regulatory structures as much as the next person, but
I do not see a need for yet further oversight.

Where I do see a need is for the organization of cooperation.

Cooperation can happen in many ways including by not limited to:

- ad hoc  - e.g. cooperation among SG reps to achieve a policy goal in
the council

- self-organization  - something like the ccWG Ig, assuming it ever
becomes real, where there was a decision on the part of some to attract
the rest of the community to work on a particular issue and there are
organizational aspirations.

-  top-down suggested/enforced - e.g. the GNSO that was told by the
Board to figure out a solution to reorganizing the GNSO structure a few
years back that resulted in a set of SIC requirements for Constituencies
and Stakeholder Groups.

> — Council as service organization to SGs when they have common cause
>  to effect change beyond GNSO policy.  i also need convincing on this
>  one - can you point me at documentation that supports this role?
A thought or two occur to me on this.

I tend to think that a group that can help coordinate the efforts of
the willing is of course always authorized to help the willing
cooperate.  To say that we need a document to tell us we may coordinate
the goals of our SG and Cs when they consent, is difficult for me to
understand.  I don't really understand needing to be convinced that
helping people cooperate needs permission from some authority. That is
indeed another feature of a bottom-up organization - you are as
organized as you decide to be (again with the caveat that having an
authoritative Board does add a touch of the top down to make any
analysis a bit more complex).  Note I do not argue that the SGs could
not come together and create an organizational framework - I would still
argue against it for various reasons, but that would at least be a
bottom-up process of self-aggregation and self-imposition of further
oversight.  But, the fact that this could happen does not mean that the
action of the council in regard to organizing cooperation are in any way
limited by the by-laws now.


> it seems quite different than my understanding of what we’re
> supposed to do.

We have some designated activities:

- managing policy process
- electing seats 13 and 14 of the Board

But the By-Laws X.9 do no limit the GNSO to those actions:

> 9. Except as otherwise specified in these Bylaws, Annex A hereto, or
> the GNSO Operating Procedures, the default threshold to pass a GNSO
> Council motion or other voting action requires a simple majority vote
> of each House. The voting thresholds described below shall apply to
> the following GNSO actions:
This is then followed by the complexity of PDP voting.  This indicates
that the council is not barred from other activities.  They just haven't
been specifically assigned.

If electing and policy management were the only activities the GNSO
Council were permitted, then there would have been no need for this
clause.  The fact that it exists indicates that the representatives of
the SG and the community (i.e. the NCAs) may do things other than those
that have specific voting threshholds.

While these activities are limited to the GNSO and gTLDs by the nature
of ICANN organizational Architecture, there are no limitations put on
the actions of the GNSO Council within these boundaries.

So, while I do not have evidence of a specific clause that the GNSO
Council can help organize other activities according to the simple
majority vote of the council, I believe I have shown evidence that the
council MAY do more than just manage policy if the GNSO SGs, by a
majority, decide to do so.  The only things we MUST do are Manage Policy 
and Elect Board members and a GNSO.
Also I would note that:

By-Laws x.3.4

> 4. The GNSO Council is responsible for managing the policy
> development process of the GNSO.
Does not say:

4. The GNSO Council is ONLY responsible for managing the policy
development process of the GNSO and nothing more.

Further By-Laws X.5.5 says:

> Whenever the Board posts a petition or recommendation for a new
> Constituency for public comment, the Board shall notify the GNSO
> Council and the appropriate Stakeholder Group affected and shall
> consider any response to that notification prior to taking action.
Why would the Board notify the Council of the creation of new
Constituencies if it was not the case thatt the council of the GNSO, had 
a say in the GNSO as an organization.
Additionally By-Laws X.3.7 says:

> 7. The GNSO Council shall select the GNSO Chair for a term the GNSO
> Council specifies, but not longer than one year.
Note, it says "the GNSO chair," not the "GNSO Council chair." The 
vice-chairs on the other hand are specifically referred to as 
"Vice-Chair of the whole of the GNSO Council".
So, why do I think the Council as a service group that should serve the 
GNSO in any way it needs? Because I guess I believe all those elected as 
volunteer leaders are volunteers in service.  So, to my mind, if the 
representatives of the SGs in the council decide, as determined by the 
by-laws, that they need for us to take on a task, I see support in the 
by-laws for us doing so.
> thanks!  again, sorry about the sluggish reply.
No worries. I do not expect this is a conversation we will resolve
anytime soon.  The only reason I try to answer quickly is because if I
don't, it is likely to get pushed down the stack so far, it may never
surface again without a ping and guilt on my part.


> mikey

thanks,

avri


Ps.  while looking a various bits of history, I ran into the following

http://gnso.icann.org/en/group-activities/inactive/2012/improvements/restructure-working-group-en.htm
http://gnso.icann.org/en/group-activities/inactive/2012/improvements/restructure


Representation

> a. All four stakeholder groups must strive to fulfill
> pre-established objective criteria regarding broadening outreach and
> deepening participation from a diverse range of participants.
>
> b. All stakeholder groups must have rules and processes in place
> that make it possible for any and all people and organizations
> eligible for the stakeholder group to join, participate and be heard
> regardless of their policy viewpoints.
This is the recommendation that resulted from Report To ICANN Board of
Directors From Working Group On GNSO Council Restructuring 25 July 2008.
It recommended the structure we have now to the Board, which the Board
essentially accepted.

This is to some extent, an example that may go against the first
principle we agreed on - that the GNSO has no oversight over the GNSO
itself.  In this case, the sub team of council members did indeed make
recommendations with regard to the Stakeholder groups - it not only
recommended a reorganization but made recommendations on details
internal to those SGs.

The more I work on this topic, the more I start to believe that if there
is a need for further oversight of the whole GNSO, it would not be
inappropriate or outside the bounds on what has gone before, for that to
become a GNSO council task. I do not think this level of oversight
is currently required, but I am always willing to reconsider.  I.e. I
may be convincing myself that Point of Agreement 1 is based on weak
arguments.