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Re: [ga] DOC Notice of Inquiry, Notice of Public Meeting re: ICANN

  • To: "Danny Younger" <dannyyounger@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Subject: Re: [ga] DOC Notice of Inquiry, Notice of Public Meeting re: ICANN
  • From: "kidsearch" <kidsearch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sat, 3 Jun 2006 09:43:48 -0400
  • Cc: <ga@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • References: <20060602210412.50281.qmail@web37215.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
  • Sender: owner-ga@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

I only wish I was as eloquent. But I agree with it. I want ICANN to bring
back the GA and elect more than half the board to represent individual users
OR continue to give ICANN technical admin but turn policy decisions over to
an org where more than half the board is elected by a GA.

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Danny Younger" <dannyyounger@xxxxxxxxx>
To: <kidsearch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: <ga@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Friday, June 02, 2006 5:04 PM
Subject: Re: [ga] DOC Notice of Inquiry, Notice of Public Meeting re: ICANN


> Chris,
>
> Thanks for the contribution.  For your reference, I
> have posted below the preliminary thoughts that Milton
> Mueller has expressed on the governance list:
>
> Initial Discussion Points on the NTIA proceeding
>
> The numbered points below correspond to the numbers in
> the NTIA Notice of Inquiry (NOI).
>
> 1. The 1998 White Paper articulated the following four
> principles to guide DNS policy: stability;
> competition; private, bottom-up coordination; and
> representation. Are these principles still relevant?
>
> This is probably the most important area to
> concentrate comments ? the level of principle.
> I would suggest that three of the four principles
> (stability, competition, and representation) are still
> relevant. Serious questions, however, arise around the
> principle of private, bottom-up coordination. In the
> original understanding at ICANN's creation, the
> special USG oversight role was supposed to end after
> two years. It never did. Last year, the USG asserted
> for the first time a principle that it will always
> retain a unilateral oversight role. This new principle
> deviates from the White Paper principles. We know from
> the WGIG Report and the Tunis Agenda that many in the
> international community do not approve of this.
>
> The pre-eminent position of the USG has enormous
> consequences for ICANN's accountability. The White
> Paper strategy was to "internationalize via
> privatization." ICANN would be made globally
> accountable and representative by relying on private,
> multi-stakeholder mechanisms for policy making while
> avoiding intergovernmental mechanisms. The term
> "privatization" is not popular among many in civil
> society but one must understand that in many respects
> it is easier for civil society and governments to hold
> ICANN accountable if it is a private, nonprofit
> corporation than if it is an
> international treaty organization or
> quasi-governmental entity. Private nonprofit corps are
>
> subject to all kinds of regulations regarding
> disclosure of financial information, etc. and
> cannot be shielded by powerful states such as the USG.
>
> The USG and international community must to come to
> grips with the contradiction between the principle of
> "internationalization via privatization" and
> the privileged position of one national government.
> Civil society and/or IGC comments should highlight
> this contradiction.
>
> The NTIA Notice of Inquiry speaks repeatedly of a
> "transition" to a "privatized DNS."
> We should ask, "What is the end state of this
> transition" and make specific and practical
> proposals to find a way out of the contradictions of
> the US position. There are basically 4 options:
>
> a. Status quo. Leave things as they are. Unacceptable.
>
> b. Amelioration. Accept US control but take concrete
> steps to minimize and neutralize it; e.g., proposing
> that the U.S. issue a formal commitment
> not to make arbitrary changes, such as CS requested in
> the Sept. 2005 WSIS Prepcom.
>
> c. De-nationalization. End U.S. oversight, make ICANN
> a private corp. under a specific national law
> (California public benefit corporation law is quite
> good, by the way) and thus subject to all the normal
> legal checks that can be applied to corporations, such
> as antitrust law, contract law, etc. There are other
> details, such as a host country agreement that would
> exempt ICANN from being bound by certain national
> policies. There might also be a call for certain
> procedural safeguards and personnel changes needed to
> make this option secure.
>
> d. Internationalization. Involve more governments in
> ICANN's supervision via a
> formal intergovernmental agreement. The degree of
> internationalization can be arranged on a spectrum
> ranging from the weakest (a very narrow DNS
> root-centered agreement, or an international body that
> managed a competitive bid process to award the IANA
> contract) to stronger, wider-scope forms of
> involvement (e.g., a framework convention).
>
> We need to agree on the basic outlines of one of these
> options. IGP has a paper from 6 months ago basically
> advocating #3. Some elements of #4 or even #2 could be
> acceptable.
>
> 2. Has ICANN achieved sufficient progress in
> accomplishing the tasks set out for it in the MoU?
>
> This question gets one involved in the details of the
> tasks set for ICANN by the NTIA.
> Strategically, I suggest that we not get too involved
> in this. If we do anything here, we should criticize
> ICANN?s failure to develop a new TLD process and its
> bias against privacy in its handling of the Whois
> issue. The Whois bias can again be related to the
> USG?s unilateral oversight, showing how US policy
> toward privacy is foisted on the global community
> through its control of ICANN, and belying US claims of
> neutral stewardship.
>
> 3. Are these core tasks and milestones still relevant
> to facilitate this transition and
> meet the goals outlined in the DNS White Paper and the
> U.S. Principles on the Internet's Domain Name and
> Addressing System?  Should new or revised
> tasks/methods be considered in order for the
> transition to occur?  And on what time frame and by
> what method should a transition occur?
>
> This item opens up discussion not only of the MoU
> substance, but the process of oversight as well. Here
> I think we should be ready with a specific
> timetable for change, based on elaboration of one of
> the four options discussed above. If our proposals
> involve any new tasks, such as a competitive bid
> process for IANA, it might go here.
>
> 4. Are stakeholder groups involved effectively? Are
> there additional stakeholder groups?
>
> CS actors from developing countries may wish to
> address this issue. I would not presume
> to speak for them so will await comments.
>
> From an ICANN-veteran perspective, the major issue
> revolves around the role of the At Large (ALAC). ALAC
> is supposed to represent the individual Internet user
> and domain name registrants. Its proposed structure
> under the "reformed" ICANN is not workable.
> IGP partners, especially Klein and Mueller, have
> always advocated a return to direct elections as a way
> of solving the collective action problem.
>
> This section might also provide a way to discuss the
> issue of governments and the changing role of the GAC
> in ICANN. We could argue that governments are
> not involved properly ? instead of participating as
> equals in the development of policy they are trying
> for an after the fact veto, which is destructive.
>
> 5. Are ICANN SOs doing their job and functioning
> properly?
>
> For a broader civil society constituency I think this
> is a minor issue and need not be addressed. If it is
> addressed, we could make all the usual and obvious
> arguments about the biased constituency structure of
> the GNSO. Others with more information about the
> address SO and the country code SO might have
> something to say here.
>
> 6. Automation of request processing for root zone
> changes.
>
> This is one of the most promising areas where NTIA
> actually seems likely to introduce a
> meaningful change. Automated request processing
> basically reduces the power of the root
> administrator and allows ccTLDs and presumably other
> registries to modify the root zone file on their own.
> We should support this idea.
>
> 7. How can information exchange, collaboration and
> enhanced cooperation among these organizations be
> achieved as called for by the WSIS?
>
> Participate in good faith in the IGF. Here is a chance
> to elaborate the proper vision for the
> Forum, where cross-cutting issues are considered and
> international and intergovernmental
> organizations are subjected to independent assessment.
>
>
>
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