Re: [ga] Letter to the ALAC

["Richard Henderson" <richardhenderson@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Sotiris

My opposition to the ALAC concept, its structure, methodology, and intent is as follows:

1. It is entirely a top-down ICANN Board initiative, which was launched to "cover up" the disgraceful expulsion from the Boardroom of the elected representatives of the open At Large, in an effort to give ICANN a facade of credibility while in reality removing the most open, democratic and free voices of individual users from any substantial power in its organisation.

2. Nobody asked for this ALAC initiative - it was imposed.

3. The political purpose of ALAC is to create a semblance of "representation" (without any individual membership or elections) while keeping the potentially powerful Internet User constituency at arm's length from any real power in the ICANN organisation.

4. In replacing the elected At Large directors with ALAC, ICANN was flying in the face of its own ALSC task force, which recommended increased representation by At Large directors in the ICANN Boardroom, not their total removal.

5. It was clear (from lawsuits which ICANN failed to win) that the ICANN old guard saw At Large directors like Karl Auerbach as a total threat to their hegemony and 'insider' control. The ICANN old guard were faced with duly elected Directors who had a mandate and who spoke with freedom and independence, and it was typical that these threatening free voices were booted out. ALAC was part of this 'coup' process.

6. The 'control' aspect of the ICANN insiders is linked to the lack of any true mandate for ICANN itself - a Californian quango accountable only to the department of Commerce of a single country, which dictates its terms of reference without any further accountability to all the other countries of the world. In this carefully controlled US structure, lip-service is paid to other countries through GAC and lip-service is paid to the millions of worldwide users through ALAC, but power and control is retained by the US which enjoys a symbiotic relationship with ICANN which benefits both establishments. To this extent, ALAC as a structure supports a status quo which is lacking in any accountability to either users or governments anywhere else in the world.

7. It is transparently obvious that a structure for individual users should allow membership to individual users - something ALAC prohibits.

8. This lack of individual participation, membership and involvement explains to a great extent the 'deadness' of ALAC, the lack of activity in its mailing-lists, and the unwillingness of thousands of At Large individuals to get involved.

9. Many of the ALAC member-organisations lack democratic elections or representation themselves and simply send nominees who lack mandate and are largely just a small circle of people who have chosen to take the ride on the ICANN bandwagon, with free travel provided to locations around the world.

10. The ALAC structure and methodology in real terms just means a group of 6 or 7 of these unelected people running the At Large interests, drafting the policies, while all the rest of the vast user constituency just aren't involved at all - locked out from membership, and locked out of the structure.

11. There was a large electoral role of many thousands of At Large participants, used effectively at the earlier elections of the At Large directors, which ICANN has conveniently lost, mislaid or locked away. This electoral role worked perfectly well in bringing about representation for Individual Internet Users, and in generating a lively and participating At Large community. It is a transparently better way of involving the individual internet users because they feel more involved and feel they have more ownership of the process. Most interested Individual Users favour a self-determining At Large structure, with electoral representation, to the craven nominees and member lock-out which has resulted in a near-dead ALAC which is little more than a smal group of people drafting a few policies without accountability to anyone but themselves. They are not voted in. They are not voted out. They just enable ICANN to say "We have an At Large structure" as part of the "sham" by means of which it retains control of the DNS in co-operation with the department of Commerce.

Sotiris - this ALAC pretence is a typical example of how people with power use devices and processes to hold onto power at the top. It is not a bottom-up structure. It does not help ordinary and individual internet users to determine FOR THEMSELVES the way they want the Internet and DNS to be overseen. It "does it for them", while locking them out, in a manner which is paternalistic and patriarchal in its methodology and structure. It does not involve the very people - and specifically those people as individuals - which it purports to represent.

Because, apart from anything else, there IS no representation.

That was expelled by the ICANN Board.

Yrs,

Richard Henderson

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Sotiris Sotiropoulos" <sotiris@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: <ga@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Friday, January 14, 2005 10:03 PM
Subject: Re: [ga] Letter to the ALAC


> Richard,
> 
> Happy New Year!
> 
>  From what I've come to understand, in order for the ALAC to become some 
> sort of integral ICANN appendage, its chapter organizations are required 
> to have a representative presence at all ICANN meetings (to which ICANN 
> will fund the travel for approved organizations).  At this time, I see 
> nothing wrong with this approach, except for its painstakingly slow 
> implementation, and perhaps, the criteria for approval.  Sure, many of 
> us wish we could go back to the past At-Large structure (indeed to 
> implement its original scope and position), but as this is apparently 
> highly unlikely at this juncture, I think it is important for us to try 
> and understand what the proposed framework actually entails.
> 
> Be Well,
> 
> Sotiris Sotiropoulos