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**ICANN Transcription**

**Transfer Policy Review PDP WG**

**Tuesday, 05 October 2021 at 16:00 UTC**

Note: Although the transcription is largely accurate, in some cases it is incomplete or inaccurate due to inaudible passages or transcription errors. It is posted as an aid to understanding the proceedings at the meeting, but should not be treated as an authoritative record. Attendance and recordings of the call are posted on agenda wiki page: [https://community.icann.org/x/LAA\\_Cg](https://community.icann.org/x/LAA_Cg)

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JULIE BISLAND:

Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening, everyone. Welcome to the Transfer Policy Review PDP Working Group Call taking place on Tuesday, the 5<sup>th</sup> of October 2021.

In the interest of time, there will be no roll call. Attendance will be taken by the Zoom room.

For today we have apologies from the RrSG—Crystal Ondo, Tom Keller, Catherine Merdinger; and from the RySG, James Galvin; At-Large, Steinar Grøtterød; and IPC, Salvador Camacho Hernández. They have formally assigned Essie Musailov, Eric Rokobauer, Jothan Frakes from the RrSG, Beth Bacon (RySG), and Raymond Mamattah (At-Large) as their alternates for this call and for remaining days of absence.

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As a reminder, an alternate assignment must be formalized by way of a Google Assignment form. The link is available in all meeting invite e-mails.

All members and alternates will be promoted to panelists. When using the chat feature, please select either Panelists and Attendees or select Everyone in order for all participants to see your chat and for it to be captured in the recording. Observers will remain as an attendee and will have access to view chat only.

Alternates not replacing a member are not permitted to engage in the chat or use any of the other Zoom room functionalities. If you are an alternate not replacing a member, please rename your line by adding three Z's before your name and add in parenthesis "Alternate" after your name. This will move you to the bottom of the participant list. To rename yourself in Zoom, hover over your name and click Rename.

Statements of Interest must be kept up to date. If anyone has any updates to share, please raise your hand or speak up now. Seeing no one, if you do need assistance updating your Statements of Interest, please e-mail the GNSO secretariat.

Please remember to state your name before speaking for the transcription. Recordings will be posted on the public Wiki space shortly after the end of the call.

And as a reminder, those who take part in ICANN multistakeholder process are to comply with the Expected Standards Of Behavior.

Thank you. And over to our chair, Roger Carney. Please begin.

ROGER CARNEY:

Thanks, Julie. Welcome, everyone. Let's go ahead and jump in. Again, as we'll trying to start every meeting, I'll leave the floor open for anyone that has any discussions from their stakeholder groups that they want to bring forward or any comments or questions from the last few meetings that they want to bring up before we get started on today's discussion. So I'll open the floor up to whoever wants to have a few minutes here if they have anything to share. Okay, great.

Well let's jump in. There are just a couple things I wanted to talk about. ICANN72, we do have our session scheduled for Tuesday the 26<sup>th</sup> at 15:30 UTC. What we're going to talk about, I think we'll firm up as we finish our discussions prior to that. So we'll get the agenda out at a later time, but please plan on attending. That'll be basically our normal weekly.

Sarah, please go ahead.

SARAH WYLD:

Thank you. Just in terms of updates, I haven't updated my SOI because I'm still trying to figure out if I need to do so. But I feel that I should inform this team that my company that I work for, Tucows, has recently purchased the registry platform of another company. So we are not a registry. I will continue to represent the Registrar Stakeholder Group, but I felt that should be mentioned. Thank you.

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ROGER CARNEY: Thanks, Sarah. I appreciate that. Okay. So again, just to reiterate, our ICANN72 session will be on Tuesday October 26<sup>th</sup> at 15:30 UTC. And it will act as our normal weekly.

On the topic of schedules, we plan to work even through these prep weeks coming up. But we plan to still meet weekly up until ICANN and then take the Tuesday after ICANN off and then continue our schedule after that. And I think staff has already sent out those notices, so hopefully everybody has those.

I think that's all I had, and it looks like Kristian would like to talk. Please go ahead, Kristian.

KRISTIAN ØRMEN: Thank you. I was just wondering if it's necessary to announce Tom Keller at each meeting. He has unfortunately left the Registrar space, so he will be absent from this working group for the next six years.

ROGER CARNEY: Thanks, Kristian. Yeah, I'll talk with staff about that and how want to work that. Thanks, Kristian.

And Sarah, to your note in chat. Yes, the November 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting, we will not be having.

Okay, any other comments or questions from anybody? Anybody thought of anything that their stakeholder groups have talked about or anything that they want to share with the group before we get started into the meat of our agenda? Okay.

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Well let's go ahead and jump into talking about the Gaining FOA. And maybe we'll try to wrap up the Gaining FOA discussions for now anyway. Just like all of our previous discussions, we're tying a loose bow on these. Obviously we'll come back and touch on them as we progress through other topics. So let's go ahead and try to work through these.

And I think—thank you—staff added to the Gaining FOA working document a few pieces of what they saw as functionality of the current Gaining FOA, and looking at each one of those and deciding if that functionality should be continuing or not. And this is our goal, I guess. Our goal for the group is deciding if that functionality should continue or not. If it does continue, in what form. If it doesn't continue, why are we discontinuing it.

So I think this is just a rough here. I think a lot of these things we've talked about, so I don't think it's a surprise for the group. But we can go through each one of these and see how is this working group making the decision on what to do with it.

All right. Let's go ahead and jump into the first one here. "Provides a verification step that is distinct from any process with the Losing Registrar."

And I think that a lot of this—and I think maybe there's another one here, too. I think this kind of goes along with the express authorization. The Gaining FOA requires an active participation from the registrant. Today, the Gaining FOA requires an active participation from the registrant to verify and make sure that the transfer is okay before it gets executed. If the registrant does not accept that actively, then the transfer actually stops. And today

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we're actually talking about reversing—or not reversing it—but making it a passive communication as going forward. So I just want to get people's ideas on that and see ...

Again, I think that this was what I think everybody air quoted—or however you want to put it—talked about the “security-ish” features, this being one of those. What is the security feature? I think this is basically that security feature where it's an active registrant participation to make the transfer go through. Whereas what we're suggesting is that this be removed. It goes to the forefront of possibly where the TAC is requested and followed through.

But as we discussed previously, that TAC request could actually be from someone different than the registrant. So there's still a slight difference here where we're getting rid of that active registrant participation.

Theo, please go ahead.

THEO GEURTS:

Yeah. I see it's laid out here as a verification step, but basically when we talk about the Gaining FOA and the Losing FOA, it was just a method on how to transfer a domain name. And it was done through the Gaining FOA and the Losing FOA. You would ask permission to transfer it, and that was the vehicle to accommodate the transfer process. It was not as much or as such as a verification step.

And as you pointed out, with the creation of the TAC and the procedures that are required there, that's a step in the right

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direction. And given the fact that we don't use this as much anymore for the last couple of years, I think we are in pretty good shape of saying that we already are addressing this in the other recommendation, in the creation of the TAC.

But it will be interesting when we talk about the creation of the TAC and where it gets acknowledged or not acknowledged, regarding if it's valid or not or should be valid if the TTL [in overall].

That is going to be an interesting discussion. If we look at what happened with that registrar that got hacked a couple of weeks ago, it would be fantastic to have a TAC system in place. I mean that would have solved them a lot of headaches. It isn't in place there. Not yet.

But from my perspective, we already addressed this first question here, and I think we're in pretty good shape. Thanks.

ROGER CARNEY:

Thanks, Theo. Any other comments on this? Again, I think this is probably one of the major differences from—I say today—from pre-GDPR to ... What we're recommending here is this actual verification by the registrant themselves.

Okay. We're getting some agreement with Theo in chat here. Okay. And again, I think, several of these can ...

Berry, please go ahead.

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BERRY COBB:

Thank you, Roger. I'm just picking up on some of the chat traffic here. Specifically, Farzaneh has asked that if the Gaining FOA were removed and we're relying on stronger security features. And Kristian's response is that we still have as part of our charter and project plan talking about additional security measures.

I'm just wondering if now might be a good time to understand what some of those might be. I understand that we've started to coalesce around some preliminary conclusions as it relates to the Losing FOA. But again, channeling Jim's interventions about the timing aspects of when thinking about the entire transfer process, is it worth at least just giving some initial indications about what other security measures could be explored in the context that the Gaining FOA is indeed removed.

And one of the things that I'd like to, again ... I know that we touched upon it within this document, but I believe it's either Charter Question 2 or 3 which specifically is pointing back to the Temporary Specification and making a connection about some future restricted system when available. If that is something that should also be explored here. Thank you.

ROGER CARNEY:

Great. Thanks, Berry. Yeah and, definitely, I think if anyone has in mind any of those enhanced security concepts or even early ideas, the sooner we get them out, the better. And that way we can flush them out and everybody can get a good understanding of them.

Theo, please go ahead.



THEO GEURTS: Yeah. I don't mind going over them, but if you look at what we ... Let me rephrase this. I mean we already put in a couple of things with the creation of the TAC. Do we feel that is not sufficient enough as a working group? Because for me, they are pretty obvious. But if the rest of the group goes like, "Okay, we need to have more discussion on this because we don't see the current advancements that we already created with the generation of the TAC—which in my mind, like I said, is pretty clear.

And maybe this is just because when I'm looking at what happened with that registrar that got hacked and everything—I mean everything—was available to the entire Internet. I mean, if you had an Internet connection, you could download all the domain names, all the Auth-Codes, all the e-mail addresses, everything.

And if I compare that with the suggestion which we made a couple of weeks ago about how we should create a TAC, that is definitely a step forward if a registrar gets hacked. If we look at the function of creating a hash at the registry when the registrar creates a TAC and the registry creates a hash. That is a fantastic security feature.

For example, if a registry would get hacked and only those hashes are available, that is a step in the right direction instead of having access to all the Auth-Codes. In such situations, speed is of the essence. And if you are a large registry and you need to change all the Auth-Codes, that could be a somewhat lengthy process. It won't take weeks, but still it could be hours of time.

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And then having all your hash available, that's a great step in the right direction. And if you look at a question at the verification step, I mean if we talk about domain theft, that is not a great security feature because that verification step doesn't do anything at all. Thanks.

ROGER CARNEY:

Great, Theo. And I think that's the important thing. I don't think that we have rehash any of those old things. I think everybody kind of understands it.

But I think the important thing is to bring those forward and say, "These things have been added, and that's why this makes it better." I just think we have to enumerate those ideas in saying, "Yes, we add this, so it helps here." Again, I don't think we have to rehash those things. I think everybody thinks they're great ideas. We just need to pull those forward so that we can say, "Yes, this was added, and this helps here." And it helps explain why we start to move away from certain things or move toward certain things.

Berry, please go ahead.

BERRY COBB:

Thank you, Roger. Yes, building on what you just said, Roger, the process that we're going through here is trying to capture the deliberations and the understanding to provide the appropriate rationale for each of the changes that are going to be proposed by the working group. And so I think a part of that process is trying to consider other possible aspects.

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And so, just to kind of put a more specific point on my previous intervention. So it is Charter Question a3 which is from the Temporary Specification. “Until such time when the RDAP service (or other secured methods for transferring data) is required by ICANN to be offered, if the Gaining Registrar is unable to gain access to then-current Registration Data for the domain name subject of a transfer ...”

I’m not going to read the entire thing, but the point here is that the Temporary Specification is pointing to RDAP and/or some secure method for transferring the data. And I would like to set aside previous interventions about the lawfulness, or is it necessary, or data minimization. But it's these types of questions that I think the group really needs to provide appropriate rationale for why a particular secure method couldn't be used to replace the intent of what the Gaining FOA is.

And perhaps it is enough that the other recommendations that are being considered for the TAC in the Losing FOA are enough. But as a practical matter in today's world, or I should say pre-GDPR, my understanding was that in terms of obtaining the Gaining Registrar, obtaining the necessary information to complete the Gaining FOA, that was typically automated through Port 43. And my understanding is that registrars basically whitelisted each other that would allow bypassing any throttling mechanisms or other aspects related to getting to that information.

And I’m the furthest from an RDAP expert, but could it be conceivable that now that RDAP is implemented at least partially—I know there's still a lot of work going on in relation to RDAP—but is it conceivable that two years from now, or 18

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months or whatever that timeframe is, that when the RDAP instances are stood up, could some sort of whitelist function be implemented that would allow registrars to still obtain at least the e-mail address of the RNH from a Gaining perspective?

Or if it's not just as simple as whitelisting because the information is redacted, is there some sort of authentication mechanism that could be considered that would allow access to that partial personal information?

And I'm not saying it should or shouldn't. But that is the kind of deliberation that needs to happen here enough of a way to provide the appropriate rationale for why the Gaining FOA might be removed. Thank you.

ROGER CARNEY: Thanks, Berry. Theo, please go ahead.

THEO GEURTS: Yeah. I'm having a little bit of a difficult time processing this. The technical answer is, of course, yes, that can be done. We can create a million ways to facilitate this. But if we cannot take account the legal reality of data protection law, if we just completely set that aside ...

Because in my mind, I'm looking at the legal ramifications and restrictions first, which I have done over a couple of years. And I've got to a point that if I take data protection law in mind, I cannot get to the technical solution because I'm limited by data protection law.

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So I'm not sure we ... Of course we can deliberate about a system through whitelisting or setting up connections with escrow data providers. There is no limit in your thinking here. I'm just wondering if that is the correct path to go down. The TechOps group has already put their best technical people for months on the problem. They couldn't come up with a solution that would be [legal] and [technically] feasible at that given time. And it was mostly due to the legal restrictions.

And yeah, again, if we go down a path where we go dream up a whole lot of solutions that will never pass any legal requirements, then I think we're losing a lot of time there. Thanks.

ROGER CARNEY:

Great. Thanks, Theo. Sarah, please go ahead.

SARAH WYLD:

Thank you. Well, gosh, Theo really said a lot of what I was going to say. Technically, probably, we can do anything. That's what my developers are always telling me. "We can do anything. We just have to decide what we want."

But I don't think that there would be a legal basis for that data processing. I don't think there is one, and I think we've established that we don't need the Gaining FOA, which is where that basis would come from based on the brainstorming that Theo mentioned and the current, actual, real-life functionality that's been operating just fine.

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So I think we should continue ... I'm happy to document reasons why each of these things that the FOA does are addressed elsewhere, but I definitely don't think that we want to pursue figuring out how to do something technically which legally is not feasible.

Thank you. Oh, sorry. And also commercially probably not feasible. Thank you.

ROGER CARNEY: Thanks, Sarah. Kristian, please go ahead.

KRISTIAN ØRMEN: Thank you. Well, yeah, Theo and Sarah said most of what I would say as well, but I'm going to add a tiny bit. When the Temporary Specification was active in the start, it still said we had to get the e-mail if we could. And with some registrars, you could because they didn't have to comply with GDPR. And some you couldn't.

And the next problem was, could you actually process that data if you were, yourself, complying to GDPR, and so on. So you have registrars behaving very differently, which was understandable because of the situation, making a very confusing situation for the registrant.

And even if what Berry described could maybe be [technically] possible and so on, and maybe with NIS 2 coming could even be [legally] possible, we end up with this being maybe possible in some jurisdictions. Some it would not. And we end up with a

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space where transfers would again be handled differently from registrar to register and jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

And I think it's important that we try to make these changes to the Transfer Policies so we don't have this issue again in a couple of years that we have had the past couple of years. So we really think we should try to secure this Transfer Policy in order to make it work for many years forward. And by processing personal data more than basically needed, we are going to create problems in the future that would definitely be best to avoid. Thank you.

ROGER CARNEY: Great. Thanks, Kristian. Caitlin, please go ahead.

CAITLIN TUBERGEN: Thanks, Roger. This is Caitlin Tubergen speaking from the support staff side. I know this isn't a perfect analogy and it's not something that exists at the moment, but I did want to note that when the EPDP Phase 2 Team was going over recommendations for the SSAD—or for those who aren't familiar with that acronym, the System for Standardized Access and Disclosure—there is a dedicated Service Level Agreement for UDRP providers or the providers that are trying to verify who a UDRP complaint has been filed against.

And as all of the Registrars know on this call, you'll receive those requests for verification from a UDRP provider and are required under the UDRP to respond within two business days. And the SSAD is envisioned to be able to handle those types of data transfers. And so we were just throwing out ideas, and thought

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perhaps if the SSAD does eventually exist that registrars could also submit requests for disclosure to confirm the identity of a Registered Name Holder via the SSAD as an option.

And again, I know it's not a perfect analogy but there could be a dedicated SLA similar to what a UDRP provider is operating under to allow this transfer of data for an additional security measure if the team wants to consider allowing the Gaining FOA or some form to still function. Thank you.

ROGER CARNEY: Great. Thanks, Caitlin. Jothan, please go ahead.

JOTHAN FRAKES: Hi, thank you. Right. So I will put on my hat as the co-chair of TechOps here and just respond because I did hear that that had come up. Prior to GDPR there was a system called RADAR that ICANN have been operating where registrars could whitelist IP addresses and kind of poke holes and allow each other access to be able to query and do some of this Gaining FOA processing. I like where Caitlin is trying to think in terms of potentially things that would work.

What we kept running up against was the level of effort that goes towards where you are essentially losing a paying customer is a business expense and an obligation. So we want to keep that from being ... I don't think people are going to put as much gold-plated effort into that process. Even if the specs do require it, how do we make sure that whatever we're putting in place could continue to



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give the ability to reach out to the Registered Name Holder of the prior registrar?

Registrars could still have, as Owen notes in the chat, some way to whitelist each other. But it doesn't get over the risk that was introduced with GDPR in the transfer of personal information unless there's some contractual or some sort of an acknowledgement or agreement that is something that should be being transferred that's being done.

So we'd have to think in terms ... Not of technical. I think Sarah's right. Technically, anything can be accomplished. But there were quite a few different obstacles put in place of that technical solution in the legal risk.

And I want to be candid about this, not to put down registrars, but I think that registrars will often do the bare minimum to comply with this. And we want to make sure that whatever we propose or suggest would have to consider those various issues. What's the level of effort? What is the level of risk? What is the exposure in the case of compliance with GDPR or other such rules about PII? Thank you.

ROGER CARNEY: Thanks, Jothan. Berry, please go ahead.

BERRY COBB: Thank you, Roger. So I'm really picking up on Theo's last intervention, and I'm supportive of how precise we're being in the discussion. So channel one is a technical perspective. And I think

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it's worthy to note for the record or for the rationale that, yes, perhaps there are technical solutions.

But then channel two, as Theo suggested and that was also mentioned by Jothan there, I think it warrants this group ... Let me back up. I think a few calls ago, I offered the opportunity for this group to explore whether legal advice would be necessary in helping to make a determination about the lawfulness of the processing of this data in terms of the transfer of a domain name because there are security aspects associated with protecting the data subject's information as well as their licensed rights to this particular domain name, etc.

And I believe Sarah even brought up on a prior call that 6.1 is about determining the lawful basis for processing the data. And again, I'm not a legal expert or privacy expert here, but I do think that it warrants an action for this group to document about the possible lawfulness or unlawfulness in processing that data, not only for justifying the rationale here, but as a mechanism to also explain to the community when this goes out to public comment, to the GNSO Council as well as the Board, thinking far, far ahead here because I believe those types of questions will come up.

And a simple statement that it's not lawful, I don't think, will be adequate enough. So I might suggest that an action item be put forward here by those that are more expert about the legal bases here as possible information that can be deposited into the report. But we think about 6.1—I can't remember the letter—about contracts providing the lawful basis. I think Sarah had mentioned that that wasn't possible, but I think we need to explain why that wouldn't work.

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The Registered Name Holder would have a contract with the Losing Registrar and would be initiating a new contract with the Gaining Registrar. So what is it about that lawful basis that wouldn't work in that condition? And there are several others that were mentioned—thank you, Sarah, [6.1(b)]—theoretically. And I'm not suggesting that this happened, but could a [6.1(f)] apply that there is a balancing test, as Caitlin just opined on about, in relation to SSAD and the disclosure of that information for a UDRP?

I think, even in a pre-SSAD world and today's environment, there is a balancing test conducted about the disclosure that information to the UDRP providers ... Why wouldn't that lawful basis work? Maybe it would, but then it presents the technical challenges.

So I guess the suggestion here is that we need to be very precise about the technical and legal challenges here as it pertains to how the Gaining FOA or the additional security measures may be changed, answering the questions in the context of data minimization and privacy by design. But also, it necessary or not?

And I think that will go a long way to explaining to the community and the decision bodies ahead of us so that those questions don't come up and we're not prepared for them. Thank you.

ROGER CARNEY:

Thanks, Berry. Theo, please go ahead.

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THEO GEURTS:

So what Berry just said is well understood and I agree with it for most part of it. Where I have sort of an issue with it, I'll try to be as diplomatic as possible.

But when I look at a process point of how the EPDP was done, in my opinion—and it's my personal opinion—I thought it was a disaster because every time when we were discussing stuff, we would always try to lawyer our way out of certain obligations, trying to find a solution, get some more legal advice.

And when I look at this verification step of the Losing Registrar, in my point we shouldn't even go there because I don't see the benefit from it. Does it prevent domain name thefts? Is it really a security feature? No. It was a vehicle to transfer the domain name. It is dead for three years now so, technical wise, it didn't do really much to facilitate a transfer at all. So from a data protection point of view, I don't even go explore any other legal options for a process that is already not in use and clearly does not have any function anymore in nowadays transfers process.

And, sure, we can explore systems very whitelist APIs, etc., but I think it's much more important that we do not go take such routes and explore technical possibilities to transfer even more data. That is very bad for the registrant in my opinion—for every data subject, in my opinion. Every system that has many, many access point to APIs that data can be transferred ends up in many, many more databases and is much more a security risk to the registrant than the function of the entire FOA—the Losing FOA in this case—which has no security function. And we are not doing it for a couple years now.

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Yes, we should make it understandable to the Board why went down this road. That is understandable. They need a justification. That is clear to me. Bu I am really wondering about the levels of depth we need to make clear here to get to that point. Because, like I said, if this was a really technical ...

If it was a really security-level wise thing that is very much needed in today's transfers, we would have solved that a couple years ago. But we didn't because it has not much of a function anymore. So we shouldn't go explore any legal options to make data transfer from other registrars possible again. That is the core essence of data protection law. Thanks.

ROGER CARNEY: Thanks, Theo. Berry, please go ahead.

BERRY COBB: Thank you, Roger. My final intervention here. I don't disagree. It's not my place to agree or disagree, anyway, but I don't disagree with everything that Theo just mentioned. But again, my only reason for the intervention is that we need to document what we just verbally discussed and that it be placed in a way that is easily understandable by those outside of this working group. So that's purely my only ask or reason for even interjecting here.

And so I think staff can take an action item that when the transcript is available, we pull out this transcript of this last 10 or 15 minutes and try to get it as a first version or a second version into the form of what would be a paragraph or two explaining what we just mentioned verbally. And I think that goes a long way to

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providing the context and rationale for why this group is making the possible decision about whether the Gaining FOA remain or not. Thank you.

ROGER CARNEY:

Thanks, Berry. Okay, any other comments? I see that there's a lot of talk going on in chat. And I just wonder if ... I think Sarah went through this document here real quick and put in responses. I also took a look at the Transfer Policy and tried to pull out as many things as I could from it that seemed like the functional aspects of it, of the Gaining FOA itself.

And I think there are still a couple ... We did hit on, obviously, one thing that the Gaining FOA was doing was the sharing of the PII information. And today ...

Sarah, please go ahead.

SARAH WYLD:

Thank you. I just had to throw my hand up at that one because it's not that the Gaining FOA itself is what's sharing or obtaining the PII. Right? It used to be that the public WHOIS record had the data and the Gaining Registrar would grab it from the public WHOIS and use that to send the FOA to the domain owner. So we should just be very mentally clear about how that was working.

And again, as I said, I think both verbally and in chat, we have to ground that in a necessity. Right? Compared to—I think, somebody mentioned the UDRP a few minutes ago—that process cannot function without certain pieces of data. Here, for the

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Gaining FOA, we see that it has functioned for quite some time and we do not see an increase in domain theft. So it suggests that we do not have that necessity.

So we don't need to go through this step of finding the legal basis if there's no actual need for the data. Thank you.

ROGER CARNEY:

Thanks, Sarah. And I'd just like to say I think—and again, I don't have it up in front of me—but I think that the Gaining FOA process did state that the Gaining Registrar needed to go to the Losing Registrar and get the data. So I think the Gaining FOA did say ... And again, not the actual text from the Gaining Registrar to the registrant, but I think the process in the Transfer Spec says, "Get the data." So that was my point.

And again, I'm not saying these are right and wrong. I'm just saying what I thought functionality of the Gaining FOA process from the policy was. And to me that was one of them. I thought I read it. Maybe I was wrong. But it says that the Gaining Registrar needs to get the data from the Losing Registrar.

Theo, please go ahead.

THEO GEURTS:

Yeah, just to build a little bit on what Sarah just said. I mean, if we talk about data protection law and you talk about concepts like privacy by design, privacy by default, data minimization, it always boils down to the question of purpose. Do you need data to carry out this function or to achieve your purpose?

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I think we can argue all day long, but if we look at it from a data transfer perspective, do we need to prefer process personal data at a different registrar to transfer a domain name? The answer is no because we've been doing that for three years. And you could ask yourself, did that result in major domain name thefts? Then it would be a valid question. But as far as our discussions go and from what we've seen, we've not seen a major uptick in domain name theft, nor did we see other major issues on different fronts which would cause all kinds of problems.

So you keep going back to the purpose, do you need to process personal data? And I think we come up with the same answer over and over. No we don't because we're already doing it without personal data processed at a different registrar. Thanks.

ROGER CARNEY:

Thanks, Theo. And I think that's the perfect thing too, again. I think what this group has to do is look at what the purposes are, what the functionality of the Gaining process is and, again, document and discuss if those are valid.

And to your point, what we've heard here ... I haven't heard it from all the groups, but what we've heard is that the sharing of the PII doesn't seem to be necessary anymore. I'm just saying that was one of the functions I saw out of the policy. So it's the only reason I bring it up. And I'm going to bring up several more, and I know we talked about most of them.

But again, I think these purposes are what needs to ... And it goes to kind of what Kristian said in chat a long time ago now. What is



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the functionality and what are we doing with it? So, just my comments.

And that's why I went through, last week, the Gaining process and just looked at what function—what I saw anyway—and maybe there are others. Or maybe these aren't even accurate. But I just wanted to bring them up so.

Theo, I think that's an old hand.

THEO GEURTS: No.

ROGER CARNEY: Okay, go ahead.

THEO GEURTS: I agree with you, [what you just said]. And I think, as a group, we need to understand that the personal data that we are talking about ... I'm not sure if my assumption is correct, but I sometimes feel within the ICANN community that we are very easygoing on the amount of data which we collect and keep processing.

And what I'm driving at is that the data we have as registrar in general, that is high-level data in the sense that it poses a huge security risk. I mean, a lot of people put their smartphone number into our systems, which is fine. I understand it's a requirement from the registries and from ICANN.

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But if that data becomes public because we are lax on security and we use processing of personal data an excuse to achieve certain goals within this community, I think that is the wrong path to take. A smart phone number is very personal. You use it for a lot of applications like messaging, etc. If that thing becomes public, it's a problem. Same as e-mail addresses. It almost feels like, within this community, "Oh, it's just an e-mail address."

No, it's not just an e-mail address. It is an e-mail address that you use within countless portals to gain access to whatever—be it Netflix, be it Amazon, whatever. I mean, you use that e-mail address over and over.

And within the GDPR, such data carries a higher risk and we sometimes overlook that fact. So we need to be very careful when we talk about the purposes and if we need to process personal data. And the less we process, the better it is for the registrant, the better it is for the registrar, actually.

And I don't want to go the route which the EPDP has mentioned a million times before, doing a data protection impact assessment. Given the amount of data and the type of data that we are doing, we technically should be doing that as a working group. I don't recommend it because it's a boatload of work. But I hope we can move forward with less processing. Thanks.

ROGER CARNEY:

Great. Thanks, Theo. And I think everybody agrees on the concept of the less data—whatever data is necessary. I shouldn't say less data. I should say whatever data is necessary. The more

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data you collect, all you're doing is helping whoever subverts the security measures. Other data doesn't help the regant/registrar/ICANN, no one. So I think that's important. And again, I think it's not less data but the appropriate data.

Kristian, please go ahead.

KRISTIAN ØRMEN:

Thank you. Maybe I'm remembering wrong because it's many years ago, but if I remember correctly, transfers used to be without Auth-ID. It was only the FOAs, like way back in the days. And then at some point we added Auth-IDs to [higher] the security. And after we got our Auth-ID, we haven't really needed Gaining FOA since. And since we haven't been using it for the last three years, that really, really shows that we don't really need it.

I just thought of this because a lot of people, or some people were writing that we have to remember the security mechanism. And I would say that the Gaining FOA has been outdated as a security mechanism ever since we introduced the Auth-ID many years ago. Thank you.

ROGER CARNEY:

Thanks, Kristian. I think that's important. I think it was brought up and I think several people confirmed that early on that, the Gaining FOA was a pre-date mechanism before Auth-Codes were used—got to quit saying that, got to go with TAC—before the TACs were being used. And I think that is a good rationale bullet point to put in there, if that's the way it goes.

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And again, I think there's a lot of chat going on. I think that if anybody wants to come forward and talk about anything in chat or have any questions. It seems like there are a lot of questions and answers going on. I'm not able to keep up with them, actually. So if anybody has anything specific they want to bring forward, please do, especially anything that was said in chat. Okay.

And again, last week I went through here and it's very similar to this chart here. But I just went through the functionality, and that was ... The PII was the one functionality I noticed. Obviously we've talked about notification. The Gaining FOA provided a notification. And we've talked about ...

When we talked about the Losing FOA, we actually kind of went past the Losing FOA and talked about other mechanisms which I think may have provided some Gaining FOA functionality, notifying functionality anyway. And I don't know if there is anything more needed there. But again, just something I noticed. That when I read the Gaining section, that was, to me, one of the functionalities that it provided.

Paper trail. We've talked about this. An audit trail. The Gaining FOA provided some kind of audit trail or paper trail functionality. And I think that, again, when we talked about the Losing FOA, we talked about some of this audit trail anyway. I don't know that we got specific in that, maybe, and that's why I think the discussion is probably never done because we probably go back to it and add in recommendations that say yes. Not just that, hey, we recommend that the Losing Registrar send a notice here. But they also have to log it and do whatever, as we should.

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One other functionality I noticed was that the Gaining Registrar had to provide, or provided a notice to the registrant that they needed to sign a new registration agreement with the Gaining Registrar. I don't know that that's ever been brought up. But again, I don't know how big a functionality that is, that it's just part of the Gaining process that the Gaining Registrar had to notify the Gaining Registrant that they would have to sign a new registration agreement with the new Gaining Registrar.

Theo, please ahead.

THEO GEURTS:

Good point. I didn't even think of that function anymore. But, you know, as that goes, there are two things to consider there. You have the account signup at the Gaining Registrar. So I think that [the terms and conditions then] do not apply or do not have a function in the FOA anymore. Plus you have the verification which is required, so you have always that angle to get agreement to your terms of service right there also.

So you've got a couple of points there that sort of counter the requirement for the FOA to enter into an agreement.

ROGER CARNEY:

Yeah. I agree, and I think ... I think. I don't know how a registrar could get away from doing it. Any registration requires a registration agreement, so if it's a new or a transfer, they have to do it. But again, it was just something that I saw that the Gaining FOA did. So that's the only reason I mentioned it.

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Okay. Sarah, please go ahead.

SARAH WYLD:

Thank you. Yeah, I just wanted to speak to why this doesn't require the Gaining FOA. So yes, of course, the registrant does need to enter into probably more than one agreement with their registrar, depending on what services they're purchasing. Not only the registration agreement probably.

But the Gaining FOA is not the first interaction between the domain owner and the registrar. Right? They have to first submit a transfer request and provide the TAC to the registrar. Then if we were doing the Gaining FOA, then it would be sent out. So getting acceptance of the terms of service and registration agreement should happen before they get to that stage that would have been the Gaining FOA. Thank you.

ROGER CARNEY:

Yeah. And I completely agree, Sarah. And again, I'm just bringing these points up to as what functionality I saw. And really, the discussion about getting the consent and all that, that's not part of the Gaining process. It was just notifying the Gaining Registrant that they would have to go through that process. It didn't formulate how it went through that process or what the process looked like. It just said that they would have to do that.

Okay. And I've just got two more, so bear with me here. Two more that I found, anyway. And the next one, we've talked about quite a bit here.

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“Confirm the transfer intent within a five-day window.” In today's Gaining process the notice provides the registrant a five-day window to acknowledge ... Again, this is where the active piece of this comes in. They have to actively acknowledge that they are accepting the transfer. So again, this is probably the one security-ish—or “security” in air quotes, however you want to say it—feature because it is moving from an active to a passive; or moving some of this again, as we've talked about, forward in the process so. Again, just something that is in the current one.

And the last piece that I saw was that it loosely provides instructions on how to stop the transfer. It basically tells the Gaining Registrant, “Hey, you have five days. And if you don't do it, it's going to end.” So they can add in text of, “and if you want to stop it, you can do that as well.”

So again, those were the things I ... And again, I think this chart details a lot of that. Those were the functions I saw. And again, I think we're covering some of these, most of these. I just think that is the start of a list of purposes that the Gaining FOA was trying to achieve. And I think that we have to just come up with a rationale of, “Okay, we're keeping it. We're not keeping it and this is the reason. We're modifying it. We're making it. We're pushing this up here.” However that is, I just think we have to come up with the rationale for those purposes.

Sarah, please go ahead.

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SARAH WYLD:

Thank you. Yeah, I do really appreciate the chart. Oh, thank you, Emily. I think it's a great way to track that we have considered all of these questions that should absolutely be considered. The last two things that you said, I do think are already really encompassed in what's here. So ability to start ... Sorry, the five-day window. That is the one I've got highlighted at the top of the screen. It can proceed "only when the RNH has responded." That is the five-day window right there.

And then also, three down from there. If they "take no action in response", that's also a five-day window. And that's also the cancellation right there. If they don't respond.

So I don't think we need more rows on the chart, but on the other hand we're not going to run out of [bites]. So that's fine. Thank you.

ROGER CARNEY:

Thanks, Sarah. Yeah, and I agree. And again, if someone else sees something, great. Let's add another row. But I think that's pretty thorough of the functionality that the Gaining process did. And again, I went beyond just the Gaining FOA and looked at the Gaining process. But I think the key is not adding more rows, but filling in the right side of this of what we're doing and why we're doing it and our reasons and logic for doing those things.

And just one last thing. I didn't even know that notice this, but just for, I guess, transparency, the Gaining FOA process states that it is a good faith item and there is no validation or verification at the time. It only happens if there's a compliance issue that's looked at



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afterwards. So just to throw that out there. It talks briefly about that, that there is no check that the Gaining FOA was completed unless there's a follow-up audit or a compliance check later on.

Obviously there are some things that the registry makes the registrar do or the registrar makes the registrant do. This is written in a policy and the adherence is not validated at time of execution. It's validated at post. So I just wanted to bring that up.

Okay. Any other comments/questions? And again, I think this the point where we need to be at. These are the purposes and these are what we're doing with those. We're going to keep it. We're not going to keep it. We're going to change it. We've already discussed it.

Again, I think a lot of these things we've at least touched on if we haven't drilled down into them, and we will have to drill down into each one of them so that we can provide that rationale so that a year from now, we don't have to have these discussions anymore because we've documented it and everybody's aware of it.

Any other comments? And again, I encourage everybody to add in. And the more rationale, the more bullets that we can get on the right side of this, the better, especially now that we're talking about it because when we write these up and look at him six months from now, we're going to forget that we talked about that. And I think it's important that we get it added now.

Probably the one last thing I want to hit on this is that I know that the BC provided several comments, early input, on the Gaining FOA features. And I didn't know if the BC wanted to talk about any

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of those comments. They were leaning toward keeping the FOA. Not necessarily keeping the FOA, but keeping the functionality. Some of their comments were very specific about, "Well, if the functionality's there, then that solves the problem."

But I didn't know if anyone from the BC wanted to talk about these comments. Again, they made pretty good remarks about the Gaining FOA.

ZAK MUSCOVITCH: Hey, Roger.

ROGER CARNEY: Hey, Zak. Go ahead.

ZAK MUSCOVITCH: Thanks, Roger. No further comments. I've been monitoring the discussion closely, and we're happy with how the discussion's evolving and the considerations and decisions the group is making. So no further comments at this time. But thank you for the opportunity.

ROGER CARNEY: Great. Thanks, Zak. I appreciate that.

Any other comments on this? I don't know if there's a lot of discussion left on this, but I think there's a lot of documentation of the rationale that still needs to be done. So again, a big homework project for everybody is to add bullets into that. Let's make sure

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that we're documenting it and it makes sense. And we'll circle back and make sure that everybody agrees to those. And we're not looking for consensus at this point, but that everybody understands and agrees that makes sense.

Well, let's go ahead and move on to our next topic, then, on the agenda which ... And again, I'm not saying we're done with the Gaining FOA, just where I think our discussions have come to a good spot and we just need to provide that rationale.

So let's go ahead and move on to, jumping into, yes, the Auth-Info draft recommendations and the comments that we had with this.

Emily, do you want to run through the comments we've received?

EMILY BARABAS: Hi, Roger. Sure. I'm happy to do that. And when you say "comments we've received" ...

ROGER CARNEY: Yeah. And I don't know what kind. I haven't read it since we sent it out, so I don't know what the other new comments have been on it.

EMILY BARABAS: Sure. So for context, everyone, this is back to our original Auth-Info Codes working document. We're on page 16 for those who want to follow along.

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So what staff has done here is to try to pull together the main threads of the conversation from the deliberations that are recorded above in the document and start to draft some text responding to the charter questions and also creating some candidate recommendations based on what we think we are hearing the group say during those conversations.

And what we've done is, as we've drafted this text, we've also circulated it with some of our internal colleagues within the organizations and subject matter experts and some folks who are in on the operations side who might be implementing this policy. Noting, of course, that it's very early stages, but just to get any additional input that might be helpful to further the deliberations.

So I think everyone can obviously read the draft response to the charter question and insert comments as they'd like to, but maybe what it makes sense to do is to run through the candidate recommendations. And we can touch on any Org comments that came up for those.

Is that in line with what you're thinking, Roger?

ROGER CARNEY: That would be great. Thanks, Emily.

EMILY BARABAS: Sure. So I'm going to skip ahead of the Charter Question b1. Please do take some time to just read that and make sure that it's consistent with your understanding of the discussions. It's providing some context, so it's sort of flushed out in the

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recommendations themselves. So I'm just going to drop down to there because that's where the comments actually are.

And we're using the term "candidate recommendation" right now because they're not even, at this stage, draft recommendations. The working group obviously is a long way away from consensus, but we just want to put something on paper so that people can react to it and respond to it because that's often a constructive way for the group to actually crystallized its thinking.

So hopefully none of this is completely surprising, but please do comment here. Or, of course, you can speak up on the call itself.

So the first candidate recommendation is about the use of the term "TAC." So recommending a substitution of the term "Transfer Authorization Code" in the Transfer Policy and related policies in place often "Auth-Info-Codes" and clarifying that that's just a recommendation about terminology and not about functionality or anything else.

The second recommendation is about the definition. And this is pretty much the text that was used in the deliberations in the working document, although we did just create one clarification here. I believe that it said "validate a request to transfer a gTLD" and we just clarified that we're talking about a domain name in a gTLD. So just a clarification of the meaning.

In the original text that was drafted, the term "authorized person" was used. And I noted the Holidia from our Contractual Compliance Department who's been on all of these calls and has helped to weigh in quite a bit comments that, here, the term

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“authorized person” is not an officially defined term in the policy. It doesn't, for example, explicitly refer to the Registered Name Holder.

And her recommendation was to use a more precise term there. So that's up to the working group, of course, to determine whether either “authorized person” should be substituted with something that's more carefully defined, or if the working group wants to more closely define what it means by “authorized person.”

So I'm going to pause for a moment if anyone wants to speak up. But of course, you can also just insert comments directly into the document if you have thoughts on that after taking your time to read through it, of course.

Holida, please.

HOLIDA YANIK:

Hi. So the consideration by Compliance in here by proposing a more specific term was because when we put “authorized person,” it could be interpreted in many different ways. Maybe a designated agent or designee. And some registrars and resellers may add provisions in their registration agreements, forcing the [originators] to agree that the account holder or even the reseller may be an authorized person.

And considering the fact that many registrants do not carefully read their registration agreements or terms of service before signing, this may lead to unauthorized transfers. Thank you.

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EMILY BARABAS: Thanks, Holidia. Roger, do you want to manage the queue or would you like me to do so?

ROGER CARNEY: You can. Please do.

EMILY BARABAS: Sure. Sarah, please.

SARAH WYLD: Thank you, hi. Yeah, I'm not sure that we want to make that change. I wonder if I should go back to some notes from the previous calls or if we didn't talk about this because it is, I think, reasonable for somebody other than the domain owner to, in some cases, be the person initiating the transfer.

So, for example, if a domain owner works with a website designer who holds the account. I'm not sure that's the best idea, but I can see that being an appropriate business relationship. Right? The domain owner might give the TAC to their account holder/website designer person to initiate the transfer. So I don't think we want to limit that, necessarily. I think saying "authorized person"... You're right that it does open it up to other people. It's not explicit. But I think that's okay. Thank you.

EMILY BARABAS: Thanks, Sarah.

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SARAH WYLD: Sorry. I just ... I'm so sorry. Can I actually say one other thing?

EMILY BARABAS: Please.

SARAH WYLD: Thank you. I think we had maybe considered that having the TAC is what indicates that I am an authorized person. I have the TAC, so I am the authorized person who is allowed to submit it. It doesn't matter what my relationship is to the domain name. Thank you.

EMILY BARABAS: Thanks, Sarah. And I'm noting that you have a few people agreeing. And I also see that Jothan is saying that he thinks it's okay for it not to be a defined term because it's not in caps. You could use RNH to be more precise or "registrant" or "appropriate party."

Roger, please.

ROGER CARNEY: Thanks, Emily. I was just going to add. I think maybe it was you, Emily, that put it in chat—it was so long ago, or maybe it was Caitlin—that talked about ... And it was answering someone's question about identification and authorization of the users in the system. And I think that what Sarah just mentioned was that, I think, the policy today states basically that there are two separations there.



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And I think that still exists, always. But I think what we're saying is that once the TAC is created—and I think this is what Sarah was saying—that shows the identity and the authorization. So I think that kind of gets combined. And again, I don't remember who put that in chat but I thought it was earlier. Thanks.

EMILY BARABAS:

Thanks, Roger. So perhaps we'll add some additional text to this definition to sort of speak to what Sarah has said and others have supported that the idea is that holding the TAC is the indication of who the authorized person is. And we'll put that in as a suggestion so people can see that that's new text and respond if they would like to see it phrased differently.

The next candidate recommendation was about the minimum character length. There were two suggestions and I don't think the group really made a decision between the two.

One of the suggestions was to make the minimum character length 16 characters. Another suggestion was 32 characters. So we've put both in brackets. Anywhere that you see texts in brackets here is something that either needs to be filled in or discussed more, or that more comments are particularly welcome.

And I'll actually just go over Candidate [Recommendation] 4 as well because they're connected.

The second one was about the complexity of the TAC, and the suggestion there from the group was to have a requirement that there's at least one uppercase letter, one lowercase letter, one number, and one special character. One of our internal subject

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matter experts had suggested the possibility of providing some specific requirements about complexity that focus more on entropy. And that's consistent with some IETF documentation previously that was about Auth-Info-Code security and best practices around that.

The idea there was to make it more timeless where recommendations for a minimum character length or one uppercase letter/one lowercase letter the risk is that those could become out of date pretty quickly. Whereas making the requirements around entropy creates more flexibility while also providing strong security. That's at least my understanding. Of course I'm not a full expert on that, but I did want to pass it along for further discussion.

I guess a third possibility is that you simply say that it meets best practices as dictated by whatever standard, rather than being really specific about requirements.

I see that Theo has his hand up. Theo, please.

THEO GEURTS:

Well, you actually just said it there. I think that is a good suggestion that we, instead of specifying how many characters, it must be at a minimum that we simply reference to.

For example NIST who, from time to time, updates their requirements when it comes to stuff like passwords to meet the ongoing realities, so to speak. I mean, 32 characters at a minimum might be good practice for now, but we could be in a situation in two years from now [where] 32 characters is horribly

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insecure for whatever reason. Quantum computing, for example. Not sure if you can relate to that in this fashion, but it is an ongoing concern within the encryption community that if quantum computing becomes reality, that current encryption which is pretty good at the current standards will be horribly outdated. They are actively warning most people there now.

So I would reference to something like NIST. And maybe there are other certifying bodies out there which give really good up-to-date advice on such requirements. So I would definitely go there and not be overly specific because, yeah, it could be very outdated very soon. Thanks.

EMILY BARABAS: Thanks, Theo. Roger, please.

ROGER CARNEY: Thanks, Emily. Yeah, and I think that what Theo is saying makes sense. I think, just a couple of comments in chat. The hard part about specifying a standard ... And I think, obviously, we can say “and current standard” or whatever. But the hard part is that when you say “the current standard” then when the standard changes, everybody has to implement it. And how long of a time do you get to implement it, and so forth and so on?

So I think that's one of the trickier parts of doing it. I still like the less specific and the more ... But allowing it to be changed going along the way, I just think we have to handle that time period of, okay, a new standard's available. How long does it take to get implemented and so forth?

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And I think Kristian kind of threw something in there about when ICANN says it needs to change. Obviously, we can come up with some wording, but just to be careful there. Thanks.

EMILY BARABAS: Kristian, please.

KRISTIAN ØRMEN: Thank you. We probably should say “or any alternative [minimal length] longer than what [is already suggested/prescribed by ICANN]” because I wouldn't like to give ICANN a possibility to make it [shorter] at any time.

EMILY BARABAS: Thanks, Kristian. Any other comments on this at this time? Or shall we give everyone some time to respond and think about it in the document?

Theo, please.

THEO GEURTS: Yeah, just really quickly. I think Roger just said it already. I mean, how do you enforce it? Farzaneh also mentioned it in the chat. But if you reference to a sort of golden standard like NIST ... I mean their updates sort of become news, so to speak. So it shouldn't be too hard for an organization like ICANN to monitor something like NIST in regard to password requirements. That shouldn't be too hard.

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And if that occurs, yeah, there should be an implementation deadline. But we already have implementation deadlines within the current policy process, so I would automatically think such a process would be applicable, then, as soon as ICANN announces it. "Okay, there has been a change and now you've got X time to do this."

And we can argue about that timeline, of course, but I think the current timelines or deadlines are pretty flexible for most registrars already. Thanks.

EMILY BARABAS:

Thanks, Theo. And I'm noting in chat that Farzaneh was mentioning that her concern was that if the policy recommendations are too vague and there's not a standard there.

So I'm wondering if possibly a way to thread the needle here is for the policy recommendation to be that ICANN sets the specific standard based on current best practices "as defined by" ... And the working group can do some more thinking on if they want to be specific about NIST standards or what have you. And maybe some of our folks from SSAC might be able to weigh in on that as well if they're able to join a call where we discuss this.

But that would mean that the policy itself would be specific, but the policy recommendations wouldn't necessarily be dictating what the requirements are. So that would give Org the flexibility to adjust the policy language based on changing standards. You could also put in the policy recommendations something like, "Org would give

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a sufficient amount of time for any changes to be implemented” or something like that.

But the idea is that the recommendation itself is relatively broad, but what's ultimately required is fairly specific and also timely to any changes and best practices and so forth.

Any thoughts on that? I'm hearing a few a few people supporting that, so we can sort of take that back on the staff side and start to think about it. And if folks on the call or listening to the recording have specific things that they want to point to as best practices that the policy should be adhering to, that's certainly helpful to make sure that we craft the language appropriately.

Okay. Seeing no other hands on that topic, the next candidate recommendation is that the working group recommends that their registry verify that the TAC meets requirements specified in Recommendations 3 and 4.

A question for the working group here is whether the working group wants to make a specific recommendation about when in the process this verification takes place; so when the TAC is generated versus when the registry is checking that the TAC is valid.

I don't know if anyone has initial reactions to that. Or please comment in the document if you don't. Okay.

Looking at the time. We have just five more minutes, so I think we'll go through this last one under Charter Question b1. And then maybe we'll pause from there and close.

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And Sarah's suggesting perhaps both times. So we'll accept thoughts on that.

Candidate Recommendation 6 is that the working group recommends that the Registrar of Record, potentially also the registrant that was under discussion, receive a notification after a certain number of failed attempts to enter the TAC, which could be changed from time to time if it seemed appropriate by ICANN Org. Or alternatively that after a number of failed attempts, it's no longer possible to try to transfer for a certain period of time. So you're sort of locked out of doing a transfer.

A couple of questions there. The first one is just to confirm who would send that notification. Would that be the registry? And also noting a comment from one of our SMEs in Org that if it is the case that after a certain number of failed attempts it's not possible to complete a transfer, there is the possibility that someone sort of games that. A bad actor could potentially block a transfer from taking place by entering a bunch of random TACs just to just stop another party from transferring the domain. So, something to consider in looking at these two possible alternatives for Candidate Recommendation 6.

So again, anywhere that you see brackets, if you have input on that particular element, that's something that's still up in the air that may require further discussion. Comments on this one?

ROGER CARNEY: Sarah, please go ahead.

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SARAH WYLD: Thanks. I want to thank the SME representative. I had not thought of that, and that's just very interesting. So I will need to sit down and think about how to address it. But, my goodness, what a good thing to think of. Thank you.

EMILY BARABAS: Thanks, Sarah. Kristian.

KRISTIAN ØRMEN: Thank you. We should probably, in the recommendation, note that it should be the registry that notifies the Losing Registrar. I don't see right now who puts the notification out, and I definitely think it should be the registry notifying the Losing Registrar. Thank you.

EMILY BARABAS: Thanks, Kristian. Jothan, please.

JOTHAN FRAKES: I want to just build on what Kristian just shared, excuse me, [inaudible]. The registry would notify the registrar, but the registrant would be notified by the registrar. The registry would not notify the registrant Thank you.

EMILY BARABAS: Thanks, Jothan. We'll jot that down, as well, as an additional comment in the document for folks to respond to.



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I see Roger is unmuted and we have one minute left on the call, so I'll pass it back to you, Roger. Thanks.

ROGER CARNEY:

Thanks, Emily. And just to add on to what Jothan just said there. I think that, obviously, the registry tells the registrar, but the registrar may—I don't think that's a “must”. But again, the wording we can agree on later. But it seems like it should be a “may” to the registrant. But just my thought.

Okay, well I appreciate it. A great call today. I think we made great progress. And again, homework. Take a look at the table we were working on for the majority of the time. Fill in all the rationale you can think of on the right side there. And if anybody finds another function, obviously add another line. But let's make sure we get the right side of that table filled in as thoroughly as we can so we can move on from there.

And again, take a look at these. We'll start the next meeting covering the rest of these recommendations, so please take a look at them and provide comments in line here so we can talk about them.

I think that's it. Thanks, everybody. We'll see you next Tuesday.

JULIE BISLAND:

Thank you, Roger. This meeting is adjourned, everyone. Thank you for joining. You can disconnect your lines, and I hope you have a good day.

**[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]**