

Final Issue Report on a Policy Development Process on DNS Abuse Mitigation

Status of This Document

This Final Issue Report has been drafted by ICANN Policy Support Staff as requested by the GNSO Council. This report is published following the closure of the public comment forum on the Preliminary Issue Report, which closed on 18 October 2025.

Preamble

On 14 August 2025, the GNSO Council passed a [motion](#), requesting ICANN's Policy Support Staff to draft a Preliminary Issue Report on DNS Abuse. The objective of this Preliminary Issue Report is for Staff to assess all relevant issues related to the GNSO Council request and, following Community Input during the Public Comment phase, to recommend a course of action to the GNSO Council. It remains the GNSO Council's prerogative to either follow Staff recommendations or to pursue alternative action.

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1 Executive Summary

1.1 Discussion of the issue

The impetus for this Issue Report stems from the recognition by the GNSO Council that Domain Name System (DNS) Abuse as defined in the Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) and the Base Generic Top-Level Domain (gTLD) Registry Agreement (RA) remains a significant challenge to the security, stability, and trust in the DNS. For the purpose of the RAA and the RA, DNS Abuse means malware, botnets, phishing, pharming, and spam (when spam is used as a delivery mechanism for any of the other four types of DNS Abuse). Recent contractual amendments, while impactful and a big milestone for the ICANN Community in addressing DNS Abuse, could not address all mitigation gaps. The GNSO Council's request for an Issue Report is grounded in the DNS Abuse Small Team's findings¹ that certain DNS Abuse mitigation gaps may be best remedied through GNSO consensus policies.

In early 2025, the GNSO Council reconvened its DNS Abuse Small Team with a revised assignment form to re-examine DNS Abuse mitigation considering new developments, research, and data. The previous Small Team (2021–2022) had identified obligation gaps and issued recommendations,² some of which were addressed through contractual amendments to the RA and RAA. Those amendments (effective since April 2024) strengthened abuse mitigation obligations, and ICANN Contractual Compliance has since reported initial data on their impact. With these measures in place and new research available, the Small Team was tasked to consider new insights and discuss potential next steps on DNS Abuse. Drawing from community input, compliance data, and external studies, the team was tasked with identifying remaining gaps and assessing whether further policy development is warranted.

The DNS Abuse Small Team conducted a review of data and source documents noted in their assignment form, focusing on identifying potential gaps in DNS Abuse mitigation efforts across multiple phases of the DNS Abuse lifecycle (as proposed by the Small Team in 2022³). The Small Team compiled a matrix of DNS Abuse “gaps,”⁴ noting areas where abuse prevention, reporting, response, or obligations could be strengthened after further investigating the identified

¹ “DNS Abuse Small Team Report to GNSO Council,” *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/policy/2025/draft/dns-abuse-small-team-report-04aug25-en.pdf>

² “DNS Abuse Small Team Report to GNSO Council,” *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/policy/2025/draft/dns-abuse-small-team-report-04aug25-en.pdf>

³ “DNS Abuse Small Team Report to GNSO Council,” *ICANN GNSO*, 7 October 2022, <https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/policy/2022/correspondence/dns-abuse-small-team-to-gnso-council-07oct22-en.pdf>.

⁴ In this context, the Small Team uses the term “gap” to denote an area flagged by the data and document review as potentially warranting further analysis, but not necessarily an “issue” in the ICANN Policy Development sense. A gap may or may not merit policy action; some may be better addressed through best practices, or no action at all. Accordingly, the Small Team recommended that these gaps be examined in the Issue Report to determine whether they are suitable for policy development or more appropriate for alternative follow-up. “DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps,” *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0lGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

gaps. Findings were categorized by lifecycle stage and further grouped by thematic clusters to support potential prioritization and future policy scoping.

Based on data analysis, community consultation, and input from stakeholder groups (SGs), the Small Team recommended the following three gaps be prioritized for policy work in the Issue Report:

- **Associated Domain Checks:** Malicious domains are often part of broader campaigns involving dozens or hundreds of related domains. Currently, when a registrar finds that one domain is malicious, there is no contractual requirement that the registrar must investigate whether the same registrant or account has other active domains that are also being used for similar abuse.⁵
- **Unrestricted Application Programming Interface (API) access for new customers:** Many registrars offer Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) or batch-registration portals that allow resellers or high-volume customers to register large numbers of domain names rapidly. According to studies such as the INFERMAL study, insufficient gating or friction for new users to access these batch registration tools can lead to the proliferation of DNS Abuse.⁶
- **Limited coordination on Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA)-based abuse:** Botnets using DGAs generate many domain names (sometimes hundreds a day) for their command-and-control.⁷ Law enforcement must contact each implicated registry individually when trying to mitigate malware or botnets that use DGAs at scale, which can result in fragmented, delayed, and inconsistent responses. These are low frequency but high impact events. There is no central clearinghouse or coordination hub to quickly disseminate these domain lists to all relevant operators.⁸

The Small Team has chosen the above topics from the matrix, based on topics that seem appropriate for policy development (taking into consideration review of source data, input/priorities received by Small Team members, and Community consultation during ICANN83), meaning that the topics are intended to be:

⁵ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. "INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains," *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

⁶ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. "INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains," *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

⁷ Command and control is defined as a technique used by threat actors to communicate with compromised devices over a network. See, Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. "INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains," *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

⁸ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. "INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains," *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

- important/impactful gap to solve,
- likely to gain broad consensus, and
- ideally, areas in which the potential solution(s) seem achievable, having in mind current workload and resources.

The Final Issue Report concludes that all of the three identified priority issues are appropriate for policy development. However, the Final Issue Report recommends that only two of the three identified DNS Abuse issues should be prioritized for policy development, while one may be addressed more directly and expeditiously outside of the ICANN policy development process. This prioritization reflects where policy intervention could likely reduce DNS Abuse at scale, is broadly applicable across the gTLD space, and aligns with the community input and lifecycle-and-cluster analysis used in the updated Small Team gap matrix.

The first issue recommended for a PDP on DNS Abuse Mitigation is **Associated-Domain Checks**. Domain name registrars, accredited by ICANN, are contractually obligated to investigate and address reports of DNS Abuse involving domains they sponsor. This obligation is outlined in the RAA. The current wording in the RAA focuses on the reported domain and actionable evidence related to it. However, malicious domains are often part of broader campaigns potentially involving dozens or hundreds of related domains. When a registrar finds that one domain is malicious, there is no contractual requirement that the registrar must investigate whether the same registrant or account has other active domains that are also being used for similar abuse. A PDP for Associated Domain Checks could establish a contractual requirement for registrars to proactively investigate other domains registered by a particular registrant or account when abuse is identified on one of their domains.

The second issue recommended for a PDP on DNS Abuse Mitigation is on Safeguards for Advanced Programming Interface (**API**) **access to new customers**. Easy access to tools allowing for automated and high-volume domain name registrations such as APIs seems to be a significant enabler of DNS Abuse. In the context of DNS Abuse this issue refers to the exploitation of APIs by malicious actors to carry out harmful activities related to the DNS. The Final Issue Report recognizes that “API access” is not the root cause of enabling threat actors to register a high amount of domains in a short time for malicious purposes. However, the report, supported by recent studies, concludes that easy/ungated API access for domain name registration can present a significant contributing factor to threat actors if no proper safeguards are in place. These actors often exploit the interconnected nature of APIs to automate and scale their attacks, which can lead to various forms of DNS Abuse. The data review and community discussions indicate that easy access to an API creates lower marginal difficulty for malicious actors and can amplify phishing/malware campaigns. One of the most consistent findings in the INFERMAL study was that malicious actors are highly price-sensitive (Gaps P9 and P10).⁹ This underscores how economic incentives, particularly when paired with automation, can increase vulnerability to abuse. According to the NetBeacon White Paper, introducing proportionate, risk-based friction targets one of the main drivers of abuse without impeding legitimate users.¹⁰ While pricing is out of scope for ICANN policy making, addressing unrestricted API access could reduce DNS Abuse

⁹ “Insights and Clarifications on the INFERMAL Study,” *ICANN org*, 10 June 2025, p. 4, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/insights-clarifications-infermal-study-10jun25-en.pdf>.

¹⁰ White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 13, <https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

early in the lifecycle. Furthermore, introducing policy on this issue could avoid the task of defining exactly how many domains qualify as a “bulk registration” impacting gaps such as P4. The Netbeacon White Paper suggests that friction be implemented based on customer activity rather than customer identity. Friction based on activity (e.g., how old is the account and has it had reports of abuse) is suggested to be more robust, reliable, and easier to implement than attempts at customer verification.

The third issue focuses on **better coordination in addressing DGA attacks**.¹¹ Law enforcement currently faces a challenge where they must contact each implicated registry individually when attempting to mitigate malware or botnets that leverage DGAs. This fragmented approach can lead to significant delays and inconsistencies in the takedown process, allowing the attackers to maintain control over infected systems for longer periods and hinder law enforcement's ability to disrupt their operations. Addressing this could fill a coordination gap highlighted in the Netbeacon White Paper and other community discussions. By streamlining the process of submitting evidence and coordinating action, ICANN can act as a trusted hub, reducing inefficiencies and ensuring that registries are aligned and responsive to urgent abuse cases. This model would aim to speed up mitigation efforts but also bring greater consistency to DGA-related takedowns. The Final Issue Report concludes that this issue be best addressed via non-binding best practices, as this issue may be addressed more directly and expeditiously outside of the ICANN policy development process. However, public comment suggests that this issue should be addressed at a later stage via policy development as well. It should be noted that preliminary work outside of the policy development process context does not preclude policy development in the future.

The three issues address different stages of the DNS Abuse lifecycle but can be considered complementary to each other. API safeguards can reduce the size and speed of potentially abusive registrations at the point of acquisition; associated-domain checks can enable campaign-level disruption once a single domain is confirmed to be abusive (the scope of which is potentially minimized by API safeguards); and better DGA mitigation/coordination can provide a common operating picture and synchronized response for high-impact, cross-TLD botnet attacks.

These issues are (i) broadly applicable to multiple business models and geographies; (ii) within GNSO remit as they pertain to registrar/registry obligations and DNS security/stability; and (iii) sufficiently concrete to support tightly scoped policy development.

The first two topics could impose new, uniform duties that a PDP/Consensus Policy could establish and ICANN can enforce. A community best-practice document (PSWG/ RySG DGA framework) for DGA coordination already exists, but there is potential to continue strengthening best practices, e.g. recognizing ICANN as a neutral clearinghouse for DGA lists.

¹¹ DGAs can algorithmically generate thousands of candidate domains across many TLDs. DGAs are computer programs that automatically generate domain names, usually using a long random collection of numbers and letters. In the case of “Avalanche”[#], the botnet frequently registered domains with multiple registrars, while testing others to check whether their distinctive domains were being detected and blocked. A domain that was not suspended by a registrar was re-used in later attacks. This was done at scale and pace to allow the attackers to move between different domain names to continue their activities, for example to distribute malware.

In summary, this Final Issue Report concludes that the three priority issues proposed by the DNS Abuse Small Team are within the remit of GNSO policy development and two merit prompt attention through initiating a PDP, while one of the priority issues would be addressed at a later stage. The report provides background and analysis for each of these three priority issues. While there is focus on these three issues (as proposed by the DNS Abuse Small Team), it is important to note that a number of other issues are included and covered in subsequent sections of this Issue Report, and could be handled in future PDPs or other mechanisms.

1.2 Staff recommendation

ICANN staff has confirmed that the proposed issues are within the scope of the GNSO's Policy Development Process (see Annex G-2 of the ICANN Bylaws).

In addition, the issues are broadly applicable to multiple organizations and will have lasting value of applicability. Mitigating DNS Abuse (as defined in the RAA/RAs) directly relates to the security and stability of the DNS, and uniform policies in this area would help protect Internet users and infrastructure. Furthermore, the issues raised are broadly applicable across the gTLD space, affecting gTLD registries, registrars, registrants, and end-users globally.

1.3 Next steps

In accordance with the GNSO PDP rules, the Staff Manager published the Preliminary Issue Report for public comment in order to allow for Community input on additional information, or the correction or updating of any information provided so far. The public comment period allowed for members of the ICANN Community to express their views to the GNSO Council on whether or not to initiate a PDP on the proposed issues. Following review of the public comments, the Staff Manager has updated the Issue Report accordingly and included a summary of the comments (see Annex B), which is now submitted as the Final Issue Report to the GNSO Council for its consideration.

2 Procedural Foundation

2.1 Grounds for submission

This Final Issue Report is submitted in accordance with Step 2 of the Policy Development Process described in Annex A of the ICANN Bylaws.¹²

2.2 The identity of the party submitting the request

The GNSO Council has requested this Issue Report.

2.3 Support for the issue to initiate a PDP

On 14 August 2025, the GNSO Council passed a resolution: “The GNSO Council accepts the recommendations as outlined in the DNS Abuse Small Team report and requests that an Issue Report be initiated on the topics as outlined by the Small Team and requests that Staff create the report.”¹³

2.4 How that party is affected by the issue

The issue of DNS Abuse is broadly impactful to the Domain Name System and has a direct impact on registrants, end-users, and the operations of registries and registrars. Recommendations that may be developed by a GNSO PDP on DNS Abuse will also be of interest to other ICANN Supporting Organizations (SOs) and Advisory Committees (ACs) because of the impact to their constituents. After ICANN83, the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) provided advice on the topic of DNS Abuse, noting the expectation for a PDP on DNS Abuse issues, prioritizing bulk registration of malicious domain names and the responsibility of registrars to investigate domains associated with registrant accounts that are the subject of actionable reports of DNS Abuse.¹⁴ The SSAC published the SAC115 report proposing a general framework of best practices to streamline the DNS abuse handling process within and beyond the ICANN and broader Internet communities.¹⁵ ALAC provided advice on the matter of DNS Abuse in 2019, proposing

¹² “Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers,” *ICANN org*, 9 January 2025, <http://www.icann.org/general/bylaws.htm#AnnexA>.

¹³ “GNSO Council Resolutions 2025-08-14,” *ICANN GNSO*, 14 August 2025, <https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/x/RKifBg>.

¹⁴ “GAC Communiqué – Prague, Czech Republic,” *ICANN GAC*, 16 June 2025, <https://gac.icann.org/contentMigrated/icann83-prague-communique>.

¹⁵ “SAC115: SSAC Report on an Interoperable Approach to Addressing Abuse Handling in the DNS,” *ICANN SSAC*, 19 March 2021, <https://itp.cdn.icann.org/en/files/security-and-stability-advisory-committee-ssac-reports/sac-115-en.pdf>.

eight recommendations to the ICANN Board.¹⁶ In 2018, the DNS Abuse Review Team provided an overview on DNS abuse during the initial three years of the New gTLD Program (2014-2016), comparing rates in new and legacy gTLDs, and explored methods for evaluating the effectiveness of safeguards designed to mitigate malicious activities in the Domain Name System.¹⁷

2.5 Issue under consideration

The Small Team identified several gaps in existing DNS Abuse mitigation frameworks. These gaps highlight that despite recent significant improvements, issues remain in current DNS Abuse mitigation efforts. In this context, the Small Team uses the term “gap” to denote an area flagged by the data and document review as potentially warranting further analysis, but not necessarily an “issue” in the ICANN Policy Development sense. A gap may or may not merit policy action; some may be better addressed through best practices, or no action at all. Accordingly, the Small Team recommended that these gaps be examined in the Issue Report to determine whether they are suitable for policy development or more appropriate for alternative follow-up. The Small Team believes that many of these gaps lie squarely within the GNSO’s policy development remit and merit structured policy consideration. However, it is likely that some identified gaps might not be best addressed via Consensus Policies but could be addressed via other recommendations, such as non-binding best practices, or even mechanisms outside of policy development.

The purpose of the gap overview by the Small Team was to systematically capture what could be considered a gap in DNS Abuse mitigation across the entire domain lifecycle (as introduced by the DNS Abuse Small Team in 2022), from registration through enforcement.

2.6 Legal scope to launch Policy Development Process

Based on the documentation above, the launch of a dedicated PDP to consider the issues identified in this Preliminary Issue Report has been confirmed by ICANN’s General Counsel to be properly within the scope of the GNSO as well as the ICANN Policy Development Process.

¹⁶ “ALAC Advice on DNS Abuse,” *ICANN ALAC*, 24 December 2019, https://atlarge.icann.org/en/advice_statements/13747.

¹⁷ “DNS Abuse Review – New gTLDs 2012 Program,” *ICANN org*, Updated 18 February 2018, <https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/reviews/cct/dns-abuse>.

3 Discussion of Issues

3.1 Overview of Issues

This section provides an overview of all relevant issues related to the GNSO Council request for this Preliminary Issue Report. In addition, it provides references to relevant documentation, ongoing and completed work efforts, and other applicable information.

3.1.1 Introduction: Organizing the Gaps/Issues and How to Consider Them

This section provides a deeper level discussion of the DNS Abuse mitigation gaps identified by the GNSO Council's Small Team and is supported by Staff research.¹⁸ It is organized according to the **phases of the DNS Abuse mitigation lifecycle**, as introduced earlier and in the DNS Abuse Small Team Report to Council.¹⁹ Organizing the issues by lifecycle phase helps illustrate who is primarily responsible for abuse mitigation at each stage and where in the process the gaps occur.²⁰

The phases are:

- **Phase 0: Preventative Measures** (before a domain is maliciously used – the registration stage, aiming to prevent malicious domains from entering the DNS);
- **Phase 1 & 2: Abuse Reporting** (when abuse is observed, how it is reported and routed to the appropriate party, and ensuring the reports are actionable);
- **Phase 3: Mitigation by Contracted Parties** (once an abuse report is received by a registrar/registry, the actions taken to stop the abuse, per contractual obligations or best practices);
- **Phase 4: ICANN Compliance Enforcement** (if the responsible registrar/registry fails to act, how ICANN enforces the contracts to ensure abuse is mitigated).

In addition to these lifecycle phases, the discussion includes cross-cutting categories such as:

- **Community Collaboration** (issues that require broad coordination (not just a single contracted party's action), such as handling DGA botnet domains);
- **Data & Transparency** (issues that underpin all phases, focusing on information-sharing, reporting, and research).

¹⁸ "DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps," *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0IGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

¹⁹ "DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps," *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0IGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

²⁰ "DNS Abuse Small Team Report to GNSO Council," *ICANN GNSO*, 7 October 2022, <https://gns0.icann.org/sites/default/files/policy/2022/correspondence/dns-abuse-small-team-to-gns0-council-07oct22-en.pdf>.

For each gap or issue, the report provides:

- a description of the gap,
- its origin or source (e.g., which report or community input highlighted it, research on gap),
- why it is considered a gap (implications or consequences if the gap were to remain unaddressed).

The list of gaps and accompanying discussion of them in this Issue Report are based on the work initiated by the DNS Abuse Small Team, particularly the preliminary gap matrix developed in the course of its 2025 mandate. That matrix was constructed through an initial review of source materials as referenced in the group's assignment form. In preparing this Preliminary Issue Report, the Staff Manager has conducted additional research and review to validate, refine, and supplement the original entries. Where appropriate, gaps that initially appeared as distinct have been consolidated into one gap discussion, particularly where the substance or intent of those gaps significantly overlapped. These consolidations are indicated in the respective gap and text below. To maintain traceability and alignment with the original matrix, this report references the original Gap IDs (e.g., P1) used in the Small Team matrix.²¹ This allows community members and stakeholders to map the content of the report directly to earlier work.

Finally, the report also considers the **nature of potential solutions** for each gap: whether it likely calls for a Consensus Policy (contractual requirement), or could be handled via best practices, or other means. The Issue Report's role is not to decide the solution, but to outline the possibilities. Drawing such distinctions will aid the Council in deciding the appropriate mechanism (if any) for each group of issues and may help establish a starting point.

The **nature of potential solutions** as captured in the PDP Manual notes that a PDP may recommend a wide range of outcomes to the GNSO Council, including Consensus Policies, non-binding best practices, implementation guidelines, technical specifications, and recommendations on future policy development activities. In some instances, it may be equally appropriate to pursue certain solutions outside of the PDP, including the development of best practices.²²

Moreover, recent studies and community-driven analyses indicate that closing specific mitigation gaps could contribute meaningfully to reducing DNS abuse in gTLDs.²³ This is a shared objective across the ICANN community and is aligned with ICANN's mission to ensure the stable and secure operation of the DNS.

²¹ "DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps," *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0lGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

²² "GNSO Policy Development Process Manual," *ICANN org*, Version 2.6, pg, 57, https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/filefield_38869/annex-2-pdp-manual-16may13-en.pdf.

²³ See: Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. "INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains," *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>. And "DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps," *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0lGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

For reference, effective 5 April 2024, global amendments to the RAA and RA introduced **new DNS Abuse mitigation requirements**.

These updates:

- **Define DNS Abuse** for the purpose of the RAA and the RA as malware, botnets, phishing, pharming, and spam used to deliver any of the other four types of DNS Abuse.²⁴
- **Require mitigation actions** to stop or disrupt well-evidenced DNS Abuse.
- **Clarify** that abuse contact information must be easy to find.
- **Require** the provision of receipt confirmation for abuse reports.

Public Comment: As noted in the Public Comment Summary Report, the Staff Manager has updated the “Proposed Solutions” section of the report to reflect community feedback and incorporate additional examples or refinements suggested during the comment period, where appropriate and relevant.

Preventative Measures (Phase 0)

Preventative measures refer to steps taken prior to, during, or immediately after domain registration to reduce the likelihood of the domain name being used to perpetrate DNS Abuse (e.g. a malicious registration). The focus is on proactive steps that can be taken in the domain acquisition process or other proactive security practices to reduce the likelihood of harm. The underlying idea is that once a domain is activated in the DNS and starts to be used to cause harm to users, damage can happen quickly; therefore, preventing such domains from being registered or being activated in the DNS would be the best case scenario. However, preventative measures must be balanced against the need for an open and accessible domain name marketplace; overly onerous checks could hinder legitimate registrations.

The gaps identified here include:

- **P1: Unrestricted Access to Application Programming Interface (APIs) to new customers**
 - **Description:** Malicious actors use ungated access to APIs to register large volumes of domains in a matter of minutes, enabling large-scale phishing, smishing, and botnet operations. Many registrars require some sort of friction before a new customer account has access to an API where it can create thousands of names at once (e.g., restrict access to an API until the customer has more than three transactions not flagged as fraudulent or engaged in DNS Abuse). Some registrars allow brand-new accounts to access these bulk registration capabilities without any meaningful checks.

²⁴ SAC115 defines each of these DNS Abuse forms. ICANN used the definition of those terms (malware, botnets, phishing, pharming, and spam used to deliver abuse) named in SAC115 to shape its definition for the purpose of the RA and RAA. “SAC115: SSAC Report on an Interoperable Approach to Addressing Abuse Handling in the DNS,” *ICANN SSAC*, 19 March 2021, pp. 12-13, <https://itp.cdn.icann.org/en/files/security-and-stability-advisory-committee-ssac-reports/sac-115-en.pdf>.

- o **Research on Gap:** According to studies such as INFERMAL, insufficient gating or friction for new users to access these tools can lead to the proliferation of DNS Abuse.²⁵ The availability of APIs for domain registration and account management seems to be strongly associated with a higher volume of malicious registrations according to INFERMAL.²⁶ Specifically, registrars that provided unrestricted API-based registrations saw a significantly elevated risk of phishing domains: “API access was linked to a 401 percent increase in malicious domain registrations” relative to a baseline in the study.²⁷ In other words, the study found that the presence of easy automation (via APIs) can multiply the likelihood of abuse by roughly four times, all else being equal. By contrast, the study noted that registrars employing restrictions on API usage for unverified users or requiring some form of vetting saw lower abuse rates.
- o **Potential Solution:** This was named as a high-priority topic by the DNS Abuse Small Team for a potential PDP. The Netbeacon Institute’s White Paper noted that easy API access without vetting “allows for the rapid setup of malicious infrastructures” and suggests a PDP on adding lightweight but effective friction points on API access to ensure that registrants, particularly new or untrusted accounts, cannot immediately access high-volume domain registration tools.²⁸ The proposal from the Netbeacon White Paper is to introduce **friction for new registrants or accounts before they can conduct high-volume registrations.**²⁹ According to the Netbeacon White Paper, policy could seek to introduce friction to slow abuse at scale, such as requiring new registrants to pass a basic trust threshold at the registrar before gaining access to programmatic registration tools. Such thresholds could include (i) requiring that a registrant has held one or more domains through the Add Grace Period without action for DNS Abuse, (ii) implementing waiting periods for newly created accounts, (iii) denying access to high-speed and/or high-volume registration methods for existing customers, if

²⁵ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. “INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains,” *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

²⁶ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. “INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains,” *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

²⁷ Note: Percentages like the 401 percent increase associated with API access must be interpreted within the full statistical context. GLMs account for interactions among all variables. These results do not imply a standalone causal relationship but rather an observed correlation while holding other factors constant. Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. “INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains,” *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

²⁸ “White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, <https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

²⁹ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. “INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains,” *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, p. 13, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

the customer has had domains which the registrar has identified as being maliciously registered DNS Abuse.³⁰ This approach would aim to balance the need to prevent abuse with the legitimate use of high-volume registration by trusted entities.³¹ Furthermore, the Netbeacon White Paper research suggests that friction be implemented based on customer activity rather than customer identity. Friction based on activity (e.g., how old is the account and have they had reports of abuse) is more robust, reliable, and easier to implement than attempts at customer verification.³² However, the PDP should consider that effectively all transactions at wholesale registrars are via API. This policy would need to differentiate between retail API access, and API access where a signed reseller agreement is in place. Introducing friction here could avoid the task of defining exactly how many domains qualify as a “bulk registration”.³³

- **P2 and P3: Lack of Proactive/Timely Contact Verification:**

- **Description:** ICANN’s existing RAA³⁴ requires some validation of registration data (e.g., verifying that an email or phone number is in correct format, and verifying email/phone operability under certain circumstances), but the **effectiveness and timeliness of these checks seem to vary** according to the INFERMAL study.
- **Research on Gap:** The INFERMAL study found that some tested registrars did not fully perform syntactic checks on contact info, and operational validation (e.g., ensuring a phone number works) was sometimes lacking.³⁵ Additionally, the **requirement for registrars to verify contact info (e.g., email) after registration** allows up to 15 days for the registrant to respond, which an attacker can exploit to carry out abuse before the verification deadline. The INFERMAL study results suggest that proactive or timely (e.g., during or prior to registration) verification can reduce DNS abuse by a significant amount based on the test dataset and method.³⁶
- **Potential Solution:** The GNSO Council Accuracy Small Team recommended to Council “examining the existing process for validating and verifying registration

³⁰ White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 12, <https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

³¹ White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 7, <https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

³² White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 13, <https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

³³ White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 10, <https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

³⁴ “2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement,” *ICANN org*, 21 January 2024, <https://www.icann.org/en/contracted-parties/accredited-registrars/registrar-accreditation-agreement>

³⁵ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. “INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains,” *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, p. 9, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

³⁶ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. “INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains,” *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, p. 14, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

data under the 2024 Registrar Accreditation agreement³⁷ and the potential impact on registrants if this process is modified.”³⁸ Some members of the DNS Abuse Small Team noted it as a priority topic for a PDP. Addressing this would require further policy work. If this would be included in a future PDP on DNS Abuse, it could address work related to Accuracy as well. A commenter suggested immediate contract amendments instead of a PDP by amending the RAA’s Section 3.7 and the RDDS Accuracy Program Specification to mandate instant (simultaneous) email and phone verification via OTP at the time of registration, thus eliminating the current 15-day window. Other commenters noted that this issue should not be covered within a DNS Abuse PDP, but could be part of other GNSO-led efforts. Regarding the lack of full syntactic checks, a commenter noted that the issue should be raised to ICANN Compliance. Other commenters suggested that the SSAC could be invited to suggest tools for those basic syntactic checks (email and phone formats per RFC).

- **P5. Minimal Deterrent Effect of Reactive Measures (“Uptime”):**

- **Description:** “Uptime” refers to the duration a website, server, or application is operational and accessible to users. Shorter uptimes of malicious domains should ideally discourage attackers from using certain TLDs and registrars, as swift suspension might drive them to seek alternatives. However, it seems that even brief activity may yield valuable credentials and financial gain, potentially diminishing the impact of reactive security measures on their registrar choices.
- **Research on Gap:** This was noted in the INFERMAL study’s finding that even very fast takedowns of malicious domains (e.g., within hours) may not deter attackers sufficiently.³⁹ According to the study, reactive mitigation has only a limited impact on attacker behavior and may not impose enough cost on them to serve as a deterrent. While promptly suspending malicious domain names is essential for mitigating potential harm, the INFERMAL study analysis shows that longer uptime has only a marginal effect on the concentration of malicious domains and minimal impact on the attacker choice of a registrar or TLD.⁴⁰

³⁷ The terms validation and verification within this recommendation refer to the current definitions and associated requirements within the RDDS Accuracy Program Specification of the Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA). Specifically, validation requirements are defined in Section 1(a) - 1(d) of the RDDS Accuracy Program Specification, and the verification requirements are defined in Section 1(f) of the RDDS Accuracy Program Specification. “2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement,” *ICANN org*, 21 January 2024, <https://itp.cdn.icann.org/en/files/accredited-registrars/registrar-accreditation-agreement-21jan24-en.htm#rdds-accuracy>.

³⁸ “GNSO Council Accuracy Small Team Summary Report,” *ICANN GNSO*, 31 July 2025, <https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/policy/2025/draft/gnso-council-accuracy-small-team-summary-31jul25-en.pdf>

³⁹ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. “INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains,” *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, p. 4, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

⁴⁰ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. “INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains,” *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, p. 14, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

- o **Potential Solution:** This gap suggests that improving preventative measures has more impact on reducing DNS Abuse. Therefore, this gap does not appear to warrant any specific solution. Many commenters suggested that the root cause of the problem be addressed through instant/ simultaneous contact verification - meaning addressing gap P2 and P3.
- **P6. Challenges in Real-Time Detection of Short-Lived Abuse:**
 - o **Description:** This issue relates to the technical challenge that many abuse detection systems (blocklists, DNS query analysis) have a lag. Some systems rely on DNS zone file updates or aggregated data that may only show a domain after it is active for a relatively long period of time.⁴¹ However, a significant challenge known as the "fast-flux" technique is often associated with the use of "one-hour domains" or "one-day" lifespans.⁴² Attackers utilize fast flux techniques to rapidly change the IP addresses associated with a domain name, making it difficult to block malicious sites using traditional IP blocking methods. These rapid changes in IP addresses also make it harder for investigations to trace the origin of malicious content. Detection can be challenging when the evidence of abuse is insufficient or takes time to gather. Depending on the timing of notification, it may be too late to gather necessary evidence and take action. Attackers constantly evolve their techniques and tactics, making it harder for existing detection systems to keep up.
 - o **Research on Gap:** Traditional abuse detection systems, including blocklists and DNS query analysis, often rely on retrospective data.⁴³ This data can be gathered through DNS zone file updates, which are not instantaneous, or through aggregated threat intelligence that takes time to compile and disseminate.
 - o **Potential Solution:** Overall, combating short-lived DNS abuse requires a multi-layered approach that combines advanced detection techniques with proactive monitoring, information sharing, and rapid response capabilities. Thus, this might be tackled outside policy (e.g., through technology improvements or threat intel sharing), but shows that, similar to the gap above, focusing or introducing more preventative measures can reduce DNS Abuse more effectively than reactive measures.
- **P7. Underuse of Predictive Algorithms for Early Detection:**
 - o **Description:** Crime often involves patterns that, if recognized, could be identified and acted upon to prevent abuse (e.g., many throwaway domains registered with similar names or from the same subnet). Predictive algorithms can look at patterns like certain keywords (e.g., "login-<brand>" domains),

⁴¹ Ali, Anas, Mubashar Husain, and Peter Hans, "Real-Time Detection of Insider Threats Using Behavioral Analytics and Deep Evidential Clustering," *ArXiv*, 21 May 2025, <https://arxiv.org/html/2505.15383v1>.

⁴² "What is DNS Fast Flux?," *Cloudflare*, <https://www.cloudflare.com/en-gb/learning/dns/dns-fast-flux/>.

⁴³ Gañán, Carlos Hernández,, "How Choice of Reputation Blocklists Affects DNS Abuse Metrics, *ICANN org*, 7 July 2025, <https://www.icann.org/en/blogs/details/how-choice-of-reputation-blocklists-affects-dns-abuse-metrics-07-07-2025-en>.

suspicious registrar account behavior, known bad IP addresses to flag domains for review or suspension before they start abusing.⁴⁴

- o **Research on Gap:** The Small Team’s review in 2022 indicated that apart from examples from outside the immediate ICANN community such as Classification of Compromised versus Maliciously Registered Domains (COMAR), Logo collision and EU Common Logo the Small Team was not aware of any ICANN community work being undertaken on this topic.⁴⁵ However, the Small Team noted that predictive algorithms may be useful but there is always the potential for false positives and the negative impact these may have on registrants.
- o **Potential Solution:** The Small Team in 2022 observed that the above suggestion is a possible solution that could be further explored by ICANN org and contracted parties. However, if such a solution would be developed and made available to contracted parties, incentives could be explored to encourage adoption.⁴⁶ Some companies/organizations likely use predictive systems (e.g., some large registrars have internal fraud detection and some registries collaborate with security firms to vet registrations in sensitive TLDs). Contractually requiring specific security measures based on an algorithm may be challenging, given the chance for false positives and the reality that technology-specific mandates can quickly become outdated. Given the technical nature of this issue, it does not appear best suited for ICANN policy. A more feasible path might be inclusion in a non-binding best practices document. Some commenters would like to see a policy recommendation on this issue. Even though they recognize “that one cannot mandate specific algorithms, but policy can require registrars to have a fraud detection mechanism in place and act on its output.”

- **P8. No Post-Registration Identity Checks for Suspicious Activity:**

- o **Description:** The Commercial Stakeholders Group (CSG) added this gap noting that after domains are registered, if they start showing patterns of abuse (e.g., multiple abuse reports or being added to blocklists), there is no policy requiring re-validation of the registrant’s identity or information. The RAA contains obligations related to contactability, not confirming identity. ICANN Contractual Compliance will investigate allegations received through complaints or indications that the registration data associated with a domain name is inaccurate.

⁴⁴ “DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps,” *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0IGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

⁴⁵ “DNS Abuse Small Team Report to GNSO Council,” *ICANN GNSO*, 7 October 2022, p. 12, <https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/policy/2022/correspondence/dns-abuse-small-team-to-gnso-council-07oct22-en.pdf>.

⁴⁶ “DNS Abuse Small Team Report to GNSO Council,” *ICANN GNSO*, 7 October 2022, p. 13, <https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/policy/2022/correspondence/dns-abuse-small-team-to-gnso-council-07oct22-en.pdf>.

- o **Research on Gap:** The NIS⁴⁷ Cooperation Group suggests that a risk-based approach could be used to verify the name of the registrant at registration and renewal, but the group is not recommending that “all” new and renewing domains are subject to identity checks, only where they are flagged for medium or high risk.⁴⁸ The 2022 DNS Abuse Small Team noted “that ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC) measures could play an important role in addressing DNS Abuse. However, there is currently little visibility on which KYC measures may be applied by Contracted Parties and what effect these may have on DNS Abuse. Further information on this topic may help identify whether further action is helpful in this area.”⁴⁹ The INFERMAL study noted certain registries verify registrants’ identities to ensure compliance with local regulations and to enhance the overall security of their domain ecosystem. For instance, when the CNNIC⁵⁰ mandated formal documentation (previously known for being attacked by spammers frequently)⁵¹ and validation for individual registrations, it significantly reduced spam domains under the .cn TLD.⁵² Intuitively, attackers would avoid such TLDs and registrars. However, if these practices were implemented globally, malicious actors might adapt by resorting to identity theft for fraudulent registrations or compromising legitimate websites.⁵³
- o **Potential Solution:** In order to close this gap via binding requirements, policy development would be needed. However, the practice could also be encouraged via inclusion in a non-binding best practices document. A commenter proposed amending RAA Section 3.7 or adding a new section requiring triggered Know Your Customer-style checks after specific thresholds of abuse (e.g., multiple abuse reports within 30 days). Other commenters suggested that when a domain is reported for DNS abuse (with evidence), the registrar should be

⁴⁷ The Network and Information Systems (NIS) Cooperation Group was established by the NIS Directive to ensure cooperation and information exchange among EU Member States. The group provides non-binding guidelines to the EU Member States to allow effective and coherent implementation of the NIS Directive across the EU and to address wider cybersecurity policy issues. “NIS Cooperation Group,” *European Commission*, <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis-cooperation-group>.

⁴⁸ “NIS Cooperation Group Recommendations for the implementation of NIS2 Directive Article 28 (Database of domain name registration data),” *NIS Cooperation Group*, September 2024, <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/108437>.

⁴⁹ “DNS Abuse Small Team Report to GNSO Council,” *ICANN GNSO*, 7 October 2022, p. 13, <https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/policy/2022/correspondence/dns-abuse-small-team-to-gnso-council-07oct22-en.pdf>.

⁵⁰ “Advantages of a .CN Domain Name,” *CNNIC*, 22 September 2003, https://www.cnnic.com.cn/IS/CNym/CNymzc/201208/t20120823_35222.htm.

⁵¹ Liu, He (Lonnie), et al., “On the Effects of Registrar-level Intervention,” *LEET ‘11*, 29 March 2011, p. 4 <https://klevchen.ece.illinois.edu/pubs/lfkmys-leet11.pdf>.

⁵² Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. “INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains,” *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, p. 7, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

⁵³ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. “INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains,” *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, p. 7, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

obligated to re-confirm the registrant's identity and details. For example, require the registrant to provide a valid government-issued ID or additional verification promptly once their domain is the subject of a credible abuse complaint. Other commenters noted that it is current practice to conduct some level of review when addressing abuse reports, which can trigger further in-depth review of contact data as appropriate and that the topic will also be addressed at least in part when the Associated Domains Check PDP is completed. Commenters noted that this gap might blur the line between contact detail verification and identity review. Commenters further added that the "RAA already requires re-verification in specific circumstances.

- **P9. and P10. Economic Incentives Prone to Abuse (P9 - Discounted Pricing and P10 - offering Free Services):**
 - **Description:** According to the INFERMAL study's conclusions, economic incentives, such as registration discounts, are associated with an increase in the number of malicious registrations.⁵⁴ By leveraging low-cost options, attackers can maximize their return on investment, especially given the short lifespan of these domains before they are suspended. Similar to pricing, offering free add-on services can inadvertently facilitate abuse. For example, some registrars provide free DNS hosting, free email, free SSL certificates, or free Whois privacy by default. These incentives, while valuable to legitimate users, also allow criminals to set up functioning malicious sites with almost no cost, while also being able to hide their identity.
 - **Research on Gap:** The INFERMAL study's statistical analysis reveals that nearly half of maliciously registered domains cost \$2 USD or less. The presence of discounts raises the likelihood of domains being registered for malicious purposes. Even if discounts are limited to new users, attackers may exploit free APIs to automate account creation and domain registration at discounted prices.⁵⁵ The study noted that free services are more likely to be abused by threat actors and based on its analysis model demonstrates that free services (web hosting and DNS) significantly increase the number of malicious registrations, indicating that they lower entry barriers for attackers, allowing them to set up and maintain malicious domains with minimal expense.⁵⁶ However, the study also noted that while initial pricing plays a role, attractiveness to attackers likely results from a combination of factors, not just

⁵⁴ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. "INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains," *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, p. 13, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. "INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains," *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, p. 13, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

⁵⁶ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. "INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains," *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, p. 13, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

pricing. If a business is engaging in a multitude of practices, there might be a compounding effect that may actively encourage attackers to choose a specific registrar/registry for their purposes.

- o **Potential Solution:** The gap here is essentially how to mitigate the “abuse side-effects” of discount regimes and other economic incentives, since pricing strategies and free add-on services are a business decision and considered outside the scope of ICANN’s policymaking remit. These “abuse side-effects” based on the above description might be best addressed by building awareness and ultimately left with the contracted party to decide.
- o **Relation to other gaps in the DNS Abuse Small Team Matrix: E4. Abuse concentrated in a small number of registrars** The gaps here are acknowledging that a small number of registrars have a disproportionately high abuse volume.⁵⁷ As noted above, if these registrars were better aware of best practices and adjusted some of their practices, abuse may drop. The gap is understanding the factors that lead to abuse concentration and addressing those factors.
- **P11. Limited Use of Abuse Feeds/Threat Data for Prevention:**
 - o **Description:** This gap identifies that registrars/registries are seemingly not consistently using abuse feeds data to inform domain-level restrictions or validation rules.⁵⁸ This is somewhat related to P7 (predictive algorithms) and P6 (challenges in real-time detection of short-lived abuse).
 - o **Research on Gap:** Currently, use of such data is optional and varies widely. DNS Abuse measurements and incident response are often based on domains listed on Reputation Block List (RBLs). An ICANN analysis notes different blocklists have limited visibility, and there seems to be little overlap between them, creating blind spots in abuse detection and measurement.⁵⁹ Open-source lists, maintained by volunteer communities or public projects, rely on user reports and open feeds. While transparent and broadly accessible, they often miss abuse that escapes their contributors’ notice. In contrast, commercial blocklists, curated by security vendors, leverage proprietary data and advanced analytics for deeper, faster insights into emerging attacks. However, their visibility is shaped by collection infrastructure, customer networks, and intelligence partnerships, leading to unique blind spots of their own.⁶⁰ This fragmentation

⁵⁷ “DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps,” *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0IGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

⁵⁸ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. “INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains,” *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

⁵⁹ Lloyd, Siôn, Carlos Hernández Gañán, and Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob, “RBL Evaluation Methodology,” *ICANN org*, 11 December 2023 <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/octo-037-11dec23-en.pdf>.

⁶⁰ Gañán, Carlos Hernández, “How Choice of Reputation Blocklists Affects DNS Abuse Metrics,” *ICANN org*, 7 July 2025, <https://www.icann.org/en/blogs/details/how-choice-of-reputation-blocklists-affects-dns-abuse-metrics-07-07-2025-en>.

can have far-reaching implications for how DNS Abuse metrics and global trends are interpreted.

- o **Potential Solution:** While these data sources can be a helpful tool, imposing their usage may not be ideal; integrating into best practices would help contracted parties benefit from the usage of data sources as appropriate for their business. This gap was named as high priority by some members of the DNS Abuse Small Team. Given limitations in data feeds (e.g., timing lag and blind spots), it is difficult to envision a practical "uniform or coordinated resolution" for their usage. To mitigate the fragmentation to a degree, ICANN's Domain Metrica system aggregates data from multiple RBLs to assess abuse rates across registries and registrars. ICANN Domain Metrica, launched in February 2025, aims to improve the way domain data is captured, measured, analyzed, and shared.⁶¹
- o **Relation to other gaps in the DNS Abuse Small Team Matrix: DT1, Lack of Transparency on Abuse Trends:** Some SGs noted there is not a comprehensive, agreed-upon public metric or reporting of DNS Abuse per registry/registrar. Some SGs have called for more publicly available data on abuse trends.⁶² Some such reporting exists: ICANN's Domain Metrica project provides daily data on abuse rates per TLD. This might be better addressed under best practices or community collaboration.

In summary, **Phase 0 preventive measures gaps** highlight that the current DNS registration system is relatively open and with limited friction requirements, which has the benefit of ease of use, but the drawback of being sometimes easily exploited by threat actors. The identified gaps point toward introducing targeted friction, smarter screening and addressing business practices that may inadvertently encourage abuse. As the report considers policy development, one key question is: which of these should be mandatory Consensus Policies vs. which are better as optional best practices? The Small Team and Staff acknowledge that **not all preventive measures may be appropriate for Consensus Policy** (due to technical, legal, or operational practicality reasons). However, including these gaps here ensures they are not overlooked, and it allows the GNSO Council or a future Working Group to decide what to recommend formally or informally.

Abuse Reporting (Phases 1–2)

In the DNS Abuse lifecycle, "Phase 1" can be described as the stage where an abuse event is noticed by someone (an Internet user, a security researcher, law enforcement, etc.) and needs to be reported to the party that can take action, and "Phase 2" involves ensuring the report itself is well-formed and contains what's needed for action.⁶³ The 2022 Small Team separated these, but for this report's discussion these two phases were combined under **Abuse Reporting** generally.

⁶¹ "ICANN Domain Metrica: A Measurement Platform," *ICANN org*, <https://www.icann.org/octo-ssr/metrica-en>.

⁶² "DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps," *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0IGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

⁶³ "DNS Abuse Small Team Report to GNSO Council," *ICANN GNSO*, 7 October 2022, <https://gns0.icann.org/sites/default/files/policy/2022/correspondence/dns-abuse-small-team-to-gns0-council-07oct22-en.pdf>.

Effective abuse mitigation depends on an efficient flow of information: the right complaint has to reach the right actor with the right evidence. If any of those elements fail, abuse may not be resolved promptly or efficiently.

The gaps identified here include:

- **A1. Unactionable Complaints to ICANN:**
 - **Description:** Between 70% and over 80% of abuse complaints ICANN Contractual Compliance have closed since the new DNS Abuse mitigation requirements became effective did not result in investigations being initiated with a registrar or registry operator. Most complaints refer to phishing, either alone or in combination with other types of abuse.⁶⁴ The CPH/CSG abuse reporting workshop at ICANN 82 suggested there's still room for improvement on how to report phishing to registrars (and registries when appropriate). Phishing reports that are incomplete, or incorrectly evidenced, can create a bottleneck in contracted parties' anti-abuse team queues.
 - **Research on Gap:** The complaints ICANN Contractual Compliance closed without initiating an investigation with a contracted party (CP) lacked evidence required by ICANN, including any indicator that the domain name was engaged in DNS Abuse or that the reported activity was ever reported to or known by the CP. Other complaints involved country-code top level domain (ccTLD) names, were duplicative or related to domain names that had already been mitigated or were no longer registered, while other complaints involved customer service disputes between the complainant and a registrar or a third party, among other issues.⁶⁵ This indicates a lack of understanding among many complainants about the proper channel or how to properly report DNS Abuse in a way that can be promptly acted on.
 - **Potential Solutions:** This gap might be addressed through best practices or educational initiatives rather than policy development. For instance, the CPH "Guide to Abuse Reporting" could help users send actionable reports to the right place.⁶⁶ Additionally, ICANN Contractual Compliance has conducted

⁶⁴ Castillo, Leticia, "ICANN's Enforcement of DNS Abuse Requirements Six Months" *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024,

<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/icann-enforcement-of-dns-abuse-mitigation-requirements-08-nov24-en.pdf>. And Castillo, Leticia, Rómulo Chacín, and Charmaine Lim, "Enforcement of DNS Abuse Mitigation Requirements - A Look at the First Year," *ICANN org*, 23 April 2025, https://icanncrm.my.salesforce.com/sfc/p/#1a000000Y7OU/a/Qk000001geDN/9sof6KwBYa_N6kv4nnFTAiWuHValPVrAZYrnTXy8gGc.

⁶⁵ Castillo, Leticia, "ICANN's Enforcement of DNS Abuse Requirements Six Months" *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024,

<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/icann-enforcement-of-dns-abuse-mitigation-requirements-08-nov24-en.pdf>. And Castillo, Leticia, Rómulo Chacín, and Charmaine Lim, "Enforcement of DNS Abuse Mitigation Requirements - A Look at the First Year," *ICANN org*, 23 April 2025, https://icanncrm.my.salesforce.com/sfc/p/#1a000000Y7OU/a/Qk000001geDN/9sof6KwBYa_N6kv4nnFTAiWuHValPVrAZYrnTXy8gGc.

⁶⁶ "CPH Guide to Abuse Reporting Practices v1.0," *ICANN RrSG and RySG*, 2022, <https://rrsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/CPH-Guide-to-Abuse-Reporting-v1.0.pdf>

presentations⁶⁷ on how to submit actionable complaints to ICANN and has published related [guidelines](#). The 2022 Small Team recommended encouraging parties to improve abuse reporting tools, which has happened to some extent already. For instance, there is Netbeacon Reporter, a centralized abuse reporting platform launched by Netbeacon, intended to streamline reporting and route it properly.⁶⁸ This gap was named as a high-priority topic by some DNS Abuse Small Team members. Some commenters proposed a PDP focusing on amending RAA Section 3.18.4 to require registrars to publish a clear abuse reporting user-friendly web form with mandatory fields (e.g., domain name, evidence of abuse) and step-by-step guidance with FAQs to assist the complainants, combined with best-practice educational materials, will reduce unactionable reports and improve responsiveness. Other commenters noted that there is no mention of whether ICANN Compliance provides feedback to complainants on why their report was unactionable when closing a report. Other commenters suggested clearer publication of abuse-contact details by registries and registrars. They urged that each contracted party maintain an easily discoverable, functional email address for reporting abuse and that ICANN ensure these contacts remain accurate. They objected to the growing trend of replacing abuse-reporting email addresses with online forms.

- **A3. Malicious vs. Compromised - Clarifying Responsibility:**

- **Description:** A distinction is made between a maliciously registered domain, where the domain itself was registered with bad intent, versus compromised legitimate domains, where a legitimate domain/account gets hacked to host phishing or malware unbeknownst to the owner. The mitigation pathways differ for malicious registrations, where the registrar/registry can suspend or delete the domain. For compromised domains, the registrar cannot fix the hacked website; the solution often lies with the hosting provider or the registrant cleaning their site. If policies are crafted without this distinction, it may either overstep (e.g., expecting registrars to fix compromised domain names that they cannot fix) or leave gaps (e.g., not adequately addressing malicious domains firmly enough because of wariness of compromise scenarios).
- **Research on Gap:** In 2022, the Small Team suggested that any policy efforts explicitly scope to malicious registrations (which are within ICANN's remit) and avoid areas that require content takedown or website cleanup (which are not in ICANN's remit).⁶⁹ The new DNS Abuse contract obligations actually require mitigation for both malicious or compromised domain names but allow flexibility in how (e.g., the contracted party is not expected to remove content

⁶⁷ Castillo, Leticia, Rómulo Chacín, and Charmaine Lim, "Enforcement of DNS Abuse Mitigation Requirements - A Look at the First Year," *ICANN org*, 23 April 2025, https://icanncrm.my.salesforce.com/sfc/p/#1a000000Y7OU/a/Qk000001geDN/9sof6KwBYa_N6kv4nnFTAiWuHValPVrAZYrnTXY8gGc.

⁶⁸ "NetBeacon Reporter," *NetBeacon Institute*, <https://netbeacon.org/reporting/>.

⁶⁹ "DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps," *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9gOI6E6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

but could, for instance, suspend a compromised domain after notifying the registrant if that is the best course of action).

- o **Potential Solution:** The 2022 Small Team suggests distinguishing between malicious vs. compromised registrations when considering what topics may fall within the scope of ICANN to address. Taking this approach would ensure that responsibility for taking action on malicious registrations is within the remit of contracted parties and/or ICANN, while action on compromised registrations may require involvement of actors that are not subject to ICANN agreements.⁷⁰ This gap identification is thus about ensuring clarity of scope in response. It may not become a standalone policy item but will inform how other policies are crafted. For the Issue Report, it was included to acknowledge the nuance. Commenters noted that this distinction between malicious and compromised domains is complex and sometimes impossible to determine. It may be more useful to refer to “fraudulent” registrations, whereas “malicious” implies a level of intent which we cannot determine, while “fraudulent” relates to a demonstrated behavior and we can base processes and policies around it. Other commenters suggested for registrars be required to publish clear FAQs and guidance for registrants whose domains have been compromised, explaining how they may contact agencies (e.g. national CERTs, cybercrime units), what documents must be submitted (identity proof, domain ownership evidence, security logs), and what procedural steps are available to restore suspended or blocked sites. In summary, **reporting-phase issues** are largely about communication and ensuring the system to alert abuse is efficient. Many solutions here might be best practices, improved tools, and possibly making sure every registrar has an abuse web form or requiring timely automated acknowledgments to reporters. The GNSO can consider if a PDP’s scope should include such “operational” improvements or if it should defer to community-led initiatives like best practices. In addition to preventing DNS Abuse e, improving reporting of DNS Abuse is essential to mitigating DNS Abuse. Evidence based, well-formed and appropriately routed reports underpin the rest of DNS Abuse mitigation.

Taking Action on DNS Abuse (Phase 3: Contractual Obligations)

Phase 3 concerns what the **well-positioned party** does once it has a DNS abuse report. In the context of ICANN policy, this typically means the registrar (or registry) that sponsors the abusive domain, since ICANN’s contracts are with those parties. This phase corresponds to the new duties in the RAA/RAs that took effect in April 2024, which require prompt action to stop or disrupt DNS Abuse given evidence. The Small Team’s gap list labels this category “Contractual Obligations – Well-positioned party takes action as necessary.”

The gaps identified here include:

- **C1. Limited Transparency in Mitigation Actions taken:**

⁷⁰ “DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps,” *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0IGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

- o **Description:** After a registrar or registry acts on an abuse report (e.g., suspends a domain, or decides not to suspend), that information is generally not shared for various reasons, which can create difficulties in understanding the DNS Abuse landscape or for a “reporter” to understand what has happened to their report.
- o **Research on Gap:** The Netbeacon Institute noted a lack of detailed reporting on mitigation actions taken from contracted parties.⁷¹ In their analysis of the ICANN contract amendments from 2024, Netbeacon noted measurement challenges, where their methodology was unable to determine whether or not mitigation occurred or which party took action. The presence of this “grey area” could mean that statistics on mitigation might be either overestimating or underestimating outcomes.⁷²
- o **Potential Solution:** If the intention is to create minimum reporting requirements, this could be addressed by policy development. Another path could be developing best practices in this area. This gap is related to Gap C7, which notes registrants should be notified on “what action was taken”. Some commenters suggested developing a requirement that registrars send a response to the abuse reporter when a case is resolved. Other commenters proposed a contract amendment complemented by best practices to establish transparency in reporting mitigation actions by registrars/registries and thus amending RAA Section 3.18.4 (handling and tracking abuse reports) by setting up obligations upon the registrars to publish periodic statistics. Other commenters suggested non-binding best practices for abuse reporting.
- o **Relation to other gaps in the DNS Abuse Small Team Matrix: A2 and E1 Lack of Measurement Challenges: “Uncategorized” Abuse Outcomes and Disparate Registrar Abuse Mitigation Responses:** This might be better addressed under non-binding best practices or community collaboration. ICANN Compliance publishes monthly and ad hoc reports dedicated to DNS Abuse mitigation enforcement. As noted in its blog post accompanying the launch of these reports, ICANN Compliance welcomes community feedback.⁷³ Any feedback received is reviewed, and, where feasible, additional enhancements to ICANN metrics and reporting are implemented.⁷⁴

⁷¹ “DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps,” *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0lGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

⁷² “How Have the gTLD Contractual Amendments Impacted DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, 16 December 2024, <https://netbeacon.org/how-have-the-gtld-contractual-amendments-impacted-dns-abuse/>.

⁷³ Castillo-Sojo, Leticia, “ICANN Launches Reports on the Enforcement of DNS Abuse Requirements,” *ICANN org*, 28 June 2024, <https://www.icann.org/en/blogs/details/icann-launches-reports-on-the-enforcement-of-dns-abuse-requirements-28-06-2024-en>.

⁷⁴ Castillo, Leticia, “Responses to the GNSO Council Small Team on DNS Abuse,” *ICANN org*, 26 June 2025, <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1gTq-l7irOAt252jq2lvMJY6NGYlg2RliKO6jhKYI6jl/edit?tab=t.0>.

- **C2. No Requirement to Check for Associated Domains:**

- **Description:** Malicious domains are often part of broader campaigns involving dozens or hundreds of related domains. When a registrar finds that one domain is malicious, there is no contractual requirement that the registrar must investigate whether the same registrant or account has other active domains that are also being used for similar abuse.
- **Research on Gap:** The Netbeacon White Paper suggested an “Associated Domain Check” requirement via a PDP.⁷⁵ Without this requirement, an attacker might only lose one domain at a time, continuing to use the rest until each is individually reported. If registrars proactively pivot on the information, it could curtail whole DNS Abuse campaigns. Some registrars likely do this voluntarily, but others may not due to lack of resources or fear of overreaching. The RAA currently only requires registrars to evaluate individual domain names when they obtain evidence that the domain name is being used for DNS Abuse.⁷⁶ This current “one-at-a-time” approach limits the mitigation of related domains operated by the same actor, even when those domains are part of an identifiable campaign.
- **Potential Solution:** This gap was noted as high-priority for a consensus policy by the 2025 DNS Abuse Small Team. The Netbeacon White Paper proposes for a PDP to examine whether registrars, upon obtaining actionable evidence that a domain name is used for DNS Abuse, should be required to review other domain names within the same account and/or registered by the same registrant. This “pivot” approach could help identify and mitigate related DNS Abuse more effectively, particularly in organized campaigns (including those registered in bulk to conduct such campaigns).⁷⁷ Once a registrar identifies additional domains engaged in DNS Abuse in the customer account, its existing obligations in the RAA (set forth in Section 3.18) will require the registrar to mitigate or otherwise disrupt the abuse, provided there is actionable evidence associated with each additional identified abusive domain. This approach could also create an incentive structure: registrars that permit unrestricted access to automated registration tools (e.g., ungated APIs) for high-volume customers, or employ other low-friction practices, would now bear a cost for enabling malicious portfolios. Furthermore, investigating multiple domains separately can be more resource intensive (in terms of time and resources) than investigating them all in one single case. This is why the Netbeacon White Paper believes that the Associated Domain Check could also have a meaningful preventative impact (in relation to P1) on the presence of malicious campaigns.⁷⁸ It will be particularly important for this topic to ensure that any policy recommendations will be

⁷⁵ White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 14, <https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

⁷⁶ “2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement,” *ICANN org*, 21 January 2024, <https://itp.cdn.icann.org/en/files/accredited-registrars/registrar-accreditation-agreement-21jan24-en.htm>

⁷⁷ White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 6, <https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

⁷⁸ White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 13, <https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

implementable and contractually enforceable; the potential solutions and their feasibility must be considered during the PDP deliberations.

- **C3. Lack of Standard Dispute/Recourse Mechanism for Registrants:**

- **Description:** When a domain name is suspended due to DNS Abuse, registrants currently lack a process to request that the registrar or registry review its decision. While swift action is often necessary to combat DNS Abuse, the absence of a clear channel for registrants to seek recourse (particularly in the case of mistaken or disputed suspensions) can lead to unnecessary harm, reputational damage, or loss of legitimate services.⁷⁹
- **Research on Gap:** The Netbeacon White Paper notes that suspensions for DNS Abuse are sometimes contested by registrants, particularly when decisions are made based on limited or incomplete information. Nonetheless, it seems that across the industry, there is no standard expectation that a registrar or registry must provide a process for recourse. In many cases, registrants are left with no way to communicate their perspective, even when legitimate harm is done.⁸⁰
- **Possible solutions:** This gap was named as a high-priority topic by some members of the DNS Abuse Small Team. The Netbeacon White Paper lists “Registrant Recourse Mechanisms” as one of its proposed PDPs.⁸¹ According to the White Paper, this PDP would aim to establish a baseline process for registrant recourse, ensuring that registrars and registries provide a means for registrants to submit evidence and request a review of a suspension. Registries and registrars would then be required to review any relevant and actionable evidence submitted by the registrant in order to consider whether to lift a suspension. This would not compel the lifting of any suspension, but it would ensure registrants have a meaningful opportunity to be heard, without undermining DNS Abuse mitigation efforts. The White Paper notes that an outcome of the PDP could have the following elements (i) maintain a publicly available webform or email address through which registrants can request review, (ii) be willing and able to accept and review evidence submitted by the registrant, (iii) evaluate the submission in good faith, with the discretion to maintain or lift the suspension based on the merits of the evidence. Some commenters suggested that this could be addressed by requiring registrars to offer a point of contact for suspension disputes, and to promptly review any evidence provided by the registrant. Other commenters suggested that all PDPs that have effects on registrants include consideration of recourse and dispute mechanisms available to registrants.

⁷⁹ White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 17, <https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

⁸⁰ White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 12, <https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

⁸¹ “White Paper Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, 21 May 2025, <https://netbeacon.org/white-paper-proposal-for-pdps-on-dns-abuse/>.

- **C4. Unregulated Subdomain Abuse:**

- **Description:** This gap refers to the scenario where the registrant uses their domain to offer subdomains to the public (either free or paid). The problem that may arise is that the registrar/registry deals with the main domain, but not the subdomains. Threat actors have shifted to exploiting services that generate subdomains. A threat actor could register one domain and then host dozens of phishing sites on subdomains, evading per-domain mitigation focus. The registry/registrar might see only one domain which by itself might not get reported if, say, each subdomain usage is short-lived. If a registrar or registry suspends a second-level domain in response to DNS Abuse, it risks disabling thousands, even hundreds of thousands of legitimate subdomains and any connected services or infrastructure.⁸² Subdomain hosting services are outside ICANN's direct remit.
- **Research on Gap:** The 2024 Interisle Phishing Landscape Report shows that 24% of all phishing attacks take place via subdomains.⁸³ The same report documents 454,948 phishing attacks created on just 750 second-level domains operated by subdomain providers.⁸⁴ A DNS Research Federation analysis found that 36.27% of phishing attacks use subdomain infrastructure belonging to a fraction of domain names pointing to a concentrated threat vector with limited oversight.⁸⁵ According to the Netbeacon White Paper, subdomain hosting services remain outside ICANN's direct remit, and registries and registrars often have no recourse unless the registrant's own policies provide a way to act.⁸⁶
- **Potential Solution:** The Netbeacon White Paper suggests creating obligations for second-level registrants that operate services generating subdomains used by third parties. The aim here would be to create tools for registries and registrars to engage with and require action from registrants who offer services that generate subdomains engaged in DNS Abuse. The policy would not seek to restrict third-level domains directly. Instead, it would equip registrars and registries with tools - through contractual obligations - to better hold registrants

⁸² White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse," *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 14,

<https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

⁸³ "Phishing Landscape 2024: An Annual Study of the Scope and Distribution of Phishing," *Interisle*, 23 July 2024,

<https://interisle.net/insights/phishing-landscape-2024-an-annual-study-of-the-scope-and-distribution-of-phishing>.

⁸⁴ "Phishing Landscape 2024: An Annual Study of the Scope and Distribution of Phishing," *Interisle*, 23 July 2024,

<https://interisle.net/insights/phishing-landscape-2024-an-annual-study-of-the-scope-and-distribution-of-phishing>.

⁸⁵ Deacon, Alex, "Use of Subdomain Providers Gains Popularity as a Mechanism to Launch Phishing Attacks," *DNS Research Federation*, 14 August 2023, <https://dnserf.org/blog/use-of-subdomain-providers-gains-popularity-as-a-mechanism-to-launch-phishing/index.html>.

⁸⁶ White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse," *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 14,

<https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

accountable when subdomain infrastructure is used for abuse.⁸⁷ This proposal would require registrar and registry policies (i.e., terms of service or acceptable use policies) to include the following requirements for registrants operating services that generate subdomains used by third parties: (i) maintain a publicly available, monitored abuse reporting mechanism, such as an email address or web form, (ii) prohibit DNS Abuse on any associated subdomains in their own terms of service or similar policy, (iii) review and respond to credible abuse complaints concerning subdomain misuse, and (iv) implement internal processes or technical controls to mitigate abuse on third-level domains.⁸⁸

- **C6 and C7. Due Diligence and Transparency in Mitigation:**

- **Description:** The Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) provided detailed input on how mitigation should be conducted to ensure fairness and minimize collateral damage. According to the NCSG, before taking action against a domain, the registrar should perform a proportionate investigation and ensure there is specific, actionable evidence of abuse.⁸⁹ They caution against instant suspensions and suggest to consider if a less drastic measure than suspension could suffice (e.g., maybe temporarily redirect or contact the registrant first if appropriate).⁹⁰ This NCSG perspective is about codifying a norm of careful assessment, which could possibly be a best practice. As noted in Gap C1, the NCSG suggests that if a domain is suspended or action taken, the registrar should promptly notify the registrant with clear information: the reason, what action was taken, who initiated it (registrar itself, law enforcement request, etc.), and explanation in plain language.⁹¹
- **Potential Solution:** These considerations do not necessarily represent a gap in DNS Abuse mitigation since the scope of these is currently unclear due to the lack of data. Without fully understanding the scope of the issue, it's difficult to assess the best mechanism to mitigate the potential harms. Many commenters support best practices on this issue. Other commenters noted this should be a priority policy topic and that there is sufficient data available on the topic.

- **C8. Inconsistent Responses - Seeking Standardization:**

- **Description:** The Commercial Stakeholders Group (CSG) noted in the DNS Abuse Small Team gap matrix that similar abuse complaints get very different

⁸⁷ White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 14, <https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

⁸⁸ White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse,” *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 14, <https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

⁸⁹ “DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps,” *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0IGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

⁹⁰ “DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps,” *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0IGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

⁹¹ “DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps,” *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0IGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

responses depending on the registrar or registry involved.⁹² For example, one registrar might respond within hours with suspension and a detailed reply, while another might take days and give a boilerplate answer or none. Thus, calling for more standardization of responses and timing, such as Service Level Agreements (SLAs) or at least guidelines so that the industry's performance becomes more consistent.⁹³

- o **Potential Solution:** The amended ICANN contracts deliberately did not include rigid timelines, to allow flexibility. Instead, they say “promptly” and allow for case-by-case circumstances to dictate appropriate actions (e.g., the mitigation path for a compromised domain name may be very different than for a maliciously registered domain).⁹⁴ Different reports (even if they appear similar to some) and circumstances will naturally yield different responses, timing, and actions – including the level of detail provided in each response. This intentional flexibility in the agreements makes the establishment of SLAs challenging. Pursuing non-binding best practices may be more appropriate.
- o **Relation to other gaps in the DNS Abuse Small Team Matrix: E5 and E6. No Rapid Takedown Requirement (Desire for 24-hour response) and Lack of Feedback Loop.** This gap came from the ICANN81 Contracted Party House (CPH)/CSG discussion: certain stakeholders want a hard rule that, say, within 24 hours of a valid abuse report, the registrar must take action (suspend or disable the domain).⁹⁵ Furthermore, some abuse reporters often note that they submit reports and do not hear back about the outcome, leading them to wonder if it was addressed. A standardized approach could be part of the abuse reporting tools (e.g., Netbeacon is already trying to show reporters the status if the registrar updates it).

Many of these gaps intersect with the changes made in the recent ICANN contract amendments. Some items like associated domain checks, recourse, and subdomains are not covered by the amendments and could be considered for new policy. Others might refine the implementation of the existing obligations and be well-suited for non-binding best practices.

Enforcement by ICANN Contractual Compliance (Phase 4)

Phase 4 is when ICANN's Contractual Compliance department enforces the contracts if the abuse is not being properly mitigated by the contracted party. [ICANN's Enforcement of DNS Abuse](#)

⁹² “DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps,” *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0lGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

⁹³ “DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps,” *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0lGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

⁹⁴ “Advisory: Compliance With DNS Abuse Obligations in the Registrar Accreditation Agreement and the Registry Agreement,” *ICANN*, 5 February 2024, <https://www.icann.org/en/contracted-parties/advisories/documents/advisory-compliance-with-dns-abuse-obligations-in-the-registrar-accreditation-agreement-and-the-registry-agreement-05-02-2024-en>.

⁹⁵ “DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps,” *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0lGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

[Mitigation Requirements](#) details Contractual Compliance enforcement actions under the new DNS Abuse mitigation requirements. Upon their effective date, ICANN Contractual Compliance commenced vigorous enforcement of these new requirements. It is important to note that the enforcement of contractual requirements is one aspect of ICANN's multifaceted DNS Abuse Mitigation Program.⁹⁶ ICANN Contractual Compliance has processes and systems in place for complaint-based enforcement, along with a dedicated [audit program](#) featuring two audit rounds per year. The gaps in this phase touch upon the Compliance area, but are outside of ICANN Contractual Compliance's current scope. However, closing these gaps could result in impact on this phase and accordingly on Enforcement and Compliance.

The gaps identified here include:

- **E2. No Clear Escalation of Sanctions for Recurring Non-Compliance:**
 - **Description:** Currently, if a registrar repeatedly violates terms, ICANN Compliance goes through an escalated breach notice process. In case of recurring non-compliance from a party, ICANN escalates notices which, if not addressed, move immediately to a breach notice. ICANN can also suspend a registrar's ability to register new domains. The Small Team noted that beyond issuing breach notices (and eventually terminating if uncured), there are no intermediate penalties aside from termination.
 - **Research on Gap:** ICANN Compliance issues a formal Notice of Breach only after exhausting the information resolution stage of its process.⁹⁷ ICANN enforces all obligations through a clearly established process that ensures consistent and equal treatment for everyone. This process is [publicly explained](#) and consists of two stages: an informal resolution stage and a formal resolution stage. Most complaints are resolved confidentially during the informal stage, where Contracted Parties (CPs) demonstrate compliance or remediate a noncompliance before reaching the formal Notice of Breach stage, which can lead to termination or suspension of their agreements. Three Notices of Breach within 12 months allow ICANN to suspend or terminate a registrar's accreditation. Repeated Notices of Breach, under certain conditions, may also prevent renewal or assignment of an agreement. In some cases, remediation extends beyond the individual domain names originally reported. Remediation plans are required when it is determined that a CP lacks the necessary understanding, systems, and/or processes to consistently meet DNS Abuse mitigation requirements. These plans address the root cause of noncompliance and are not only requested when a CP is issued a formal Notice of Breach; enforcement and remediation most often occur at the informal resolution stage of the compliance process. This process also allows for expedited action, up to and including the issuance of a Notice of Breach, in cases of repeated noncompliance for previously remediated matters. Through its established process, as detailed in the [last ICANN update on DNS Abuse mitigation requirements](#), ICANN

⁹⁶ "DNS Abuse Mitigation Program," *ICANN org*, 3 October 2024, <https://www.icann.org/dnsabuse>.

⁹⁷ Castillo, Leticia, "ICANN's Enforcement of DNS Abuse Mitigation Requirements: A Look at the First Six Months," *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/icann-enforcement-of-dns-abuse-mitigation-requirements-08-nov24-en.pdf>.

Contractual Compliance launched 330 investigations during the first year of the DNS Abuse mitigation requirements' effectiveness. These efforts led directly to the mitigation of nearly 10,000 malicious domains, and hundreds of thousands more were addressed through the implementation by CPs of systems and processes resulting from compliance cases, among other outcomes. ICANN Compliance's processes are intentionally measured and gradual, with intermediate steps designed to allow for collaboration and remediation prior to termination. It is therefore unclear what additional intermediate penalties are envisioned.

- **Potential Solution:** Introducing sanctions would require further policy work and would likely need to define "recurring non-compliance". Some commenters proposed a PDP to establish graduated sanctions, balanced with due process. Other commenters suggested that an intermediate sanction could be introduced by creating two tiers of registrar fees: lower fees for registrars who receive less than a given number of compliance inquiries and non-compliance notices in a billing period, and, likewise, higher fees for registrars who exceed this number.

- **E3. Delayed ICANN Enforcement Actions:**

- **Description:** This gap refers to the pace of Contractual Compliance enforcement-related activity. For instance, after the new DNS Abuse obligations took effect in April 2024, the first breach notices came in mid-July and September.⁹⁸ Some felt this was slow given likely non-compliance earlier.
- **Research on Gap:** As shared in multiple presentations, including the [last webinar on DNS Abuse Mitigation requirements](#), ICANN initiated 330 investigations under these new obligations during their first year of effectiveness. These investigations led directly to the mitigation of nearly 10,000 malicious domains, and hundreds of thousands more were addressed through the implementation by CPs of systems and processes resulting from compliance cases, among other outcomes. It is important to note that Notices of Breach represent only a small portion of enforcement activities and are not the sole indicator of enforcement. Most mitigation and remediation occur during the informal resolution stage of the compliance process, without the need for a formal Notice of Breach. Details of these informal actions are not published individually, but they are included in aggregate in monthly and other ad hoc reports.⁹⁹ ICANN Contractual Compliance began enforcing the DNS Abuse Amendments immediately upon their effective date, with no delay.
- **Potential Solution:** ICANN Contractual Compliance began enforcing the DNS Abuse Amendments immediately upon their effective date, with no delay, and has been reporting on its progress regularly. According to the ICANN Org reply to

⁹⁸ Castillo, Leticia, "ICANN's Enforcement of DNS Abuse Mitigation Requirements: A Look at the First Six Months," *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/icann-enforcement-of-dns-abuse-mitigation-requirements-08-nov24-en.pdf>.

⁹⁹ "Contractual Compliance Twelve-Month Trends on DNS Abuse Reporting," *ICANN org* <https://compliance-reports.icann.org/dnsabuse/dashboard/trends-list.html>.

the Small Team, ICANN Compliance has the tools, processes, and commitment needed to enforce the current requirements in the RAA and RA, and is prepared to evolve alongside the needs of the community. While enforcement began on 5 April 2024 without delay, ICANN is also developing new tools and strategies. These include proactive enforcement initiatives that will be fully integrated into ICANN's daily operations, with all relevant data captured for public reporting, as well as expanded educational and communication resources for reporting parties.¹⁰⁰ These enhancements are not addressing a gap or delay, but rather building on the strong foundation already established.

Community Collaboration (Cross-Cutting)

DNS Abuse mitigation often requires cooperation beyond just the registrar, registry, and reporter. Some abuse types or preventive efforts call for the broader ICANN community, law enforcement, and others to work together.

The gaps identified here include:

- **CC1. Lack of Coordination during Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Botnet Attacks:**
 - **Description:** DGAs are often used by criminals to prevent their online activity being detected. DGAs are computer programs that automatically generate domain names, usually using a long random collection of numbers and letters. This is done at scale and pace (and across multiple TLDs or registries in varying jurisdictions and locations) to allow the attackers to move between different domain names to continue their activities, for example to distribute malware. The intention is to evade security countermeasures that are designed to prevent attackers from reaching victims, such as blocking the domain on a network.¹⁰¹ Currently, law enforcement must contact each implicated registry individually when trying to mitigate malware or botnets that use DGAs at scale, which can result in fragmented, delayed, and inconsistent responses. According to the Netbeacon Whitepaper, these are low frequency but high impact events and streamlining the response could make it easier and faster for law enforcement to deal with large-scale criminal abuse campaigns. There is no central clearinghouse or coordination hub to quickly disseminate these domain lists to all relevant operators.¹⁰²
 - **Research on Gap:** As noted in the Public Safety Working Group (PSWG) and gTLD Registries' publication, in respect of one particular botnet (Avalanche): The operation included close cooperation from over 40 top-level domain registries

¹⁰⁰ Castillo, Leticia, "Responses to the GNSO Council Small Team on DNS Abuse: ICANN Contractual Compliance," *ICANN org*, 26 June 2025.
<https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/gnsocouncilmeetings/pages/178389129/DNS+Abuse+Small+Team+2024-2025>

¹⁰¹ "Framework on Domain Generating Algorithms (DGAs) Associated with Malware and Botnets," *RySG*, <https://www.rysg.info/wp-content/uploads/assets/Framework-on-Domain-Generating-Algorithms-DGAs-Associated-with-Malware-and-Botnets.pdf>.

¹⁰² "Framework on Domain Generating Algorithms (DGAs) Associated with Malware and Botnets," *RySG*, <https://www.rysg.info/wp-content/uploads/assets/Framework-on-Domain-Generating-Algorithms-DGAs-Associated-with-Malware-and-Botnets.pdf>.

globally (both gTLDs and ccTLDs). In all, approximately 800,000 domain names were seized, blocked and/or sinkholed each year of the operation's existence (2016-2019). And yet, Avalanche's use of DGAs persists and has since required law enforcement to go before the courts on an annual basis to refresh authority for seizure of the list of domains expected to be generated by the DGA that year. In turn, law enforcement must then again provide the collaborating registry operators with those seizure orders requiring their action on an annual basis to prevent the dangerous domains from being made available to the public.¹⁰³ **A voluntary approach taken in addressing this gap is the** "Framework on Domain Generating Algorithms (DGAs) Associated with Malware and Botnets". This framework is intended to explain how domain names can support malware and botnets through these DGAs, and the unique mitigation practices that are essential to addressing the resulting DNS Abuse. This framework has been jointly drafted by the Governmental Advisory Committee Public Safety Working Group (PSWG) and the Registries Stakeholder Group (RySG). The framework is voluntary and non-binding and does not reflect any consensus policy affecting gTLD registries.¹⁰⁴

- o **Potential Solution:** This was mentioned as a high-priority topic by the DNS Abuse Small Team for a potential PDP. The NetBeacon White Paper proposes a PDP on "Establishing a Centralized ICANN Coordination Role for DGA-Related Malware and Botnet Mitigation." It proposes that ICANN serve as a centralized clearinghouse for DGA abuse reports. By streamlining the process of submitting evidence and coordinating action, ICANN can act as a trusted hub, reducing inefficiencies and ensuring that registries are aligned and responsive to urgent abuse cases. This model aims to speed up mitigation efforts but also bring greater consistency to DGA-related takedowns. ICANN would serve as a "hub" for verified law enforcement court orders.¹⁰⁵ Proposed policy elements include: (i) establish ICANN as a trusted escalation and coordination point for DGA-related abuse, receiving reports from law enforcement (or other trusted third party¹⁰⁶), (ii) define a standardized intake and validation process within ICANN for DGA evidence submissions, (iii) enable ICANN to issue SRW (Security Response Waivers)¹⁰⁷ or pre-authorized notices to implicated registries to allow

¹⁰³ "Framework on Domain Generating Algorithms (DGAs) Associated with Malware and Botnets," RySG, <https://www.rysg.info/wp-content/uploads/assets/Framework-on-Domain-Generating-Algorithms-DGAs-Associated-with-Malware-and-Botnets.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴ "Framework on Domain Generating Algorithms (DGAs) Associated with Malware and Botnets," RySG, <https://www.rysg.info/wp-content/uploads/assets/Framework-on-Domain-Generating-Algorithms-DGAs-Associated-with-Malware-and-Botnets.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵ White Paper: Proposal for PDPs on DNS Abuse," *NetBeacon Institute*, May 2025, p. 19, <https://netbeacon.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-NetBeacon-PDP-Whitepaper-Final.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ For example, with Conficker, it was the Conficker Working Group, see: Joffe, Rodney, "Conficker Working Group – Archive of Materials," *Senki*, January 2011, <https://www.senki.org/operators-security-toolkit/security-organizations/conficker-working-group-archive-of-materials/>.

¹⁰⁷ Using the SRW service, registrars can request a contractual waiver for actions it might take, or has taken, to mitigate or eliminate an incident. "Security Response Waiver Requests for Registrars," *ICANN org*, <https://www.icann.org/en/contracted-parties/accredited-registrars/resources/security-response-waiver-requests>.

prompt action in accordance with contractual obligations, (iv) create a notification and coordination protocol for impacted registries to respond simultaneously based on centralized guidance, and (v) provide contractual clarity to ensure registries and registrars can rely on ICANN's role in good faith without fear of violating contractual requirements. NetBeacon noted in its White Paper: "It is not strictly necessary that the below go through a PDP process. ICANN could voluntarily adopt the role we propose. A PDP would clarify, however, that the Community supports ICANN performing this function." Limited Coordination of DGA-based attacks, is suggested in this Final Issue Report as appropriate for policy development but would be better addressed via best practices. However, the majority of public comment noted this issue should also be addressed via policy development at a later stage.

- **CC2. No Mechanism to Update DNS Abuse Definitions (Periodic Review):**

- **Description:** ICANN's definition of DNS Abuse is precise, focused primarily on specific categories of malicious activities that deceive and misdirect users, namely: "malware, botnets, phishing, pharming, and spam (when spam is used as a delivery mechanism for any of the other four types of DNS Abuse)." These activities can compromise the security and stability of the DNS. New abuse types or edge cases might not clearly fall under the definition, such as "impostor" domains that mimic famous and well-known brands and actions associated with them (e.g., "login", "security", etc.).¹⁰⁸
- **Research on Gap:** ICANN and the community focused on the definition that fits into the ICANN Bylaws and DNS Abuse types that impact the security and stability of the DNS. Furthermore, it focused on the aspects that can be best addressed by contracted parties. However, the SSAC's SAC115 (2021) recommended acknowledging that any fixed list of DNS abuse definitions will need updates as it can be limiting.¹⁰⁹
- **Potential Solution:** This gap was named as a high-priority topic by some members of the DNS Abuse Small Team. Definitional discussions can be particularly challenging and it may be helpful to have a structure or framework under which these conversations can take place. For instance, potential considerations could include: (i) agreeing on the attributes that make a particular form of DNS Abuse appropriate to consider within ICANN's remit, and then (ii) measure emerging vectors against those attributes. The SSR2 Review's recommendation 10.2 suggested establishing a cross-community working group (CCWG) to periodically review and potentially update DNS Abuse-related definitions.¹¹⁰ It is important to note that the contract amendments resulted from the November 2022 proposal the CPH sent to ICANN org to collaborate and

¹⁰⁸ Cole, Mason, "Attacking DNS Abuse: The Next Amendments Needed," *CircleID*, 4 November 2024, <https://circleid.com/posts/attacking-dns-abuse-the-next-amendments-needed>.

¹⁰⁹ "SAC 115: SSAC Report on an Interoperable Approach to Addressing Abuse Handling in the DNS," 19 March 2021, <https://itp.cdn.icann.org/en/files/security-and-stability-advisory-committee-ssac-reports/sac-115-en.pdf>.

¹¹⁰ "Second Security, Stability, and Resiliency (SSR2) Review Team Final Report," *ICANN org*, 25 January 2021, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ssr2-review-team-final-report-25jan21-en.pdf>.

enhance the existing contracts by creating clear obligations to stop or otherwise disrupt DNS Abuse. This proposal came with certain guideposts, including to not include matters pertaining to website content. It is equally important to note that while the new obligations are specific to DNS Abuse as defined in the amendments, they do not negate the existing obligations in Section 3.18 of the RAA. Section 3.18.1 of the RAA requires that registrars take reasonable and prompt steps to investigate and respond appropriately to any (emphasis added) report of abuse. This obligation remains in effect and will continue to be enforced. It is clear that the items listed in the proposed definition of DNS Abuse within the amendments are within ICANN's remit. It is in line with the ICANN Bylaws (Sections 1.1 and 1.2.) as well as ICANN's Strategic Plan, which states that a "coordinated approach is necessary to effectively identify and mitigate DNS security threats and combat DNS abuse." However, many other examples of abuse discussed in some sectors of the community and the Public Comments, while malicious, are deemed outside of ICANN's remit as they pertain to content, such as certain forms of fraud, copyright or trademark infringement, and scams perpetrated through websites. These harms often require legal expertise and due process to the registrant. Intellectual property disputes are complex, involving considerations such as fair use, free speech, and laws from multiple jurisdictions, and CPs are not the proper venue to adjudicate these disputes. Other frameworks exist to address some forms of intellectual property infringement.¹¹¹

- **Relation to other gaps in the DNS Abuse Small Team Matrix: C5. Imposter Domain Names (Exact Matches to Trusted Names):** Domains that exactly match a known brand or person (especially in new gTLDs or different TLDs) which are then used for abuse. Currently, there is no requirement that registries/registrar prevent or mitigate domains that are exact matches to famous names or sensitive keywords as these are outside the current ICANN definition of DNS Abuse.¹¹² During ICANN81 the CPH and CSG held a session¹¹³ discussing this topic and how the DNS Abuse definition established by the ICANN contract amendments is not sufficient to address this type of DNS Abuse.¹¹⁴

These "Community Collaboration" gaps likely do not require consensus policies in the sense of binding contracted party obligations immediately. They are more about facilitating cooperation, establishing community structures, and ensuring ICANN evolves alongside an evolving DNS Abuse landscape. The Council might decide to address them in parallel or as non-binding best practices.

¹¹¹ "Public Comment Summary Report: Amendments to the Base gTLD RA and RAA to Modify DNS Abuse Contract Obligations," *ICANN org*, 31 August 2023, <https://itp.cdn.icann.org/en/files/registry-agreement/public-comment-summary-report-amendments-base-gtld-ra-raa-modify-dns-abuse-contract-obligations-31-08-2023-en.pdf>.

¹¹² "DNS Abuse Mitigation Program," *ICANN org*, 3 October 2024, <https://www.icann.org/dnsabuse>.

¹¹³ "Joint Session: CPH & CSG Work Session – ICANN81," 10 November 2024, <https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/gnsocouncilmeetings/pages/111123187/Joint+Session+CPH+CSG+Work+Session+--+ICANN81>.

¹¹⁴ Cole, Mason, "Attacking DNS Abuse: The Next Amendments Needed," *CircleID*, 4 November 2024, <https://circleid.com/posts/attacking-dns-abuse-the-next-amendments-needed>.

Data & Transparency (Cross-Cutting)

Similar to the category above, this is not a normal domain lifecycle phase as introduced by the DNS Abuse Small team in 2022. But DNS Abuse mitigation often requires data and research in order for registrars/registries to better understand what drives DNS Abuse and for the ICANN community to develop policies.

The gaps identified here include:

- **P4. Lack of Data on “Bulk Registrations”:**
 - **Description:** The Small Team in 2022 noted that the community lacks clarity on which “bulk registrations” are malicious versus legitimate. Furthermore, it noted a lack of definition for “bulk registration,” especially as it relates to some sort of contractual enforcement. Many businesses register portfolios of similar names or when planning for a launch of a new campaign. However, “bulk registration” can also be a known tactic of bad actors.
 - **Research on Gap:** There seems to be limited empirical data on the scale of “bulk-registration” abuse. Without data, it’s hard to craft proportional solutions. This was flagged in the 2022 Small Team Report, which called for further exploration of “bulk registrations” and their role in DNS Abuse.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, the 2022 Small Team noted that it may be difficult to identify objective factors that could flag when “bulk registrations” may be intended for abusive purposes and there is a risk of impeding “bulk registrations” for legitimate purposes.¹¹⁶ However, the recognition of patterns in the case of abusive “bulk registration” (e.g., over 100) could help reduce malicious registration, or at least reduce incentives.
 - **Potential Solution:** In 2022, the DNS Abuse Small Team recommended working with registrars, ICANN org, and DNS Abuse Research Institute to study “bulk registrations” and develop possible mitigations.¹¹⁷ As such, the lack of data does not warrant a PDP topic on its own; note, the API/friction issue is intended to at least partially address “bulk-registration” abuse.
- **DT2. Lack of Empirical Research on Abuse Factors:**
 - **Description:** Aside from the INFERMAL study, there have been relatively few studies connecting specific policies or practices to levels of DNS abuse. While

¹¹⁵ “DNS Abuse Small Team Report to GNSO Council,” *ICANN GNSO*, 7 October 2022, p. 4, <https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/policy/2022/correspondence/dns-abuse-small-team-to-gnsocouncil-07oct22-en.pdf>.

¹¹⁶ “DNS Abuse Small Team Report to GNSO Council,” *ICANN GNSO*, 7 October 2022, p. 12, <https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/policy/2022/correspondence/dns-abuse-small-team-to-gnsocouncil-07oct22-en.pdf>.

¹¹⁷ “DNS Abuse Small Team Report to GNSO Council,” *ICANN GNSO*, 7 October 2022, p. 4, <https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/policy/2022/correspondence/dns-abuse-small-team-to-gnsocouncil-07oct22-en.pdf>.

progress is being made, this Preliminary Issue Report and the 2025 DNS Abuse Small Team acknowledges not everything is well-quantified.¹¹⁸

- o **Research on Gap:** According to the INFERMAL study, no existing study has systematically analyzed the factors driving DNS abuse, leaving a critical gap in understanding how different variables influence malicious registrations.¹¹⁹
- o **Potential Solution:** The INFERMAL study, commissioned by ICANN, represents a study aiming to address this gap. A PDP working group focusing on DNS Abuse might identify data it needs and request a study, gather input, or document where knowledge is lacking so that future work can address it.

3.1.2 Considerations

Discussion of Issues:

It is important to note that none of the practices or mechanisms identified in this report are inherently abusive. These tools and operational models are widely used and valued by legitimate registrants, including service providers operating at scale. This report is to analyse and discuss issues in mitigation efforts that, if addressed, can help reduce DNS Abuse through prevention or remediation. Thus, the aim is to make it significantly more difficult for malicious actors to exploit these mechanisms to carry out large-scale or coordinated DNS Abuse. The approach taken reflects the understanding that threat actors are highly adaptive; therefore, addressing existing mitigation gaps requires a balance between protective measures and operational flexibility.

Source documents referenced in the Preliminary Issue Report:

While this report draws on multiple sources (see Section 3.1.1), it references the INFERMAL study and the Netbeacon PDP White Paper more frequently because the INFERMAL study was commissioned by ICANN org and provides recent empirical findings on malicious registrations and domain registration practices; the NetBeacon paper reflects community-informed proposals aligned to the same problem space. Both were considered by the 2025 Small Team alongside other materials, and are cited here as two among several inputs, not as exclusive authorities.

DNS Abuse Small Team Gap Matrix:

The list of gaps and accompanying discussion of them in this Issue Report are based on the work initiated by the DNS Abuse Small Team, particularly the preliminary gap matrix developed in the course of its 2025 mandate. That matrix was constructed through an initial review of source materials as referenced in the group's assignment form. In preparing this Issue Report, the Staff Manager has conducted additional research and review to validate, refine, and supplement the original entries. Where appropriate, gaps that initially appeared as distinct have been

¹¹⁸ "DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps," *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OQ65NT9g0IGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

¹¹⁹ Nosyk, Yevheniya, et al. "INFERMAL: Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains," *ICANN org*, 8 November 2024, p. 1, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registered-domains-08nov24-en.pdf>.

consolidated into one gap discussion, particularly where the substance or intent of those gaps significantly overlapped. These consolidations are indicated in the respective gap and text below. To maintain traceability and alignment with the original matrix, this report references the original Gap IDs (e.g., P1) used in the Small Team matrix.¹²⁰ This allows community members and stakeholders to map the content of the report directly to earlier work.

Nature of gap solutions proposed:

The **nature of potential solutions** as captured in the PDP Manual notes that a PDP may recommend a wide range of outcomes to the GNSO Council, including Consensus policies, Best Practices, Implementation Guidelines, Technical Specifications and Recommendations on future policy development activities. In some instances, it may be equally appropriate to pursue certain solutions outside of the PDP.¹²¹

Consideration for the PDP structure:

Staff recommends that the GNSO Council proceed to initiate PDP(s) to address the DNS Abuse mitigation gaps outlined in this report.

The Preliminary Issue Report proposed covering the two priority issues in one PDP and dividing the PDP into phases. However, seventeen (17) commenters during the public comment period prefer individual PDPs for each issue rather than multi-layered or phased constructs, arguing that bundling issues increases complexity and delays in measurable outcomes. Commenters note that the topics are not similar (enough) to be covered in one PDP.

Based on the community input, the Staff Manager has included two draft Charters on the two priority topics for GNSO Council consideration. Breaking the work into a set of targeted and concurrent PDPs (for example: PDP 1 on two priority issues, PDP 2 on subsequent priority gaps, etc.) could make each effort more focused and faster on its topic. The downside is managing multiple simultaneous PDP WGs, which can strain community volunteer and staff resources. Coordination would also be needed to ensure no gaps or overlaps between them. Given community feedback to date, there appears to be interest in a narrowly scoped approach. To that end, staff recommends initiating two PDPs, focusing on the two priority issues, with the option to initiate additional PDPs subsequently. This approach balances urgency with manageability.

Working Group Model:

Commenters provided input during the public comment period related to the Working Group model. The draft charter included with the Preliminary Issue Report suggested a Representative model, including as well the number of suggested members from each Supporting Organization (SO), Advisory Committee (AC), Stakeholder Group (SG), and Constituency (C). A number of commenters suggested a change to a Representative + Open model, which would allow for broader participation; this suggested WG membership model has been reflected in the updated

¹²⁰ "DNS Abuse Small Team List of Gaps," ICANN GNSO, 25 July 2025, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18PdZnH3OO65NT9g0lGE6Y2toFaCrtxyf/edit?gid=1836517289#gid=1836517289>.

¹²¹ "GNSO Policy Development Process Manual," ICANN org, Version 2.6, p. 57, https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/filefield_38869/annex-2-pdp-manual-16may13-en.pdf.

draft charters included in the Final Issue Report. Comments were also shared about the number of members allocated to each SO/AC/SG/C, with some believing that adjustments were needed to better ensure balance and parity that is more reflective of the makeup of the ICANN community. For two reasons, the membership allocations in the draft charters have not been adjusted. First, the membership allocations suggested are consistent with other recent WGs (e.g., see page 23 of the EPDP on Internationalized Domain Names [charter](#)). Second, the shift to a Representative + Open model should minimize the potential risks of not having certain voices properly represented. It is important to note that per the [GNSO's Working Group Manual](#), the consensus designation process should not include voting and in addition, WG charters make clear that, "for the purpose of assessing consensus, groups that do not fulfil their maximum membership allowance should not be disadvantaged." Considered collectively, the intention is to provide balance and parity, without having to focus on the specific number of representatives for any particular group.

What Should Be Consensus Policy vs. Other Outcomes:

It's important to note that not all identified gaps may result in new Consensus Policy (binding contract changes). The PDP(s) can also recommend best practices, guidelines, or other community actions where appropriate. For example, issues like DGA coordination (CC1) might be addressed by community initiatives rather than contractual terms.

3.1.3 Relevant Documentation and Reports

- [DNS Abuse Small Team Report 2025](#)
- [DNS Abuse Small Team Report 2022](#)
- [ICANN's Enforcement of DNS Abuse Mitigation Requirements - A look at the first 6 months](#)
- [NetBeacon White Paper](#)
- [INFERMAL Study](#)
- [NetBeacon Analysis: How have the gTLD contractual amendments impacted DNS Abuse?](#)

3.2 Potential issues to be considered in a PDP on DNS Abuse

3.2.1 Issues to be considered

While this report covered all identified gaps by the DNS Abuse Small Team, the two priority issues for policy development recommended by the Final Issue Report are:

- (1) Associated Domain Checks
- (2) Unrestricted API Access for new customers,

These areas represent issues in current DNS Abuse mitigation efforts and are considered suitable for early policy work. Note, the third priority topic identified by the DNS Abuse Small Team,

Limited Coordination of DGA-based attacks, is suggested in this Final Issue Report as appropriate for policy development but to be addressed at a later stage. This does not preclude the ICANN Community from establishing non-binding best practices in these areas first, then determining whether further policy work is needed.

Consideration of Remaining Gaps for Subsequent PDP Phases

While the first two PDPs will concentrate on the two priority issues, the **remaining gaps** identified in Recommendation 4¹²² of the DNS Abuse Small Team also garnered significant support across SGs and ACs. These topics could be considered in later policy development phases, subject to available resources, community bandwidth, and Council priorities.

- Lack of proactive Contact Verification (P2)
- Unactionable Complaints (A1)
- Limited Use of Abuse Feeds/Threat Data for Prevention (P11)
- No Mechanism to Update DNS Abuse Definitions (Periodic Review) (CC2)
- Lack of Standard Dispute/Recourse Mechanism for Registrants: (C3)

3.2.2 Possible Impact on Human Rights

Consideration of this issue may impact human rights (e.g., enhance freedom of expression). For further information about ICANN and the ICANN Community's work on human rights, please see <https://community.icann.org/x/RAPCCw>. It is important to note that a Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) will be included in the PDP by default.

3.2.3 Objectives of a possible PDP

A PDP on DNS Abuse Mitigation aimed at the two priority gaps would pursue closing the DNS Abuse mitigation gaps related to:

(i) Associated-domain checks to develop a Consensus Policy that imposes an obligation on ICANN accredited registrars to proactively investigate associated domain names, registrant accounts, or other potential connection points when a domain under their management is found to have been registered for malicious purposes. To introduce a requirement for registrars to review other associated domains, upon receiving a valid abuse report, for example by investigating domains in the same user account, or linked to the same registrant.

(ii) Unrestricted API access for new customers: to develop a Consensus Policy requiring ICANN-accredited registrars to enforce certain obligations and controls over their resellers or third parties who are authorised to access registrar platforms (e.g., APIs, white-label systems, plugins) for automated domain registration or management.

¹²² "DNS Abuse Small Team Report to GNSO Council," *ICANN GNSO*, 25 July 2025, <https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/policy/2025/draft/dns-abuse-small-team-report-04aug25-en.pdf>

3.2.4 Specific questions to be considered in a possible PDP

1. Associated-Domain Checks (Domains Linked to Confirmed Abuse)

- Must registrars be required to investigate other domains associated with a customer account, registrant email address, or other identifying information when a domain under that account is reported and confirmed to be engaged in malicious DNS Abuse?
- What criteria should be used to define “association” between domains (e.g., customer account ID, registrant email, payment method)?
- How should the obligation be scoped for wholesale registrars where customer account information may not be available to the registrar? Would identifying associated domains by registrant email or another field be sufficient in these cases?

2. Unrestricted API access for new customers

- What minimum safeguards must registrars be required to implement before granting access to high-speed or high-volume domain registration tools (e.g., APIs) to new customer accounts?
- How can “trustworthiness” be defined or operationalized in a way that is based on customer behavior rather than identity?
- What types of friction (e.g., waiting periods, registration history, and DNS Abuse checks) are both effective and reasonable for registrars to implement?
- Must an existing customer account lose access to high-speed or high-volume domain registration tools (e.g., APIs) for registration if the registrar confirms that the customer has maliciously registered a domain for DNS Abuse in its account?

3.2.5 Other factors relevant to the decision whether to initiate a PDP

None identified.

4 Staff Recommendation

4.1 General Counsel recommendation

4.1.1 Scope considerations

Based on the documentation above, the launch of a dedicated PDP to consider the issues identified in this Preliminary Issue Report has been confirmed by ICANN's General Counsel to be properly within the scope of the GNSO as well as the ICANN Policy Development Process. In reaching that determination, the General Counsel's office and ICANN Policy Support staff have considered the factors in the following sections:

4.1.2 Whether the issue is within the scope of ICANN's mission statement

ICANN's mission is to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems, and this includes facilitat[ing] the coordination of the operation and evolution of the DNS root name server system" and "coordinat[ing] the development and implementation of policies for which uniform or coordinated resolution is reasonably necessary to facilitate the openness, interoperability, resilience, security and/or stability of the DNS." Annex G-1 and Annex G-2 of the ICANN Bylaws (which enumerate the topics appropriate for GNSO policies) has been consulted to ensure that each of the three gaps falls within the realm of "names policy" that can be enforced upon contracted parties. For example, policies governing registrar accreditation practices, registrant validation, and abuse reporting/response requirements are well within GNSO scope.

4.1.3 Whether the issue is broadly applicable to multiple situations or organizations

The issues are important to multiple stakeholder groups and end-users; mitigating DNS Abuse is broadly beneficial to the security and stability of the DNS, and thus a proper subject for GNSO policy considering the criteria of global applicability and lasting value.

4.1.4 Whether the issue is likely to have lasting value of applicability

The three priority issues identified are not limited to any single registry, registrar, business model, geography, or user community. Given this breadth of impact, a PDP on these topics would have system-wide relevance and lasting value for a wide range of organizations and use-cases.

4.1.5 Whether the issue implicates or affects ICANN Consensus Policy

The review of DNS Abuse mitigation gaps does not appear to impact existing ICANN Consensus Policy, but this question will be further considered during policy development. Furthermore, a PDP on DNS Abuse may create new ICANN Consensus Policy, as the issues identified in this report fall outside current policy obligations.

4.2 Policy Support Staff recommendations

ICANN Staff confirms that the issue of DNS Abuse is within the scope of the GNSO's Policy Development Process as outlined in the ICANN Bylaws. The issue is one in which "uniform or coordinated resolution is reasonably necessary to facilitate interoperability, security and/or stability of the Internet or DNS."

5 Next Steps

In accordance with the GNSO PDP rules, Staff published the Preliminary Issue Report for public comment in order to allow for Community input on additional information, or the correction or updating of any information provided so far. Following review of the public comments, Staff updated the Preliminary Issue Report and submitted a summary of the comments received. The Final Issue Report and summary of comments received will be forwarded to the GNSO Council for its consideration. The GNSO Council will then vote on the staff recommendations, as to whether or not to go ahead and initiate PDP(s) on the two priority issues and, if so, whether or not to adopt or amend (e.g. by forming a Drafting Team to review) the Charter(s) appended to the Final Issue Report – a draft version of which can be found in Annex A of this Final Issue Report. It should be noted that the GNSO Council is not bound by Staff recommendations, and, if it chooses to do so, may pursue alternative actions to those proposed in the Final Issue Report.

6 Annex A – DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP 1 Charter

ICANN | GNSO

Generic Names Supporting Organization

WG Name:	TBD	
Section I: Working Group Identification		
Chartering Organization(s):	Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO) Council	
Charter Approval Date:	<Enter Approval Date>	
Name of WG Leadership:	<Enter Elected WG Leadership>	
Name(s) of Appointed Liaison(s):	<Enter Liaison>	
WG Workspace URL:	<Enter Active Project URL from GNSO Site>	
WG Mailing List:	<Enter Mailman archive link>	
GNSO Council Resolution:	Title:	Initiation of the Policy Development Process on DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP 1
	Ref # & Link:	<Enter Resolution link>

Important Document Links:	Procedural Documents: • Annex A-1: GNSO Expedited Policy Development Process • Expedited GNSO Policy Development Process Manual • GNSO Working Group Guidelines Non Exhaustive List of Substantive Documents: • DNS Abuse Small Team Report 2025 • DNS Abuse Small Team Report 2022 • ICANN's Enforcement of DNS Abuse Mitigation Requirements - A look at the first 6 months • NetBeacon White Paper • INFERMAL Study • NetBeacon Analysis: How have the gTLD contractual amendments impacted DNS Abuse?
Section II: Mission, Purpose, and Deliverables	
Mission & Scope:	

Background

The GNSO Council [requested](#) an Issue Report on DNS Abuse in August 2025 and in doing so, suggested three (3) priority topics that should be included in the Policy Development Process (PDP) on DNS Abuse that is expected to follow the completion of the Final Issue Report. The DNS Abuse Small Team, in alignment with community support, [recommended](#) narrowly scoped PDP on three issues. The [Preliminary Issue Report](#) concluded that all of the three identified priority issues are appropriate for policy development. However, the report suggests that only two of the three identified DNS Abuse Issues should be prioritized for policy development, while one could potentially be addressed more directly and expeditiously outside of the policy development process. This prioritization reflects where policy intervention could likely reduce DNS Abuse at scale, is broadly applicable across the gTLD space, and aligns with the community input and lifecycle-and-cluster analysis used in the updated Small Team [gap matrix](#).

Informed by the DNS Abuse Small Team's recommendations and the Community's support for a narrowly scoped Policy Development Process (PDP), the Council initiated a PDP on:

1. **Associated Domain Checks:** An framework requiring registrars to proactively pivot to investigate domains linked to malicious actors, particularly in cases of high-volume domain registrations used for DNS Abuse campaigns.

Threat actors often register large portfolios of malicious domains which enables them to launch coordinated phishing or malware campaigns at scale. The Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) currently requires registrars to evaluate individual domain names upon receipt of an DNS Abuse report. When a registrar finds that one domain is malicious, there is no contractual requirement that the registrar must investigate whether the same registrant or account has other active domains that are also being used for similar abuse. Without this requirement, an attacker might only lose one domain at a time, continuing to use the rest until each is individually reported. This current "one-at-a-time" approach limits the mitigation of related domains operated by the same actor, even when those domains are part of an identifiable campaign. If registrars proactively pivot on the information, it could curtail whole campaigns.

Scope & Charter Questions – Associated Domain Checks

This PDP seeks to create an obligation for registrars to investigate other domains associated with a customer account or registrant where at least one domain of that registrant is found to be engaged in DNS Abuse. To develop a Consensus Policy that imposes an obligation on ICANN accredited registrars to proactively investigate associated domain names, registrant accounts, and/or related orders when a domain under their management is found to have been registered for malicious purposes. This would specifically exclude domains that have been compromised. Understanding that registrars value their customers and namespace, the PDP WG should ensure to keep in mind the Registrant's rights and responsibilities throughout the process. By identifying and acting on malicious domain portfolios - often part of coordinated campaigns - this policy could significantly reduce abuse uptime and disrupt large campaigns used for phishing and other DNS Abuse.

The Associated Domain Check would seek to solve a gap by requiring all registrars to cross-check within the registrar's portfolio the known abusive domain(s) to others

connected to the same customer account, registrant email address, or other pieces of information.

Purpose

- Define the scope and triggers for requiring an associated domain check (e.g. abuse reporting, internal detection).
- Specify what constitutes “associated” domains/accounts/orders, taking into account different registrar business models.
- Develop minimum procedural requirements and proposed timelines for conducting checks.
- Clarify obligations regarding evidence gathering, confidentiality, escalation, and reporting.
- Ensure alignment with ICANN Core Values, RAA obligations, privacy/regulatory frameworks (GDPR, data protection), and abuse mitigation principles.

Charter Questions**Initiating Associated Domain Check**

1. What triggers the requirement to investigate associated domain names?
2. Defining "investigation": What constitutes a "reasonable investigation" by a registrar? What steps and depth of analysis are required? What investigation steps are required or recommended?
3. What criteria should be used to define “association” between domains?
4. How will linked entities (e.g. domains/accounts/orders/registration information/payment information/infrastructure) be established and investigated?
5. What are necessary data access and privacy safeguards?
6. What are appropriate timelines and thresholds for initiating and concluding the associated domain check?

Reporting Requirements

7. What specific requirements are necessary to implement this policy and what parts can be subject to best practices, or potentially left to the discretion of the contracted party?
8. What reporting obligations will registrars have to ICANN? What metrics will be used to evaluate the policy's effectiveness?
9. What types of evidence and reports will registrars be required to submit to demonstrate their compliance?

Considerations:

Any new requirements in this areas should:

- Be specific enough to enforce contractually
- But flexible enough to cover different business structures and evolving technology and threat vectors
- Avoid becoming a “blueprint” that malicious actors can use to evade detection
- Consider privacy and data-security questions like the Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) and Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA).

Impact on Human Rights

The WG is expected to consider the potential impact of any recommendations on human rights. Based on the information included in the request for an Issue Report and the Issue Report, the WG is expected to further consider whether there is a likely human rights impact, and if so, who are the groups expected to be impacted and the expected severity of the impact (high / medium / low). If an impact is anticipated, the WG is expected to address the following questions: 1) is the proposed action necessary to achieve the desired outcome, 2) is the proposed action proportionate, 3) is the proposed action legitimate.

Impact on the Global Public Interest

The WG is also expected to consider the potential impact of any recommendations on the Global Public Interest. In order to facilitate this analysis, the WG may wish to consult this [checklist](#) and may also benefit from consulting the [GPI Toolkit Wiki page](#).

Deliverables:

To develop an Initial Report and a Final Report regarding the WG's recommendations on issues relating to DNS Abuse Mitigation, following the processes described in Annex A of the ICANN Bylaws and the GNSO PDP [Manual](#).

If the WG concludes with any recommendations, the WG shall (or recommend the subsequent policy Implementation Review Team to) conduct a policy impact analysis and identify a set of metrics or indicators to measure the effectiveness of the policy change, including source(s) of baseline data for that purpose:

- Identification of policy goals
- Identification of metrics used to measure whether policy goals are achieved
- Identification of potential problems in attaining the data or developing the metrics
- Identification of potential impact of its recommendations on any currently existing requirements on registrars and registry operators
- A suggested timeframe in which the measures should be performed
- Define current state baselines of the policy and define initial benchmarks that define success or failure
- Metrics or Indicators may include but not limited to (Refer to the [Hints & Tips Page](#)):
 - ICANN Compliance data
 - Industry metric sources
 - Community input via public comment
 - Surveys or studies

Data and Metric Requirements:

The WG should as soon as practicable:

- Determine a set of questions which, when answered, provide the insight necessary to achieve the policy goals.
- Determine whether certain data is required to help understand a specific issue or answer a charter question.
- Determine a set of data and metrics which can be collected and analyzed to help answer the specific question.
- Submit a Working Group Metrics Request Form (see [GNSO Working Group Guidelines Section 4.5](#)), if data gathering at the charter drafting phase or during the working phase is deemed necessary.

WG leaders shall review the Guidance document below to understand the need for performing due diligence before submitting a data gathering request to the GNSO Council.

Section III: Project Management

Work Product Requirement:

The WG leadership, in collaboration with the WG support staff and GNSO Council liaison, shall use a standard set of project management work products that help plan, guide, track, and report the progress of the WG from start to finish, and include the necessary data and information to assess the progress of the WG. These work products include but not limited to:

- Work Plan
- Summary Timeline
- Project Situation Report
- Project Plan
- Action Items

See the full suite of work products in the [GNSO Project Work Product Catalog](#).

Project Status & Condition Assessment:

The WG leadership, in collaboration with the WG support staff and the GNSO Council liaison, shall assess the Status and Condition of the project at least once a month. Such frequency is required in preparation for the GNSO Council monthly meeting, where At-Risk or In-Trouble projects are subject to review by GNSO Council leadership, and in some instances may be deliberated by the full GNSO Council.

The WG leadership, in collaboration with the WG support staff and the GNSO Council Liaison, shall use an [escalation procedure](#), which defines specific conditions that trigger the execution of a repeatable mitigation plan. The objective of this exercise is to return the project to an acceptable state ultimately achieving its planned outcomes.

Project Change Request:

The WG shall submit a [Project Change Request \(PCR\) Form](#) to the GNSO Council when its deliverable and baseline delivery date are revised. The PCR shall include a rationale for why these changes were made, their impacts on the overall timeframe of the PDP or any other interdependencies, and a proposed remediation plan.

The use of the PCR mostly occurs when primary deliverable dates are changed due to unforeseen or extreme circumstances. However, it can also be used to document changes in the deliverable requirements that may not have been identified in the chartering process.

When the PCR is required, it should be completed by the WG Chair and it will likely be presented to the GNSO Council for approval.

Resources Tracking:

The purpose for resource tracking is to deliver its work according to the work plan and be responsible for managing these resources.

For projects where dedicated funds are provided outside of budgeted policy activities, the WG shall provide regular budget versus actual expense reporting updates using a GNSO approved tool to allow for a better tracking of the use of resources and budget.

Section IV: Formation, Staffing, and Organization

Working Group Model:

Working Group Model: Representative plus Open

Rationale: The “Representative plus Open” Model is chosen to enable the WG to conduct and conclude its work in an efficient/effective manner.

A limited number of ICANN community members have prerequisite knowledge, background, or expertise in the subject matter. As a result, a limited number of Members appointed by specified community groups, who must possess a level of expertise as detailed in the “Membership Criteria” section in this charter, should drive the deliberations of the WG and participate in the consensus designation process for final recommendations. However, due to the importance of the topic to the whole community, other members of the community can attend and participate; the PDP is open to anyone interested to join as a participant. Participants may be from a GNSO Stakeholder Group or Constituency or may be self-appointed and derive from within the ICANN or broader community. Participants will be able to actively participate in and attend all WG meetings. However, Consensus calls or decisions are limited to SG/C/SO/AC (as applicable) appointed members who may consult as appropriate with their respective appointing organizations.

Membership Structure:

Role Descriptions: All Members participating in the Working Group are expected to abide by the Statement of Participation, which is enforceable by the WG Chair and GNSO Council Leadership Team. See Section V. for details.

- **Members:** Members are expected to participate during the course of deliberations and in any WG consensus calls. Members are expected to represent the view of their appointing organization, and may be called on to provide the official position of their appointing organization. Members are required to have a level of expertise in the relevant issues and ICANN policies and procedures as that may be impacted.
- **Participants:** Participants may be from a GNSO SG/C or SO/AC, or may be self-appointed and derive from within the ICANN or broader community. Participants will be able to actively participate in and attend all WG meetings. Participants are encouraged to engage in the WG deliberation throughout its lifecycle and are expected to keep up with all relevant WG deliberations to ensure they remain informed and can contribute when needed. However, Participants do not participate in the consensus designation process. Participants are encouraged to possess similar levels of expertise as Members with respect to DNS Abuse issues, ICANN policies and procedures, and registry/registrar services in order to contribute to the deliberations effectively. No upper limit of participants is expected to be set at the chartering phase. However, the WG leadership may decide, in consultation with the WG, whether new Participants can be accepted after the start of the WG effort. See details in the “B. Joining of New Members After Project Launch” in this charter.
- **Observers:** Anyone interested in this PDP may join as an observer. Observers are provided with read-only access to the mailing list and are not invited to attend meetings.
- **GNSO Council Liaison:** The GNSO Council shall appoint one (1) Liaison who is accountable to the GNSO. The GNSO Council Liaison must be a member of the Council, and the Council recommends that the Liaison should be a Council member and be able to serve during the life of this WG. See detailed description in the “GNSO Council Liaison” section below.
- **ICANN Org Liaison(s):** ICANN Org shall appoint at least one (1) Liaison, who is expected to provide timely input on issues that may require ICANN Org input such as implementation-related queries and issues that might benefit from their subject matter expertise. The ICANN Staff Liaison(s) is not expected to advocate for any position and will not participate in any PDP Team consensus calls.
- **ICANN Board Liaison:** While not required, the ICANN Board is encouraged to appoint a liaison to this PDP. The liaison should participate in accordance with the [Guidelines for Board Members Serving as Liaisons to ICANN Community Groups](#).

Representative Membership Structure:

Some groups may choose not to appoint any Members to the WG. The table below indicates the maximum number of Members that groups may appoint.

Group	Member (up to)	Liaison
RySG	2	
RrSG	2	
IPC	2	
BC	2	
ISPCP	2	
NCSG	2	
ccNSO	2	
ALAC	2	
GAC	2	
SSAC	2	
RSSAC	2	
GNSO Council		1
ICANN Org GDS		At least 1
ICANN Board		1

The GNSO Secretariat is expected to circulate a “Call For Volunteers” in accordance with the group structure determined by the GNSO Council:

- Publication of announcement on relevant ICANN web sites including but not limited to the GNSO and other Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committee web pages; and
- Distribution of the announcement to GNSO Stakeholder Groups, Constituencies and other ICANN Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees

Membership Criteria:

A. Expected Skills for Working Group Members

WG members shall review the full text of the [Working Group Member Skills Guide](#) to understand the responsibilities and skills that they are expected to have in order to fully participate in the WG activities.

Collectively as a group, the WG Members MUST possess:

- A solid understanding of the DNS ecosystem, DNS Abuse patterns, the Domain Name Lifecycle and the operational, technical, and privacy considerations involved in domain registration and abuse mitigation;
- A solid understanding how associated domain patterns are identified and investigated to assess the feasibility and impact of proposed ADC requirements;
- Familiarity with GNSO policy development processes; direct experience is strongly preferred;
- Commitment to participating in Working Group meetings on a regular and ongoing basis;
- Highly effective oral, written, and interpersonal communication skills (in simple, comprehensible English);
- Ability to create factual, relevant and easily understandable messages, and able to succinctly deliver them to the Working Group;
- Research skills with the ability to discern factual, factually relevant, and persuasive details and sources;
- Commitment to manage a diverse workload, while collaborating with a Working Group of individuals with different backgrounds and interests in driving objectives;
- Knowledge of Working Group discussions, actions taken at meetings, and deliverables;
- Understanding of the perspectives and interests of the members' own stakeholder group or constituency;
- Understanding of what consensus means and how consensus-building process works;
- Commitment to facilitate consensus by listening, explaining, mediating, proposing clear actions, and helping other members;
- Commitment to avoid blocking consensus by looking beyond the stakeholder group or constituency affiliation of other Working Group members and judging proposals/positions on their merits;
- Commitment to avoid re-litigating closed issues or deliberate obfuscation;
- Commitment to review the [Consensus Playbook](#) and attend potential training related to the Playbook, facilitate consensus building by employing the tools and techniques as detailed in the playbook;
- Maintain high personal levels of ethical conduct and integrity, including transparency of affiliation in the SOI, by participating in accordance with the policies and procedures that make up the ICANN Ethics Policy, including the Community Participant Code of Conduct, Expected Standards of Behavior, and Community Anti-Harassment Policy.

B. Joining of New Members After Project Launch

New Members will only join after the launch of the PDP if a current Member is no longer able to continue in its membership. New WG Members should be mindful that, once input/comment periods have been closed, discussions or decisions should not be resurrected unless there is group consensus that the issue should be revisited in light of new information that has been introduced. If the reopening is perceived as abusive or dilatory, a WG member may appeal to the WG leadership.

C. Expert Contributors

The WG has flexibility/discretion to invite participation of the expert contributors in specific fields as it deems necessary.

Expert contributors are not expected to participate in any consensus designation process, but provide perspective/expertise/knowledge to the PDP WG. Based on the WG's determination, the Council may be able to use an independent evaluation process (e.g., GNSO Council Standing Selection Committee) to confirm whether those individuals have demonstrated the expertise/knowledge/perspective.

Leadership Structure:

One (1) Chair + One (1) Vice Chair

The GNSO Council will appoint one (1) qualified, independent Chair (neutral, not counted as from the WG membership) for the WG.

The WG, once formed, may select one (1) Vice Chair to assist the Chair. The Vice Chair can be selected among the WG's Members. However, if a Member is selected as the Vice Chair, his/her appointing organization may appoint a new Member as a replacement.

Should at any point a Vice Chair need to step into the role of Chair, the same expectations with regards to fulfilling the role of Chair as outlined in this charter will apply.

Leadership Criteria:

Expectations for the WG Leadership (Chair + Vice Chair):

The WG leadership is expected to carry out the role and responsibilities and meet the qualification as detailed in the [Expectations for Working Group Leaders & Skills Checklist](#).

In short, the WG leadership is expected to:

- Lead with neutrality and impartiality;
- Encourage representational balance;
- Ensure WG documents represent the diversity of views;
- Balance working group openness with effectiveness;
- Make time commitment;
- Contribute ideas and knowledge to working group discussions;
- Oversee project management of the WG deliberations;
- Build consensus;
- Make consensus designation on working group recommendations;
- Enforce compliance with Statement of Participation;
- Enforce compliance with ICANN's Expected Standards of Behavior;
- Ensure compliance with Community Anti-Harassment Policy;
- Be versed in GNSO Operating Procedures; and
- Handle working group complaint process.

Expectation for the WG Chair:

As outlined in the GNSO Working Group Guidelines, the purpose of a Chair is to call meetings, preside over working group deliberations, manage the process so that all members have the opportunity to contribute, and report the results of the Working Group

to the Chartering Organization. These tasks require a dedicated time commitment as each week calls have to be prepared, the agenda concretized, and relevant material reviewed. The Chair shall be neutral. While the Chair may be a member of any group which also has representation on the Working Group, the Chair shall not act in a manner which favors such a group. The Chair shall not be a member of the Working Group for purposes of consensus calls.

In addition, it is expected – that interested candidates shall have considerable experience in chairing working groups, and direct experience with at least one GNSO Policy Development Process throughout its lifecycle. Familiarity with the functioning of a Working Group is important to understand the various leadership skills that are necessary to employ during a WG's lifecycle. For example, a Chair has to ensure that debates are conducted in an open and transparent manner and that all interests are equally and adequately represented within the Group's discussions. During the later stages of a WG when recommendations are drafted, a Chair will benefit from understanding the viewpoints of various members to ensure that an acceptable and effective outcome – ideally in the form of consensus – can be achieved.

The WG Chair is specifically expected to carry out the following responsibilities, including but not limited to:

- Attend all PDP Working Group meetings to assure continuity and familiarity with the subject matter and the ongoing discussions;
- Prepare meetings by reading all circulated materials;
- Be familiar with the subject matter and actively encourage participation during the calls;
- Be active on the PDP mailing list and invite PDP WG members and liaisons to share their viewpoints;
- Drive the progress forward and assure that discussions remain on point;
- Work actively towards achieving policy recommendations that ideally receive full consensus;
- Ensure that particular outreach efforts are made when community reviews are done of the group's output;
- Underscore the importance of achieving overall representational balance on any sub-teams that are formed;
- Enforce Statement of Participation, ICANN's Standards of Behavior, and Community Anti-Harassment Policy;
- Coordinate with staff and ensure that the WG is supported as effectively as possible; and
- Conduct consistent, adequate, and timely reporting to the GNSO Council on the progress of the PDP.

The WG Chair is expected to meet most of the following qualifications:

- Direct experience in consensus building processes and preferably direct experience in GNSO PDPs;
- Knowledge of and preferably direct experience in DNS Abuse related work at ICANN;
- Knowledge of ICANN policies and procedures as they relate to the relevant issue;
- Project management skills: including facilitating goal-oriented Working Group meetings, agenda setting and adherence, time management, encouraging

collaboration, driving the completion of action items and achieving milestones in accordance with the WG timeline and work plan, keeping the Working Group's actions, discussions and meetings focused on serving its ultimate goals and deliverables;

- Ability to enforce compliance with the Statement of Participation, ICANN's Expected Standards of Behavior, and Community Anti-harassment Policy;
- Ability to determine when outreach is necessary and to undertake it;
- Ability to identify the diversity of views within the Working Group, if applicable;
- Knowledge of and ability to designate consensus on Working Group recommendations based on the level of agreement;
- Ability to help Working Group members understand that a consensus is a decision that is collaboratively reached and that the Working Group members can "live with"; accordingly, it may not be a perfect or unanimous decision;
- Commitment to review the [Consensus Playbook](#) and attend potential training related to the Playbook, facilitate consensus building by employing the tools and techniques as detailed in the playbook;
- Ability to refrain from promoting a specific agenda and ensuring fair, objective treatment of all opinions within the Working Group;
- Ability to distinguish between Working Group members offering genuine dissent and those raising irrelevant or already closed issues merely to block the Working Group's progress toward its goal;

Ability to halt disruption and, in extreme cases, exclude a Working Group member from a discussion per Section 3.5 of the GNSO Working Group Guidelines on Rules of Engagement;

- Ability to ensure that closed Working Group decisions are not revisited, unless there is a consensus to do so (usually in light of new information brought to the Working Group's attention);
- Ability to commit the time required to perform the WG Chair's responsibilities;
- Knowledge of topics in other policy efforts that have relations to or dependencies with the PDP working group topics;
- Ability to create factual, relevant and easily understandable messages, and able to clearly deliver them to the Working Group
- Ability to deliver a point clearly, concisely, and in a friendly way
- Exhibit agility and confidence in evolving situations and is able to swiftly transition from topic to topic
- Highly effective oral, written, and interpersonal communication skills (in simple, comprehensible English);
- Excellent research skills with the ability to discern factual, factually relevant, and persuasive details and sources;
- Commitment to manage a diverse workload, while collaborating with a Working Group of individuals with different background and interests in driving objectives; and
- Able to effectively build a course of action, analyze trade-offs, and make recommendations even in ambiguous situations; and
- Knowledge of and ability to participate in the Working Group complaint process, commitment to review the [Clarification to Complaint Process in GNSO Working Group](#) Guidelines Section 3.7.

Expressions of Interest for the WG Chair:

Staff is expected to publish a request for Expressions of Interest for the role of Chair. The GNSO Council leadership and Standing Selection Committee leadership will jointly review the responses and will propose a Chair to the GNSO Council which will then either affirm the selection or reject the selection and send the process back to the GNSO Council leadership and Standing Selection Committee leadership.

The Expression of Interest should address the following issues, including but not limited to:

- What is the applicant's interest in this position?
- What particular skills and attributes does the applicant have that will assist him/her in chairing the WG and facilitating consensus building?
- What is the applicant's knowledge of and/or experience in DNS Abuse related work at ICANN, if any?
- What is the applicant's knowledge of ICANN policies and procedures?
- What is the applicant's experience with the GNSO Policy Development Process?
- What is the applicant's experience with consensus building involving various stakeholders, as well as familiarity with the [Consensus Playbook](#)?
- Is the applicant able to commit the time required and necessary work needed to chair the PDP?
- Does the applicant have any affiliation with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial or non-financial interest in the subject matter of this PDP?
- Also expected to be included:
 - A link to an up-to-date Statement of Interest (SOI) - <https://community.icann.org/x/c4Lg>
 - A statement confirming commitment and ability to act neutrally.

Expectations for the Vice Chair:

Finally, as also pointed out in the GNSO Working Group Guidelines, the Vice Chair may facilitate the work of the Chair by ensuring continuity in case of absence, sharing of workload, and allowing the Chair to become engaged in a particular debate. As a result, similar responsibilities and qualifications are expected from the Vice Chair, although the overall workload may be reduced as a result of being able to share this with the Chair.

Leadership Review:

The review of WG leadership provides a regular opportunity for the GNSO Council to check in with WG leadership and Council Liaison to identify resources or input that Council may need to provide, as well as opportunities for the leadership team to improve. The review also enables the GNSO Council to work with the WG leadership and Council Liaison to develop and execute a plan to address possible issues/opportunities identified.

The GNSO Council leadership and/or the Council Liaison may initiate the WG leadership review in response to circumstances indicating that a review is necessary.

The WG leadership shall review the full text of [Regular Review of Working Group Leadership](#) document to understand the regular review of WG leadership performance by the GNSO Council, as well as the [member survey](#) that feeds into the review. This leadership review may be conducted alongside the [WG self-assessment](#), or be integrated as part of the WG self-assessment based on the GNSO Council's further improvement of the review mechanism.

GNSO Council Liaison

The GNSO Council shall appoint one (1) Liaison who is accountable to the GNSO. The Liaison must be a member of the Council, and the Council recommends that the Liaison should be a Council member and be able to serve during the life of this WG.

The complete description of role & responsibilities for GNSO Council Liaison is described in the [GNSO Council Liaison Supplemental Guidance](#). In short, the GNSO Council Liaison is expected to:

- Fulfill liaison role in a neutral manner
 - Importantly, the liaison is expected to fulfil his/her role in a neutral manner. This means that everything the liaison does during his/her tenure, including but not limited to participating in WG calls, reporting status, conveying information, and escalating issues, should be done in that neutral manner.
- Serve as an interim WG Chair until a Chair is named
- Be a regular participant of WG meetings
- Participate in regular meetings with WG Chair
- Report to Council on the WG progress
- Convey to Council on WG communications, questions, concerns
- Inform WG Chair about Council activities impacting the WG
- Refer to Council questions related to WG Charter
- Assist or engage when WG faces challenges
- Assist in case of abuse of ICANN's Expected Standards of Behavior and Community Anti-Harassment Policy
- Assist with knowledge of WG processes and practices
- Facilitate when there is disagreement regarding consensus designation
- Facilitate when a Section 3.7 Complaint Process is invoked
- Initiate the WG leadership review in response to circumstances indicating that a review is necessary

The liaison shall complete the following actions for onboarding purposes:

- Review the [GNSO Council liaison to the WGs - Role Description](#);
- Review the [New Liaison Briefing and Liaison Handover](#) document to understand the actions the liaison needs to take for onboarding purposes.
- Consult the [supplemental guidance](#) developed to provide more precision in their responsibilities and the frequency in which they must be carried out;
- Familiarize with the provisions of the GNSO Operating Procedures relevant to liaisons;
- Subscribe to the PDP mailing lists and relevant sub teams;
- Subscribe to the PDP Leadership mailing list(s), if applicable. In addition, add to the PDP Leadership chat (or other communication channel) if applicable;
- Consider requesting a catch up call with the relevant GNSO policy support staff. This call should clarify the role of the liaison in terms of PDP conference call attendance, expected responsibilities and an update as to the current status of the PDP if already in operation (milestones and anticipated hurdles);
- Review links to the wiki workspaces and mailing list archives via email;
- (If the PDP is already in operation) Consider requesting that PDP Leadership and the outgoing liaison(s) share relevant briefing documents specific to the PDP, to

highlight the scope of the PDP charter, current status, timeline, milestones, problem areas/challenges, anticipated hurdles, etc; • (If the PDP is already operational) Participate in an onboarding conference call with the incoming and outgoing liaisons as well as PDP Leadership; GNSO policy support staff will also be present on the call.
Support Staff:
The ICANN Staff assigned to the WG will fully support the work of the Working Group as requested by the Chair including meeting support, document drafting, editing and distribution and other substantive contributions when deemed appropriate. Staff assignments to the Working Group: • ICANN policy staff members • GNSO Secretariat In addition, regular participation of and consultation with other ICANN Org departments such as the GDS is anticipated to ensure timely input on issues that may require ICANN org input such as implementation-related queries. As such, the ICANN Org GDS is expected to appoint at least one (1) Liaison to the WG, as specified in the “Membership Structure” section above. Furthermore, additional policy staff resources are available to assist the WG leadership for consensus building purposes.
Section V: Rules of Engagement
Statements of Interest (SOI) Guidelines:
Each member of the WG is required to submit an SOI in accordance with Section 5 of the GNSO Operating Procedures and the ICANN Community Participant Code of Conduct.
Statement of Participation:
Each Member and Participant of the WG must acknowledge and accept the Statement of Participation (as provided below), including ICANN’s Expected Standards of Behavior and the ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy before he/she can participate in the WG.
Problem/Issue Escalation & Resolution Process:
The problem/issue escalation & resolution process within the WG is provided in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 of the Working Group Guidelines. WG members should also reference the Guidelines Concerning ICANN Org Resources for Conflict Resolution and Mediation.
Formal Complaint Process:
The formal complaint process within the WG is provided in Section 3.7 of the Working Group Guidelines. Further details regarding the formal complaint process are included in the Clarification to Complaint Process in GNSO Working Group Guidelines document. The formal complaint process may be modified by the GNSO Council at its discretion.

Section VI: Decision Making Methodologies

Consensus Designation Process:

Section 3.6 of the GNSO Working Group Guidelines, as included below, provides the standard consensus-based methodology for decision making in GNSO WGs.

For consensus building purposes, the WG Leadership, WG Members, and GNSO Council Liaison are expected to review the [Consensus Playbook](#) which provides practical tools and best practices to bridge differences, break deadlocks, and find common ground within ICANN processes; potential training related to the Consensus Playbook may be provided for WG Leadership, Members, and GNSO Council Liaison.

Who Can Participate in Consensus Designation:

Consensus calls or decisions are limited to Members who may consult as appropriate with their respective appointing organizations. However, for the purpose of assessing consensus, groups that do not fulfil their maximum membership allowance should not be disadvantaged.

The WG Chair shall ensure that all perspectives are appropriately taken into account in assessing Consensus designations on the final recommendations.

Unless otherwise specified in this Charter, the GNSO Working Group Guidelines apply in full and Consensus designations are therefore the responsibility of the Work Group Chair and are to be made in accordance with the consensus levels described in Section 3.6 of the Working Group Guidelines.

Termination or Closure of Working Group:

Typically, the WG will close upon the delivery of its last Final Report, unless assigned additional tasks or follow-up by the GNSO Council.

The GNSO Council may terminate or suspend the WG prior to the publication of its last Final Report for significant cause such as changing or lack of community volunteers, the planned outcome for the project can no longer be realized, or when it is clear that no consensus can be achieved.

The WG Chair, in collaboration with the WG support staff and the GNSO Council Liaison, shall use an [escalation procedure](#), which helps define the health of the WG and informs the GNSO Council's decision on whether the WG should be terminated or suspended.

Section VII: Change History

Section VIII: Charter Document History

Version	Date	Description
1.0	TBD	

Staff Contact:	TBD	Email:	TBD

Translations: If translations will be provided please indicate the languages below:											

7 Annex B – DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP 2 Draft Charter

ICANN | GNSO

Generic Names Supporting Organization

WG Name:	TBD	
Section I: Working Group Identification		
Chartering Organization(s):	Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO) Council	
Charter Approval Date:	<Enter Approval Date>	
Name of WG Leadership:	<Enter Elected WG Leadership>	
Name(s) of Appointed Liaison(s):	<Enter Liaison>	
WG Workspace URL:	<Enter Active Project URL from GNSO Site>	
WG Mailing List:	<Enter Mailman archive link>	
GNSO Council Resolution:	Title:	Initiation of the Policy Development Process on DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP 2
	Ref # & Link:	<Enter Resolution link>

Important Document Links:	Procedural Documents: • Annex A-1: GNSO Expedited Policy Development Process • Expedited GNSO Policy Development Process Manual • GNSO Working Group Guidelines Non Exhaustive List of Substantive Documents: • DNS Abuse Small Team Report 2025 • DNS Abuse Small Team Report 2022 • ICANN's Enforcement of DNS Abuse Mitigation Requirements - A look at the first 6 months • NetBeacon White Paper • INFERMAL Study • NetBeacon Analysis: How have the gTLD contractual amendments impacted DNS Abuse?
Section II: Mission, Purpose, and Deliverables	
Mission & Scope:	
Background The GNSO Council requested an Issue Report on DNS Abuse in August 2025 and in doing so, suggested three (3) priority topics that should be included in the Policy Development Process (PDP) on DNS Abuse that is expected to follow the completion of the Final Issue Report. The DNS Abuse Small Team, in alignment with community support, recommended narrowly scoped PDP on three issues. The Preliminary Issue Report concluded that all of the three identified priority issues are appropriate for policy development. However, the report suggests that only two of the three identified DNS Abuse Issues should be prioritized for policy development, while one could potentially be addressed more directly and expeditiously outside of the policy development process. This prioritization reflects where policy intervention could likely reduce DNS Abuse at scale, is broadly applicable across the gTLD space, and aligns with the community input and lifecycle-and-cluster analysis used in the updated Small Team gap matrix. Informed by the DNS Abuse Small Team's recommendations and the Community's support for a narrowly scoped Policy Development Process (PDP), the Council initiated a PDP on: 1. Safeguards for Application Programming Interface (API) access to new customers: A proactive approach that seeks to introduce friction for new customer accounts, prior to gaining access to high volume registration tools (i.e., API access for new customers), until trust is established. Malicious actors use ungated APIs to exploit the ability to register large volumes of abusive domains in a short amount of time. According to studies such as the INFERMAL	

study, insufficient gating or friction for new users to access these tools can lead to the proliferation of DNS Abuse. Specifically, registrars that provided unrestricted API-based registrations saw a significantly elevated risk of phishing domains. The study found that the presence of easy automation for domain name registrations (via APIs) can multiply the likelihood of abuse by roughly four times all else being equal. By contrast, the study noted that registrars employing restrictions on API usage for unverified users or requiring some form of vetting saw lower abuse rates. Many registrars require some sort of friction before a new customer account has access to an API for domain name registration but there is no uniform requirement(s) for API safeguards on friction in this area.

Scope & Charter Questions – Safeguards for API access to new customers

This PDP would seek to introduce a requirement to put safeguards in place to ensure that registrants, particularly new or untrusted accounts, cannot immediately access high-volume domain registration tools (APIs) until they have demonstrated basic trustworthiness. Furthermore, to develop a Consensus Policy requiring ICANN-accredited registrars to enforce certain obligations and controls over their resellers or third parties who are authorised to access registrar platforms (e.g., APIs, white-label systems, plugins) for automated domain registration or management. Understanding that Registrars value their customers and namespace, the PDP WG should ensure to keep in mind the Registrant's rights and responsibilities throughout the process. The goal is to slow the ability of threat actors to rapidly register large volumes of domains used in phishing, malware, and other DNS Abuse campaigns and create preventative barriers to criminal campaigns that seek to register malicious domains in large volumes.

Purpose:

- Define a baseline of accountability and operational standards that registrars must impose on downstream partners.
- Establish due diligence, monitoring, and enforcement obligations related to API users, resellers, or relevant third parties.
- Introduction of proportionate, risk-based friction for new or untrusted accounts before granting access to high-volume registration tools. This friction should be based on customer activity (e.g., account age, abuse history), not just identity, to avoid unnecessary barriers for legitimate users.

Charter Questions:

The WG should answer:

1. What minimum contractual safeguards related to access to automated registration tools must registrars impose on resellers/API users?
2. How should registrars ensure API users do not use their systems to register malicious domains?
3. What minimum safeguards/thresholds must registrars be required to implement before granting access to high-volume domain registration tools (APIs) to new customer accounts? This could include:
 - (i) Requiring that a registrant has held one or more domains through the Add Grace Period without action for DNS Abuse,
 - (ii) Implementing waiting periods for newly created accounts,
 - (iii) Denying access to high-speed and/or high-volume registration methods (APIs) for existing customers, if the customer has had domains which the registrar has identified as being maliciously registered DNS Abuse.

4. How can “trustworthiness” be defined or operationalized in a way that is based on customer behavior rather than identity?
5. How can such safeguards be implemented in ways that ensure new registrants, particularly smaller entities and/or those from the global majority, can still demonstrate basic trustworthiness? How can we ensure that any such safeguards are not overly burdensome for these registrants?
6. Can friction be implemented based on customer activity rather than customer identity. Friction based on activity (e.g., how old is the account and have they had reports of abuse) may be more robust, reliable, and easier to implement than attempts at customer verification?
7. What types of friction (e.g., waiting periods, registration history, and DNS Abuse checks) are both effective and feasible for registrars to implement?
8. Must an existing customer account lose access to high-speed or high-volume domain registration tools (APIs) for registration if the registrar confirms that the customer has maliciously registered a domain for DNS Abuse in its account?
9. What aspects should be consensus policy requirements and what aspects can be subject to best practices, or potentially left to the discretion of the contracted party?

Considerations:

- Consider privacy and data-security questions like the Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) and Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA).
- “APIs” or “access to APIs” are an aspect of the problem, and are how some of this abuse is carried out, but “access to APIs” is not exactly the problem itself, and “limiting access to APIs” is not the entire solution. An ICANN policy should recognize that APIs are often a tool used somewhere in the process, but just “restricting access to APIs” will not solve the problem, and may have loopholes. It is common for bad actors to use evasion techniques. They use multiple accounts at a registrar, sometimes register every domain to a different registrant name, and register multiple small batches of domains spaced by time, with the ultimate aim of amassing large numbers of domains.

Impact on Human Rights

The WG is expected to consider the potential impact of any recommendations on human rights. Based on the information included in the request for an Issue Report and the Issue Report, the WG is expected to further consider whether there is a likely human rights impact, and if so, who are the groups expected to be impacted and the expected severity of the impact (high / medium / low). If an impact is anticipated, the WG is expected to address the following questions: 1) is the proposed action necessary to achieve the desired outcome, 2) is the proposed action proportionate, 3) is the proposed action legitimate.

Impact on the Global Public Interest

The WG is also expected to consider the potential impact of any recommendations on the Global Public Interest. In order to facilitate this analysis, the WG may wish to consult this [checklist](#) and may also benefit from consulting the [GPI Toolkit Wiki page](#).

Deliverables:

To develop, at a minimum, an Initial Report and a Final Report regarding the WG's recommendations on issues relating to DNS Abuse Mitigation, following the processes described in Annex A of the ICANN Bylaws and the GNSO PDP [Manual](#).

If the WG concludes with any recommendations, the WG shall (or recommend the subsequent policy Implementation Review Team to) conduct a policy impact analysis and identify a set of metrics to measure the effectiveness of the policy change, including source(s) of baseline data for that purpose:

- Identification of policy goals
- Identification of metrics used to measure whether policy goals are achieved
- Identification of potential problems in attaining the data or developing the metrics
- Identification of potential impact of its recommendations on any currently existing requirements on registrars and registry operators
- A suggested timeframe in which the measures should be performed
- Define current state baselines of the policy and define initial benchmarks that define success or failure
- Metrics may include but not limited to (Refer to the [Hints & Tips](#) Page):
 - ICANN Compliance data
 - Industry metric sources
 - Community input via public comment
 - Surveys or studies

Data and Metric Requirements:

The WG should as soon as practicable:

- Determine a set of questions which, when answered, provide the insight necessary to achieve the policy goals.
- Determine whether certain data is required to help understand a specific issue or answer a charter question.
- Determine a set of data and metrics which can be collected and analyzed to help answer the specific question.
- Submit a Working Group Metrics Request Form (see [GNSO Working Group Guidelines Section 4.5](#)), if data gathering at the charter drafting phase or during the working phase is deemed necessary.

WG leaders shall review the Guidance document below to understand the need for performing due diligence before submitting a data gathering request to the GNSO Council.

Section III: Project Management

Work Product Requirement:

The WG leadership, in collaboration with the WG support staff and GNSO Council liaison, shall use a standard set of project management work products that help plan, guide, track, and report the progress of the WG from start to finish, and include the necessary data and information to assess the progress of the WG. These work products include but not limited to:

- Work Plan
- Summary Timeline
- Project Situation Report
- Project Plan
- Action Items

See the full suite of work products in the [GNSO Project Work Product Catalog](#).

Project Status & Condition Assessment:

The WG leadership, in collaboration with the WG support staff, and the GNSO Council liaison, shall assess the Status and Condition of the project at least once a month. Such frequency is required in preparation for the GNSO Council monthly meeting, where At-Risk or In-Trouble projects are subject to review by GNSO Council leadership, and in some instances may be deliberated by the full GNSO Council.

The WG leadership, in collaboration with the WG support staff and the GNSO Council Liaison, shall use an [escalation procedure](#), which defines specific conditions that trigger the execution of a repeatable mitigation plan. The objective of this exercise is to return the project to an acceptable state ultimately achieving its planned outcomes.

Project Change Request:

The WG shall submit a [Project Change Request \(PCR\) Form](#) to the GNSO Council when its deliverable and baseline delivery date are revised. The PCR shall include a rationale for why these changes were made, their impacts on the overall timeframe of the PDP or any other interdependencies, and a proposed remediation plan.

The use of the PCR mostly occurs when primary deliverable dates are changed due to unforeseen or extreme circumstances. However, it can also be used to document changes in the deliverable requirements that may not have been identified in the chartering process.

When the PCR is required, it should be completed by the WG Chair and it will likely be presented to the GNSO Council for approval.

Resources Tracking:

The purpose for resource tracking is to deliver its work according to the work plan and be responsible for managing these resources.

For projects where dedicated funds are provided outside of budgeted policy activities, the WG shall provide regular budget versus actual expense reporting updates using a GNSO approved tool to allow for a better tracking of the use of resources and budget.

Section IV: Formation, Staffing, and Organization

Working Group Model:

Working Group Model: Representative plus Open

Rationale: The “Representative plus Open” Model is chosen to enable the WG to conduct and conclude its work in an efficient/effective manner.

A limited number of ICANN community members have prerequisite knowledge, background, or expertise in the subject matter. As a result, a limited number of Members appointed by specified community groups, who must possess a level of expertise as detailed in the “Membership Criteria” section in this charter, should drive the deliberations of the WG and participate in the consensus designation process for final recommendations. However, due to the importance of the topics to the whole community other members of the community can attend and participate. Open to anyone interested to join as a participant. Participants may be from a GNSO Stakeholder Group or Constituency or may be self-appointed and derive from within the ICANN or broader community. At the time of chartering, the Council may consider whether an upper limit of participants is to be set, and if so, how it should be implemented. Participants will be able to actively participate in and attend all Team meetings. Consensus calls or decisions are limited to SG/C/SO/AC (as applicable) appointed members who may consult as appropriate with their respective appointing organizations.

Membership Structure:

Role Descriptions: All Members participating in the Working Group are expected to abide by the Statement of Participation, which is enforceable by the WG Chair and GNSO Council Leadership Team. See Section V. for details.

- **Members:** Members are expected to participate during the course of deliberations and in any WG consensus calls. Members are expected to represent the view of their appointing organization, and may be called on to provide the official position of their appointing organization. Members are required to have a level of expertise in the relevant issues and ICANN policies and procedures as that may be impacted.
- **Participants:** Participants may be from a GNSO SG/C or SO/AC, or may be self-appointed and derive from within the ICANN or broader community. Participants will be able to actively participate in and attend all WG meetings. Participants are encouraged to engage in the WG deliberation throughout its lifecycle and are expected to keep up with all relevant WG deliberations to ensure they remain informed and can contribute when needed. However, Participants do not participate in the consensus designation process. Participants are encouraged to possess similar levels of expertise as Members with respect to DNS Abuse issues, ICANN policies and procedures, and registry/registrar services in order to contribute to the deliberations effectively. No upper limit of participants is expected to be set at the chartering phase. However, the WG leadership may decide, in consultation with the WG, whether new Participants can be accepted after the start of the WG effort. See details in the “B. Joining of New Members After Project Launch” in this charter.

- **Observers:** Anyone interested in this PDP may join as an observer. Observers are provided with read-only access to the mailing list and are not invited to attend meetings.
- **GNSO Council Liaison:** The GNSO Council shall appoint one (1) Liaison who is accountable to the GNSO. The GNSO Council Liaison must be a member of the Council, and the Council recommends that the Liaison should be a Council member and be able to serve during the life of this WG. See detailed description in the “GNSO Council Liaison” section below.
- **ICANN Org Liaison(s):** ICANN Org shall appoint at least one (1) Liaison, who is expected to provide timely input on issues that may require ICANN Org input such as implementation-related queries and issues that might benefit from their subject matter expertise. The ICANN Staff Liaison(s) is not expected to advocate for any position and will not participate in any PDP Team consensus calls. **ICANN Board Liaison:** While not required, the ICANN Board is encouraged to appoint a liaison to this PDP. The liaison should participate in accordance with the [Guidelines for Board Members Serving as Liaisons to ICANN Community Groups](#).

Representative Membership Structure:

Some groups may choose not to appoint any Members to the WG. The table below indicates the maximum number of Members that groups may appoint.

Group	Member (up to)	Liaison
RySG	2	
RrSG	2	
IPC	2	
BC	2	
ISPCP	2	
NCSG	2	
ccNSO	2	
ALAC	2	
GAC	2	
SSAC	2	
RSSAC	2	
GNSO Council		1

ICANN Org GDS		At least 1
ICANN Board		1

The GNSO Secretariat is expected to circulate a “Call For Volunteers” in accordance with the group structure determined by the GNSO Council:

- Publication of announcement on relevant ICANN web sites including but not limited to the GNSO and other Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committee web pages; and
- Distribution of the announcement to GNSO Stakeholder Groups, Constituencies and other ICANN Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees

Membership Criteria:

A. Expected Skills for Working Group Members

WG members shall review the full text of the [Working Group Member Skills Guide](#) to understand the responsibilities and skills that they are expected to have in order to fully participate in the WG activities.

Collectively as a group, the WG Members MUST possess:

- A solid understanding of the DNS ecosystem, DNS abuse patterns, and the operational, technical, and privacy considerations involved in domain registration and abuse mitigation;
- Participants should understand how automated registration tools and APIs operate, and the range of technical and procedural safeguards that can reduce DNS Abuse while supporting legitimate registrations.
- Familiarity with GNSO policy development processes; direct experience is strongly preferred;
- Commitment to participating in Working Group meetings on a regular and ongoing basis;
- Highly effective oral, written, and interpersonal communication skills (in simple, comprehensible English);
- Ability to create factual, relevant and easily understandable messages, and able to succinctly deliver them to the Working Group;
- Research skills with the ability to discern factual, factually relevant, and persuasive details and sources;
- Commitment to manage a diverse workload, while collaborating with a Working Group of individuals with different backgrounds and interests in driving objectives;
- Knowledge of Working Group discussions, actions taken at meetings, and deliverables;
- Understanding of the perspectives and interests of the members’ own stakeholder group or constituency;
- Understanding of what consensus means and how consensus-building process works;
- Commitment to facilitate consensus by listening, explaining, mediating, proposing clear actions, and helping other members;

- Commitment to avoid blocking consensus by looking beyond the stakeholder group or constituency affiliation of other Working Group members and judging proposals/positions on their merits;
- Commitment to avoid re-litigating closed issues or deliberate obfuscation;
- Commitment to review the [Consensus Playbook](#) and attend potential training related to the Playbook, facilitate consensus building by employing the tools and techniques as detailed in the playbook;
- Maintain high personal levels of ethical conduct and integrity, including transparency of affiliation in the SOI, in treatment of others and respecting the professional reputation of all in the ICANN community.

B. Joining of New Members After Project Launch

New Members will only join after the launch of the PDP if a current Member is no longer able to continue in its membership. New WG Members should be mindful that, once input/comment periods have been closed, discussions or decisions should not be resurrected unless there is group consensus that the issue should be revisited in light of new information that has been introduced. If the reopening is perceived as abusive or dilatory, a WG member may appeal to the WG leadership.

C. Expert Contributors

The WG has flexibility/discretion to invite participation of the expert contributors in specific fields as it deems necessary.

Expert contributors are not expected to participate in any consensus designation process, but provide perspective/expertise/knowledge to the PDP WG. Based on the WG's determination, the Council may be able to use an independent evaluation process (e.g., GNSO Council Standing Selection Committee) to confirm whether those individuals have demonstrated the expertise/knowledge/perspective.

Leadership Structure:

One (1) Chair + One (1) Vice Chair

The GNSO Council will appoint one (1) qualified, independent Chair (neutral, not counted as from the WG membership) for the WG.

The WG, once formed, may select one (1) Vice Chair to assist the Chair. The Vice Chair can be selected among the WG's Members. However, if a Member is selected as the Vice Chair, his/her appointing organization may appoint a new Member as a replacement.

Should at any point a Vice Chair need to step into the role of Chair, the same expectations with regards to fulfilling the role of Chair as outlined in this charter will apply.

Leadership Criteria:

Expectations for the WG Leadership (Chair + Vice Chair):

The WG leadership is expected to carry out the role and responsibilities and meet the qualification as detailed in the [Expectations for Working Group Leaders & Skills Checklist](#).

In short, the WG leadership is expected to:

- Lead with neutrality and impartiality;
- Encourage representational balance;
- Ensure WG documents represent the diversity of views;
- Balance working group openness with effectiveness;
- Make time commitment;
- Contribute ideas and knowledge to working group discussions;
- Oversee project management of the WG deliberations;
- Build consensus;
- Make consensus designation on working group recommendations;
- Enforce compliance with Statement of Participation;
- Enforce compliance with ICANN's Expected Standards of Behavior;
- Ensure compliance with Community Anti-Harassment Policy;
- Be versed in GNSO Operating Procedures; and
- Handle working group complaint process.

Expectation for the WG Chair:

As outlined in the GNSO Working Group Guidelines, the purpose of a Chair is to call meetings, preside over working group deliberations, manage the process so that all members have the opportunity to contribute, and report the results of the Working Group to the Chartering Organization. These tasks require a dedicated time commitment as each week calls have to be prepared, the agenda concretized, and relevant material reviewed. The Chair shall be neutral. While the Chair may be a member of any group which also has representation on the Working Group, the Chair shall not act in a manner which favors such a group. The Chair shall not be a member of the Working Group for purposes of consensus calls.

In addition, it is expected – that interested candidates shall have considerable experience in chairing working groups, and direct experience with at least one GNSO Policy Development Process throughout its lifecycle. Familiarity with the functioning of a Working Group is important to understand the various leadership skills that are necessary to employ during a WG's lifecycle. For example, a Chair has to ensure that debates are conducted in an open and transparent manner and that all interests are equally and adequately represented within the Group's discussions. During the later stages of a WG when recommendations are drafted, a Chair will benefit from understanding the viewpoints of various members to ensure that an acceptable and effective outcome – ideally in the form of consensus – can be achieved.

The WG Chair is specifically expected to carry out the following responsibilities, including but not limited to:

- Attend all PDP Working Group meetings to assure continuity and familiarity with the subject matter and the ongoing discussions;
- Prepare meetings by reading all circulated materials;
- Be familiar with the subject matter and actively encourage participation during the calls;
- Be active on the PDP mailing list and invite PDP WG members and liaisons to share their viewpoints;
- Drive the progress forward and assure that discussions remain on point;

- Work actively towards achieving policy recommendations that ideally receive full consensus;
- Ensure that particular outreach efforts are made when community reviews are done of the group's output;
- Underscore the importance of achieving overall representational balance on any sub-teams that are formed;
- Enforce Statement of Participation, ICANN's Standards of Behavior, and Community Anti-Harassment Policy;
- Coordinate with staff and ensure that the WG is supported as effectively as possible; and
- Conduct consistent, adequate, and timely reporting to the GNSO Council on the progress of the PDP.

The WG Chair is expected to meet most of the following qualifications:

- Direct experience in consensus building processes and preferably direct experience in GNSO PDPs;
- Knowledge of and preferably direct experience in DNS Abuse related work at ICANN;
- Knowledge of ICANN policies and procedures as they relate to the relevant issue;
- Project management skills: including facilitating goal-oriented Working Group meetings, agenda setting and adherence, time management, encouraging collaboration, driving the completion of action items and achieving milestones in accordance with the WG timeline and work plan, keeping the Working Group's actions, discussions and meetings focused on serving its ultimate goals and deliverables;
- Ability to enforce compliance with the Statement of Participation, ICANN's Expected Standards of Behavior, and Community Anti-harassment Policy;
- Ability to determine when outreach is necessary and to undertake it;
- Ability to identify the diversity of views within the Working Group, if applicable;
- Knowledge of and ability to designate consensus on Working Group recommendations based on the level of agreement;
- Ability to help Working Group members understand that a consensus is a decision that is collaboratively reached and that the Working Group members can "live with"; accordingly, it may not be a perfect or unanimous decision;
- Commitment to review the [Consensus Playbook](#) and attend potential training related to the Playbook, facilitate consensus building by employing the tools and techniques as detailed in the playbook;
- Ability to refrain from promoting a specific agenda and ensuring fair, objective treatment of all opinions within the Working Group;
- Ability to distinguish between Working Group members offering genuine dissent and those raising irrelevant or already closed issues merely to block the Working Group's progress toward its goal;

Ability to halt disruption and, in extreme cases, exclude a Working Group member from a discussion per Section 3.5 of the GNSO Working Group Guidelines on Rules of Engagement;

- Ability to ensure that closed Working Group decisions are not revisited, unless there is a consensus to do so (usually in light of new information brought to the Working Group's attention);

- Ability to commit the time required to perform the WG Chair's responsibilities;
- Knowledge of topics in other policy efforts that have relations to or dependencies with the PDP working group topics;
- Ability to create factual, relevant and easily understandable messages, and able to clearly deliver them to the Working Group
- Ability to deliver a point clearly, concisely, and in a friendly way
- Exhibit agility and confidence in evolving situations and is able to swiftly transition from topic to topic
- Highly effective oral, written, and interpersonal communication skills (in simple, comprehensible English);
- Excellent research skills with the ability to discern factual, factually relevant, and persuasive details and sources;
- Commitment to manage a diverse workload, while collaborating with a Working Group of individuals with different background and interests in driving objectives; and
- Able to effectively build a course of action, analyze trade-offs, and make recommendations even in ambiguous situations; and
- Knowledge of and ability to participate in the Working Group complaint process, commitment to review the [Clarification to Complaint Process in GNSO Working Group](#) Guidelines Section 3.7.

Expressions of Interest for the WG Chair:

Staff is expected to publish a request for Expressions of Interest for the role of Chair. The GNSO Council leadership and Standing Selection Committee leadership will jointly review the responses and will propose a Chair to the GNSO Council which will then either affirm the selection or reject the selection and send the process back to the GNSO Council leadership and Standing Selection Committee leadership.

The Expression of Interest should address the following issues, including but not limited to:

- What is the applicant's interest in this position?
- What particular skills and attributes does the applicant have that will assist him/her in chairing the WG and facilitating consensus building?
- What is the applicant's knowledge of and/or experience in DNS Abuse related work at ICANN, if any?
- What is the applicant's knowledge of ICANN policies and procedures?
- What is the applicant's experience with the GNSO Policy Development Process?
- What is the applicant's experience with consensus building involving various stakeholders, as well as familiarity with the [Consensus Playbook](#)?
- Is the applicant able to commit the time required and necessary work needed to chair the PDP?
- Does the applicant have any affiliation with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial or non-financial interest in the subject matter of this PDP?
- Also expected to be included:
 - A link to an up-to-date Statement of Interest (SOI) - <https://community.icann.org/x/c4Lg>
 - A statement confirming commitment and ability to act neutrally.

Expectations for the Vice Chair:

Finally, as also pointed out in the GNSO Working Group Guidelines, the Vice Chair may facilitate the work of the Chair by ensuring continuity in case of absence, sharing of workload, and allowing the Chair to become engaged in a particular debate. As a result, similar responsibilities and qualifications are expected from the Vice Chair, although the overall workload may be reduced as a result of being able to share this with the Chair.

Leadership Review:

The review of WG leadership provides a regular opportunity for the GNSO Council to check in with WG leadership and Council Liaison to identify resources or input that Council may need to provide, as well as opportunities for the leadership team to improve. The review also enables the GNSO Council to work with the WG leadership and Council Liaison to develop and execute a plan to address possible issues/opportunities identified.

The GNSO Council leadership and/or the Council Liaison may initiate the WG leadership review in response to circumstances indicating that a review is necessary.

The WG leadership shall review the full text of [Regular Review of Working Group Leadership](#) document to understand the regular review of WG leadership performance by the GNSO Council, as well as the [member survey](#) that feeds into the review. This leadership review may be conducted alongside the [WG self-assessment](#), or be integrated as part of the WG self-assessment based on the GNSO Council's further improvement of the review mechanism.

GNSO Council Liaison

The GNSO Council shall appoint one (1) Liaison who is accountable to the GNSO. The Liaison must be a member of the Council, and the Council recommends that the Liaison should be a Council member and be able to serve during the life of this WG.

The complete description of role & responsibilities for GNSO Council Liaison is described in the [GNSO Council Liaison Supplemental Guidance](#). In short, the GNSO Council Liaison is expected to:

- Fulfill liaison role in a neutral manner
 - Importantly, the liaison is expected to fulfil his/her role in a neutral manner. This means that everything the liaison does during his/her tenure, including but not limited to participating in WG calls, reporting status, conveying information, and escalating issues, should be done in that neutral manner.
- Serve as an interim WG Chair until a Chair is named
- Be a regular participant of WG meetings
- Participate in regular meetings with WG Chair
- Report to Council on the WG progress
- Convey to Council on WG communications, questions, concerns
- Inform WG Chair about Council activities impacting the WG
- Refer to Council questions related to WG Charter
- Assist or engage when WG faces challenges
- Assist in case of abuse of ICANN's Expected Standards of Behavior and Community Anti-Harassment Policy
- Assist with knowledge of WG processes and practices
- Facilitate when there is disagreement regarding consensus designation
- Facilitate when a Section 3.7 Complaint Process is invoked
- Initiate the WG leadership review in response to circumstances indicating that a review is necessary

The liaison shall complete the following actions for onboarding purposes:

- Review the [GNSO Council liaison to the WGs - Role Description](#);
- Review the [New Liaison Briefing and Liaison Handover](#) document to understand the actions the liaison needs to take for onboarding purposes.
- Consult the [supplemental guidance](#) developed to provide more precision in their responsibilities and the frequency in which they must be carried out;
- Familiarize with the provisions of the GNSO Operating Procedures relevant to liaisons;
- Subscribe to the PDP mailing lists and relevant sub teams;
- Subscribe to the PDP Leadership mailing list(s), if applicable. In addition, add to the PDP Leadership chat (or other communication channel) if applicable;
- Consider requesting a catch up call with the relevant GNSO policy support staff. This call should clarify the role of the liaison in terms of PDP conference call attendance, expected responsibilities and an update as to the current status of the PDP if already in operation (milestones and anticipated hurdles);
- Review links to the wiki workspaces and mailing list archives via email;
- (If the PDP is already in operation) Consider requesting that PDP Leadership and the outgoing liaison(s) share relevant briefing documents specific to the PDP, to

highlight the scope of the PDP charter, current status, timeline, milestones, problem areas/challenges, anticipated hurdles, etc; • (If the PDP is already operational) Participate in an onboarding conference call with the incoming and outgoing liaisons as well as PDP Leadership; GNSO policy support staff will also be present on the call.
Support Staff:
The ICANN Staff assigned to the WG will fully support the work of the Working Group as requested by the Chair including meeting support, document drafting, editing and distribution and other substantive contributions when deemed appropriate. Staff assignments to the Working Group: • ICANN policy staff members • GNSO Secretariat In addition, regular participation of and consultation with other ICANN Org departments such as the GDS is anticipated to ensure timely input on issues that may require ICANN org input such as implementation-related queries. As such, the ICANN Org GDS is expected to appoint at least one (1) Liaison to the WG, as specified in the “Membership Structure” section above. Furthermore, additional policy staff resources are available to assist the WG leadership for consensus building purposes.
Section V: Rules of Engagement
Statements of Interest (SOI) Guidelines:
Each member of the WG is required to submit an SOI in accordance with Section 5 of the GNSO Operating Procedures.
Statement of Participation:
Each Member and Participant of the WG must acknowledge and accept the Statement of Participation (as provided below), including <u>ICANN’s Expected Standards of Behavior</u>, before he/she can participate in the WG.
Problem/Issue Escalation & Resolution Process:
The problem/issue escalation & resolution process within the WG is provided in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 of the Working Group Guidelines. WG members should also reference the Guidelines Concerning ICANN Org Resources for Conflict Resolution and Mediation.
Formal Complaint Process:
The formal complaint process within the WG is provided in Section 3.7 of the Working Group Guidelines. Further details regarding the formal complaint process are included in the Clarification to Complaint Process in GNSO Working Group Guidelines document. The formal complaint process may be modified by the GNSO Council at its discretion.

Section VI: Decision Making Methodologies

Consensus Designation Process:

Section 3.6 of the GNSO Working Group Guidelines, as included below, provides the standard consensus-based methodology for decision making in GNSO WGs.

For consensus building purposes, the WG Leadership, WG Members, and GNSO Council Liaison are expected to review the [Consensus Playbook](#) which provides practical tools and best practices to bridge differences, break deadlocks, and find common ground within ICANN processes; potential training related to the Consensus Playbook may be provided for WG Leadership, Members, and GNSO Council Liaison.

Who Can Participate in Consensus Designation:

Consensus calls or decisions are limited to Members who may consult as appropriate with their respective appointing organizations. However, for the purpose of assessing consensus, groups that do not fulfil their maximum membership allowance should not be disadvantaged.

The WG Chair shall ensure that all perspectives are appropriately taken into account in assessing Consensus designations on the final recommendations.

Unless otherwise specified in this Charter, the GNSO Working Group Guidelines apply in full and Consensus designations are therefore the responsibility of the Work Group Chair and are to be made in accordance with the consensus levels described in Section 3.6 of the Working Group Guidelines.

Termination or Closure of Working Group:

Typically, the WG will close upon the delivery of its last Final Report, unless assigned additional tasks or follow-up by the GNSO Council.

The GNSO Council may terminate or suspend the WG prior to the publication of its last Final Report for significant cause such as changing or lack of community volunteers, the planned outcome for the project can no longer be realized, or when it is clear that no consensus can be achieved.

The WG Chair, in collaboration with the WG support staff and the GNSO Council Liaison, shall use an [escalation procedure](#), which helps define the health of the WG and informs the GNSO Council's decision on whether the WG should be terminated or suspended.

Section VII: Change History

Section VIII: Charter Document History

Version	Date	Description
1.0	TBD	

Staff Contact:	TBD	Email:	TBD

Translations: If translations will be provided please indicate the languages below:											

8 Annex C – Public Comment Summary Report

ICANN Public Comment Summary Report

Title of Open Proceeding:

Preliminary Issue Report on a Policy Development Process on DNS Abuse Mitigation

Open for Submissions Date:

Monday, 08 September 2025

Closed for Submissions Date:

Saturday, 18 October

Summary Report Due Date:

Monday, 17 November 2025

Category:

- Policy

Requester:

- Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO)

ICANN organization contact(s):

policy-staff@icann.org

Open Proceeding Link:

<https://www.icann.org/en/public-comment/proceeding/preliminary-issue-report-on-a-policy-development-process-on-dns-abuse-mitigation-08-09-2025>

Outcome:

On 14 August 2025 the GNSO Council requested an Issue Report on DNS Abuse Mitigation based upon the DNS Abuse Small Team [Report](#) from July 2025. ICANN org delivered the Preliminary Issue Report on 8 September and the community was invited to comment on the identified issues and draft charter.

The Preliminary Issue Report received 27 comments from across the ICANN community. ICANN Org will consider all comments submitted and update the Preliminary Issue Report where necessary. Once the Final Issue Report is ready, it will be shared with the GNSO Council for their consideration.

Section 1: What We Received Input On

This summary report presents an overview of the public comments received on the Preliminary Issue Report on DNS Abuse and provides a record of community input across all issue areas identified in the report.

There is overall support for pursuing focused policy development on two priority topics: unrestricted API access for high-volume registrations and Associated Domain Check. Both were viewed as having the most immediate potential to reduce systemic DNS abuse. Most commenters also supported continued exploration of Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) coordination, though with varying opinions about whether it should proceed as consensus policy or as a best-practice initiative. In parallel, many commented on the Policy Development Process (PDP) structure and preferred individual PDPs for each topic instead of one PDP for both topics.

Commenters also raised other issues identified in the report, mentioning topics they think should be considered for subsequent PDPs or not prioritized at all. “Verification of Contact Data” and a “Recourse Mechanism” have been noted as other priority topics for subsequent PDPs.

Section 2: Submissions

Organizations and Groups:

Name	Submitted by	Initials
Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group	Amy Cadagin	M3AAWG
Fraudkillers.org	Steven Tenny	Fraudkillers
CleanDNS	Chris Lewis-Evans	CleanDNS
Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group	Mesumbe Tomslin Samme-Nlar	NCSG
Contracted Party House	Sue Schuler	CPH
Ministry of Electronics and IT, Government of India	Pradeep Verma	Government of India
Registries Stakeholder Group		RySG
Identity Digital Inc.	Catherine Paletta	ID
Registrar Stakeholder Group	Zoe Bonython	RrSG
At-Large Advisory Committee		ALAC
Tucows	Sarah Wyld	Tucows
Namecheap, Inc.	Owen Smigelski	Namecheap
Intellectual Property Constituency	Margaret Milam	IPC
Ethereum Name Service (ENS) Labs	Alexander Urbelis	ENS Labs
Public Interest Registry	Elizabeth Bacon	PIR
NetBeacon Institute	Graeme Bunton	Netbeacon
INTA	Lori Schulman	INTA
Business Constituency	Business Constituency	BC
Meta Platforms, Inc.	Mia Brickhouse	Meta
DNS AXE	Mark William Datysgeld	DNA Axe
Governmental Advisory Committee	Fabien Betremieux	GAC
.au Domain Administration Limited	Jordan Carter	auDA

Individuals:

Name	Affiliation (if provided)	Initials
Sourena MAROOFI		SM
Isaac OMAR		IO
Nick WENBAN-SMITH	Nominet UK	NWS
Maciek PIASECKI	ICANN Fellowship	MP
Raffaele SOMMESE	University of Twente	RS

Section 3: Summary of Submissions

The Preliminary Issue Report on a PDP on DNS Abuse Mitigation received twenty-seven (27) comments during the Public Comment period. ICANN received input addressing three principal aspects of the DNS Abuse Issue Report:

- a. The scoping of the identified issues, including views on which issues warrant policy development and how they should be framed;
- b. Suggested additional charter questions and considerations to guide the work of a potential PDP; and
- c. Proposed solutions and implementation approaches as proposed by the commenters or Public Comment input.

This Public Comment Summary Report organizes and discusses the community feedback according to these three broad areas of input where relevant.

Issue 1: Unrestricted Advanced Programming Interface (API) for high-volume registrations

Scoping: Most commenters support moving forward on “unrestricted API access” as a policy topic, with 15 submissions recorded as supporting the recommendation as written. One commenter, SM, asks to clarify what “large volumes” means and “to consider the potential for bad actors to operate across many registrar accounts, which would complicate detection thresholds that reinforce the call for careful scoping and measurable objectives.”

Meta and M3AAWG note similarly that “access to API” is just part of the problem and not the root cause. Meta suggests further that “bulk registration must be defined as being in-scope for the PDP, and calling this policy initiative an “API issue” is in some ways confusing. The GNSO should clarify that bulk registrations made for abusive purposes are the main problem that needs to be solved.

Charter questions: The ALAC supports prioritization and highlights additional Charter questions when considering this topic. The Government of India also supports controls for high-volume registrations APIs and references analysis indicating materially higher abuse when APIs are ungated.

However, the RrSG noted: “the Charter must ensure the WG focuses on APIs that are used for registering domains rather than for other aspects of portfolio management or the EPP [Extensible Provisioning Protocol] interactions between registry and registrar.” auDA notes that API use is common in reseller models and proposes straightforward vetting and verified payment before opening programmatic access and notes examples from their business practices that demonstrate how “access to APIs” can be managed.

The NCSG suggested that “the charter question for this PDP neglects to account for undue burden that such barriers to accessing APIs could pose to new registrants. The

charter should therefore also include a question about how to find this balance, such as: ‘How can such safeguards be implemented in ways that ensure new registrants, particularly smaller entities and/or those from the global majority, can still demonstrate basic trustworthiness? How can we ensure that any such safeguards are not overly burdensome for these registrants?’”

Proposed Solutions by Commenter(s): CleanDNS, DNS AXE, M3AAWG, and NWS argue for activity-based friction, trust thresholds for new or untested accounts, and risk-based gating as proportionate, targeted mitigations that preserve legitimate high-volume use. CleanDNS notes its support for “the introduction of proportionate, risk-based friction for new or untrusted accounts before granting access to high-volume registration tools. This friction should be based on customer activity (e.g., account age, abuse history), not just identity, to avoid unnecessary barriers for legitimate users.”

Multiple commenters, including the IPC, Meta, Namecheap, RrSG, RySG and Tucows, concur that gating and measured friction for APIs access can be required, with registrar discretion in how friction is applied, to achieve evidence-based reductions in abuse. Meta adds that “this includes encouraging waiting periods for new accounts, verifying and validating account activity and history to ensure no prior abuse reports, and implementing tiered access based on risk signals. This approach will reduce the speed and scale at which attackers can launch phishing and impersonation campaigns.” NC further adds “we additionally caution that by providing specific details, limits, or exact requirements into a public ICANN policy will allow bad actors to easily circumvent the policies and continue their campaigns unimpeded and without recourse.”

Issue 2: Associated Domain Check

Scoping: Most commenters support taking up “Associated Domain Checks” as priority topics for a PDP. Supporters including CleanDNS, the CPH, IPC, and the Government of India endorse a policy track to enable or require checks that help link domains associated with an actor or incident. CleanDNS noted that “this *pivot* approach is already best practice among many of their clients and should be standardized as an effective anti-abuse model.” Tucows also notes that this is a practice in their organisation and they support this being formalized. SM questions whether the solution proposed for associated domain checks meaningfully differs from the API-gating work, and suggests that “if a compromised domain is mistakenly flagged as malicious, checking associated domains could result in the take-down of several legitimate domains registered by the same account.”

Charter questions: Commenters such as the ALAC, CPH, and CleanDNS stress that the policy should clearly set the objective, scope, and evidentiary threshold so registrars know what to look for and how to act, while ensuring due regard for registrant rights. IPC suggests that “any obligations should be scoped to ensure it is practical for both retail

and wholesale registrars, with clear criteria for what constitutes “association” (e.g., account ID, email, payment method, account access).”

The ALAC, CPH, DNS Axe, and Meta provide additional draft charter questions that should be considered.

Tucows recommends “that the Charter include a requirement that the WG perform a Data Protection Impact Assessment in addition to the planned Human Rights Impact Assessment.”

M3AAWG, NCSG, and the RrSG also ask for concrete answers during PDP scoping: which data are necessary and proportionate to request when investigating complaints; how data minimization, burden on smaller or low-resource registrants, and privacy will be handled; what enforcement mechanisms and proof standards will apply; and how to assure interoperability and fairness across contracted parties. The RrSG further notes that “initial discussions among stakeholders have brought to light the considerable complexity of codifying this practice into a policy that is both clear and enforceable.” They suggest that “any resulting policy would need to strike a delicate balance: it must be specific enough to be enforceable by contract, flexible to accommodate for situations requiring different types of review, and sufficiently general so as not to inadvertently serve as a blueprint for malicious actors seeking to evade detection.”

Proposed Solutions by commenter(s): Commenters such as CleanDNS and Netbeacon suggest that “for overall impact to the reduction of DNS Abuse and online harms, we believe that Associated Domain Checks should be the priority effort as it will have the more significant impact across the industry while continuing to counteract the malicious actor’s ability to adapt.”

Issue 3: Limited coordination on Domain Generation Algorithm-based abuse

Scoping: The majority of commenters such as the BC, CleanDNS, DNS AXE, Identity Digital, Meta, and the RrSG agree that there should be a clearing house or coordination hub to quickly disseminate Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) domain lists to all relevant operators. However, the approach on how to create that coordination hub varies significantly amongst commenters and stakeholder groups.

The BC, CleanDNS, DNS Axe, Meta, ID, and RySG support best-practices to establish a coordination role for ICANN in this area. However, commenters such as the CPH, the Government of India, IPC, Namecheap, RrSG, and Tucows suggest a PDP on this topic. Tucows noted concerns “that this topic is being singled out for treatment as a non-binding best practice while others are pushed to policy and do not agree that this is appropriate.”

CPH and IPC suggest policy requirements to formally recognize ICANN's role as "clearing house" or "coordination hub" for DGA-based abuse. The CPH noted that policy should consider, amongst others, the following question: "Should there be a centralized coordinating role within the ICANN community to perform the collection and distribution of systemic DGA-based threat information to help protect the security and stability of the DNS?"

The RrSG noted that policy is needed for the "creation of a system available to the community for the collection and distribution of DGA-based threat information, updates to the Security Response Waiver process, and consideration of how to dispose of the DGA domains." Significant concerns were expressed by M3AAWG, which notes that ICANN itself may not be the right place or may not have the "ability to create an effective solution" here.

PDP Structure

Scoping: The Preliminary Issue Report proposed covering the two priority topics in one PDP and dividing the PDP into phases. Some commenters, such as the Government of India, favor launching a single, narrowly scoped PDP that tackles the two top-priority gaps (unrestricted API access and associated domain checks) first, emphasizing that these enable bulk or fast-moving abuse and merit immediate treatment.

However, seventeen (17) commenters such as CleanDNS, CPH, ID, Namecheap, PIR, Tucows, and RrSG, prefer individual PDPs for each topic rather than multi-layered or phased constructs, arguing that bundling issues increases complexity and delays measurable outcomes. Commenters note that the topics are not similar (enough) to be covered in one PDP. CleanDNS for instance "believe[s] that a phased PDP approach would lead to unnecessary delay, in further bolstering anti-DNS abuse actions." The Preliminary Issue Report also added that having these two topics covered in one PDP would "fail the aspiration of a *narrowly scoped PDP*."

On aspects of the WG model, Tucows, Namecheap, and RrSG ask for balanced, parity-minded participation across the community in any working group, noting that "the current draft Charter, however, provides for uneven representation across Stakeholder Groups, with most Stakeholder Groups allotted two seats on the Working Group but one Stakeholder Group allotted six seats." Adding that "when a particular topic will have a greater impact on a particular group this model should be adjusted to ensure voices from the targeted group(s) are prioritized. For the recent Transfer Review PDP, additional registrars were allowed to participate to ensure diverse representation." The ALAC and INTA also note that the Representative Model could "lock out experts who are not part of current ICANN AC/SOs/C/SG groups" and therefore ALAC and INTA recommend a "Representative + Open Working Group Model."

Proposed Solution by Commenter(s): The IPC pointed out that “additional gaps highlighted in the Preliminary Issue Report should be addressed concurrently or in parallel, rather than postponed for years. Rather than endure years of policy-making, ICANN should consider contract negotiations as an alternative approach to a PDP.” The GAC asks in its comments that the Issue Report provides potential solutions to other issues identified in the report, while the IPC further added that a PDP with the other priority topics named by the DNS Abuse Small Team report should begin in parallel, suggesting issues such as “Proactive contact verification” be included in the PDP. The BC similarly notes that policy work on DNS Abuse that takes all gaps into consideration might take many years and therefore, ICANN org should: “Enter into contract negotiations with registries and registrars to amend the Registry Agreement (RA) and Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) to implement new obligations for mitigating DNS abuse.” BC and Meta suggest that ICANN should deliver the PDP on DNS Abuse within 12 months.

Other Issues discussed in the report

This section covers the comments made related to other Issues identified in the Preliminary Issue Report, but not named as priority topics for a PDP.

- **Sources:** The NCSG asked that ICANN and the GNSO draw on a broader and more diverse set of research sources when preparing future Issue Reports. They recommended incorporating other studies and regional perspectives to improve objectivity and global representation when drafting Issue Reports. Furthermore, Namecheap noted that publishing too much detail about detection methods or mitigation strategies can inadvertently aid bad actors. They advised maintaining discretion in future reports and avoiding disclosure of specific technical indicators or operational processes.

Phase 0: Preventative Measures

- **P2 and P3 Lack of Proactive or Timely Contact Verification:**

Scoping: Commenters such as the Government of India would like to see a PDP on this issue. The BC sees policy development on this issue as “top priority” and adds that “as of April 2024, GoDaddy has required domain name auction participants to complete a reasonably stringent verification procedure that includes submission of government-issued identification, a photograph of the user, and a copy of proof of address (e.g., a utility bill or credit card statement).”

Other commenters, such as Namecheap and Tucows, however, consider “the current validation and verification processes to be effective and the current timeline to be appropriate in context of real-life user experiences.” Tucows further added that “if any consideration is to be made regarding adjustment of verification timing, there would first need to be a clear

understanding of when the DNS Abuse occurs in relation to the verification process and whether verified or un-verified domains are more likely to be used in DNS Abuse.”

Proposed Solution by Commenter(s): The Government of India would prefer immediate contract amendments instead of a PDP by “amending the RAA’s Section 3.7 and the RDDS Accuracy Program Specification to mandate instant (simultaneous) email and phone verification via OTP at the time of registration, thus eliminating the current 15-day window.” The RySG notes that this issue should be covered within a DNS Abuse PDP, but “could be part of other GNSO-led efforts.”

Regarding the lack of full syntactic checks, Tucows noted that the issue should be raised to ICANN Compliance. Namecheap and the RrSG suggest that “SSAC should be invited to provide or endorse tools for those basic syntactic checks (email and phone formats per RFC).”

- **P5 Minimal Deterrent Effect of Reactive Measures (“Uptime”):**
Commenters such as the Government of India, the RrSG, and Tucows agree that no specific solution is needed for this issue. The Government of India notes, however, that increasing education on preventative measures should be considered.
- **P6 Real-Time Detection of Short-Lived Abuse:**
Scoping: Most commenters, such as Namecheap, Tucows, and the RrSG, agree that “combating short-lived DNS abuse requires a multi-layered approach” and should be approached holistically and outside of policy. The NCSG suggests that this issue is outside of ICANN’s remit. It argues that “even where technically possible, the constant monitoring of all registrants’ domain-related activities amounts to a staggering system of surveillance that may not only produce a chilling effect among registrants and should only be undertaken should with clear safeguards.”
Proposed Solution by Commenter(s): The Government of India suggests that “the root cause of the problem can be addressed through instant/ simultaneous verification (meaning gap P2 and 3) along with other approaches.” The BC and IPC both suggest that this Issue could be solved addressing P2 and P3 as well as P7 and suggests that ICANN “facilitate data sharing and technology tools to help registrars identify high-velocity abuse (e.g., feed of domains generated by DGAs or reported in near-real-time).”

- **P7 Underuse of Predictive Algorithms for Early Detection:**

Scoping: Most commenters supported the Preliminary Issue Report's conclusion that predictive algorithms for early detection of DNS Abuse are not for inclusion in ICANN contractual obligations and potentially best addressed in non-binding best practices. The Government of India, NCSG, and Namecheap caution that automated detection tools risk high false-positive rates, potentially leading to unjustified mitigation actions against legitimate domains.

Proposed Solution: The IPC, on the other hand, would like to see a policy recommendation on this issue. Even so, they recognize "that one cannot mandate specific algorithms, but policy can require registrars to have a fraud detection mechanism in place and act on its output."

- **P8 No Post-Registration Identity Checks for Suspicious Activity:**

Scoping: Commenters such as the BC, the Government of India, and IPC supported additional post-registration identity verification for suspected abuse, while other commenters, such as the RrSG, Tucows, and Namecheap, note that no further policy work is needed here.

Proposed Solution by Commenter(s): The Government of India proposes "amending RAA Section 3.7 or adding a new section requiring triggered KnowYourCustomer-style checks after specific thresholds of abuse (e.g., multiple abuse reports within 30 days)." The IPC suggests that "when a domain is reported for serious abuse (with evidence), the registrar should be obligated to re-confirm the registrant's identity and details. For example, require the registrant to provide a valid government-issued ID or additional verification promptly once their domain is the subject of a credible abuse complaint."

The RrSG added that "it is current practice to conduct some level of review when addressing abuse reports, which can trigger further in-depth review of contact data as appropriate. The topic will also be addressed at least in part during the Associated Domains Check PDP." The RrSG cautions that "this identified gap blurs the line between contact detail verification and identity review. That distinction must remain clear[.]"

Namecheap and RrSG both point out that the "RAA already requires re-verification in specific circumstances." Tucows added that "Registrant identity and validation of the registrant's information has not been shown to be a factor in identifying DNS Abuse." The NCSG further emphasizes its position on "registration data accuracy" to focus on "contactability, not identity verification."

- **P9 and P10 Discounted Pricing and Free Services:**

All commenters, such as the Government of India, NCSG, and RrSG, agree that while free or heavily discounted domain pricing can correlate with DNS Abuse, pricing policies fall outside ICANN's remit. Furthermore, commenters support the report's recommendation to address this issue through education and awareness. Some commenters, such as the BC and IPC, encourage ICANN to publish educational material and best practices or "future contract incentives."

- **P11 Limited Use of Abuse Feeds and Threat Data:**

Scoping: Commenters such as the Government of India and the RrSG agree with the report that requiring use of commercial block lists is not appropriate for policy.

Proposed Solution by Commenter(s): Tucows suggested that this can be addressed by best practices but also points out that the "presence of a domain on a commercial blocklist is neither determinative nor conclusive but rather a single data point that may be considered when making a determination about the existence of DNS Abuse." Namecheap adds that "it should be for individual contracted party to determine which of these commercial (e.g. paid) services they should utilize, based upon the registrar or registry's unique business needs" and emphasized "that some popular abuse feeds contain high levels of false positives and little (if any) transparency regarding data collection and analysis."

Phase 1 and 2: Abuse Reporting

- **A1 Unactionable Complaints to ICANN:**

Scoping: Many commenters, such as the RrSG, appreciate the current approach, where ICANN org filters "unactionable complaints" and supports "educational initiatives" to improve DNS Abuse reporting. Commenters reported that complainants often receive limited feedback or unclear referral paths. The BC and IPC note that "part of the issue at play is standards and procedures that differ by registrar or registry" and don't seem to be "user-friendly."

Proposed Solution by Commenter(s): The BC and IPC "support efforts to standardize the DNS abuse reporting intake process, and the community should define what constitutes an 'actionable' abuse report (fields, evidence required and other elements of actionable report) and ensure complainants are guided to provide."

The Government of India "proposes a narrowly scoped PDP amending RAA Section 3.18.4 to require registrars to publish a clear abuse reporting user-friendly web form with mandatory fields (e.g., domain name, evidence of abuse) and step-by-step guidance with FAQs to assist the

complainants, combined with best-practice educational materials, will reduce unactionable reports and improve responsiveness.”

INTA noted in its comment “that there is no mention of whether ICANN Compliance provides feedback to complainants on why their report was unactionable when closing a report,” explaining that “INTA members and a minority of registrars agree that ‘fake web shops’ constitute phishing, whereas most registrars will not action DNS abuse reports related to ‘fake web shops.’” INTA, therefore, recommends “ICANN to add language to A1 (issue) that addresses our concern regarding the subjectivity of responses and require ICANN compliance to report the reasons why a report is unactionable when closing the file.”

SM suggests clearer publication of abuse-contact details by registries and registrars. He urged that each contracted party maintain an easily discoverable, functional email address for reporting abuse and that ICANN ensure these contacts remain accurate. SM objected to the growing trend of replacing abuse-reporting email addresses with online forms. He argued that forms can fail or restrict urgent reports, especially for automated submissions from security researchers. He asked that ICANN reaffirm the requirement for a working abuse email address as a baseline standard, allowing web forms only as supplementary channels.

- **A3 Malicious vs. Compromised Domains:**

Scoping: The IPC expresses a view that policy efforts should focus on malicious registrations (within ICANN’s remit) but encourages cooperative action on compromised domains. In contrast, the BC does not agree that compromised domains are expressly outside ICANN’s remit, stating: “we acknowledge that it may be prudent to focus initially on mitigation of maliciously registered names” and emphasizes that this could be addressed by focusing policy on preventative measures.

Proposed Solution by Commenter(s): Commenters such as Namecheap, the RrSG, and Tucowas note that this distinction between malicious and compromised domains is complex and sometimes impossible to determine. It may be more useful to refer to “fraudulent” registrations, whereas “malicious” implies a level of intent which we cannot determine, while “fraudulent” relates to a demonstrated behavior and we can base processes and policies around it.

The Government of India “insists registrars be required to publish clear FAQs and guidance for registrants whose domains have been compromised, explaining how they may contact agencies (e.g. national CERTs, cybercrime units), what documents must be submitted (identity

proof, domain ownership evidence, security logs), and what procedural steps are available to restore suspended or blocked sites.”

Some commenters provided the following comment regarding the use of the Centralized Zone Data Service (CZDS): The BC noted “this is not directly tied to this request for comment; however, the BC offers in good faith its ideas for improving CZDS as an abuse mitigation tool.” The BC further proposed “Voluntary Daily Zone File Publication by Commercially Used ccTLDs - Increasing Transparency & DNS Security via CZDS,” referencing research “that at least 1% of domain names exist in a ‘window of invisibility’ registered and used maliciously within the 24-hour gap between daily zone file publications (Sommese et. al.,2024).”

RS proposed a similar approach, noting “DarkDNS: Revisiting the Value of Rapid Zone Updates (IMC 2024), we measured a persistent visibility gap in the ICANN Centralized Zone Data Service (CZDS), where at least one percent of newly registered domains never appear in the daily zone snapshots.” SM also suggests “a log would allow security experts and organizations to instantly access changes in zone files, enabling real-time monitoring of newly registered domains. This, in turn, would make it possible to detect malicious activities more quickly and effectively.”

Phase 3: Mitigation by Contracted Parties

- **C1 Limited Transparency on Mitigation Actions Taken:**

Scoping: Some commenters, such as the IPC, would like to see policy development on this issue. The NCSG “urge[s] the ICANN community to place greater priority on actioning these transparency requirements” and to consider policy development. RrSG and Tucows note that this could be addressed via policy development but is not a priority topic at this time.

Proposed Solution by Commenter(s): The IPC would like to see a requirement “(via policy or procedure) that registrars send a response to the abuse reporter when a case is resolved.” The Government of India, for instance, proposes “a contract amendment complemented by best practices to establish transparency in reporting mitigation actions by registrars/registries. In this context, amending RAA Section 3.18.4 (handling and tracking abuse reports) by setting up obligations upon the registrars to publish periodic statistics.”

The RrSG, however, suggests that “as a start, the Community should consider nonbinding guidance and best practices for abuse reporting.” INTA noted that “the Issues Report should consider the overlap between C1 (Limited Transparency in Mitigation Actions Taken) and A1 (Unactionable Complaints to ICANN) and identify that there is a common theme of needing to close the feedback loop to reporters.”

- **C3 Lack of Standard Recourse or Appeal Mechanisms for Registrants:**

Scoping: Many commenters such as Namecheap and the RySG agree with the conclusion of the Preliminary Issue Report and support this topic being considered in subsequent PDPs. The NCSG added “concern that this gap was not listed as a priority item for a policy development process.” The M3AAWG, however, noted “this idea is not designed to prevent or mitigate abuse. The need for a policy has not been justified, and a policy could be abused if not written properly.”

Proposed Solution by Commenter(s): The IPC suggests that this could be addressed by “simply requiring registrars to offer a point of contact for suspension disputes, and to promptly review any evidence provided by the registrant.” Tucows suggests that “all PDPs that have effects on registrants include consideration of recourse and dispute mechanisms available to registrants.”

- **C6 and C7 Due Diligence and Transparency in Mitigation:**

Commenters such as the RySG and Tucows agree with the report’s conclusion that “this is not a gap in DNS Abuse mitigation itself and does not require policy development work at this time.”

The Government of India and IPC support best practices. India also recommends to “develop policy once more data is available.” The NCSG, however, disagrees significantly with the report noting that this should be a priority policy topic and that there is sufficient data available on the topic.

The NCSG points to “civil society organisations who have conducted research on the importance of human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) for infrastructure companies and for technology companies more broadly.”

- **C8 Inconsistent Responses - Seeking Standardization:**

The RrSG noted that the contract amendments kept the timeline to respond intentionally flexible “to ensure that Contracted Parties have the ability to take appropriate action depending on the circumstances.”

Tucows “understands the Report’s conclusion that pursuing non-binding best practices would be appropriate here but suggests instead that this should be addressed by offering education.”.

The IPC, however, notes that “promptly” is “too elastic” and proposes “the community could agree that an abuse complaint with sufficient evidence should be processed within 24 hours in normal circumstances”. “SM asked in his comment: “It is important to clearly define what ‘promptly’ means in practice. Does it refer to 24 hours, 48 hours, one week, or

another timeframe?” He references the RA that “registry operators must promptly take the appropriate action...” Furthermore, SM comments noted a lack of transparency in sink holing practices. He explained that he “observed cases where some registrars’ ‘sinkhole’ a domain by changing its nameservers to ones under their control” and according to him “this practice is fundamentally problematic.”

Phase 4: ICANN Compliance Enforcement

- **E2 No Clear Escalation of Sanctions for Recurring Non-Compliance:**

Scoping: Most commenters agree that addressing this would require policy work. However, commenters such as the RrSG argue that this is not a priority topic and the community should address other issues first. Tucows notes, “it is unclear what additional intermediate penalties would be envisioned.”

Proposed Solution by Commenter(s): The Government of India “favours exploring a PDP to establish graduated sanctions, balanced with due process.” The IPC suggests “if a few registrars are responsible for an outsized share of abuse, ICANN should be able to initiate audits or impose conditions on accreditation renewal.” INTA “suggests that an intermediate sanction could be introduced by creating two tiers of registrar fees: lower fees for registrars who receive less than a given number of compliance inquiries and non-compliance notices in a billing period, and, likewise, higher fees for registrars who exceed this number.”

- **CC.2 No Mechanism to Update DNS Abuse Definition:**

Scoping: There is broad agreement amongst commenters such as Government of India, NCSG, and Tucows for not expanding the current definition of DNS Abuse currently; commenters endorse using the existing RAA-anchored definition. The Government of India and NCSG agree that other definitions such as the current ICANN definition “while malicious, are deemed outside of ICANN’s remit as they pertain to content and therefore would violate ICANN’s bylaws.”

Proposed Solution by Commenter(s): The RrSG “is open to review where attributes of DNS Abuse clearly and objectively have changed and evolved away from the current definitions, while staying within ICANN’s remit, and measuring emerging vectors against those attributes.”

The BC, Fraudkillers, INTA, and IPC in contrast ask for a continuous update to the DNS Abuse definition based on emerging and evolving threats. The BC and INTA reference “that SAC115 recommends periodic review of abuse definitions, as did the recommendations from the SSR2 team.” Fraudkillers want to see “scams and fraud” included in the definition.

Section 4: Analysis of Submissions

In addition to the Public Comment, ICANN organized a [DNS Abuse Working Session at ICANN84](#). The session was convened to move from issue-framing to possible solutions on the two topics highlighted in the Preliminary Issue Report. The goal was to gather community perspectives to inform a draft charter and updates to the Issue Report.

The Public Comment and ICANN84 session showed areas of convergence and divergence.

Areas of Convergence:

- With respect to Issue 1 (API Access) and Issue 2 (Associated Domain Checks), ICANN notes that nearly all commenters agreed these topics should be prioritized for policy development through a GNSO PDP. The comments confirm that both issues are well-supported by data and provide a clear foundation for meaningful consensus policy work.
- Many commenters argued for outcome-oriented requirements that specify what must be achieved rather than dictating how each registrar must perform checks. This flexibility was seen as essential to account for varying business models, technical systems, and local legal contexts. Registrars noted that different technical infrastructures already support abuse checks; mandating specific tools or data points could be counterproductive.
- Support for proportionate, risk-based safeguards on API/high-volume access. There was broad recognition that not every reseller or registrar needs the same level of gating. Participants converged on a risk-tiered approach.
- There was general acknowledgment that registrant rights, data privacy, and non-discrimination must be built into any new policy requirements, and recognition that a Human Rights Impact Assessment is now a standard procedure for every PDP.
- Participants and commenters noted Associated Domain Checks as a potentially “high-impact” first-step PDP. There was relatively broad alignment that requiring checks for associated domains using existing registrar tools could produce tangible results relatively quickly.
- Participants urged designing solutions resilient to evolving attacker behaviour and emerging technologies.

Areas of Divergence:

- Commenters expressed differing preferences for a single comprehensive PDP or two smaller, narrowly focused PDPs. The majority seems to favor two separate charters for the topics.
- Regarding the third issue from the Preliminary Issue Report: Limited Coordination of DGA-based abuse. The community had varying opinions on whether this

should be addressed as a best practice or via PDP. The CPH proposed policy development on this issue.

- Participants and commenters emphasized that publicly detailing association signals could allow bad actors to reverse-engineer systems.
- Some noted that requirements to document every Associated Domain Check or maintain detailed investigation logs could impose significant administrative load, particularly on smaller registrars, without necessarily improving detection outcomes.

Incorporation Into Issue Report

ICANN org will integrate additional clarifications and proposed charter questions suggested by commenters concerning evidentiary thresholds, implementation feasibility, and metrics for measuring effectiveness for both priority topics. For the third priority topic, ICANN org will update the section with the differing views and suggestions on whether to address this topic via policy development or best practices.

On PDP structure, ICANN org acknowledges the thoughtful feedback received from multiple stakeholder groups regarding scope, sequencing, and representation. ICANN recognizes these concerns and will update the Preliminary Issue Report incorporating two (2) draft charters for Council consideration.

Regarding the other issues analyzed in the Preliminary Issue Report, ICANN appreciates the detailed input provided by commenters. Where appropriate, ICANN will update the “Proposed Solutions” section of the report to reflect community feedback and incorporate additional examples or refinements suggested during the comment period.

Section 5: Next Steps

ICANN org appreciates the valuable and substantive input received from all commenters on the Preliminary Issue Report. Based on the comments received, ICANN will update the report and deliver the Final Issue Report to the GNSO Council for consideration.