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JULIE BISLAND:

Good morning, good afternoon, good evening, everyone. This is Julie for the recording. Welcome to the DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP1 Working Group call, taking place on Monday, 18 May 2026. For today's call, we received apologies from Luke Wood, BC; Michaela Shapiro, NCSG; and Claire Craig, At-Large. Alternates stepping in today for them are Vivek Goyal, BC; Edmund Brahene, NCSG; and Eunice Alejandra Perez Coello, At-Large. Statements of interest must be kept up to date. Please raise your hand or speak up now if you have an update to share.

Seeing no hands, all members, participants, and alternates will be promoted to panelists. Please watch your screen for the prompt to be promoted. Observers will remain as attendees and will have access to view chat only. All documentation and information can be found on the DNS Abuse wiki space. Recordings will be posted shortly after the end of the call. Please remember to state your name before speaking for the recording. As a reminder, participation in ICANN, including this session, is governed by the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior, the ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy, and the ICANN Community Participant Code of Conduct. Thank you, and over to our Chair, Paul McGrady. Please begin, Paul.

PAUL MCGRADY:

Thank you, Julie. Good morning, everybody. We have made some great progress so far, and we are going to keep doing that. Thank you all for your active participation in these calls, in the chat, and on the list. We have a simple but robust agenda, so let's go ahead and get started. We have straw persons for questions five and six to go through, and then we

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will start some deliberations on Charter Question Number 7. Let's go ahead. Just a reminder, I see in chat somebody says you can't hear me. Hopefully, you can. If not, we will have to have that call-out that we sometimes do, but let's stay tuned.

Charter Question Number 5: If the associated domain checks have an adverse impact on domain name registrants, are there corresponding remedies? Some of the preliminary language on Charter Question 5, based upon working group discussions, indicates that the working group discussed that, aligned with the Charter Question 3 response, the ADCs must be implemented in a manner that is proportionate, evidence-based, and designed to minimize unintended impacts on legitimate registrants. Registrars and other relevant parties must take reasonable measures to reduce the risk of false positives or erroneous associations.

Aligned with the Charter Question 4 response, any ADC implementation must rely on applicable legal, contractual, and operational safeguards related to data processing, accuracy, accountability, and proportionality. Existing mechanisms may not provide sufficiently transparent remedies for registrants potentially adversely affected by conducting ADC. Other participants considered certain remedy-related issues, particularly those connected to mitigation actions such as suspension or takedown, that fall outside of the scope of the current PDP and are more appropriately addressed through future policy development efforts, as noted in the initial report.

In cases where ADC may result in adverse impacts on legitimate domain name registrants, certain existing procedures, contractual obligations,

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and legal frameworks already provide safeguards relevant to conducting ADC. These include existing RAA obligations related to DNS abuse mitigation, ICANN contractual compliance review and audit processes, applicable data protection and privacy obligations, and registrar operational review procedures.

We are moving on. We are going to Charter Question Number 6: What are appropriate timelines and thresholds for initiating and concluding the associated domain check? Now that we have read through the preliminary discussions on Charter Question 5, I think we have straw people for questions five and six. I am taking the slides out of order. Feodora, go ahead.

FEODORA HAMZA:

This is basically it on Charter Question 5. The first two bullet points are the ones most related to the charter question, and the others summarize key aspects of the working group discussion. We are happy to show the language that Natalie shared on this question as well, and then the group can discuss. I hope that makes sense.

PAUL MCGRADY:

I know Natalie's group put forward proposed language for five and six. Let's go ahead and plow through these slides, and then we will put up Natalie's language. Charter Question 6: What are appropriate timelines and thresholds for initiating and concluding the associated domain check? Based upon working group discussions, the working group discussed that registrars, if they have not already conducted ADCs as part of the mitigation of the trigger of the domain, must initiate and

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conduct an ADC promptly following the trigger as recommended in Charter Question Number 1, which is the receipt or identification of actionable evidence of DNS abuse. This should take into account the specific circumstances of each case in determining what constitutes prompt initiation and completion of an ADC.

Relevant considerations may include the severity and immediacy of the DNS abuse, the scale and complexity of the abuse activity under review, the need to minimize collateral impact on legitimate registrants, and operational realities and available resources. The working group discussed a potential timeline for conducting and initiating ADC and noted that retaining a contextual and flexible promptly standard aligns with existing RAA obligations. The working group heard that some best practice registrars already conduct some ADCs simultaneously with DNS abuse mitigation. The working group further noted that DNS abuse incidents may vary significantly in urgency, complexity, evidentiary requirements, operational impact, and risk of collateral harm.

The working group discussed the consideration of the development of implementation guidance, examples, advisories, or best practices to support consistent interpretation of prompt action under varying operational and abuse scenarios. Some participants preferred a precise timeline over promptly, but most of the working group converged on aligning with the current RAA obligations rather than creating ADC-specific timeline rules. That summarizes both things. It looks like we have a bit of a queue. Let's run this queue to the ground. We have actual straw people from the registries that have come forward. Straw people can come from anywhere. Staff has been creating them based upon discussions, but we can certainly take a look at something from

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the working group. Let's start with the queue. We have Marc, and then we have Ching. Marc, go ahead.

MARC TRACHTENBERG: Should I just be limiting my comments to Charter Question 6 or 5?

PAUL MCGRADY: Five and six, Marc. Go ahead.

MARC TRACHTENBERG: For five, it is just a domain check. You are just checking for associated domains. I think we are really overcomplicating this. How are you going to do it in a way that is proportionate, evidence-based, and designed to minimize unintended impacts on legitimate registrants? For the hundredth time, we have not even figured out what these impacts are on legitimate registrants or how that could work. It is just a check. The implementation must rely on applicable legal, contractual, and operational safeguards that already exist. I do not see any need to add that in.

If existing mechanisms do not provide sufficient transparent remedies for registrants potentially adversely affected by conducting ADC, I do not know what we are going to do here. I do not know what remedies we can create. We have not identified any potentially adverse impact. I think that we are just creating a lot of extra complexity here that is going to bog this down and make this completely unimplementable. Again, it is just a check.

Moving to Charter Question 6, we are creating a lot of additional complexity here that will make this completely not implementable in a practical way at all. I am one of the people who thinks there should be a specific timeframe to respond, because otherwise there is no way to monitor compliance. There is no way to audit. There is no way to know whether registrars are performing their obligations, taking into account that there is no transparency in whether registrars do checks. As a reporter, you are not going to know whether the ADC is happening behind the scenes, so you are not going to be able to report non-compliance to ICANN.

While I do not love promptly, adding in these other things adds additional complexity. We are saying the relevant considerations may include these, but that is going to be what the standard is. Now the registrar will have to document this every single time and do a very complicated analysis when we are just talking about a domain check. This turns the previous concerns about whether ADC will completely jam up the abuse reporting process and make all abuse reports grind to a halt because it takes too much time. To the extent that the registrar has to do all these complicated analyses and document all this stuff to show they were compliant, it is too complicated. We are just talking about a domain check for actionable evidence of DNS abuse. To add in all this stuff makes it impossible. Let's keep it simpler.

PAUL MCGRADY:

Thanks, Marc. Before you go, you mentioned that you have a specific timeframe in mind. It seemed like the working group settled on promptly because it is already in the RAA for other things. You saw how

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long it took to get a specific timeframe for law enforcement on urgent requests. All the work is related, which was a different set of issues. What is the IPC's proposal on timeframe?

MARC TRACHTENBERG:

I think it was 48 or 72 hours. I am less concerned about what the specific timeframe is exactly as opposed to having one. There is no point in discussing what that timeframe is if people cannot agree that there should be a specific timeframe. I do understand the arguments for why promptly is in there, and I acknowledge that argument. Let's first determine whether people could agree on a specific timeframe, and if they can, then we can figure out what that timeframe is. To do it the other way does not make sense.

PAUL MCGRADY:

From what I could see, the conversation was congealing around promptly, but if the IPC has a specific suggestion on a timeframe, I encourage you to bring that as soon as you can. In the chat, I see concerns that we have changed our agenda on the fly. We have not. We just have an intervening straw person that was sent out to the list. We want to reward people who are contributing during the week. We do pivot if we have specific inputs that are relevant to the discussion, but we are not abandoning our agenda. We have Ching, and then we will have Volker. Ching, go ahead.

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CHING CHIAO:

This is Ching from the BC. I would like to make two clarification points and also seek thoughts from the Chair and other members. First, I would like to clarify what the BC proposed in early input, which is that the ADC should be initiated within 24 hours after receiving the confirmed abuse case. We are advocating the 24-hour timeline to initiate the ADC check. We are not saying 24 hours to conclude or 72 hours to conclude. Since we are talking about timelines specifically here, the BC proposed this timeline to initiate.

We are happy to discuss if there is a way to address the issue of how the ADC can be completed, though I personally doubt that because many slow-burn campaigns could add to the ADC group in a larger size. Once again, the BC advocates the 24-hour timeline to initiate the ADC checks. Second, regarding the timeline, I added a comment to the Google Doc about how long we should trace back the ADC group. For example, if I launch a six-week phishing campaign and one domain is found on week six, should the ADC just check within that particular week or the overall six weeks of names registered throughout that timeframe? I was wondering if this is already covered or will be covered elsewhere.

PAUL MCGRADY:

Thanks, Ching. Volker, go ahead.

VOLKER GREIMANN:

I agree with Marc when he says that we are just talking about a domain check. It may be helpful to clarify or specify that in the supporting materials, though, because not everyone is part of this PDP. For some outside people reading the policies, it might not be clear what we

actually mean. Some registrars might need additional guidance. Some might think that a check means an automated takedown, which it does not. Making that clearer does not necessarily belong in the policy materials, but it can be somewhere else. In effect, a check does not mean a takedown.

With regard to the timelines, I am very reluctant about any definite timelines. While I personally feel that the ADC should be conducted at the same time the abuse report is being reviewed, I do not know the processes for every registrar. They may be different, and there may be reasons to do it differently. Essentially, promptly does the work. In some cases, it will mean less than 24 hours after the initial report is actioned. In some cases, it may be more than the 72 hours that were proposed. The circumstances matter here, and promptly is a word we already have in the RAA; therefore, it is fitting.

I do not see the need for any particular definition, especially since the response time to the initial report is not defined other than by promptly. Why should the ADC have a better timeline or a more concrete timeline than the actual review of the initial ticket? That should also be considered. Promptly is good.

PAUL MCGRADY:

Thanks, Volker. Gabriel, go ahead.

GABRIEL ANDREWS:

I wanted to respond in real time regarding question five. We saw a comment from Farzaneh in chat speaking to the NCSG view as to what

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the risk of an ADC is. She writes that the potential impact is surveillance, political risk exposure, privacy issues, and unfair takedown. I wanted to engage on this point because I think there has been a lack of clarity on the part of the GAC in terms of what the actual impact of ADC was perceived to be.

As I am reading these issues, I am still not seeing them associated with the ADC in the context that we are speaking of. When you mention surveillance, the data being reviewed is already in the possession of the registrar. I am not sure what additional surveillance is being referred to. It is a review of data that already exists in their custody by virtue of the fact it was provided voluntarily by the registrant. Regarding political risk exposure, I am not seeing that data being shared with any political actors outside the registrar.

Privacy issues are the same; this is data voluntarily provided to the registrar with no sharing outside of the needs just to check. Finally, unfair takedown is a mitigative action and not the action associated with the check itself. As many on this call have noted, there is a willingness and the GAC has shown interest in participating in a dialogue focused on the potential remedies for misapplied mitigative action. Such a conversation would not be appropriate for this narrowly scoped PDP. We have an interest in participating, but perhaps not here. I want to check to make sure that I am not misunderstanding, because it is important to recognize if there is indeed a harm associated with the ADC itself. I am still not seeing it.

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PAUL MCGRADY:

Thanks, Gabriel. As I look at the list, we have surveillance, political risk exposure, privacy issues, and unfair takedowns. One could argue that privacy issues are handled by privacy law, and a breach of privacy law has its own consequences from an ICANN compliance standpoint and from law enforcement. Unfair takedown seems to be in the world of what happens next, not ADCs. I view surveillance and political risk exposure in a different category. There is a sliding scale of governments that respect political speech. It is possible that an abuse complaint could come in that was meant to tie together the domain names of a dissident group. The question is whether that data ever leaves the registrar. We are not suggesting a reporting requirement from an ADC check to the initial party that made the DNS abuse complaint. I do not necessarily know where that data would go that could cause that impact, but I think there is something there we need to take seriously. Gabriel, do you have reactions to that?

GABRIEL ANDREWS:

I am trying to understand the concern. When you say tied together, are we talking about well-evidenced abuse? Any mitigative action is going to be in response to evidence of abuse. Simply because someone asks for an associated domain check with a well-evidenced abuse complaint does not mean any other domains are going to warrant mitigative action unless they are also associated in abuse. I still lack an understanding of the actual harm outside of misapplied mitigative action.

Regarding surveillance, who is conducting it? The person doing the associated domain check is the registrar who is already in possession of this data. It is not a government doing the check. If there was overly

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broad sharing of personally identifying information, relevant data-sharing laws would apply. Who is the surveillance being conducted by that is of concern to the NCSG? If it is by the registrar themselves for the purpose of checking for additional domains used in abuse, I am not seeing what the risk is.

PAUL MCGRADY:

Thanks, Gabriel. Farzaneh is in the queue, so we will hear from her. Brian, go ahead, and then we will hear from Farzaneh.

BRIAN CIMBOLIC:

On this charter question, it almost presumes an answer. It is like the second part of a question: Could there be reasonably likely adverse impacts on registrants as a result of an associated domain check? If so, what are they, and how do you address them? This is the first time we are hearing this articulation beyond mitigation, which most of us agree is outside of the scope. We are aligned with the GAC's position on this, but want to hear more.

Regarding promptly versus specific hours, it would be a bad policy to say how long it must take to conclude an associated domain check. Some campaigns are sophisticated, and you do not want a good faith registrar to rush a process just to close the books. I want to point to the existing infrastructure in the agreements. The RAA uses the promptly standard seven times, and we haven't seen challenges to the enforceability of those provisions. I do not know why we would create specific timelines for this but not for 3.18.2.

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Registrars are routinely audited, so this would not be hard to audit. It is a matter of providing a list of domains taken down and showing evidence of associated domain checks. We can allow for contractual compliance to audit the effect of the policy. It might be important to bring compliance into these discussions so we are not building a policy they say they cannot use. At some point, we should get the outputs in front of ICANN contractual compliance to ensure we are building something they can enforce.

PAUL MCGRADY:

Thanks, Brian. Farzaneh, go ahead.

FARZANEH BADII:

I have provided examples in the past on the mailing list about the risk that could occur when we do associated domain checks. It was in light of the Hong Kong process in 2019. In our risk analysis for human rights and access to digital services, we look at how different methods of investigation and mitigation can create political risk for people's access. We will send a concrete example to the mailing list.

We need to consider that this is not the first time a group has come up with a mitigation mechanism for digital abuse. In other areas of digital governance, there has been adverse impact. If we keep saying that what we are saying is not likely to happen instead of tackling the argument substantively, we are not going to get anywhere. For example, surveillance can happen when we obligate the registrar to look at the portfolio of the registrant. If there is a protest going on and the registrar

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sees politically sensitive domains in that portfolio, it could put the registrant at risk.

You could argue that this is a far-fetched scenario, but we think it is good to have policies that reduce these unlikely risks. We want proportionality so that based on the severity of the abuse, the registrar does not look at a thousand domains, but only those that are needed. These are basic principles of investigative processes. I have repeatedly mentioned these cases, and I do not know what else we can bring to convince this group that we need proportionality and safeguard measures.

PAUL MCGRADY:

I have not heard anybody talk about what the remedies would be. I want to refer us back to the question and see if we can answer it. Reg, go ahead.

REG LEVY:

I agree with Farzaneh and the NCSG that we need to look out for the rights of registrants. To that end, the RrSG conducted a public data protection impact assessment of the associated domains checks. It was determined that there is no adverse impact on the data of maliciously registered domains' registrants. I believe there are corresponding remedies. The registrant benefits and responsibilities already address a lot of the remedies. We are amenable to editing those to make them more clear and to reinforce responsibilities, but I do not think this is the PDP for it.

PAUL MCGRADY: Thanks, Reg. Marc, go ahead.

MARC TRACHTENBERG: I do not know how you answer the question of remedies if you cannot figure out what the likely adverse impacts are. I agree with Reg's comments that whatever happens is far outside this PDP. For those advocating that these risks be addressed, they provided a list of risks but no connection to how they might materialize from the associated domain check. It is not that those risks are not real in some contexts, but they do not relate here. Unless we can identify harms likely to materialize other than the use of data, which was already addressed, I think we need to move on.

PAUL MCGRADY: Thank you, Marc. Gabriel, go ahead.

GABRIEL ANDREWS: It would be easier to answer what the remedies are if we had clarity starting from a malicious domain registration where it is well evidenced. Without a clear understanding of the harm in that specific context, it is difficult to understand. Responding to Farzaneh's example, if there is a maliciously registered domain used for harm, you still need to look at the other domains in the portfolio even if they purport to be for human rights. I have seen phishing attacks by state actors targeting think tanks and human rights organizations. You cannot ignore a domain simply

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because of what it purports to be. A well-evidenced report of DNS abuse justifies that check in all cases.

PAUL MCGRADY:

I do not think we are there yet on Charter Question 5. We need to evolve concepts into concrete examples that show those potential harms exist. We will not dismiss Question 5 yet. If it turns out there are adverse impacts possible, then we need to answer what the remedies are. Regarding Question 6 and the timeline, the BC suggests beginning the ADC within 24 hours. The IPC suggests concluding it within 72 hours. Everyone else has leaned toward promptly. We should put a question to ICANN compliance regarding the standard. We can ask if beginning within 24 hours or concluding within 72 hours is better or worse from their standpoint. We will get that done. Reg, go ahead.

REG LEVY:

Regarding promptly, there are situations where a registrar is financially incentivized to act within five days of registration to ensure maliciously registered domains are suspended within the add grace period so we get our money back. That must allow us to triage so we can prioritize those. That helps everybody because we cut down on abuse right as it starts.

PAUL MCGRADY:

Thanks, Reg. Feodora, go ahead.

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FEODORA HAMZA:                   Regarding the question to ICANN compliance, Brian shared the advisory on the DNS abuse contract amendments last week. It notes that registrars will be required to explain how actions were prompt, considering the specific circumstances. If the working group has more specific questions, we can see how we bring them to compliance.

PAUL MCGRADY:                   Thanks, Feodora. Ching, go ahead.

CHING CHIAO:                   Charter Question 6 asks about the timeline and threshold for initiating and concluding. Some people choose promptly as a flexible way to answer. But the BC's way to properly answer this is to give an exact timeline and threshold. That is the task we were given.

PAUL MCGRADY:                   We have captured the BC position. The IPC suggests 72 hours to conclude. Others are leaning toward promptly but would like to hear from ICANN compliance. Thomas, go ahead.

THOMAS RICKERT:                I think it would help us understand how compliance works. If you use a term like promptly, you need to work on things as soon as possible. If ICANN compliance is comfortable with auditing such a term, then maybe we can use that standard without attaching concrete numbers of hours. Prompt is probably the best solution for those looking for the most expeditious way to have things dealt with.

PAUL MCGRADY: Thanks, Thomas. Reg, go ahead.

REG LEVY: I think it is the people who do not want promptly who want ICANN to weigh in. Those of us bound by these contracts know that ICANN compliance is good at making sure we comply with promptly.

PAUL MCGRADY: The registrar straw person language on Question 5 suggests that ADCs must rely on applicable legal, contractual, and operational safeguards and be implemented in a manner that is proportionate and evidence-based. It notes that existing recourse mechanisms may be insufficient and recommends further efforts to strengthen recourse options. For Question 6, they suggest registrars must initiate and conduct associated domain name checks promptly following identification of actionable evidence, taking into account the severity of the abuse and operational realities. Marc, go ahead.

MARC TRACHTENBERG: I do not see how this can be so meaningful. How is a proportionate ADC going to be different? You are just looking to see if there are associated domains. I do not know how you do that proportionately. For Question 6, I do not know how you tie promptness to the severity of the abuse. This seems unworkable. If we end up with prompt, adding all these other complexities makes it worse. I do not see how they are going to be meaningfully implemented or audited.

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PAUL MCGRADY: Thanks, Marc. Reg, go ahead.

REG LEVY: From our perspective, this is how we operate. We are already reviewing on the fly how bad a particular DNS abuse incident is in relation to the rest of the queue. We were trying to articulate what we already do. We thought this would clarify it.

PAUL MCGRADY: Vivek, go ahead.

VIVEK GOYAL: My concern is about operational realities and available resources. How do you ensure a registrar who is not present here cannot just say they are a small registrar and cannot afford to increase resources to look at ADCs? How do you get those registrars to put in the resources needed?

PAUL MCGRADY: That question goes to all ICANN policy development. How do we develop policies for those who do not participate? It is a larger question than what we are talking about here. Marc, go ahead.

MARC TRACHTENBERG: If registrars are currently doing this, that is fine. But I do not know that it needs to be in the policy. Registrars may just go down the queue in

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order of reports. I am just asking whether we need all this complexity in the policy.

PAUL MCGRADY: We have Volker.

VOLKER GREIMANN: If it is policy, it has to be followed. If it isn't followed, there are processes for breach of policy. Saying "I do not have enough money" is never going to fly with compliance.

PAUL MCGRADY: Vivek?

VIVEK GOYAL: Then take out operational realities and available resources. Why should available resources be a constraint?

PAUL MCGRADY: Staff will note that. Reg, go ahead.

REG LEVY: Operational realities and available resources refers to how the ADC is conducted, not whether it is conducted. Realistically, there are certain things we cannot do because we do not have access to specific data, like an IP address used to register the domain. How each of us conducts it is going to look different.

PAUL MCGRADY: Maybe the registrars could tighten up that language. Let's move on to deliberations on Charter Question Number 7: What specific requirements are necessary to implement this policy, and what parts can be subject to best practices or left to the discretion of the contracted party? Gabriel, go ahead.

GABRIEL ANDREWS: With regards to Question 7, can we use this to highlight requirements that have not been previously described? We should not feel compelled to rehash prior questions.

PAUL MCGRADY: I do not think this was meant to open a rehashing. It is more of a categorization exercise. If we have things that are stable, we can talk about whether they should be in policy or best practices. Feodora, go ahead.

FEODORA HAMZA: This question allows the categorization of what could form a policy recommendation versus rationale or implementation guidance. We have marked some language with must, which would be a policy recommendation, and may, which would be consideration or guidance. I do not think this will yield a specific recommendation in itself.

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PAUL MCGRADY: Is this just a reminder to mark things must, may, and at the discretion of the registrar?

FEODORA HAMZA: That could be an answer, but there might be more best practices the group has in mind.

PAUL MCGRADY: Volker, you are our first contestant.

VOLKER GREIMANN: Being too prescriptive in the policy will limit it. If you want a policy that is future-proof, we need a policy that can change through an advisory. All the practices should probably be in the advisory, not in the policy itself.

PAUL MCGRADY: High-level policy for stable must language, everything else in an advisory. Feodora, go ahead.

FEODORA HAMZA: Staff can clean up the collaboration document and provide a categorization of recommendations, rationale, and guidance for the group's review.

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PAUL MCGRADY: I agree for Questions 1 through 4. Five and six feel less stable. Let's evolve One through Four into draft recommendations and rationale. Gabriel, go ahead.

GABRIEL ANDREWS: If this question is intended to encapsulate language from prior questions, I worry if there is a perception that it doesn't summarize accurately. Which text prevails?

PAUL MCGRADY: Straw people are never meant to be final recommendations. This is how PDP work evolves. You move from straw people into concrete draft recommendations. If something doesn't make it in, there will be time to flag it. One clarification: I have not put five and six on the back burner; they are on the front burner. Feodora.

FEODORA HAMZA: We will provide something cleaned up, and the working group can decide which language they can live with. It is ultimately up to the working group to decide between conflicting versions.

PAUL MCGRADY: For the next call, we will see draft recommendations for One through Four and advanced straw proposals for Five and Six with differences noted. The NCSG and IPC have homework. Any staff updates on the coming meeting in Spain?

FEODORA HAMZA: Next week, we do not have a call on Monday; it is on Tuesday, 26 May 2026, due to a holiday. We will soon provide draft agendas and preparation material for ICANN 86.

PAUL MCGRADY: Reg suggested the term straw proposal. I will try to change my speech patterns because I like that. Farzaneh, go ahead.

FARZANEH BADI: Staff was working on using the global public interest framework. Has that started? It might make sense as an iterative process to help our conversations.

PAUL MCGRADY: Coming soon. It will be an iterative process. Thank you for the nudge. Everybody gets five and a half minutes back. We will talk to you next Tuesday.

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