RE: [ga] Getting Heard by the ICANN Board

["Dominik Filipp" <dominik.filipp@xxxxxxxx>]

Thanks a lot for the detailed explanation. I'm still digging into it and
trying to puzzle out all those acronyms...
 
Dominik

________________________________

From: JFC Morfin [mailto:jefsey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] 
Sent: Tuesday, December 19, 2006 2:44 PM
To: Dominik Filipp; GA
Subject: RE: [ga] Getting Heard by the ICANN Board


Dominik,
what you say about Atlarge and NCUC is true. The problem is that the 
ICANN structure is a no-Member system built in a way everything is 
locked for class membership protection, the same at the IETF where 
RFC 3774 call this the problem of an "affinity group". This developed 
with ICANN itself. They are Roberto Gaetano, Harald Alvestrand, Danny 
Younger as GA Chairs in our area, Vint Cerf and Allesandro Pisanty 
for the Board, Karl Auerbach and Vittorio Berthola for at large, 
Peter Dengate Trush for the ccTLDs, etc. Vint and Harald took also 
care of the IETF relations (Harald chaired it). Same with relations 
with ISOC, the various constituencies (controlled by some well 
identified persons at IPC [Steve Metallitz], BC [Marilyn Cade], NCUC 
[Milton Mueller]) GNSO, ASO, etc. Then they create committees 
together with people they amalgamate to the affinity group) - except 
Karl Auerbach, "the first atlarge" the pariah they respect. They 
maintain odd relations with the size creeping Staff lead by Paul 
Twomey who is a permanent member of the BoD and will stay after Vint 
and Alessandro are gone (unless they change the By-Laws). They 
shelter their relations (and various ties with the USGovernment) 
behind a document logorrhea which permit them to always be more 
complex than their opponents. And if they are not Danny Younger is 
here to create and point out new complexity.

For example I chair the eldest non-profit interested in International 
Network (created in 1978). I am denied its registration to NCUC 
saying that ... it does not exists, because I could conflict with 
Danny Younger there who represents ISOC-NY there, while all the other 
ISOC Chapters ar belonging to the ALAC.

Most of the people involved in this Saga who shared in the WG-Review, 
the IDNO, the icannatlarge, etc. generous efforts are gone after they 
understood there was nothing to do against the ICANN creeping legal 
mollusc, but to replace it. Most dropped the issue and some still 
lurk here (hi! Joop, Sotiris, Dassa, etc.) a very few like me engaged 
into making it, leading to the IGF through the lengthy WSIS process.

Today two visions are opposing in order to upgrade the decentralised 
model we organised in 1978/1884, and which is described in RFC 920 
and 1591 of Jon Postel and ICANN ICP-1 document. This follows the 
revision process engaged by Stuart Lynn (the President before Paul 
Twomey) to correct the over centralisation initiated by the first 
President (Michael Roberts).

( 1) there is an US/ICANN focalisation where the IANA becomes the 
reference for the on-line systems, and progressively for the world 
through the US Internet leadership. This option as been agreed in 
Tunis, subject to the practical limitations imposed in RFC 4646 which 
creates the IANA registry to be used to organise it. Most of the 
ICANNeers adhere to that vision as it insures the survival of ICANN 
and its support by the Internet US mammoths gathered in the Unicode 
consortium which wrote RFC 4646.

(2) the natural technical evolution of the Internet usage that the 
Internet technology can less and less support with important address, 
routing, language issues and user centric autonomies. This leaves us 
with two options (a) a multinational or (b) InterNAT network, and 
most probable (a) _and_ (b) single future. Both means that ICANN is 
going to become the US Internet International Agency managing the 
domestic and international extension of the US Internet.

This means that stabilisation will come the day we can merge the US 
centralisation into the global multilateralisation in a way truly 
acceptable to all. This calls for the US side to address the current 
destabilisation by the demands of Google pople who want too much 
control over the IANA RFC 4646 registry. This way they expose the 
IETF inability to manage that registry proprely (over a few 
registration failures). Another destabiisation is the inability of 
ICANN/IETF/IANA to understand the problems involved in the 
Multilingual Internet, spam, and IPv6 and to solve them. This in 
particular results from the disinterest of the IETF in the ICP-3 
ICANN document calling for an IETF experimentation of the Internet 
evolution, in liasing with ccTLD, and in pariticipating to the WSIS 
and IGF, a general lack of architectural (common) vision by IAB, 
IRTF, ITU, NSF and a priority put on the survival of the DN Industry 
which needs to be, and will be under the user/technologu pressure, 
completely revised to fee the user's needs, rather than the
cybesquatters ones.

jfc

At 13:25 18/12/2006, Dominica Filipp wrote:

>I've realized that I'm still lacking some information about the
internal
>processes at ICANN.
>
>We have several constituencies of which at least two should be
>representing the registrant interests - NCU and (non-voting) At-Large.
I
>don't know what the connection of the constituences to the board
members
>(who are eligible to make final decisions by voting) is like. If, for
>instance, the info/org/biz agreement was approved unanimously, does it
>mean that NCU (as a voting constituency) voted for the agreement and
>thus failed in approaching the registrant interests?
>
>What is the GNSO (which list we're subscribed to) role in all that? Can
>I find anything like organizational tree chart on the ICANN page?
>
>Maybe a bit dumb questions out here... but I'd like to get to know...
>
>thanks
>
>Dominik

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