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[council] fw: [CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue
- To: "council@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <council@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: [council] fw: [CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue
- From: "Edward Morris" <egmorris1@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2016 15:22:16 -0500
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Fellow Councillors,
I am forwarding an e-mail Keith has just submitted on behalf of a few of us in
the GNSO to the CCWG-Accountability list. Thanks Keith for your proactive
leadership on this very important issues.
Kind Regards,
Ed Morris
----------------------------------------
From: "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Saturday, February 27, 2016 8:06 PM
To: "accountability-cross-community@xxxxxxxxx"
<accountability-cross-community@xxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue
Hi Thomas, Mathieu and Leon. I'm submitting the following on behalf of the
undersigned members/participants from the GNSO:
---------------------------------------------
Dear CCWG-Accountability Chairs,
We are very concerned with the response of the Board to the request for
clarification regarding the need to adjust the thresholds for the Empowered
Community to exercise its powers if the number of decisional participants is
less than 5 SOACs. Currently the text in Annex 1 and 2 regarding this
possibility is ambiguous:
"The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this
assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN's SOs and ACs agree to be decisional
Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be adjusted.
Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or
ACs."
In our view, there is no question that the thresholds must be adjusted if there
are fewer than five decisional participants. We have acknowledged repeatedly
and operated under the assumption that there should not be a requirement of
unanimous support for the Empowered Community to exercise its powers. Yet, if
there are less than five decisional participants, unless the thresholds are
adjusted it would require unanimous support for the Empowered Community to:
· Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget;
· Recall the entire Board of Directors; and
· Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA functions,
including the triggering of any PTI separation process.
These powers are central to ensuring that ICANN remains accountable to the
Empowered Community. This matter is too critical to the primary purpose of the
CCWG-Accountability proposal to remain unclear. As the Board has noted in its
own formal comments, "Leaving this issue for future consideration raises the
potential for renegotiation of the community thresholds. This potential for
renegotiation adds a level of instability and a lack of predictability."
Although it has a superficial resemblance to the recent debate over thresholds
in the GAC carve-out, we believe it is fundamentally different. There is a
great distinction between an SO or AC choosing to not participate, and an SO or
AC being blocked from participation in a specific instance, as was the case in
the case of the GAC carve-out. We were willing to accept a unanimous threshold
for Board recall in the unique circumstances of the GAC carve-out, where the
GAC was blocked from participation, but we believe firmly that if any SO or AC
elects, whether through a conscious decision or an inability to decide, to not
participate, then the non-unanimity principle must be upheld.
However, as we saw with the debate over the thresholds in the GAC carve-out,
this could be a contentious issue. It is far better to resolve this matter now
(and during the drafting of bylaws), prior to the official transfer of the
proposal to NTIA, than to delay it when it could have significant negative
ramifications on the transition through a failure to resolve it during the
implementation phase.
Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1 and Annex 2
be edited to replace "may" with "shall" and add an additional explanatory
clause:
"The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this
assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN's SOs and ACs agree to be decisional
Participants, these thresholds for consensus support shall be adjusted to
prevent the need for unanimous support among the decisional Participants to
exercise any of the seven Community powers. Thresholds may also have to be
adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs."
Signed,
Phil Corwin
Steve DelBianco
Keith Drazek
James Gannon
Robin Gross
Ed Morris
Brett Schaefer
Greg Shatan
Matthew Shears
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