

**Appendices to the Draft Report to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers** 

Prepared by Interisle Consulting Group, LLC

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This document contains appendices which are intended to be read in conjunction with the main body of the report, contained in a separate document.

## **Appendix A Survey Questions**

The online survey gave information informing potential survey-takers about privacy and confidentiality and provided definitions for some of the terms used in the survey.

This section shows the English version of the privacy and confidentiality information, the definitions, and online survey questions for the WHOIS Proxy/Privacy Relay/Reveal Feasibility Survey.

## A.1 Privacy and Confidentiality

We respect the privacy and confidentiality concerns that respondents to this survey may have. Accordingly, the following safeguards apply:

- The survey is being conducted by Interisle Consulting Group, an independent entity with no conflicting business interests that could be served by violating respondents' privacy.
- Under the contractual agreement with ICANN, no survey information will be published in our report or shared with ICANN without explicit authorization by each respondent.
- The survey software and databases and the underlying server software are hosted on privately operated infrastructure that is under the exclusive control of the Interisle survey team.
- The infrastructure, the server software, and the databases have been secured in accordance with generally accepted practices for systems that process confidential information.

### A.1.1 Information Collected

The survey software collects your responses to the questions.

The web server software logs technical information, including the IP address from which you are accessing the survey and the contents of the HTTP messages used to request pages and post answers.

### A.1.2 Information Collection Policy

Most responses to questions are optional. You will have the opportunity to review and edit all of your answers before submitting your survey response.

You will have the opportunity to state explicitly which information (if any) may be used to develop the report or shared with the study sponsors (ICANN staff). We are contractually obligated to — and will — honor those directives.

We will not use the technical information collected by the web server software for any purpose other than system administration.

We will destroy all copies of the technical data and individually-identifiable survey responses that remain under our control upon our completion of the survey project, except for data you have explicitly authorized us to share or publish.

We will not disclose technical data or survey responses to third parties unless legally compelled to do so. If so compelled, we will object and will notify all affected parties so as to provide them with the opportunity to contest the disclosure, unless we are legally prohibited from doing so.

### A.1.3 Cookies

The survey software places and reads session cookies, used for the purpose of maintaining session state as the user moves from one page of the survey to another.

The software does not read any cookies other than the session cookies it has placed; we do not believe than any other sites could extract meaningful information from the session cookies.

We recognize that some people deliberately configure their browsers to refuse cookies — either all cookies, or specifically those that are placed not by the site visited but by a third party. If you block third-party cookies, but not all cookies, the survey software will work. If you block all cookies, and are not willing to change that setting in your browser, you will not be able to participate in the on-line survey. In that case we would still like to collect whatever information you may be willing to provide; you can provide us with your comments by e-mail

### A.1.4 JavaScript

The survey software requires JavaScript to be enabled in your browser. The survey uses a production release of LimeSurvey, which is widely distributed open source software. If your browser is configured to block JavaScript, and are not willing to change that setting, you will not be able to participate in the on-line survey. In that case you can provide us with your comments by e-mail.

### A.2 Definitions

### A.2.1 ccTLD

A ccTLD is a "country code Top-Level Domain."

### A.2.2 gTLD

A gTLD is a "generic Top-Level Domain." For the purposes of this study, gTLDs include .com, .info, .net, and .org, as well as restricted Top Level Domains such as .biz, .name, and .pro, and sponsored top-level domains such as .gov, .int, and .mil

### A.2.3 Privacy Registration

Some registrants use a privacy registration service to provide privacy protection when they register a domain name. Privacy services offer alternative WHOIS contact information (e.g., e-mail and postal addresses and telephone numbers that belong to the privacy service rather than the domain holder, and a forwarding service) but do not actually shield the identity of the registered name holder.

### A.2.4 Privacy provider

A privacy provider provides privacy registration services.

### A.2.5 Proxy registration

Some registrants use proxy registration services to provide anonymity. A proxy service registers a domain name itself, on behalf of a third party (the proxy service's customer), and then licenses the use of the domain to the third party. The WHOIS system lists the proxy provider as the holder of the domain, and contains the provider's contact information. The licensee's identity and contact information are not published in WHOIS.

## A.2.6 Proxy Provider

A proxy provider provides proxy registration services.

### A.2.7 Relay Requests

For many domains, Registered Name Holders can be reached directly at addresses obtained from WHOIS. However, for Privacy or Proxy-registered domains, Registered Name Holders or third party licensees cannot be reached directly via WHOIS-published addresses. Instead, communication with the Registered Name Holder may be accomplished by sending a request to the Privacy or Proxy service provider published in WHOIS to relay the message to the Registered Name Holder. Communication may also be possible using addresses obtained from other sources, websites, or communications associated with the domain.

### A.2.8 Reveal Requests

For many domains (including those registered via Privacy services), the Registered Name Holder's identity is published directly in WHOIS. However, for domains registered via Proxy services, the name of the licensee is not published in WHOIS; third party licensees can typically be identified only by asking the Proxy to reveal the licensee's identity.

### A 29 WHOIS

The WHOIS system is part of the Internet's Domain Naming System; it maintains information about the name and contact information for the Registered Name Holder of each domain name, and provides that information in response to queries.

### A.3 Role and Interest

1 You may have more than one role or interest, and they may overlap. Please select as many of the following statements as necessary to give a complete description of your role(s) and interest(s).

Please choose all that apply:

- I (or my organization) need to contact domain name owners, licensees, and registrants
- I have experience in making Relay requests
- I have experience in making Reveal requests
- I represent a Privacy service provider
- I represent a Proxy service provider
- I have experience in receiving and/or responding to Relay requests
- I have experience in receiving and/or responding to Reveal requests
- I represent a Registrar
- I represent a Registry
- I represent a regulator or a semi-governmental entity
- I represent a government
- I represent a network security service provider (e.g., anti-spam or anti-malware services)
- I represent a security incident response team
- I am a network security researcher
- I represent an industry or business association
- I represent a professional organization
- I represent a law firm

- I represent another kind of business entity (e.g., corporation, LLC)
- I represent a non-profit entity
- I am an individual responding on my own personal behalf
- I represent a consumer interest or privacy advocacy group
- I represent a consumer complaint center
- I participate in policy-making activities related to WHOIS in the ICANN gTLD context
- I participate in policy-making activities related to WHOIS in other contexts, (e.g., RIRs, ccTLDs)
- My organization participates in policy-making activities related to WHOIS,
- although I personally do not
- Other:

<u>2 You indicated you need to contact domain name owners, licensees, and registrants. Please indicate which if any of the following describe you:</u> <sup>1</sup>

Please choose all that apply:

- I buy or sell domain names
- I work with trademark or intellectual property issues
- I work for a law enforcement agency
- I work against phishing and other forms of abuses but I am not a law enforcement official
- I am a registrar
- I advertise or sell other goods or services to domain name registrants
- Other:

3 In order to contact domain owners, licensees, and registrants, I rely on WHOIS information: <sup>2</sup>

Please choose only one of the following:

- Exclusively
- Extensively
- Some
- Not at all

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Only asked if "I (or my organization) need to contact domain name owners, licensees, and registrants" was selected in Q1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Only asked if "I (or my organization) need to contact domain name owners, licensees, and registrants" was selected in Q1

<u>4 Other than WHOIS, what sources of information do you use to identify and contact domain owners, licensees, and registrants?</u> <sup>3</sup>

## A.4 Relay Originators

This section is only asked if "I have experience in making Relay requests" was selected in Q1.

You indicated that you send communication Relay requests about domain names registered using privacy or proxy services. If you also send identity Reveal requests, we will ask you about those later. Here, we ask about your experience transmitting communication Relay requests and receiving responses.

### 5 These Relay requests deal with:

Please choose all that apply:

- domain names registered under gTLDs
- domain names registered under ccTLDs
- Other:

### 6 These Relay requests are:

Please choose only one of the following:

- originated by me
- passed along on behalf of someone else
- both

### 7 These Relay requests are made:

Please choose all that apply:

- by telephone
- in person
- by fax
- by email
- by postal mail
- Other:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Only asked if Q3 is answered with anything but Exclusively

8 Do you have written policy guidelines for attempting to contact domain name owners, licensees, or registrants (that is, send communications which may or may not end up being relayed by a privacy or proxy service provider)?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

### 9 Roughly how many Relay requests do you make?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Fewer than once a month
- · About once a month
- About once a day
- More than once a day

## 10 Other than ordinary email and fax software, do you use any tools to generate Relay requests or process responses?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

## <u>11 Do you use a ticketing system, database, or other scheme to track Relay requests and responses?</u>

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

### 12 Do you maintain a historical record of past Relay requests / responses?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

### 13 If you have any other comments specifically about Relay requests, please provide them here.

### A.5 Reveal Originators

This section is only asked if "I have experience in making Reveal requests" was selected in Q1.

You indicated that you send identity Reveal requests about domain names registered using proxy services. Here, we ask about your experience transmitting identity Reveal requests and receiving responses.

### 14 These Reveal requests deal with:

Please choose all that apply:

- domain names registered under gTLDs
- domain names registered under ccTLDs
- Other:

### 15 These Reveal requests are:

Please choose only one of the following:

- originated by me
- passed along on behalf of someone else
- both

### 16 These Reveal requests are made:

Please choose all that apply:

- by telephone
- in person
- by fax
- by email
- by postal mail
- Other:

### 17 Do you have written policy guidelines for making identity Reveal requests?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

### 18 Roughly how many Reveal requests do you make?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Fewer than once a month
- About once a month
- About once a day
- More than once a day

## 19 Other than ordinary email and fax software, do you use any tools to generate Reveal requests or process responses?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

## 20 Do you use a ticketing system, database, or other scheme to track Reveal requests and responses?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

### 21 Do you maintain a historical record of past Reveal requests / responses?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

22 If you have any other comments specifically about Reveal requests, please provide them here.

## A.6 Relay Processors

This section is only asked if "I have experience in receiving and/or responding to Relay requests" was selected in Q1.

You indicated that you have experience processing communication Relay requests about domain names registered using privacy or proxy services. Here, we ask about Relay requests that you receive, that you process, or to which you respond.

### 23 These Relay requests deal with:

Please choose all that apply:

- domain names registered under gTLDs
- domain names registered under ccTLDs
- Other:

### 24 These Relay requests are received:

Please choose all that apply:

- by telephone
- in person
- by fax
- by email
- by postal mail
- Other:

### 25 These Relay requests are processed:

Please choose all that apply:

- automatically
- automatically, with human review
- manually

26 Do you have written policy guidelines concerning when and under what circumstances to relay, respond to, or otherwise handle a communication Relay request?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

### 27 Roughly how many Relay requests do you receive?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Fewer than once a month
- About once a month
- About once a day
- More than once a day

## 28 Do you use a ticketing system, database, or other scheme to track Relay requests and your handling of them?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

### 29 Do you maintain a historical record of past Relay requests / responses?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

30 If you have any other comments specifically about the handling of Relay requests, please provide them here.

### A.7 Reveal Processors

This section is only asked if "I have experience in receiving and/or responding to Reveal requests" was selected in Q1.

You indicated that you have experience processing identity Reveal requests about domain names registered using proxy services. These questions pertain specifically to identity Reveal requests that you receive, that you process, or to which you respond.

### 31 These Reveal requests deal with:

Please choose all that apply:

- gTLD domains
- ccTLD domains
- Other:

### 32 These Reveal requests are received:

Please choose all that apply:

- by telephone
- in person
- by fax
- by email
- by postal mail
- Other:

### 33 These Reveal requests are processed:

Please choose all that apply:

- automatically
- automatically, with human review
- manually

34 Do you have written policy guidelines concerning when and under what circumstances to process, respond to, or otherwise handle an identity Reveal request?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

### 35 Roughly how many Reveal requests do you receive?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Fewer than once a month
- About once a month
- About once a day
- More than once a day

36 Do you use a ticketing system, database, or other scheme to track Reveal requests and your handling of them?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

### 37 Do you maintain a historical record of past Reveal requests / responses?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

38 If you have any other comments specifically about the handling of Reveal requests, please provide them here.

## A.8 Study Participation

ICANN is considering a study that would inform discussion about Relay and Reveal requests by gathering actual data over an extended period of time and then analyzing those data. Ideally, findings from such an in-depth study would reflect the experiences of multiple constituencies — initiators of requests, privacy and proxy service providers, and registrars. It would also need to reflect geographical, linguistic, and cultural diversity.

You may be interested in participating in such a study. You may also have some insights into what factors would encourage or discourage your own or others' participation.

In answering the following questions, assume that such a study would be well designed, have adequate participation, and yield meaningful data.

39 To what degree and in what ways would you would expect it to be of value to you and/or your organization:

40 To what degree and in what ways would you would expect it to be of value to the broader Internet community:

41 Please respond to the following statements about the extended study on the scale of Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, Strongly Agree, or check Don't Know or Not Applicable:

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know	Not Applicable
I would be personally interested in participating in an extended study	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I would be personally interested in seeing the results of an extended study	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
An extended study would be beneficial to me or my organization	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
An extended study would be beneficial for my clients/customers/stakeholders	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
An extended study would be beneficial to the Internet community overall	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

42 What factors would be most likely to negatively influence your decision to participate in an extended study?

43 Please rate the following factors as they might negatively influence your decision to participate in the extended study in the scale of Not Significant at All, Significant, Very Significant, Critical, or check Don't Know or Not Applicable:

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Not Significant at All	Significant	Very Significant	Critical	Don't Know	Not Applicable
The time and effort required to participate	0	0	0	0	0	0
Concern about revealing confidential information about my business	0	0	0	0	0	0
Concern about revealing	0	0	0	0	0	0

	Not Significant at All	Significant	Very Significant	Critical	Don't Know	Not Applicable
confidential information belonging to my clients						
Concern about jeopardizing an on-going investigation or legal action	0	0	0	0	0	0
Participating could raise privacy concerns among my customers	0	0	0	0	0	0
Participating could potentially be inconsistent with laws or regulations that apply to me or my business	0	0	0	0	0	0
Participating could be politically sensitive for me or my business	0	0	0	0	0	0

44 What factors would be most likely to positively influence your decision to participate in an extended study?

45 Please rate the following factors as they might positively influence your decision to participate in the extended study in the scale of Not Significant at All, Significant, Very Significant, Critical, or check Don't Know or Not Applicable:

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Not Significant at All	Significant	Very Significant	Critical	Don't Know	Not Applicable
Strong privacy guarantees for submitted data	0	0	0	0	0	0
On-line tools to speed or simplify input submission	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ability to redact sensitive data elements from submissions	0	0	0	0	0	0
Personal satisfaction from improving WHOIS	0	0	0	0	0	0
Public credit for participating	0	0	0	0	0	0
The opportunity to interact with my peers and counterparts at other organizations	0	0	0	0	0	0

46 If you wish to comment more specifically about how the study organizers might minimize or mitigate factors that could discourage your participation, please do so here.

47 If you wish to comment more specifically about how the study organizers might encourage your participation, please do so here.

## A.9 Contact Information

The contact information that you provide here will not be shared without your consent.

48 Name

49 Organizational affiliation

50 Postal address

51 Email address

52 Phone number - please provide your phone number in a format that could be used by someone calling you from outside your country (for example +1 310 823 9358).

## A.10 Follow-up, Further Contact, and Information Sharing

53 Are you willing to have a follow-up conversation with us?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

54 What is your preferred language for any follow-up interaction?

55 May we include your name in a (published) list of respondents who are thanked for their participation?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

56 May we share your name and other contact information in an (internal to ICANN staff) list of interested parties to be contacted for further studies?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

57 How may we share your responses with ICANN staff?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Not at all
- Anonymously
- You may identify my role but not reveal any of my contact information
- You may include my name
- You may include all of my contact information

### 58 How may we publish excerpts from your comments?

Please choose only one of the following:

- Not at all
- Anonymously
- You may identify my role but not reveal my name or organization
- · You may identify my organization but not my name
- You may identify me by name

### 59 Please suggest other people whom we should contact for this survey.

(For each, provide name, email address, and affiliation).

### 60 May we use your name in introducing ourselves to these recommended contacts?

("No answer" will be interpreted as "No") 4

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

### 61 Would you be willing to introduce us to these recommended contacts?

("No answer" will be interpreted as "No") 5

Please choose only one of the following:

- Yes
- No

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Question only asked if there is a response to Q59

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Question only asked if there is a response to Q59

### 62 Please provide any additional comments relating to this survey:

- Answers to questions we may have forgotten to ask
- Additional explanations for any answers
- Comments about the questions we did ask
- Other comments on the survey

<u>63 Do you have any general comments on the contemplated future study of Relay and Reveal requests?</u>

## **Appendix B Interview Guide Materials**

The following information was used to guide the interviews that occurred after the survey was complete. The goal of the interviews was to gain additional perspective and detail that was not obtained from the survey. As may be inferred from the title, this is an interview *guide* and was used as a way to focus each interview, rather than being a rigid list of questions to be answered.

## B.1 Approach

Based on the experience and data gathered from the Survey exercise, the interviews were conducted as open-ended explorations guided by gaps in the survey data, the role of the interviewee and the interpersonal context of the interview, and the questions listed in the following section. Although some uniformity of approach was desirable to facilitate the integration and analysis of the data collected, in general the interviews did not simply recapitulate the substance or themes of the survey. The opinions and viewpoints of the interviewees concerning the provision and use of proxy and privacy services in general were examined in addition to gathering as much as objective information about the Relay and Reveal activities in which they personally are direct participants.

## **B.2** Questions

The following questions were intended to assist the interviewers in covering the broadest possible range of topics relevant to each individual interview and to guide the discussion of those topics by both parties. If the interviewers decided that it would be useful to actually ask one or more of these questions, literally, during the course of an interview, that was done—but it was neither necessary nor expected.

- Should ICANN conduct further work on WHOIS privacy/proxy issues? Why?
- 2. What should be the objective of further work by ICANN in this area? Why?
- 3. What topics in this area should not be the subject of further work by ICANN in this area? Why?
- 4. If future work were to be done, how best could this be arranged to result in general consensus?
- 5. If general consensus seems unlikely, how could contention be minimised?
- 6. What incentives or disincentives would encourage you to participate in or avoid future ICANN studies on this topic?
- 7. What should/could be the outcome of any future studies? Why?
- 8. What aspects of WHOIS privacy/proxy should be in (and out) of scope for further study?

- 9. How would the terms of reference or scope of a future study influence you or your organisation's willingness to participate? What features would encourage or discourage participation?
- 10. What sort of participation would you or your organisation be willing to provide (e.g., online surveys, interviews, management/expert time, submitting documents, workflows to assess how requests and responses are processed, etc.)?
- 11. Which stakeholder groups must (or must not) participate in any future studies to ensure that the results are credible and representative? Why?
- 12. Could/should the interests of one sector be regarded or weighted differently from those of other sectors? If so, why?

## **Appendix C Detailed Survey Responses**

A total of 168 surveys were completed between 14 September 2011 and 31 October 2011. A further 105 respondents got part of the way through the survey but did not complete it, 72 of those stopped after answering the role question. This could be a result of the respondent determining the survey was inappropriate for, or of no interest to, them or as a result of the respondent being interrupted while taking the survey and needing to start again (in which case this would count as a new survey response).

The results depicted in this section do not represent a statistically-valid sample – instead it represents the results of a self-selected group of respondents. The reader is cautioned not to extrapolate these results over the universe of people who could have taken the survey. Instead they provide a snapshot of opinions and perspectives which can be used to guide the funding organization in deciding whether the full study would be feasible and could produce meaningful results.

The overall coverage of survey respondents is examined first; then the results of each of the survey questions are analyzed. Note that the question numbers shown here did not appear in the online survey but are included purely for reference. Textual responses are alphabetized and shown in *italics*. For obvious typographical errors in textual responses, these have been corrected for clarity. For non-English textual responses, these have been translated into, and reported herein as, English. Where answer referred to "as above" the cited response was used instead.


Most questions did not require the respondent to answer – counts of no response, where applicable, are shown. Comments are only included in this section from those respondents who indicated that their comments could be used.

## C.1 Language and Geographical Coverage

The survey was made available in English, Simplified Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish.

The following shows the breakdown of completed surveys by language (n=168):


English (EN)	157
Simplified Chinese (ZH-HANS)	2
French (FR)	5
Russian (RU)	1
Spanish (ES)	3



The geographical coverage of respondents was determined in two ways. One was by using the postal address reported by respondents, the other using the IP address from where the survey was taken. The latter may be inaccurate where the respondent accessed the survey while away from their normal location (e.g., attending a meeting).

The following shows the breakdown of completed surveys by region using reported postal address (n=100) – 68 respondents did not provide a postal address:

Africa	0
North America	64
Latin America/Caribbean	3
Asia/Australia/Pacific	5
Europe	28



The following shows the breakdown of completed surveys by region using the IP address where the survey was taken (n=168):

Africa	3
North America	100
Latin America/Caribbean	3
Asia/Australia/Pacific	13
Europe	49

## C.2 Role and Interest (n=168)

1 You may have more than one role or interest, and they may overlap. Please select as many of the following statements as necessary to give a complete description of your role(s) and interest(s).

I (or my organization) need to contact domain name owners, licensees, and registrants

I have experience in making Relay requests

I have experience in making Reveal requests

I represent a Privacy service provider

I represent a Proxy service provider

I have experience in receiving and/or responding to Relay requests

I have experience in receiving and/or responding to Reveal requests


I represent a Registrar

I represent a Registry

I represent a regulator or a semi-governmental entity

142	84.5%
63	37.5%
65	38.7%
24	14.3%
13	7.7%
30	17.9%
27	16.1%
36	21.4%
4	2.4%
5	3.0%

I represent a government	
I represent a network security service provider (e.g., anti-spam or	
anti-malware services)	
I represent a security incident response team	:
I am a network security researcher	
I represent an industry or business association	
I represent a professional organization	
I represent a law firm	
I represent another kind of business entity (e.g., corporation, LLC)	
I represent a non-profit entity	:
I am an individual responding on my own personal behalf	
I represent a consumer interest or privacy advocacy group	
I represent a consumer complaint center	
I participate in policy-making activities related to WHOIS in the ICANN	
gTLD context	·
I participate in policy-making activities related to WHOIS in other	
contexts, (e.g., RIRs, ccTLDs)	
My organization participates in policy-making activities related to	
WHOIS, although I personally do not.	



For this question, we can also look at the answers from that population of respondents who at least answered the role question even if they chose, or were unable, to complete the survey.

The following shows the answers to this question from the larger sample (n=273):

I (or my organization) need to contact domain name owners, licensees, and registrants

I have experience in making Relay requests

I have experience in making Reveal requests

213	78.0%
93	34.1%
100	36.6%

14

29

35

34

17

23

30

50

18

26

8

5

25

16

6

8.3%

17.3%

20.8%

20.2%

10.1%

13.7%

17.9%

29.8%

10.7%

15.5%

4.8%

3.0%

14.9%

9.5%

3.6%

I represent a Privacy service provider	35	12.8%
I represent a Proxy service provider	19	7.0%
I have experience in receiving and/or responding to Relay requests	44	16.1%
I have experience in receiving and/or responding to Reveal requests	41	15.0%
I represent a Registrar	65	23.8%
I represent a Registry	9	3.3%
I represent a regulator or a semi-governmental entity	10	3.7%
I represent a government	22	8.1%
I represent a network security service provider (e.g., anti-spam or anti-malware services)	46	16.8%
I represent a security incident response team	56	20.5%
I am a network security researcher	49	17.9%
I represent an industry or business association	22	8.1%
I represent a professional organization	34	12.5%
I represent a law firm	39	14.3%
I represent another kind of business entity (e.g., corporation, LLC)	72	26.4%
I represent a non-profit entity	34	12.5%
I am an individual responding on my own personal behalf	45	16.5%
I represent a consumer interest or privacy advocacy group	14	5.1%
I represent a consumer complaint center	7	2.6%
I participate in policy-making activities related to WHOIS in the ICANN gTLD context	35	12.8%
I participate in policy-making activities related to WHOIS in other contexts, (e.g., RIRs, ccTLDs)	27	9.9%
My organization participates in policy-making activities related to WHOIS, although I personally do not.	14	5.1%

Under the selection "Other": the following responses were provided:

- Journalist
- TLD applicant
- Anti-abuse
- Law Enforcement (5 responses)
- Our company is affiliated with an ICANN-Accredited Registrar that is active in WHOIS policy-making activities
- Domain Name Registrant (2 responses)

24 respondents (14.3%) answered "Yes" to all four "experience" roles:

- Making Relay requests
- Making Reveal request
- Receiving and/or responding to Relay requests
- Receiving and/or responding to Reveal requests

# 2 You indicated you need to contact domain name owners, licensees, and registrants. Please indicate which if any of the following describe you: (n=142)

I work with trademark or intellectual property issues

I work against phishing and other forms of abuses but I am not a law enforcement official

I buy or sell domain names

I am a registrar

I work for a law enforcement agency

I advertise or sell other goods or services to domain name registrants

76	54%
70	49%
36	25%
23	16%
14	10%
5	4%

Under the selection "Other": the following responses were provided:

- I often research various domain related information
- I want to check the owners of domains before buying services advertised on www when only mobile or form contact exists on website
- I am a CSIRT coordinator
- Our firm is affiliated with an ICANN-Accredited Registrar that is active in WHOIS policy-making activities
- Network and hosting service provider

# <u>3 In order to contact domain owners, licensees, and registrants, I rely on WHOIS information:</u> (n=142)

Exclusively	30	21.1%
Extensively	90	63.4%
Some	19	13.4%
Not at all	1	0.7%
total	140	98.6%
no answer	2	

<u>4 Other than WHOIS, what sources of information do you use to identify and contact domain owners, licensees, and registrants?</u>

The following responses were provided<sup>6</sup>:

- abuse.net, abusix.org, ...
- Accessing the web site.
- Any contact information listed on a website
- Any contact information listed on domain properties associated with the properties.
- Any information located on website itself, tracing IP addresses, "tracing the money"
- Basic internet research
- Billing system
- Billing system contact details for customers in our registrar account
- Business records, Internet information sources, information on the website owner's own website
- By requisition to the intermediate court (registrars, hosts,...)
- Centralops
- Company Registries.
- Contact data on their web pages.
- Contact details on relevant website; Google searches
- Contact information displayed on a website connected to the domain; Google search results
- Contact information for the ISP providing services (hosting dns, routing the IP, etc.)
- Contact information from websites, search results, social networking, in-house and outside counsel
- Contact information on the website
- Contact information on the website [if any] associated with the domain
- Contact information on the website. This is often missing in the small business environment.
   Although required consumer Law and EU directive it is often missing. e.g. Villa rental when no checkable contact details are on website.
- Contact information on web sites. Contact information from regulatory agencies concerning entities known to be/to have been associated with the domain (Secretary of State, state licensing divisions). Directories (white pages, yellow pages). Contact database of registrant's past or current affiliation with my organization.
- Contact information published on web pages associated with domains.
- Contact with registrars.
- Contacting the registrar
- Databases
- Domain web page
- Domaintools, dig
- email addresses forum postings social networking sites
- Finding information about the activities of these persons on the Internet and off-line

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> For all comments or freeform text responses to survey questions, only those from individuals who indicated explicitly that their comments could be published are included in this report.

- Google and other investigative tools.
- Google, reverse IP lookup of records associated with the domain, social networks
- Google, web sites, TESS (USPTO), investigators
- Google, website "contacts" and industry lists
- government sources, websites
- Historical domain data in public and private archives. IRR address registries. anti-abuse databases. historical BGP data.
- Historical WHOIS data, Google
- I rely on the current WHOIS record for the most part but will also look up the history of the
  domain name and find historical registrant information. Sometimes this will provide actual
  information about the registrant that matches other information I may have gathered from the
  website content.
- I take no data as fact until an investigation has been done.
- If it is one of our own customers then we will have various forms of contact information.
- If they are registrants within us we have to ask for their ID
- impressum, reputation lists
- Independently published contact information, company records, other IT and IS contacts
- information available on websites
- Information contained on the subject web site and subpoenas.
- Information gathered from the contents of domain holders' web sites.
- Information is generated entirely from our database. We only sell available domains. We do not participate in selling and trading existing domains.
- Information on the domain name website.
- Information on the website itself. Other information found by websearch. Matching incidental data and coincidences (identical web-content on other sites)
- information on website connected to a domain name; Google Search; official registers such as trademark or commercial registers
- Information published on websites.
- Information sheets for clients who are also owners of the fields. The information accessible through the interface of the Registrar suppliers: interface of the CIRA or MelbourneIT for resellers. Information database, website or mailing list private or public
- Internal customer data
- Internet
- Internet searching, property records, information available at the website (if any). However, WHOIS is the primary source of information and if the information there is incorrect or inaccurate it is often impossible to track a registrant.
- IP address email address net personas
- IP addresses and intelligence
- IP ownership

- LinkedIn, Contact information on website, abuse.net, security lists, collection of personal contacts
- Many times owners are identified on their web pages.
- Multiple public and private database sources
- My reliance is nearly exclusively on the WHOIS information, but occasionally I will rely on direct contact information published on a website as well.
- Networking, resellers, registrars, information people give me
- No other way
- Occasionally there is information the owner's web site.
- Online imprints, any type of business directories, trade registers,...
- Open source
- Other investigative information from police and information from hosts.
- Other online information that can be found using WHOIS information, such as addresses, e-mail.
- Other providers or traces for the subject, given that the data provided by whois is most likely false we cannot rely on it 100% of the time
- Other publicly available information (web site contact information, forum postings, tax records, business records), or information provided in the course of legal process (obtained by subpoena or in depositions or interrogatories and document requests)
- Our internal database
- Passive dns, malware analysis
- Personal contacts in Law Enforcement and private industry.
- Primarily internet search engines (e.g. Yahoo, Bing, DUCKDUCKGO, etc.)
- private investigators
- Private investigators and internet research
- PTR records, A-records and NS-records
- Publicly available information on websites or through blogs and test purchases.
- Published data on websites
- Registrars, hosters
- Registrars, hosting companies, domaintools.com.
- Registrars, website content, trademark records
- Reverse WHOIS look up services, DNS queries, Google, Network, IP number registrant data, Archive.org
- RIPE Database
- RIPEDB and similar
- RIR whois on related IPs. Passive-DNS, robtex, and reverse DNS data providing clues about the organization. Process is difficult and error-prone without accurate and available whois. I try and not use domaintools.com as I think they are committing highway robbery for access to domain whois data that should be free and available.
- Search Engines and Meta search machines, Domain selling platforms, acquired knowledge over the years, forensic search on the net.

- Search engines, business register
- Search engines, companies house searches, IP register searches, investigators
- Search engines, data correlation from various sources
- Social media sites, general internet searches.
- SSL Certificates, IP addresses of email headers, reverse IP lookups of domains.
- Telephone contacts
- The contents of the website the ownership of the IP address space (i.e. the RIR's whois service, rather than ICANN's (etc.) domain name oriented systems)
- The information presented on the web-pages themselves (contact info)
- The registrars of the domain names directly
- the web in general collecting information, visiting the concerned domain name, checking the whois privacy providers
- the web in general, the website attached to the concerned domain name, the whois privacy provider
- The website itself and searching the names associated with the website.
- the website itself sometimes provides information to contact the registrant
- Their own web sites. Searches. Third party data sources.
- Their own websites, government business registers
- Through contact forms on websites
- Trademark and copyright application/registration information from trademark and copyright office databases, general searching on the Internet via search engines
- Use contact information that may be provided on the website itself.
- We use private contact information that we require of all customers to contact our customers. WHOIS information is only collected from our customers to satisfy ICANN's requirements. We do not use WHOIS data for any aspect of our relationship with existing customers. The only thing for which we use WHOIS is to obtain an email address to which to send ICANN's mandated FOA when transferring domains for new customers. A process that is redundant to the EPP token required by all current gTLD registries.
- Web pages, phone books, etc.
- Web site content.
- Web site, email domain name etc. common sense stuff
- Web sites
- website contact info
- Website contact info, investigations.
- website contact information and data collected in our internal database
- Website contact page, default email addresses
- Website content, Google, BBB,
- Website HTML Code; Online Advertising Service Accounts; Online Payment Processor Accounts; Webhost Accounts; etc.

- Website information, routing information, Internet contact info repositories, web hosting companies, ISPs
- Website, public records, search engines
- Websites (contact info on websites) Associating domains with network owners and other
  domains (via shared NS for example) and contacting via that method In most cases of malicious
  or criminal use WHOIS is not useful to make contact and contacting the registrar, network
  provider or performing other research to associate the domain to an owner is necessary.
- Websites associated with affected domain names
- Websites, Google searches, corporate records
- When available on domain owners' site, abuse contacts and support contacts.
- whois at first instance always. After that depends upon the whois results.

## C.3 Relay Originators (n=63)

Of the 168 completed surveys, 63 (37.5%) responded that "I have experience in making Relay requests". These 63 respondents were thus prompted to answer the questions in this section.


Of the 63 respondents with "experience making Relay requests":

- 55 (87.3%) are also reveal initiators
- 19 (30.2%) are also relay responders
- 17 (27.0%) are also reveal responders

### 5 These Relay requests deal with:


gTLDs	61	96.8%
ccTLDs	47	74.6%

Under the selection "Other", no additional responses were provided.



### 6 These Relay requests are:

originated by me	23	36.5%
passed along on behalf of someone else	10	15.9%
both	27	42.9%
total	60	95.2%
no answer	3	




### 7 These Relay requests are made:


email	61	96.8%
postal mail	17	27.0%
phone	12	19.0%
fax	10	15.9%
in person	2	3.2%


Under the selection "Other": the following responses were provided:

• Website



8 Do you have written policy guidelines for attempting to contact domain name owners, licensees, or registrants (that is, send communications which may or may not end up being relayed by a privacy or proxy service provider)?






### 9 Roughly how many Relay requests do you make?

Fewer than once a month About once a month


15	23.8%
25	39.7%

About once a day	6	9.5%
More than once a day	8	12.7%
total	54	85.7%
no answer	9	




# 10 Other than ordinary email and fax software, do you use any tools to generate Relay requests or process responses?

Yes	11	17.5%
No	43	68.3%
total	54	85.7%
no answer	9	




# 11 Do you use a ticketing system, database, or other scheme to track Relay requests and responses?

Yes	32	50.8%
No	25	39.7%
total	<i>57</i>	90.5%
no answer	6	



### 12 Do you maintain a historical record of past Relay requests / responses?

Yes	38	60.3%
No	16	25.4%
total	54	85.7%
no answer	9	



### 13 If you have any other comments specifically about Relay requests, please provide them here.

The following comments were included:

- I answered "more than once a day" on the question 'Roughly how many Relay requests do you make'. Often times I am spending hours on enforcement in one day and then not touch it again for a week. In one day I could easily send 25-30 relay requests. An ICANN study found that up to 25% of domain name registrations use a proxy registration service. In my enforcement I think this number is probably higher. I use Markmonitor's brand tool to send relay requests and track the information
- I do not distinguish between "relay" and "reveal" requests. Both are part of a cease and desist demand sent to the registrant of record namely the privacy protection entity. Whether the registrant's identity is revealed or the message is simply passed along is up to the privacy protection entity. Often the "reveal" does not happen unless and until WIPO or NAF contacts the registrar following receipt of a UDRP complaint. Even then, the privacy protection entity may refuse to reveal and might remain as the named UDRP respondent.
- In the anti-phishing/malware industry the time response to those threats is greatly impacted by such relay's.
- Most time I don't bother to use the relay service as I don't want to contact the service vendor by this method. I just want to check they are legitimate. Whois is a great tool for this.
- No hard data, but I estimate that I see a response of about 1 in 100. As far as I'm concerned, it's a worthless effort. Almost all my relay requests evolve from spamming incidents, but usually involve one of the following which would usually create a need for the true registrant/site owner's knowledge for their own safety (and reputation!). !) Phish scripts placed on a website page by fraudulent means. 2) Redirector scripts also as per #1, usually to hide the landing URL for pilzzspammer's websites. 3) Fraudulently using (or installing and then using) "emailfriend" scripts on websites for spamming. 4) Contacting controllers for "URL Shortener" sites to have spam and/or fraud related redirectors disabled.
- Subpoenas are issued for requests.
- The few relay requests I made were not successful, i.e. I only got the response that the request would be relayed. After that nothing happened until initiating an UDRP proceeding.
- They almost never work. & proxy whois anonymity services is such a red flag the chance of incorrectly blocking a site is well worth taking if other data systems shows the name is new.
- They don't work very well or often.
- We did not have earlier history in place but now are working to provide the tools that will allow us to do so.
- While Relay mechanisms may be useful for registrants who wish to use proxy/privacy services
  and receive communications concerning their domain registrations, our experience tends to be
  with domains that infringe trademarks or other intellectual property. Within that universe, in our
  experience, trying to use Relay requests to contact the Registrant is usually ineffective, and
  inspires no response. We have had several instances where a communication sent through a

Relay service resulted in no response, but a subsequent Reveal request to the provider resulted in being contacted by the registrant/licensee.

## C.4 Reveal Originators (n=65)

Of the 168 completed surveys, 65 (38.7%) responded that "I have experience in making Reveal requests". These 65 respondents were thus prompted to answer the questions in this section.


Of the 65 respondents with "experience making Reveal requests":

- 55 (84.6%) are also relay initiators
- 18 (27.7%) are also relay responders
- 17 (26.2%) are also reveal responders

#### 14 These Reveal requests deal with:


gTLDs	62	95.4%
ccTLDs	44	67.7%

Under the selection "Other", no additional responses were provided.



#### 15 These Reveal requests are:

originated by me	26	40.0%
passed along on behalf of someone else	7	10.8%
both	29	44.6%
total	62	95.4%
no answer	3	




### 16 These Reveal requests are made:

email	63	96.9%
postal mail	20	30.8%
fax	18	27.7%
phone	17	26.2%
in person	3	4.6%


Under the selection "Other": the following responses were provided:

- Website
- In a UDRP




### 17 Do you have written policy guidelines for making identity Reveal requests?

Yes	16	24.6%
No	32	49.2%
total	48	73.8%
no answer	17	




#### 18 Roughly how many Reveal requests do you make?

Fewer than once a month	22	33.8%
About once a month	22	33.8%
About once a day	9	13.8%
More than once a day	6	9.2%
total	59	90.8%
no answer	6	




# 19 Other than ordinary email and fax software, do you use any tools to generate Reveal requests or process responses?

_		
Yes	5	7.7%
No	51	78.5%
total	56	86.2%
no answer	9	





## 20 Do you use a ticketing system, database, or other scheme to track Reveal requests and responses?

_		
Yes	27	41.5%
No	31	47.7%
total	58	89.2%
no answer	7	



### 21 Do you maintain a historical record of past Reveal requests / responses?





# 22 If you have any other comments specifically about Reveal requests, please provide them here.

- Databases and historical records are kept by our law firm as part of confidential client case files.
- I do not distinguish between "relay" and "reveal" requests. Both are part of a cease and desist demand sent to the registrant of record namely the privacy protection entity. Whether the registrant's identity is revealed or the message is simply passed along is up to the privacy protection entity. Often the "reveal" does not happen unless and until WIPO or NAF contacts the registrar following receipt of a UDRP complaint. Even then, the privacy protection entity may refuse to reveal and might remain as the named UDRP respondent.

- I expect nothing here. First, I have no legal standing on this as (other than the spam) I have no damages of any kind. Second, the domain names used are for spamvertized sites that most likely use totally false info for registration.
- no historical records other than IMAP
- Providers usually takedown by AUP violation given sufficient evidence. By then the damage is
  done and few follow up with suspending the customer or contacting LE regarding the miscreant's
  activities.
- Subpoenas are issued for requests.
- The efficacy of Reveal requests varies widely depending on the service employed. Our perception is that with services that actually will Reveal in response to a request, we often receive a response from the registrant (or their information is eventually Revealed). With the many services that refuse to honor Reveal requests, we generally receive no response from the registrant (undoubtedly, they choose these proxy services for precisely this reason). Some services say that they are forwarding our correspondence to the registrant/licensee, and that if the registrant/licensee does not respond to us, their information will be revealed. Sometimes, if we are contacted by the registrant (who often does not provide their contact information), the service will not reveal the licensee's information, even if we have not been able to determine the registrant's identity (although in one case, a subsequent e-mail to the service resulted in a Reveal). Sometimes they do not forward our information and they reveal the licensee's information anyway (i.e. they remove themselves from any potential conflict as quickly as possible). It would be easier to track Reveal requests using a survey or case system that encourages the data to be entered as the request occurs, rather than trying retroactively to assemble data about past requests.
- The few reveal requests I made were not successful, i.e. I only got the response that the registrant does not want to be revealed.
- They really don't work very well at all.
- We make reveal requests typically after initial attempts at contact through relay requests are unsuccessful. However, we do contact Domains By Proxy first to reveal true contact information. Domains By Proxy is often quite helpful. Other services I find to be typically unresponsive.

### C.5 Relay Processors (n=30)

Of the 168 completed surveys, 30 (17.9%) responded that "I have experience in receiving and/or responding to Relay requests". These 30 respondents were thus prompted to answer the questions in this section.


Of the 30 respondents with "experience receiving and/or responding to Relay requests":

- 25 (83.3%) are also reveal responders
- 19 (63.3%) are also relay initiators
- 18 (60.0%) are also reveal initiators

#### 23 These Relay requests deal with:

gTLDs	27	90.0%
ccTLDs	20	66.7%


Under the selection "Other", no additional responses were provided.



#### 24 These Relay requests are received:

email	28	93.3%
postal mail	15	50.0%
fax	12	40.0%
phone	9	30.0%
in person	2	6.7%


Under the selection "Other", no additional responses were provided.



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
### 25 These Relay requests are processed:

automatically	4	13.3%
automatically, with human review	9	30.0%
manually	20	66.7%



26 Do you have written policy guidelines concerning when and under what circumstances to relay, respond to, or otherwise handle a communication Relay request?

Yes	17	56.7%
No	6	20.0%
total	23	76.7%
no answer	7	



### 27 Roughly how many Relay requests do you receive?

Fewer than once a month
About once a month
About once a day
About once a day
More than once a day

total
no answer

7

23.3%

20.0%

23.3%

7

23.3%

7

23.3%

7

23.3%

7

23.3%

7

23.3%

7

23.3%

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23.3%

7


23.3%

7


23.3%


7

23.3%




# 28 Do you use a ticketing system, database, or other scheme to track Relay requests and your handling of them?





#### 29 Do you maintain a historical record of past Relay requests / responses?

_		
Yes	20	66.7%
No	3	10.0%
total	23	76.7%
no answer	7	



30 If you have any other comments specifically about the handling of Relay requests, please provide them here.

The following comment was included:

• It's a manual process. Automating it doesn't work.

### C.6 Reveal Processors (n=27)

Of the 168 completed surveys, 27 (16.1%) responded that "I have experience in receiving and/or responding to Reveal requests". These 27 respondents were thus prompted to answer the questions in this section.


Of the 27 respondents with "experience receiving and/or responding to Reveal requests":

- 25 (92.6%) are also relay responders
- 17 (63.0%) are also relay initiators
- 17 (63.0%) are also reveal initiators

#### 31 These Reveal requests deal with:

gTLDs	24	88.9%
ccTLDs	18	66.7%


Under the selection "Other", no additional responses were provided.



#### 32 These Reveal requests are received:


email	22	81.5%
postal mail	14	51.9%
phone	11	40.7%
fax	11	40.7%
in person	3	11.1%

Under the selection "Other", no additional responses were provided.





### 33 These Reveal requests are processed:

automatically	6	22.2%
automatically, with human review	4	14.8%
manually	21	77.8%




# 34 Do you have written policy guidelines concerning when and under what circumstances to process, respond to, or otherwise handle an identity Reveal request?






### 35 Roughly how many Reveal requests do you receive?

Fewer than once a month	8	29.6%
About once a month	6	22.2%
About once a day	4	14.8%
More than once a day	3	11.1%
total	21	77.8%
no answer	6	
About once a day More than once a day total		14.8% 11.1%





# 36 Do you use a ticketing system, database, or other scheme to track Reveal requests and your handling of them?

Yes	17	63.0%
No	3	11.1%
total	20	74.1%
no answer	7	



### 37 Do you maintain a historical record of past Reveal requests / responses?





38 If you have any other comments specifically about the handling of Reveal requests, please provide them here.

The following comment was included:

• A reveal request usually comes from a legal firm who are preparing to go through UDRP.

## C.7 Study Participation (n=168)

39 To what degree and in what ways would you would expect it to be of value to you and/or your organization:

- A solution to issues regarding Whois privacy/proxy registration services is critical to the security
  and stability of the Internet, and critical to law enforcement's ability to quickly act to criminal
  activity occurring on the Internet.
- Any facts that would support analysis of the WHOIS system would be very useful in my view.
- As I work for a law firm, having to address relay and reveal requests leads to increased expenses for our clients. Moreover, if the information is not provided until after a UDRP complaint is filed, more fees are incurred in addressing the amendment of the domain name holder.
- Assist in identifying and closing fraudulent websites and identifying criminal patterns so activity.
- Confirm the excessive use of proxy registrations by shady businesses
- Could help get the necessary data
- Determine that all providers providing proxy and or privacy type services would comply with legitimate requests to reveal said data.
- Don't know enough about what data will be reported from the study and what the purpose is.
- Extremely valuable
- Faster contact possibilities with the registrant, also faster response from registrars

- Find solution to protect both the privacy and the right of third parties
- From my experience I believe the survey would reveal that Relay and Reveal requests are generally not useful in generating a useful response and would spur discussion to provide a different mechanism(s).
- Give us the best chance to easily be able to directly suspend the areas of fraudulent accounts or
  continually links the causes of abuse. Prohibit the use of tools or methods that qualifies to hide
  the whois information allowing us to distinguish whether an area is to our client if it really
  belongs to a customer of our client. It can make all the difference at the time of complete cases
  of abuse of our reseller customers.
- good and extensive knowledge from over 12 years in the industry and dealing with infringements and phishing over the last 6 years in trying to find data about owners, etc.
- High
- Hopefully it will convince ICANN to get rid of the proxy services so that WHOIS data identifies the domain registrant
- I am assuming you are asking this question regarding on the value of you undertaking this whois survey. It wouldn't be of much value at all to me or my organisation.
- I am hoping a unified way to receive this information will be established
- I can't see any advantage of such a study. Domains responding with fake data in whois are not trustworthy at all, so there is IMHO no need for a study.
- I cope on a daily basis with phishing and other fraud incidents. In order to alert domain PoCs about malicious artifacts which are hosted into their Web servers, I need to gather accurate information about domain ownership and contacts. 'Privacy' and 'proxy' service providers, from my point of view, are doing a bad service for CSIRTs, law enforcement agencies and other groups which combat fraud and phishing.
- I suspect it would be an interesting addition to the scope of tools that we have built to perform attribution and to assist in the categorization of traffic/services/actors/agencies.
- I suspect the study would be very beneficial by providing real data around relay and reveal requests.
- I think concealed domain name owners are generally a bad idea. If this would facilitate reaching the real owners of domain names that would be beneficial.
- I think it would be of value to track the success of relay/reveal requests and see others' experiences as compared to my own. My general inclination is that privacy services are ways for unscrupulous cybersquatters to avoid repercussions and raise costs to trademark owners to reclaim domain names incorporating their trademarks. If some insight could be gained into the use of these services, and what the overall results are of their use, I think it could help my in counseling my clients whether or not it is worth the time and effort to contact privacy services or proceed with UDRP complaints.
- I would expect the results of the survey to inform policy-making concerning proxy/privacy services, and potentially yield to uniform requirements for how proxy/privacy services respond to Relay and Reveal requests. The more data is collected about such services, I expect it might also

- have the effect of them improving their practices. If the data concerning our own requests were available to us for analysis, that might be a great benefit, so that we could understand and analyze our own practices, and the responses thereto, better.
- I would hope the study would show the number of cybersquatters using privacy services compared to those with actual privacy concerns. This would show ICANN that privacy services are being abused and there needs to be stricter rules regarding their use. I would also like the study to show which services that are responsive to Relay and Reveal requests. This would help to not waste time sending requests to services that are known not to respond.
- Identify scale of issues caused by proxy/privacy registrations used for fraudulent purposes and/or trademark infringements
- If it covers the legal situation in my country, in relation to national stakeholders and other countries.
- If it results in evidence that privacy protections services serve no legitimate purpose and only cause added expense for trademark rights holders.
- If the study can help to identify abusive and non-responsive privacy/proxy providers, it would be useful. If the study is just meant to substantiate that everything is already terrific, I don't think it would be helpful. The study needs to look, and look HARD, at some of the known corner cases where privacy/proxy registrations are being performed in abusive ways.
- In my experience there are good players and bad players in the proxy service providers. It would be very valuable to have hard statistics on how all proxy providers relay and reveal.
- It could end up in finding ways to improve the treatment of this request by proxy providers and would also allow proxy providers to have common rules/quidelines to treat those requests.
- It is very important aspects for anyone who like factual information and avoid the false information
- It may end all the time wasted on WHOIS policy and the IP lobby's attempts to use domain names as directory for enforcement
- It may lead to efficient options for addressing violations and infringement by operators using privacy services.
- It should be up to the level that no any harm or problem for the customers or clients security.
- It will not be of value. It will ultimately result in new rules or additional regulation of privacy/proxy services and registrants will return to publishing false information in whois.
- It will show that criminals cheat and that the honest can be lazy. Its value in stating the bleeding obvious is likely to be rather limited.
- It would be helpful to know how privacy and proxy services are used for malicious purposes.
- It would be useful if it demonstrates to ICANN that there are serious obstacles to tracking down
  and obtaining accurate Registrant information, and that the existing mechanisms to obtain this
  information are seriously and fatally flawed AND this information causes a change to current
  practices.
- It would be valuable to have some objective data on industry practices, rather than rely on the subjective opinions of those with an anti-proxy agenda.

- It would improve security and intelligence on bad actors.
- It would support further expansion of products and services.
- Just to satisfy my own curiosity
- Large degree
- Learn about the status quo. Get knowledge about better ways to handle such request etc.
- Make enforcing our client's legitmates rights easier, if not possible at all.
- moderate
- Moderately valuable
- Not much
- Not sure.
- Of no real interest, privacy is protected by legislation within the EU, and so the privacy policies will continue irrespective of any survey/study. As to reveals anyone with a \_legitimate\_ reason to access the details of a registrant already has the framework in place to obtain such information (e.g. court order) and all any "policy" would do is make it simpler for cranks and crackpots to stalk individuals.
- Our organization seeks to influence policy related to malware prevention and remediation.
   Understanding better how policies related to privacy and proxy services can be improved would help inform our advocacy efforts.
- Participation will provide knowledge into the current methods of operation and can possibly assist in improving access or security.
- Potential for greater transparency, at least with the gTLD's.
- Privacy shields serve a useful purpose, and I use one myself for my personal domain names.
   However, privacy shields are often abused and are a significant hindrance to IP investigations and enforcement. It would be useful to have clear standards on what will cause a privacy shield to disclose registrant info.
- Proxy is just another disappointing frustration for Law Enforcement within the whole ICANN system. Another example of obvious abuse by criminals in the name of data privacy.
- Proxy services and registrars handle relay and reveal requests in very different ways, despite similarly worded policies. In searching for the most efficient way of contacting an RNH, this uncertainty sometimes results in needing to make contact in a more heavy-handed way than would otherwise be necessary if the process were more predictable.
- Relevant study in that it allows to make this information available on the whois accurate, relevant and truthful, something that is not currently
- Right now I don't know what I don't know. I don't often attempt to obtain whois information on privacy protected (sometimes by shady organizations) whois information. I believe whois for dynamic dns should be considered as well.
- Showcasing the legitimate uses of whois privacy service. Showing that in case of illegal use of whois privacy services such services are immediately disabled upon notification.
- Significant.

- Spread light on privacy protected/proxy registration services' disreputable connivance with cybercrime
- Such a study would have no practical value to me or my organization.
- The deceptive use of proxy and false domain name registrations greatly concerns me and the companies I represent.
- The inevitable result of such a study will be an attempt by ICANN to mandate-creep and start attempting to exert control over an area which they have no basis for jurisdiction.
- The potential value would rest in the studies capacity to provide a view of across the board trends which may facilitate in the marketing of certain namespaces etc.
- The study could have implications for the formation of judicial practice and to protect the interests of my clients
- The study would give us a better understanding of the amount of false and misleading information that is returned when doing WHOIS lookups.
- The WHOIS is an important aspect for Registrars daily operations towards law enforcement and registrants and resellers. So the value could be considered high.
- This would not be helpful to me as I already know how troublesome privacy and proxy services are.
- To arrive at a policy where requests are handled consistently by ISPs, registrars etc.
- To be able to properly identify the responsible parties connected to the domain or host properties, and be able to communicate to them abuse issues. Also, to correlate properties owned by the same parties for domain reputation purposes.
- To belong to a group of incident response, we are interested to apply in the management of incidents involving.
- To better cover law enforcement needs in relation to registrants
- To determine whether and how 'hidden' details in a WHOIS search can be revealed.
- To know the extent to which proxy and privacy service providers are revealing the Whois information for the beneficial registrant, to know the extent to which further policy development and/or national legislation is necessary.
- To prove that domain name registration proxy services merely facilitate the conduct of bad actors, such as cyber-squatters, phishers and scammers.
- To show how effective (or not effective) relay and reveal requests are, to see whether registrars
  and proxy service providers are compliant, to show how criminals use proxy services to shield
  themselves from investigations and hide their identity from the consumer and the Internet
  community.
- To show that whois privacy is a beneficial service to the registrant, not a tool to avoid legal responsibility or culpability.
- To what degree and in what ways would you would expect it to be of value to you and/or your organization: The problems caused by Privacy Whois lead me to conclude it should be forbidden.
   Whois is supposed to be correct, and in fact ICANN demands we verify our whois data or lose our ICANN Accreditation. And yet the ICANN whois escrow allows deposits of Privacy Whois data

thus reducing the Whois Escrow data for uselessness. The very survey is more of an illusion. This survey is just legitimizing and rationalizing the entire concept of privacy whois. Privacy whois created procedural cover for TRUE domain squatters, brand typo squatters, etc. For those truely needing privacy many options exists such as post office boxes, lawyers, or in the case of corps in the US Nevada Incorporation. In all cases liability still exists and if accurate whois requirement is enforced deletion of the domain name remains a remedy. Privacy whois destroys the entire issue of registrant accountability. I own a house, and the entire details of my house, my taxes, etc., are publically available. And yet I can register a domain name, have ICANN force the registrar (me) to verify the registrant information and have no record of it, and that domain name can be used in many ways that cause problems for the entire industry. Chaos is good, especially when it give ICANN more reasons for more fees, and more surveys, to create the illusion of solving problems. We need to return to the time when the entire industry acted as if privacy whois was forbidden. This is not perfect, and will cause a different set of problems. However this was the way the industry previously worked, this is not unfamiliar ground. It creates registrant needed accountability. In extreme cases such as whistle blowers, or alternative media, this then does require some additional costs to create corp veils, etc., but does not eliminate the ability for them to exist.

- Towards preventing frivolous inquiries
- Tremendous value putting real data towards an issue that is always argued on anecdotal evidence would help clear up a badly flawed system. We would be able to get a lot of abuse handled more quickly.
- Unsure
- Very high
- Very low impact for lawyers.
- Very useful for outing spammers
- Very useful if it demonstrates ways to expedite getting to the identity of the beneficial owner of the domain name; not so useful if it just has facts and figures
- Very useful, as it would reveal the numerous shortcomings in the current WHOIS system with respect to IP enforcement
- Very useful. As a consumer protection enforcement body, accurate WHOIS information is a good indicator on where a site is located, or whether it is legitimate or not. We would argue that any legitimate trader selling a product would have no need to use fake WHOIS details.
- We anticipate that hard data regarding what many of us feel is an area of deep concern would lead to its betterment.
- We regularly encounter roadblocks in our trademark enforcement efforts due to nonresponsiveness of proxies and inability to penetrate privacy settings.
- We research criminal abusers of the Internet. Whois information should be useful for that but often isn't due to proxy or privacy registrations.

- We would welcome if a study let to a new policy under which a TM owner if they have detected a clearly infringing domain name registration, could demand (maybe upon proving to be the owner of the infringed TM) a registrar to reveal the real registrant data.
- Working on trademark and copyright issues I handle sites which are profiting from unauthorized sales of our properties. Usually these web sites have multiple sites and it would be beneficial to have all registrant details on all sites (accurate information) so we can investigate properly.
- Your focus is wrong. These processes are used as a last resort. Appealing to the registrar or ISP is the quickest way to get abusive services offline.

# 40 To what degree and in what ways would you would expect it to be of value to the broader Internet community:

- A better understanding of these services, including how they help provide needed anonymity and how they hinder security efforts and investigations should lead to better policies.
- A study that identifies best practices in the provision of privacy and proxy services and which also
  identifies those services that work closely with the law enforcement and intellectual property
  communities in addressing "relay" and "reveal" requests could be of great value to the broader
  Internet community. It would benefit law enforcement, the intellectual property community and
  consumers at large to be able to readily identify the reputable privacy and proxy service
  providers from those that are not.
- Accurate Whois data is very important. If there are improvements this will help to prevent misuse
- Any facts that would support analysis of the WHOIS system would be very useful in my view -- the debate over WHOIS would benefit from facts rather than relying exclusively on opinion.
- Anything that can help "take down" Internet crime and fraud is useful.
- As a step toward the abolishment of domain name proxy registration services. Anonymity encourages illicit conduct.
- Better access to this information for people wanting to purchase a domain name. The governments and law enforcement have enough means to contact the registrar and get the information they need.
- Better determine the domain owner criminals and solve incidents of abuse. Among other things would be easier not to allow a criminal to a customer using our services if we could see the whois information easily.
- Better Policing and perception of policing. A domain name should be treated as real estate online and people should not be able to hide that they own it,
- Confirm the excessive use of proxy registrations by shady businesses
- Crime on the Internet affects all members of the community as the financial infrastructure is vulnerable, as well as the overall infrastructure of the Internet.
- Determine that all providers providing proxy and or privacy type services would comply with legitimate requests to reveal said data.

- Diminish cybersquatting less user confusion, less fraud etc.
- Disclosure is necessary to take steps to avoid problems with the registration of domains
- Don't know enough about what data will be reported from the study and what the purpose is.
- Ensuring accurate data
- Every copyright owner is likely facing the same issues and it would allow other entities to see the registrant details as well.
- fight against criminal activity.
- Gather more information about the responsiveness of proxy services to reveal requests
- Good basis for future decisions as there seem to be rather no factual information.
- High
- High value
- Hopefully it will convince ICANN to get rid of the proxy services so that WHOIS data identifies the domain registrant
- I don't know statistical analysis of requests?
- I don't think it would be of great benefit to the broader Internet Community. I guess this all comes down to questions like "should we allow privacy/proxy services?". You will eventually find that almost all people using privacy services are people who do have valid contact details stored with their registrar, and are contactable, they just don't want to be contacted by third parties. The problem is when people put false details in the whois database, and don't use a privacy service. This is what the whois complaint policy is there for and should be used effectively. This is another case whereby educating the broader internet community (so they understand what the whois database is, why and how they can use it, and what to do if the information is false) would, in my opinion, be a wiser use of resources, than conducting a study such as this.
- I don't.
- I suspect the study would be very beneficial by providing real data around relay and reveal requests.
- I think a larger discussion is needed. The process should not just be driven by people monetizing the process. This data is crucial towards the goal of minimizing crime and abuse on the internet.
- I think it could be illuminating.
- I would expect the results of the survey to inform policy-making concerning proxy/privacy services, and potentially yield to uniform requirements for how proxy/privacy services respond to Relay and Reveal requests.
- I would hope that it will make more Internet users aware of the issues resulting from many uses of privacy services. The more educated people are and the larger the number of people that are aware of the issues, the better the chances of seeing necessary change.
- If it informs the public about the difficulties in achieving judicial investigations now.
- If it ultimately results in the end of privacy protection services, by requiring website operators to be held more directly and immediately accountable for their actions rather than affording them the ability to obfuscate enforcement efforts and avoid or delay liability.

- If the final outcome manages to ban or significantly reduce the possibility to use proxy / privacy protected whois.
- If this would facilitate reaching the real owners of domain names that would be beneficial.
- In order to build a more secure Internet for all, CSIRTs, law enforcement and justice agencies must be granted free access to WHOIS information, which is the foundation of expedite incident response.
- Increase trust, and provide a true contact.
- It is a main source of information to the all communities that's why it is critical to them
- It is very important to keep internet a "free" place subject again not to infringe other people's rights
- It may lead to efficient options for addressing violations and infringement by operators using privacy services.
- It may provide a more comprehensive overview of domain name usage, which may educate as to which namespaces are most valuable and which ones are too restricted etc.
- It might prove the abuse happening using proxy/privacy providers
- It really depends, as I previously mentioned, on how you design and execute the study. If you take a broad random sample, you are unlikely to see much that's of interest. You need a sample design plan that will allow you to intentionally OVERSAMPLE and focus on the problematic providers and their abusive practices, which is the reason why most folks are interested in this area.
- It will allow everyone to move on and stop worrying about privacy/proxy services.
- It will more clearly reveal the parameters around contact information and use of a privacy proxy
- It will unnecessarily provoke the ignorant into demanding that something-must-be-done. There is a small chance that something might be useful.
- It would be helpful to know how privacy and proxy services are used for malicious purposes.
- It would ensure internet users that they are able to reach the holder of any registered domain names.
- It would improve security and accountability
- It would provide real data points to prove the presence of a problem or deficiency in current policies and/or implementations of WHOIS.
- It's better to have a community, Google group, Facebook page and Poral to provide news, information and findings for all users.
- Larger degree
- May assist to highlight lack of diligence in obtaining accurate details on the part of others in the Internet community.
- Moderate
- Moderately valuable
- More transparency is beneficial to curb infringing activities.
- My personal view is that privacy and proxy services are mainly used to mask the identity of the registrant so as to make evidence gathering on cybersquatting behavior more difficult.


- None
- None really.
- Not sure.
- Openness and transparency are fundamental to economic growth and give a comparative advantage to those jurisdictions where such principles are followed.
- Our information about criminal abuse of the Internet is published and used widely. Therefore
  improved transparency and visibility of whois for our use would benefit the entire Internet
  community indirectly but significantly.
- Perhaps a study (if accurate) would educate others about the difficulties created by privacy and proxy services.
- Perhaps, reducing the idea that privacy and proxy services are exploited for wrongdoing.
- Privacy shields serve a useful purpose, and I use one myself for my personal domain names.
   However, privacy shields are often abused and are a significant hindrance to IP investigations and enforcement. It would be useful to have clear standards on what will cause a privacy shield to disclose registrant info.
- Protecting the privacy of registrants and ensuring better underlying registrant data for law enforcement
- Provide fact-based evidence and help make informed decisions for policy development.
- Resolving the problem of proxy and false domain name registrations.
- Significantly only if the end result was machine paresable abuse contacts for domains and IP blocks. Separate abuse contact addresses for MARF qould be helpful.
- Simply having knowledge of who is the owner of such website, its level of authenticity
- So long as Registrants are able to successfully hide from law enforcement agencies and legal process servers, the Internet Community remains at risk from illegal activity. If this study ultimately leads to a reveal/relay process that tracks back to a unique identity and an individual, the entire Internet Community will benefit, as will the many companies (such as Visa, MasterCard, insurance companies, banks, etc.) that are currently paying the price of fraud on the internet.
- Such a study could be helpful to argue against proxy services, at least for commercial entities. Commercial entities have no legitimate interest in revealing their identity if they are actively participating in a market. If they do not actively participate in the market, they do not need a domain name. Eventually, all members of the Internet community will benefit being freed of fraudulent domain name registrations or domain name registration for fraudulent uses.
- Such a study might be moderately interesting from a social science or policy studies perspective, if it were unbiased and the staff did not "spin" its conclusions but simply published the data.
- The awareness it could bring to the validity and need of such services and their benefits.
- The inevitable result of such a study will be an attempt by ICANN to mandate-creep and start attempting to exert control over an area which they have no basis for jurisdiction.

- The needs are so infrequent that this would actually be of little or no value, and might be a waste of people's time. This whole process seems as though it is the intellectual property interests attempting to
- The outcome could proof valuable and show short comings in the current used system.
- There would be benefits to broad internet community.
- This study could help insure the protection of internet users in general.
- To a large extent, my answer to this is the same as above. Being able to see the experiences of many in dealing with proxy services, and in the efforts proxy services make, would help make the process (if not registrants' identities) more transparent and help both sides better understand one another.
- To know the extent to which proxy and privacy service providers are revealing the Whois information for the beneficial registrant, to know the extent to which further policy development and/or national legislation is necessary.
- To make internet-related information more transparent to the public
- To properly identify the owner of a property for various contact reasons.
- To provide a clear and consistent policy for bona fide parties seeking Whois information.
- To show that whois privacy is a beneficial service to the registrant, not a tool to avoid legal responsibility or culpability.
- Transparency
- Tremendous value putting real data towards an issue that is always argued on anecdotal evidence would help clear up a badly flawed system.
- Understanding how various operators handle requests increases the possibility that standard, accepted practices emerge across the community, which may increase efficiency for all constituencies.
- Unsure
- Very high
- Very useful for outing spammers
- Very useful if it leads to clear pathways for registrars to reveal the identity of or relay correspondence to the beneficial owner of the domain
- Very useful, as it would reveal the numerous shortcomings in the current WHOIS system with respect to IP enforcement
- Very valuable
- We anticipate that hard data regarding what many of us feel is an area of deep concern would lead to its betterment.
- Will put some seriousness in this tool

41 Please respond to the following statements about the extended study on the scale of Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, Strongly Agree, or check Don't Know or Not Applicable:


I would be personally interested in participating in an extended study:

Strongly Disagree	8	4.8%
Disagree	16	9.5%
Neutral	42	25.0%
Agree	53	31.5%
Strongly Agree	27	16.1%
Don't Know	9	5.4%
Not Applicable	5	3.0%
total	160	95.2%
no answer	8	




I would be personally interested in seeing the results of an extended study:

Strongly Disagree	5	3.0%
Disagree	1	0.6%
Neutral	9	5.4%
Agree	51	30.4%
Strongly Agree	93	55.4%
Don't Know	1	0.6%
Not Applicable	1	0.6%
total	161	95.8%
no answer	7	




An extended study would be beneficial to me or my organization:

9	5.4%
8	4.8%
26	15.5%
52	31.0%
61	36.3%
3	1.8%
1	0.6%
160	95.2%
8	
	8 26 52 61 3 1




An extended study would be beneficial for my clients/customers/stakeholders:

Strongly Disagree	9	5.4%
Disagree	9	5.4%
Neutral	23	13.7%
Agree	44	26.2%
Strongly Agree	62	36.9%
Don't Know	3	1.8%
Not Applicable	6	3.6%
total	156	92.9%
no answer	12	



An extended study would be beneficial to the Internet community overall:

Strongly Disagree	7	4.2%
Disagree	7	4.2%
Neutral	11	6.5%
Agree	52	31.0%
Strongly Agree	77	45.8%
Don't Know	6	3.6%
Not Applicable	1	0.6%
total	161	95.8%
no answer	7	



## 42 What factors would be most likely to negatively influence your decision to participate in an extended study?

- A burdensome access or time commitment
- Amount of resource required.
- As I am not a stakeholder of WHOIS I do not recognize the relevance of my opinion, its accuracy or objectivity.
- As mentioned above, I can't see the advantage of such a study.
- Availability of free time
- Burdensome gathering of detailed information to answer questions
- Cumbersome procedure in place to collect data.
- disclosure of particular information
- Excessive time commitment, requests for privileged or confidential information.
- Excessive time needed to participate.
- Extended hours / long esoteric meetings.
- Extensive time requirements
- Heavy documentation requirements; volume of examples needed.
- High time commitment or administrative burden -- if the study were to just track requests sent, for instance, and their outcome, this would not be a high burden (I wouldn't think). But if there were some long survey to take on a regular basis, or some other administrative burden that would increase time commitment, perhaps that would make me less likely to participate.
- how much time it would involve

- I am jaded about this initiative being one that is authentically necessary. This is most likely to be pre-weighted disproportionately with interests furthering the Intellectual Property Agenda
- I am not sure what is meant by "participation". Probably that question is more relevant to registrars, proxy service providers, etc. who would be providing internal data. This would not be the case for my organization. Our use of DNS Whois data is quite rare, perhaps two or three requests every quarter. We have never initiated a "reveal" request and do not use privacy or proxy services on our own DNS. Therefore, the amount of data we could supply would be minimal.
- I don't think I know enough about what you're trying to learn
- I don't use privacy/proxy registration providers, I just need to overcome their negative impact on access to whois data.
- I think it's a big waste of time and effort.
- I would need permission from my supervisors since we have government ties.
- If it revealed my contact information such that more junk mail or spam mail followed.
- If it was too time consuming.
- If my identity is revealed to be it as being in agreement to support such a project
- If the actual study does not allow for the examination of privacy abuse.
- If the study required extensive searching through historical data concerning Relay / Reveal requests that may not have been maintained / collected with the aim of producing such aggregate data, or where the information we collect may not include all the data points the survey tries to collect. (It would be much better to collect data on requests as they happen, using some kind of a case-tracking system, where a request could be tracked when initiated, and the results tracked when received, with reminders to enter data on requests not closed out.)
- If the study was to lead to a pdp to a working group for 2 years to discuss changes to fix something which isnt broken
- If the study were disproportionately influenced by domain name registration interests or fanatic free speech advocates.
- I'm an enthusiastic supporter of the idea -- the more credible/broad the approach, the better.
- In-person meetings may be difficult to attend.
- It has been several years since I was sufficiently active in domain name enforcement issues and I am not currently up-to-date on the latest developments or trends
- lack of time
- Lack of time and specific expertise
- Mostly the factors that affect stakeholders security
- No such factors
- None
- None
- None
- None.
- None.


- None. I would be delighted. Anything that changes this for the better online is good.
- Not enough to support the study in the way I think I should.
- Other competing time commitments.
- Personal time commitment however our organization would certainly participate extensively and provide data.
- Privacy considerations.
- Resourcing matters.
- That it not be conducted.
- The amount of time it will consume
- The amount of time participation would take.
- The fact that I do not often require Whols / registrant information
- the time and effort involved
- The time commitment
- The time commitment of participation, the study's timeline and the cost of the study with the goals of this study compared to previous Whois studies.
- the usual: time and cost
- time
- Time
- time access to corporate information
- Time and effort
- Time and what would be required of me to document said activities or results. This part of the process needs to be simple and programmatic.
- Time and work commitments would prevent it
- Time available
- Time commitment
- Time commitment and workflow disruption.
- Time commitment.
- Time commitment.
- Time constraints
- Time constraints. We probable do not have a relevant number of incidents or the documenting history to make it beneficial to the study.
- Time involved.
- time involved; not sure I have enough experience in it
- Time required
- Time required to participate, identification of client-sensitive information.
- Time required.
- Time sensitive.
- Time!
- Time! Am drowning in new gTLD consulting work...after April 12th, 2012 I would have more time

- time, privacy
- Time, study construct
- Time.
- Time.
- Time. Not knowing what is the end reason for this study when the results come in, what is the next stage.
- Very time consuming, data protection and ethic conducts for lawyers
- We don't do a large number of requests
- What the results will be used for in a sense that they cannot be used to decide of a binding policy for every actor under every TLD whether generic or national.
- Would need to assess the time commitment.

43 Please rate the following factors as they might negatively influence your decision to participate in the extended study in the scale of Not Significant at All, Significant, Very Significant, Critical, or check Don't Know or Not Applicable:


The time and effort required to participate:

Not Significant at All	17	10.1%
Significant	49	29.2%
Very Significant	44	26.2%
Critical	33	19.6%
Don't Know	5	3.0%
Not Applicable	3	1.8%
total	151	89.9%
no answer	17	




Concern about revealing confidential information about my business:

Not Significant at All	39	23.2%
Significant	34	20.2%
Very Significant	33	19.6%
Critical	36	21.4%
Don't Know	2	1.2%
Not Applicable	8	4.8%
total	152	90.5%
no answer	16	




Concern about revealing confidential information belonging to my clients:

Not Significant at All	31	18.5%
Significant	24	14.3%
Very Significant	28	16.7%
Critical	45	26.8%
Don't Know	3	1.8%
Not Applicable	21	12.5%
total	121	72.0%
no answer	47	




Concern about jeopardizing an on-going investigation or legal action:

Not Significant at All	46	27.4%
Significant	28	16.7%
Very Significant	19	11.3%
Critical	28	16.7%
Don't Know	11	6.5%
Not Applicable	19	11.3%
total	151	89.9%
no answer	17	




Participating could raise privacy concerns among my customers:

Not Significant at All	59	35.1%
Significant	29	17.3%
Very Significant	14	8.3%
Critical	20	11.9%
Don't Know	9	5.4%
Not Applicable	21	12.5%
total	152	90.5%
no answer	16	




Participating could potentially be inconsistent with laws or regulations that apply to me or my business:

Not Significant at All	56	33.3%
Significant	22	13.1%
Very Significant	19	11.3%
Critical	18	10.7%
Don't Know	15	8.9%
Not Applicable	21	12.5%
total	151	89.9%
no answer	17	



Participating could be politically sensitive for me or my business:

Not Significant at All	64	38.1%
Significant	22	13.1%
Very Significant	19	11.3%
Critical	12	7.1%
Don't Know	14	8.3%
Not Applicable	16	9.5%
total	147	87.5%
no answer	21	



# 44 What factors would be most likely to positively influence your decision to participate in an extended study?

- A sense that it would actually accomplish something and be conducted without a bias going in.
- A study large enough to produce useful data across all 900 registrars
- Anything that may help in fighting Internet crime and fraud.
- As I work for law enforcement this would only add to the long overdue engagement of law enforcement with the Internet community.
- Assurance that a resolution to the problem will result from the study.
- Aware of other business people experiences and challenges
- Better results
- Better understanding of the study
- Bringing an end to privacy protection services.
- Comprehensiveness of the data and how much it could help to contribute towards our business.
- Development of single true source of information about domain names information
- Easy access/use via smartphone, e.g. waiting for a plane at the airport etc.
- Easy, short time
- Expected outcome.
- Gaining information/Knowledge (about best practice)
- Gaining new information
- I am jaded about this initiative being one that is authentically necessary. This is most likely to be pre-weighted disproportionately with interests furthering the Intellectual Property Agenda
- I think just knowing the ultimate goals would positively affect my decision. I'm frankly already inclined to participate. I would like to see privacy or confidentiality guarantees so that I would not reveal confidential information from my clients.
- I would have to have my organization approve before moving forward, but likely it will not be an issue.
- If I could answer quickly, anonymously, and without citing specific examples.
- If I felt that the results would lead to a policy which would directly benefit me.
- If it studied the harm privacy services cause to average joe's who are misled.
- If it was intended to draw conclusions and concrete proposals.
- If it would lead to more openness about owners of domain names, even if it took several back and forth conversations and providing reasons to achieve this.
- If positive action by ICANN was assured based upon the results of the study.
- If the data concerning our own requests were available to us for analysis, that might be a great benefit, so that we could understand and analyze our own practices, and the responses thereto, better. It would be ideal to collect data on requests as they happen, using some kind of a case-tracking system, where a request could be tracked when initiated, and the results tracked when

received, with reminders to enter data on requests not closed out. If there was some indication that the result of the study would be regulation of the many proxy/privacy services that fail to take action in regard to Reveal requests.


- If the goals were to improve the security of the Internet.
- If the study focused on the needs of the organizations that actually depend upon accurate WHOIS information on a daily basis, including law enforcement authorities and representatives of intellectual property owners, rather than classroom academics and registration interests (that already collect and maintain accurate billing information from their customers).
- Improving the outlook for domain name registration and action in the event of fraud.
- Knowing that the results would actually drive policy.
- Lack of burdensome time commitment.
- None.
- None.
- Not sure
- Participation would positively impact the current system.
- Possible legislation mandating more internet security.
- Programmatic ways to submit data.
- Rapidity of deployment, and ease of facility of participation
- Relevance to our work of reporting malware URLs to domain owners
- Results.
- Shortest possible time and effort required, confidentiality assurances.
- The benefits of the survey.
- The chance that Proxy registrations would not be allowed for any domain name registrations containing third party TMs.
- The desperate need for hard facts concerning the relay and reveal practices by provider.
- The effort to build a "phishing-less" Internet.
- The perception that there's actual the political will power to take action against identified abusive proxy/private whois practices.
- The type of data we should have to provide. Considering our company is established in Luxembourg and as such compelled to abide to European and Luxembourgish regulations on data privacy, we won't be allowed/able to provide any such data.
- Time
- Time will be granted
- Time.
- To get \*something\* done about the quality of information in WHOIS -- right now, it's just a mess. Build some accountability into the WHOIS system.
- Understanding the value of it.
- Unsure

- We are currently seeing country laws demanding more privacy protection and this will only increase in the future. Instead of reinventing the wheel for a future proof WHOIS solution it might be wise to how ccTLD's deal with this matter.
- Well, mostly if one conclusion could be "Domains have to be registered by real persons" and a straight policy against spamfriendly "Anonymisers" of whois data.
- What view the lawyers took of the terms of engagement

45 Please rate the following factors as they might positively influence your decision to participate in the extended study in the scale of Not Significant at All, Significant, Very Significant, Critical, or check Don't Know or Not Applicable:


Strong privacy guarantees for submitted data:

Not Significant at All	20	11.9%
Significant	43	25.6%
Very Significant	38	22.6%
Critical	45	26.8%
Don't Know	0	0.0%
Not Applicable	6	3.6%
total	152	90.5%
no answer	16	




On-line tools to speed or simplify input submission:

Not Significant at All	7	4.2%
Significant	39	23.2%
Very Significant	66	39.3%
Critical	28	16.7%
Don't Know	3	1.8%
Not Applicable	5	3.0%
total	148	88.1%
no answer	20	




Ability to redact sensitive data elements from submissions:

Not Significant at All	23	13.7%
Significant	35	20.8%
Very Significant	42	25.0%
Critical	42	25.0%
Don't Know	1	0.6%
Not Applicable	6	3.6%
total	126	75.0%
no answer	42	




Personal satisfaction from improving WHOIS:

Not Significant at All	12	7.1%
Significant	42	25.0%
Very Significant	60	35.7%
Critical	28	16.7%
Don't Know	2	1.2%
Not Applicable	4	2.4%
total	148	88.1%
no answer	20	




Public credit for participating:

Not Significant at All	91	54.2%
Significant	26	15.5%
Very Significant	11	6.5%
Critical	2	1.2%
Don't Know	8	4.8%
Not Applicable	8	4.8%
total	146	86.9%
no answer	22	



The opportunity to interact with my peers and counterparts at other organizations:

Not Significant at All	37	22.0%
Significant	59	35.1%
Very Significant	34	20.2%
Critical	7	4.2%
Don't Know	5	3.0%
Not Applicable	5	3.0%
total	147	87.5%
no answer	21	



46 If you wish to comment more specifically about how the study organizers might minimize or mitigate factors that could discourage your participation, please do so here.

- Assure that regional and national RIRs understand the study and use their law consultants to guide their constituency about a lawful participation in the extended study.
- Describe/explain what ICANN will do if/when they identify problematic proxy/privacy practices.

  Make me believe that something will ACTUALLY HAPPEN as a result of Yet Another Whois Study.
- Due to EU/USA privacy quandaries, please consider having a Canadian subcontractor as Canada privacy regulations are compatible di EU privacy directives.
- I am jaded about this initiative being one that is authentically necessary. This is most likely to be pre-weighted disproportionately with interests furthering the Intellectual Property Agenda
- I don't know
- I think it should be properly planned and the participants should be trustworthy
- I understand that the survey may need to collect not only the fact of the request, but what specific domain it applies to; this can reveal information about my organization's participation in the survey, so the ability to redact that information from use, or to ensure that it is handled carefully could be key.
- I would not want the information revealed by the proxy provider included in the report. I am assuming that only the result of the request will be tallied. For example, yes I received a response and the requested information.
- Indemnity for any repercussions due to data leaks.
- It would help if people recognize that some of these providers may be complicit or criminal themselves.
- Operate the study from within the EU, thereby removing the issue of personal data flowing to the USA
- Please don't do this AGAIN
- Provide for working off-line, e.g., via e-mail, rather than via web-based tools.

- See above. Actually focus on the needs of organizations that require accurate, easily obtainable WHOIS data.
- The organizers need to commit to safeguarding and treating as confidential, any information our organization provides. Confidential information would encompass both data but also, internal policies and procedures. We further suggest that any data requests be framed so as not to require the provision of specific customer information (i.e. names, addresses, telephone numbers, domain names, etc.); requiring our organization to provide customer details could very well preclude us from participating.

## 47 If you wish to comment more specifically about how the study organizers might encourage your participation, please do so here.

The following comments were included:

- Clarify intent to support automated discovery of abuse reporting addresses, including those for spam and DOS complaints.
- Define the expertise you are looking for (technical, administrative, data collection...
- Engage with INTERPOL and other international policing agencies to ensure buy in from as many law enforcement agencies as possible.
- Financial incentives.
- I don't know
- I think it should be properly planned and the participants should be trustworthy
- I work daily with over 45 ccTLD's and have in-depth knowledge about how other countries deal with WHOIS issues. And of course I am no stranger to current WHOIS system and its short comings.
- If the data concerning our own requests were available to us for analysis, that might be a great benefit, so that we could understand and analyze our own practices, and the responses thereto, better.
- No more comments.
- Tie to specific actions that will be taken as a result of the study.
- We would be strongly encouraged to participate if we were provided ample opportunity to describe the policies and practices we have developed over the past decade and how we routinely cooperate with the law enforcement and intellectual property communities. Our organization believes that our practices and dedicated customer service resources for handling "relay" and "reveal" requests (as well as other issues) are the "gold standard" in the industry, and that any in-depth study regarding Whois Privacy and Proxy services practices regarding "relay" and "reveal" must address and consider more than raw data.

### C.8 Contact Information (n=168)

### 48 Name

127 (75.6%) of respondents provided their name.

### 49 Organizational affiliation

122 (72.6%) of respondents provided their organizational affiliation.

#### 50 Postal address

103 (61.3%) of respondents provided their postal address.

### 51 Email address

123 (73.2%) of respondents provided their email address.

#### 52 Phone number

107 (63.7%) of respondents provided their phone number.

# C.9 Follow-up, Further Contact, and Information Sharing (n=168)

53 Are you willing to have a follow-up conversation with us?

Yes	89	53.0%
No	79	47.0%

#### 54 What is your preferred language for any follow-up interaction?

104 respondents indicated a preferred language for follow-up.

Of these, 100 indicated English; other languages mentioned (some people mentioned more than one language) French (4), Bulgarian (1), German (3), Danish (1), Swedish (1), Finnish (1), Portugese (2), Spanish (2), Russian (1), and Chinese (1).

Of those people who did not take the survey in English and who provided an answer for this question, the following answers were provided by each survey language:

- French: one indicated French, another English or French
- Simplified Chinese: one indicated English, one indicated Chinese
- Russian: one indicated Russian or English
- Spanish: two indicated Spanish

## 55 May we include your name in a (published) list of respondents who are thanked for their participation?


Yes	65	38.7%
No	103	61.3%

56 May we share your name and other contact information in an (internal to ICANN staff) list of interested parties to be contacted for further studies?

Yes	81	48.2%
No	87	51.8%

### 57 How may we share your responses with ICANN staff?

Not at all	24	14.3%
Anonymously	57	33.9%
You may identify my role but not reveal any of my contact information	34	20.2%
You may include my name	15	8.9%
You may include all of my contact information	38	22.6%



### 58 How may we publish excerpts from your comments?

Not at all Anonymously S9

You may identify my role but not reveal my name or organization You may identify my organization but not my name S

You may identify me by name 27


26.2%

35.1%

19.6%

3.0%

16.1%



### 59 Please suggest other people whom we should contact for this survey.

6 respondents suggested other people to be contacted for the survey

60 May we use your name in introducing ourselves to these recommended contacts?

61 Would you be willing to introduce us to these recommended contacts?

#### 62 Please provide any additional comments relating to this survey:

The following comments were included:

• "Do you see examples of abusive proxy/privacy whois-related practices?" "What do you consider to be an example of an abusive proxy/privacy whois practice?" "Why are those practices a problem for you?" "In your experience, which privacy/proxy provider is most strongly associated

- with problematic practices?" "What changes would you like to see made with respect to the proxy/privacy whois service?"
- I am jaded about this initiative being one that is authentically necessary. This is most likely to be pre-weighted disproportionately with interests furthering the Intellectual Property Agenda
- I don't think you focusses on those like me who want info for a legit purpose (checking service vendor of www when no info on www) and do not at that moment actually want to contact vendor whois admin contact record.
- I have an automated tool for extracting drop boxes from spam and searching for potential complaint addresses. I have found that may of the whois records have contact information only in comments, or in records linked to from the main records. I am hoping for changes that would simplify the code for extracting contact addresses and also simplify limiting the search to the relevant entity, e.g., exclude irrelevant contacts for upstream entities.
- I really don't get the point of this. The internet's self-appointed guardians (private and commercial) have relationships with ISP's and registries because whois data is so often total crap. Why aren't ICANN actually insisting it be improved and why? I think we all know why.
- In the frequency of reveal/relay requests question, there should be a "more than once a month" option.
- It is a "badly kept secret" that privacy is being abuse to the detriment of the common internet user. The actual legitimacy of privacy proxies needs to be examined. Heihachi would make an excellent case study: http://heihachi-worms.blogspot.com/ Why did the authorities find it necessary to imprison the owner of Heihachi? Likewise Alantron in the MediaOn group: http://hphosts.blogspot.com/2010/04/crimeware-friendly-isps-alantron-bltd.html
- More details about how regional and national RIRs would participate.
- More information about what you expect to find out or what you are looking for in the study
- No Answer, NA and I don't know are all basically the same response (that is none of them end up counting in the end). So having 3 such options might skew your results towards incomplete answers somewhat.
- Standardization amongst all gTLD WHOIS data would be phenomenal. There is some much inconsistency between com/net Registrars. Registrars also need to have some standard checks in place to verify WHOIS data upon registration and update. There is so much obvious incorrect information it's unclear how it makes it through the registration process.
- Timing of the survey when and how much effort.

63 Do you have any general comments on the contemplated future study of Relay and Reveal requests?

The following comments were included	$d^7$
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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Note that some respondents chose to repeat the same comment, often verbatim, in the answers to multiple questions.

- A very helpful and practical survey and it would be better if you contact academic organizations,
   LAW and IT students and business people directly.
- Don't just do it to do it. Have a plan for how the study will actually drive policies, procedures, and contractual requirements. We don't need another study that will just sit on a shelf; we need a study that can drive ACTION.
- From our perspective, proxy registration services serve no other purpose than to shield the contact information of bad actors, in most cases cybers-quatters. Proxy registration services cause undue expense and delay for our clients. Proxy registration services also provide bad actors with additional time and anonymity to game the system and engage in cyber-flight.
- Good luck
- I am jaded about this initiative being one that is authentically necessary. This is most likely to be pre-weighted disproportionately with interests furthering the Intellectual Property Agenda
- I really don't get the point of this. The internet's self-appointed guardians (private and commercial) have relationships with ISP's and registries because whois data is so often total crap. Why aren't ICANN actually insisting it be improved and why? I think we all know why.
- I strongly support the conduct of a full study on Relay and Reveal requests.
- ICANN should not attempt to interfere with privacy/proxy services. New rules will only make life difficult for those who wish to follow the rules. Criminals will always find ways to do their evil deeds.
- Let's get started
- Please make it clear under what conditions a domain can be Privacy/Proxy-registered. For example, e-commerce and email sites should not be allowed to be anonymous.
- Please make it happen soon!!!
- Thank you! We desperately need this information
- The current WHOIS system is working but there are too many issues when it comes to privacy, data mining and data not be accurate. A future proof solution is needed and ccTLD registries have a better solution already inplace.
- Typically, empirical studies are based on a hypothesis or expectation regarding what kind of data might be found and what those data patterns might prove or disprove. This seems to be completely lacking in this case.
- WhoIS is an important matter, ICANN should take seriously and get feedback from the relevant stakeholders

### **Appendix D Survey Response Analysis**

This section provides additional analysis of, along with selected quotes from, the survey responses.

### D.1 Sources of Information to Contact Domain Owners

The survey asked people to indicate sources, other than WHOIS, used to identify and contact domain owners, licensees, and registrants,

123 (73.2%) of the 168 survey respondents provided one or more responses.

60 (48.8%) of responses cited some variation of "information on the website".

31 (25.2%) of responses cited an internal or Internet-accessible database, regulatory agencies, or using other public records.

26 (21.1%) of responses cited search (of which Google was mentioned 11 times).

21 (17.0%) of responses cited various forensic, research, and investigative methods.

15 (12.2%) of responses cited some variation of WHOIS

- WHOIS privacy provider
- RIR's WHOIS service rather than ICANN's
- Reverse WHOIS lookup services

10 (8.1%) of responses cited contacting the Registrar; 3 cited contacting the ISP or hosting company

5 (4.1%) of responses indicated use of email (via a default address or forum postings) and/or social networking sites.

Various technical means were cited:

- Associating domains with network owners and other domains (via shared name servers for example)
- Historical domain name and registrant information
- DNS queries
- Geolocation information about the IP address(es) of interest
- RIR databases and WHOIS services for the IP address(es) in question
- Email headers and IP addresses
- Historical BGP data
- IP addresses

- Reverse DNS
- PTR, A, and NS records
- SSL certificates

#### The following specific sources were cited:

- abuse.net
- abusix.org
- archive.org
- BBB
- Centralops
- CIRA
- dig
- domaintools
- impressum
- LinkedIn
- MelbournelT
- Passive-DNS
- robtex
- RIPE Database
- TESS (USPTO)


#### Other noteworthy quotes:

- Contact information on the website [...] is often missing in the small business environment. Although required [by] consumer Law and EU directive it is often missing. E.g. Villa rental when no checkable contact details are on website.
- I try and not use domaintools.com as I think they are committing highway robbery for access to domain whois data that should be free and available.
- In most cases of malicious or criminal use WHOIS is not useful to make contact and contacting the registrar, network provider or performing other research to associate the domain to an owner is necessary.
- We use private contact information that we require of all customers to contact our customers. WHOIS information is only collected from our customers to satisfy ICANN's requirements. We do not use WHOIS data for any aspect of our relationship with existing customers. The only thing for which we use WHOIS is to obtain an email address to which to send ICANN's mandated FOA when transferring domains for new customers. A process that is redundant to the EPP token required by all current gTLD registries.


• WHOIS is the primary source of information and if the information there is incorrect or inaccurate it is often impossible to track a registrant.


### D.2 Level of Interest in Participation in the Larger Study


The following chart summarizes the interest and benefit perspectives of the survey respondents.





Each of the criteria was analyzed to determine how the views of each of three constituencies (relay and reveal requestors, proxy/privacy service providers, and registrars) might differ as shown in the following charts. Strongly Agree and Agree are shown together under "Agree" and Strongly Disagree and Disagree are shown together under "Disagree".












The data was further analyzed to look at the "Agree" from each of the factors shown together comparing the three constituencies:



### D.2.1 Value of Study to Individuals or Their Organization

The survey asked respondents to explain the value of the survey to themselves and/or their organization.

119 (70.8%) of respondents provided answers to this question.

49 (29.2%) people did not provide an answer to the question.

17 (14.3%) of those answering responded that the proposed full study would be of little or no value or interest to them or their organization, including these comments:

- Domains responding with fake data in whois are not trustworthy at all, so there is no need for a study.
- It will ultimately result in new rules or additional regulation of privacy/proxy services and registrants will return to publishing false information in whois.
- Privacy is protected by legislation within the EU, and so the privacy policies will continue
  irrespective of any survey/study. As to reveals anyone with a \_legitimate\_ reason to
  access the details of a registrant already has the framework in place to obtain such

- information (e.g. court order) and all any "policy" would do is make it simpler for cranks and crackpots to stalk individuals.
- The inevitable result of such a study will be an attempt by ICANN to mandate-creep and start attempting to exert control over an area which they have no basis for jurisdiction.
- Your focus is wrong. These processes are used as a last resort. Appealing to the registrar or ISP is the quickest way to get abusive services offline.

6 (5.0%) of those answering were unsure or answered "I don't know".

96 (80.7%) of those answering felt the full study would be of value to them or their organization. Of these, 11 used phrases such as "extremely valuable", "very useful", "significant", "high interest and value"; 2 indicated "moderately valuable"; 2 indicated lukewarm support. Respondents provided specific reasons for, or expectations of, the full study, including:

- 9 mentioned policy, e.g., "ability to shape the policy of whois", "to know the extent to which further policy development and/or national legislation is necessary", "to arrive at a policy where requests are handled consistently by ISPs, registrars etc.", "inform policy-making concerning proxy/privacy services, and potentially yield to uniform requirements for how proxy/privacy services respond to Relay and Reveal requests"
- A solution to issues regarding Whois privacy/proxy registration services is critical to the security and stability of the Internet, and critical to law enforcement's ability to quickly act to criminal activity occurring on the Internet.
- Any facts that would support analysis of the WHOIS system would be very useful in my view.
- Assist in identifying and closing fraudulent websites and identifying criminal patterns
- Find solution to protect both the privacy and the right of third parties
- Hopefully it will convince ICANN to get rid of the proxy services so that WHOIS data identifies the domain registrant
- Identify scale of issues caused by proxy/privacy registrations used for fraudulent purposes and/or trademark infringements
- It could end up in finding ways to improve the treatment of this request by proxy providers and would also allow proxy providers to have common rules/guidelines to treat those requests.
- It would be helpful to know how privacy and proxy services are used for malicious purposes.
- It would be valuable to have some objective data on industry practices, rather than rely on the subjective opinions of those with an anti-proxy agenda.

- Privacy shields are often abused and are a significant hindrance to IP investigations and enforcement. It would be useful to have clear standards on what will cause a privacy shield to disclose registrant info.
- Spread light on privacy protected/proxy registration services' disreputable connivance with cybercrime
- To prove that domain name registration proxy services merely facilitate the conduct of bad actors, such as cyber-squatters, phishers and scammers.
- To show how effective (or not effective) relay and reveal requests are, to see whether registrars and proxy service providers are compliant, to show how criminals use proxy services to shield themselves from investigations and hide their identity from the consumer and the Internet community.
- To show that whois privacy is a beneficial service to the registrant, not a tool to avoid legal responsibility or culpability.
- Would give us a better understanding of the amount of false and misleading information that is returned when doing WHOIS lookups.

### D.2.2 Value of Study to Internet Community

The survey asked respondents to explain the value of the survey to the broader Internet community.

117 (69.6%) of respondents provided an answer to this question. 51 (30.4%) of respondents did not provide an answer to the question.

13 (11.1%) of those answering responded that the proposed full study would be of little or no value or interest to the broader Internet community, including these comments:

- I think a larger discussion is needed. The process should not just be driven by people monetizing the process. This data is crucial towards the goal of minimizing crime and abuse on the internet.
- It will unnecessarily provoke the ignorant into demanding that something-must-be-done. There is a small chance that something might be useful.
- This all comes down to questions like "should we allow privacy/proxy services?" You will eventually find that almost all people using privacy services are people who do have valid contact details stored with their registrar, and are contactable, they just don't want to be contacted by third parties. The problem is when people put false details in the whois database, and don't use a privacy service. This is what the whois complaint policy is there for and should be used effectively. This is another case whereby educating the broader internet community (so they understand what the whois database is, why and

how they can use it, and what to do if the information is false) would, in my opinion, be a wiser use of resources, than conducting a study such as this.

7 (6.0%) of those answering were unsure or answered "I don't know".


97 (82.9%) of those answering felt the study would be of value to the broader Internet community. Of these, 10 used phrases such as "very valuable", "high value", "critical", "very useful", "very important"; 6 indicated moderately valuable. Respondents provided specific reasons for, or expectations of, the full study, including:

- 8 mentioned policy, e.g., "It would provide real data points to prove the presence of a problem or deficiency in current policies and/or implementations of WHOIS", "Provide fact-based evidence and help make informed decisions for policy development", "To provide a clear and consistent policy for bona fide parties seeking WhoIs information", and "A better understanding of these services, including how they help provide needed anonymity and how they hinder security efforts and investigations should lead to better policies."
- A study that identifies best practices in the provision of privacy and proxy services and which also identifies those services that work closely with the law enforcement and intellectual property communities in addressing "relay" and "reveal" requests could be of great value to the broader Internet community. It would benefit law enforcement, the intellectual property community and consumers at large to be able to readily identify the reputable privacy and proxy service providers from those that are not.
- Any facts that would support analysis of the WHOIS system would be very useful in my view. The debate over WHOIS would benefit from facts rather than relying exclusively on opinion.
- Anything that can help "take down" Internet crime and fraud is useful.
- Crime on the Internet affects all members of the community as the financial infrastructure is vulnerable, as well as the overall infrastructure of the Internet.
- Gather more information about the responsiveness of proxy services to reveal requests
- Hopefully it will convince ICANN to get rid of the proxy services so that WHOIS data identifies the domain registrant
- If it ultimately results in the end of privacy protection services, by requiring website operators to be held more directly and immediately accountable for their actions rather than affording them the ability to obfuscate enforcement efforts and avoid or delay liability.
- It may lead to efficient options for addressing violations and infringement by operators using privacy services.
- It will allow everyone to move on and stop worrying about privacy/proxy services.

- Openness and transparency are fundamental to economic growth and give a comparative advantage to those jurisdictions where such principles are followed.
- Privacy shields serve a useful purpose, and I use one myself for my personal domain names. However, privacy shields are often abused and are a significant hindrance to IP investigations and enforcement. It would be useful to have clear standards on what will cause a privacy shield to disclose registrant info.
- So long as Registrants are able to successfully hide from law enforcement agencies and legal process servers, the Internet Community remains at risk from illegal activity. If this study ultimately leads to a reveal/relay process that tracks back to a unique identity and an individual, the entire Internet Community will benefit, as will the many companies (such as Visa, MasterCard, insurance companies, banks, etc.) that are currently paying the price of fraud on the internet.
- To show that whois privacy is a beneficial service to the registrant, not a tool to avoid legal responsibility or culpability.

### D.3 Obstacles to Participation

The following chart depicts the factors that might negatively influence participation in the full study:



When asked to explain the factors most likely to negatively influence participation in an extended survey, there were 104 (61.9%) responses to this question. 64 (38.1%) people did not respond.

54 (51.9%) of those answering cited "time" – for example "time consuming", "time commitment", "time required". Other

12 (11.5%) of those answering cited some form of cost, resource, effort, administrative burden, or expertise impact –for example "in-person meetings may be difficult to attend", "cumbersome procedure in place to collect data", "heavy documentation requirements; volume of examples needed", and "burdensome gathering of detailed information to answer questions".


11 (10.6%) of those answering cited "privacy" – for example "privacy considerations", "stakeholders' security", "client confidentiality".


3 (2.9%) of those answering mentioned concerns for their anonymity, and one indicated "If it revealed my contact information such that more junk mail or spam mail followed."


### The following comments were made:


- If the study required extensive searching through historical data concerning Relay / Reveal requests that may not have been maintained / collected with the aim of producing such aggregate data, or where the information we collect may not include all the data points the survey tries to collect. (It would be much better to collect data on requests as they happen, using some kind of a case-tracking system, where a request could be tracked when initiated, and the results tracked when received, with reminders to enter data on requests not closed out.)
- If the study were disproportionately influenced by domain name registration interests or fanatic free speech advocates.
- What the results will be used for in a sense that they cannot be used to decide of a binding policy for every actor under every TLD whether generic or national.
- What would be required of me to document said activities or results. This part of the process needs to be simple and programmatic.


The following charts look at the negative factors across the three constituencies (relay and reveal requestors, proxy/privacy service providers, and registrars) to see how perspectives varied. Very Significant and Significant are shown as "Significant".



















The following chart looks at just the "Critical" across the factors for each of the three constituencies:



### D.4 Incentives to Participate

The following chart depicts the factors that might positively influence participation in the full study:



When asked to explain the factors most likely to positively influence participation in an extended survey, 69 (41.1%) of respondents provided an answer to this question. 99 (58.9%) did not respond.

7 (10.1%) of those answering cited "time" or "effort" in their response, including "shortest possible time and effort required".

5 (7.2%) of those answering cited "policy", or "legislation" as an expected result, including "Knowing that the results would actually drive policy", or "Possible legislation mandating more internet security".

Many respondents have very explicit expectations, though they are not always congruent. Some expectations include:

- A sense that it would actually accomplish something and be conducted without a bias going in.
- A study large enough to produce useful data across all 900 registrars
- Assurance that a resolution to the problem will result from the study.
- Bringing an end to privacy protection services.
- Build some accountability into the WHOIS system.
- Development of single true source of information about domain names information.
- If I felt that this study would result in the demise of Privacy and Proxy-registered domains
- If I felt that this study would result in the demise of Privacy and Proxy-registered domains.
- If it was intended to draw conclusions and concrete proposals.
- If positive action by ICANN was assured based upon the results of the study.


- If the study focused on the needs of the organizations that actually depend upon accurate WHOIS information on a daily basis, including law enforcement authorities and representatives of intellectual property owners, rather than classroom academics and registration interests (that already collect and maintain accurate billing information from their customers).
- *Improve the security of the Internet.*
- Need for hard facts concerning the relay and reveal practices by provider.
- Participation would positively impact the current system.
- The chance that Proxy registrations would not be allowed for any domain name registrations containing third party TMs.
- The perception that there's actual the political will power to take action against identified abusive proxy/private whois practices.


A few respondents cited specific practical concerns related to providing data around confidentiality and anonymity, including "programmatic ways to submit data", "anonymously, without citing specific examples", and "I would like to see privacy or confidentiality guarantees so that I would not reveal confidential information from my clients". Another cited "ease of participation".


#### Other comments include:


- If the data concerning our own requests were available to us for analysis, that might be a great benefit, so that we could understand and analyze our own practices, and the responses thereto, better. It would be ideal to collect data on requests as they happen, using some kind of a case-tracking system, where a request could be tracked when initiated, and the results tracked when received, with reminders to enter data on requests not closed out. If there was some indication that the result of the study would be regulation of the many proxy/privacy services that fail to take action in regard to Reveal requests.
- The type of data we should have to provide. Considering our company is established in Luxembourg and as such compelled to abide to European and Luxembourgish regulations on data privacy, we won't be allowed/able to provide any such data.
- We are currently seeing country laws demanding more privacy protection and this will only increase in the future. Instead of reinventing the wheel for a future proof WHOIS solution it might be wise to how ccTLD's deal with this matter.


The following charts look at the positive factors across the three constituencies (relay and reveal requestors, proxy/privacy service providers, and registrars) to see how perspectives varied. Very Significant and Significant are shown as "Significant".















The following chart looks at just the "Critical" across the factors for each of the three constituencies:



# **Appendix E Comparing Survey Results from Different Constituencies**

The survey results were also categorized by five different constituencies as follows:

- Those who make relay or reveal requests (73 responses) that is, those who answered 'Yes' to the role/interest selection "I have experience in making Relay requests" or "I have experience in making Reveal requests"
- Those who receive relay or reveal requests (32 responses) that is, those who
  answered 'Yes' to the role/interest selection "I have experience in receiving and/or
  responding to Relay requests" or "I have experience in receiving and/or responding to
  Reveal requests"
- Proxy/privacy providers (25 responses) that is, those who answered 'Yes' to the role/interest selection "I represent a Privacy service provider" or "I represent a Proxy service provider"
- Registrars (36 responses) that is, those who answered 'Yes' to the role/interest selection "I represent a Registrar"
- Law enforcement (14 responses) that is, those who, having indicated they need to contact domain name owners, licensees, and registrants, answered 'Yes' to "I work for a law enforcement agency"

The following data is organized into columns for each of the constituencies identified, with a column showing the results from all 168 survey respondents.

For sets of data, the highest value is depicted in green and the lowest value is depicted in red.

				Role(s)	and Int	erest(s):						
	n	=73	n=32		n	n=25		n=36		=14	n=168	
	4	3%	1	L9%	1	15%		21%	:	8%	1	00%
	•	/Reveal lestors	-	/Reveal eivers	se	/Privacy rvice viders	Reg	gistrars		aw cement	Т	otal
I (or my organization) need to contact domain name owners, licensees, and registrants	69	94.5%	25	78.1%	16	64.0%	25	69.4%	14	100.0%	142	84.5%
I have experience in making Relay requests	63	86.3%	20	62.5%	12	48.0%	15	41.7%	7	50.0%	63	37.5%
I have experience in making Reveal requests	65	89.0%	19	59.4%	12	48.0%	13	36.1%	9	64.3%	65	38.7%
I represent a Privacy service provider	12	16.4%	19	59.4%	24	96.0%	20	55.6%	1	7.1%	24	14.3%
I represent a Proxy service provider	8	11.0%	11	34.4%	13	52.0%	9	25.0%	1	7.1%	13	7.7%
I have experience in receiving and/or responding to Relay requests	19	26.0%	30	93.8%	19	76.0%	17	47.2%	3	21.4%	30	17.9%
I have experience in receiving and/or responding to Reveal requests	17	23.3%	27	84.4%	19	76.0%	17	47.2%	3	21.4%	27	16.1%
I represent a Registrar	15	20.5%	18	56.3%	20	80.0%	36	100.0%	1	7.1%	36	21.4%
I represent a Registry	2	2.7%	1	3.1%	1	4.0%	2	5.6%	2	14.3%	4	2.4%
I represent a regulator or a semi-governmental entity	3	4.1%	1	3.1%	0	0.0%	1	2.8%	4	28.6%	5	3.0%
I represent a government	6	8.2%	3	9.4%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	8	57.1%	14	8.3%
I represent a network security service provider (e.g., anti-spam or anti- malware services	16	21.9%	4	12.5%	6	24.0%	5	13.9%	1	7.1%	29	17.3%

		I	1	i	I	I	Ì	I	I	I	Ī	i i
I represent a security incident response team	18	24.7%	5	15.6%	5	20.0%	6	16.7%	3	21.4%	35	20.8%
I am a network security researcher	12	16.4%	4	12.5%	5	20.0%	3	8.3%	5	35.7%	34	20.2%
I represent an industry or business association	8	11.0%	4	12.5%	3	12.0%	2	5.6%	0	0.0%	17	10.1%
I represent a professional organization	10	13.7%	4	12.5%	3	12.0%	8	22.2%	2	14.3%	23	13.7%
I represent a law firm	18	24.7%	4	12.5%	2	8.0%	2	5.6%	2	14.3%	30	17.9%
I represent another kind of business entity (e.g., corporation, LLC)	26	35.6%	10	31.3%	10	40.0%	9	25.0%	2	14.3%	50	29.8%
I represent a non-profit entity	7	9.6%	3	9.4%	3	12.0%	5	13.9%	1	7.1%	18	10.7%
I am an individual responding on my own personal behalf	6	8.2%	2	6.3%	3	12.0%	3	8.3%	1	7.1%	26	15.5%
I represent a consumer interest or privacy advocacy group	4	5.5%	2	6.3%	2	8.0%	2	5.6%	0	0.0%	8	4.8%
I represent a consumer complaint center	2	2.7%	2	6.3%	0	0.0%	1	2.8%	2	14.3%	5	3.0%
I participate in policy-making activities related to WHOIS in the ICANN gTLD context	13	17.8%	7	21.9%	6	24.0%	8	22.2%	2	14.3%	25	14.9%
I participate in policy-making activities related to WHOIS in other contexts, (e.g., RIRs, ccTLDs)	6	8.2%	5	15.6%	4	16.0%	7	19.4%	1	7.1%	16	9.5%
My organization participates in policy-making activities related to WHOIS, although I personally do not	5	6.8%	2	6.3%	2	8.0%	2	5.6%	0	0.0%	6	3.6%

	Of t	those nee	eding to	contact	name (	owners/li	icense	es/registra	ants:			
	n	n=69		n=25		n=16		n=25		=14	n=142	
	-	/Reveal lestors		/Reveal eivers	se	/Privacy rvice viders	Reg	gistrars	_	aw cement	Т	otal
I work with trademark or intellectual property issues	20	29%	8	32%	6	38%	9	36%	3	21%	76	54%
I work against phishing and other forms of abuses but I am not a law enforcement official	46	67%	14	56%	9	56%	8	32%	2	14%	70	49%
I buy or sell domain names	9	13%	3	12%	1	6%	1	4%	14	100%	36	25%
l am a registrar	32	46%	8	32%	6	38%	10	40%	2	14%	23	16%
I work for a law enforcement agency	11	16%	12	48%	12	75%	21	84%	0	0%	14	10%
I advertise or sell other goods or services to domain name registrants	3	4%	2	8%	2	13%	5	20%	0	0%	5	4%

	0	f thos	e needin	g to	contact na	ame ov	wners/lice	nsees	/registra	ints:			
		r	า=69		n=25		n=16		ı=25	n	=14	n=142	
		l -	//Reveal uestors		y/Reveal ceivers	S	y/Privacy ervice oviders	Reg	istrars	_	.aw cement	Т	otal
In order to	Exclusively	11	15.9%	7	28.0%	5	31.3%	5	20.0%	3	21.4%	30	21.1%
contact domain	Extensively	50	72.5%	14	56.0%	9	56.3%	14	56.0%	7	50.0%	90	63.4%
owners, licensees,	Some	7	10.1%	4	16.0%	2	12.5%	5	20.0%	4	28.6%	19	13.4%
and registrants, I	Not at all	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	4.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.7%
rely on WHOIS	total	68	98.6%	25	100.0%	16	100.0%	25	100.0%	14	100.0%	140	98.6%
information:	no answer	1		0		0		0		0		2	

Please respond to the following statements about the extended study on the scale of Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, Strongly Agree, or check Don't Know or Not Applicable:

		r	n=73		n=32		n=25	r	n=36	r	n=14	n:	=168
		-	//Reveal uestors		y/Reveal ceivers	S	y/Privacy ervice oviders	Reg	istrars		Law Enforcement		otal
	Strongly												
	Disagree	5	6.8%	3	9.4%	2	8.0%	2	5.6%	0	0.0%	8	4.8%
I would be	Disagree	4	5.5%	2	6.3%	3	12.0%	3	8.3%	1	7.1%	16	9.5%
personally	Neutral	21	28.8%	11	34.4%	9	36.0%	13	36.1%	4	28.6%	42	25.0%
interested in	Agree	25	34.2%	11	34.4%	7	28.0%	11	30.6%	5	35.7%	53	31.5%
participating	Strongly Agree	9	12.3%	5	15.6%	3	12.0%	3	8.3%	4	28.6%	27	16.1%
in an extended	Don't Know	4	5.5%	0	0.0%	1	4.0%	1	2.8%	0	0.0%	9	5.4%
study	Not Applicable	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.8%	0	0.0%	5	3.0%
	total	68	93.2%	32	100.0%	25	100.0%	34	94.4%	14	100.0%	160	95.2%
	no answer	5		0		0		2		0		8	
	,			•				•			-		
	Strongly												
	Disagree	4	5.5%	3	9.4%	2	8.0%	2	5.6%	0	0.0%	5	3.0%
I would be	Disagree	0	0.0%	1	3.1%	1	4.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.6%
personally	Neutral	4	5.5%	3	9.4%	2	8.0%	2	5.6%	0	0.0%	9	5.4%
interested in	Agree	16	21.9%	12	37.5%	12	48.0%	14	38.9%	5	35.7%	51	30.4%
seeing the	Strongly Agree	44	60.3%	13	40.6%	8	32.0%	15	41.7%	9	64.3%	93	55.4%
results of an extended	Don't Know	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.8%	0	0.0%	1	0.6%
study	Not Applicable	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.6%
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	total	68	93.2%	32	100.0%	25	100.0%	34	94.4%	14	100.0%	161	95.8%
	no answer	5		0		0		2		0		7	

	Strongly Disagree	5	6.8%	5	15.6%	4	16.0%	3	8.3%	0	0.0%	9	5.4%
	Disagree	5	6.8%	3	9.4%	4	16.0%	3	8.3%	0	0.0%	8	4.8%
An extended	Neutral	10	13.7%	10	31.3%	11	44.0%	10	27.8%	0	0.0%	26	15.5%
study would	Agree	19	26.0%	9	28.1%	4	16.0%	8	22.2%	7	50.0%	52	31.0%
be beneficial	Strongly Agree	28	38.4%	5	15.6%	2	8.0%	8	22.2%	7	50.0%	61	36.3%
to me or my organization	Don't Know	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	5.6%	0	0.0%	3	1.8%
organization	Not Applicable	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.6%
	total	67	91.8%	<i>32</i>	100.0%	25	100.0%	34	94.4%	14	100.0%	160	95.2%
	no answer	6		0		0		2		0		8	
											·		
	Strongly												
	Disagree	4	5.5%	5	15.6%	4	16.0%	4	11.1%	0	0.0%	9	5.4%
An extended	Disagree	6	8.2%	4	12.5%	5	20.0%	4	11.1%	0	0.0%	9	5.4%
study would	Neutral	6	8.2%	6	18.8%	9	36.0%	8	22.2%	0	0.0%	23	13.7%
be beneficial	Agree	19	26.0%	8	25.0%	4	16.0%	8	22.2%	4	28.6%	44	26.2%
for my	Strongly Agree	30	41.1%	9	28.1%	3	12.0%	8	22.2%	6	42.9%	62	36.9%
clients, customers,	Don't Know	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.8%	0	0.0%	3	1.8%
stakeholders	Not Applicable	2	2.7%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	4	28.6%	6	3.6%
	total	67	91.8%	32	100.0%	25	100.0%	33	91.7%	14	100.0%	156	92.9%
	no answer	6		0		0		3		0		12	

An extended
study would
be beneficial
to the
Internet
community
overall

Strongly												
Disagree	5	6.8%	4	12.5%	3	12.0%	3	8.3%	0	0.0%	7	4.2%
Disagree	2	2.7%	3	9.4%	3	12.0%	1	2.8%	0	0.0%	7	4.2%
Neutral	6	8.2%	4	12.5%	7	28.0%	8	22.2%	0	0.0%	11	6.5%
Agree	20	27.4%	12	37.5%	6	24.0%	11	30.6%	5	35.7%	52	31.0%
Strongly Agree	35	47.9%	7	21.9%	4	16.0%	8	22.2%	9	64.3%	77	45.8%
Don't Know	1	1.4%	2	6.3%	2	8.0%	3	8.3%	0	0.0%	6	3.6%
Not Applicable	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.6%
total	69	94.5%	32	100.0%	25	100.0%	34	94.4%	14	100.0%	161	95.8%
no answer	4		0		0		2		0		7	

Please rate the following factors as they might negatively influence your decision to participate in the extended study in the scale of Not Significant at All, Significant, Very Significant, Critical or check Don't Know or Not Applicable:

			n=73		n=32	r	n=25	r	ı=36	r	า=14	n=168	
		Relay/Reveal requestors		Relay/Reveal receivers		Proxy/Privacy service providers		Registrars		Law Enforcement		Т	otal
	Not Significant at All		11.00/		12.5%	1	16.09/	3	0.20/		14.3%	17	10.10/
	Not Significant at All	8	11.0%	4	12.5%	4	16.0%		8.3%	2			10.1%
	Significant	21	28.8%	14	43.8%	8	32.0%	12	33.3%	2	14.3%	49	29.2%
The time	Very Significant	21	28.8%	7	21.9%	5	20.0%	7	19.4%	5	35.7%	44	26.2%
and effort	Critical	14	19.2%	5	15.6%	4	16.0%	6	16.7%	3	21.4%	33	19.6%
required to participate	Don't Know	1	1.4%	0	0.0%	1	4.0%	1	2.8%	1	7.1%	5	3.0%
	Not Applicable	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.8%	0	0.0%	3	1.8%
	total	65	89.0%	30	93.8%	22	88.0%	30	83.3%	13	92.9%	151	89.9%
	no answer	8		2		3		6		1		17	
	Not Significant at All	21	28.8%	4	12.5%	4	16.0%	7	19.4%	2	14.3%	39	23.2%
Concern	Significant	18	24.7%	8	25.0%	3	12.0%	7	19.4%	4	28.6%	34	20.2%
about	Very Significant	10	13.7%	2	6.3%	2	8.0%	3	8.3%	5	35.7%	33	19.6%
revealing	Critical	14	19.2%	15	46.9%	12	48.0%	11	30.6%	1	7.1%	36	21.4%
confidential information about my	Don't Know	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	1.2%
	Not Applicable	2	2.7%	1	3.1%	1	4.0%	2	5.6%	1	7.1%	8	4.8%
business	total	65	89.0%	30	93.8%	22	88.0%	30	83.3%	13	92.9%	152	90.5%
	no answer	8		2		3		6		1		16	

	i					1	1		1		1	1	
	Not Significant at All	16	21.9%	5	15.6%	2	8.0%	4	11.1%	3	21.4%	31	18.5%
Concern	Significant	13	17.8%	5	15.6%	3	12.0%	6	16.7%	3	21.4%	24	14.3%
about	Very Significant	11	15.1%	2	6.3%	1	4.0%	4	11.1%	2	14.3%	28	16.7%
revealing confidential	Critical	18	24.7%	17	53.1%	15	60.0%	14	38.9%	0	0.0%	45	26.8%
information	Don't Know	1	1.4%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	3	1.8%
belonging to	Not Applicable	7	9.6%	1	3.1%	1	4.0%	2	5.6%	5	35.7%	21	12.5%
my clients	total	50	68.5%	25	78.1%	20	80.0%	26	72.2%	10	71.4%	121	72.0%
	no answer	23		7		5		10		4		47	
	Not Significant at All	22	30.1%	8	25.0%	7	28.0%	11	30.6%	2	14.3%	46	27.4%
Concern	Significant	14	19.2%	4	12.5%	4	16.0%	6	16.7%	4	28.6%	28	16.7%
about	Very Significant	7	9.6%	3	9.4%	2	8.0%	2	5.6%	1	7.1%	19	11.3%
jeopardizing	Critical	15	20.5%	11	34.4%	7	28.0%	6	16.7%	4	28.6%	28	16.7%
an on-going investigation	Don't Know	3	4.1%	1	3.1%	1	4.0%	2	5.6%	0	0.0%	11	6.5%
or legal	Not Applicable	5	6.8%	2	6.3%	2	8.0%	3	8.3%	1	7.1%	19	11.3%
action	total	66	90.4%	29	90.6%	23	92.0%	30	83.3%	12	85.7%	151	89.9%
	no answer	7		3		2		6		2		17	
								•					
	Not Significant at All	30	41.1%	10	31.3%	6	24.0%	8	22.2%	5	35.7%	59	35.1%
Participating	Significant	12	16.4%	4	12.5%	4	16.0%	9	25.0%	1	7.1%	29	17.3%
could raise	Very Significant	9	12.3%	2	6.3%	2	8.0%	1	2.8%	1	7.1%	14	8.3%
privacy concerns	Critical	5	6.8%	12	37.5%	10	40.0%	8	22.2%	0	0.0%	20	11.9%
	Don't Know	2	2.7%	1	3.1%	0	0.0%	1	2.8%	0	0.0%	9	5.4%
among my	Not Applicable	7	9.6%	1	3.1%	1	4.0%	4	11.1%	6	42.9%	21	12.5%
customers	total	65	89.0%	30	93.8%	23	92.0%	31	86.1%	13	92.9%	152	90.5%
	no answer	8		2		2		5		1		16	
			•		•	-		-					

Participating	Not Significant at All	23	31.5%	10	31.3%	8	32.0%	9	25.0%	3	21.4%	56	33.3%
could	Significant	13	17.8%	3	9.4%	2	8.0%	6	16.7%	5	35.7%	22	13.1%
potentially be inconsistent	Very Significant	7	9.6%	7	21.9%	6	24.0%	4	11.1%	2	14.3%	19	11.3%
	Critical	10	13.7%	6	18.8%	5	20.0%	6	16.7%	0	0.0%	18	10.7%
with laws or	Don't Know	8	11.0%	2	6.3%	1	4.0%	1	2.8%	0	0.0%	15	8.9%
regulations	Not Applicable	4	5.5%	2	6.3%	1	4.0%	5	13.9%	3	21.4%	21	12.5%
that apply to	total	65	89.0%	30	93.8%	23	92.0%	31	86.1%	13	92.9%	151	89.9%
me or my business	no answer	8		2		2		5		1		17	
	Ī								T I				
	Not Significant at All	29	39.7%	13	40.6%	10	40.0%	12	33.3%	3	21.4%	64	38.1%
Participating	Significant	12	16.4%	5	15.6%	4	16.0%	9	25.0%	4	28.6%	22	13.1%
could be	Very Significant	6	8.2%	4	12.5%	2	8.0%	2	5.6%	2	14.3%	19	11.3%
politically	Critical	7	9.6%	5	15.6%	5	20.0%	3	8.3%	1	7.1%	12	7.1%
sensitive for	Don't Know	5	6.8%	2	6.3%	2	8.0%	2	5.6%	0	0.0%	14	8.3%
me or my	Not Applicable	3	4.1%	1	3.1%	0	0.0%	3	8.3%	3	21.4%	16	9.5%
business	total	62	84.9%	30	93.8%	23	92.0%	31	86.1%	13	92.9%	147	87.5%
	no answer	11		2		2		5		1		21	

Please rate the following factors as they might positively influence your decision to participate in the extended study in the scale of Not Significant at All, Significant, Very Significant, Critical or check Don't Know or Not Applicable:

		ı	n=73  Relay/Reveal requestors		n=32	r	n=25	r	ı=36	n=14		n=168	
					Relay/Reveal receivers		Proxy/Privacy service providers		Registrars		Law Enforcement		otal
	Net Circlificant et All		42.20/		12.50/		16.00/		0.20/	T 2	14.20/	20	11.00/
	Not Significant at All	9	12.3%	4	12.5%	4	16.0%	3	8.3%	2	14.3%	20	11.9%
Strong	Significant	20	27.4%	8	25.0%	3	12.0%	9	25.0%	2	14.3%	43	25.6%
privacy	Very Significant	17	23.3%	3	9.4%	4	16.0%	4	11.1%	6	42.9%	38	22.6%
guarantees for submitted	Critical	19	26.0%	13	40.6%	11	44.0%	14	38.9%	3	21.4%	45	26.8%
	Don't Know	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
	Not Applicable	0	0.0%	1	3.1%	0	0.0%	1	2.8%	0	0.0%	6	3.6%
data	total	65	89.0%	29	90.6%	22	88.0%	31	86.1%	13	92.9%	152	90.5%
	no answer	8		3		3		5		1	_	16	
	Not Significant at All	2	2.7%	3	9.4%	3	12.0%	3	8.3%	0	0.0%	7	4.2%
	Significant	22	30.1%	9	28.1%	7	28.0%	9	25.0%	6	42.9%	39	23.2%
On-line tools	Very Significant	24	32.9%	9	28.1%	7	28.0%	11	30.6%	6	42.9%	66	39.3%
to speed or	Critical	15	20.5%	6	18.8%	3	12.0%	5	13.9%	1	7.1%	28	16.7%
simplify input submission	Don't Know	0	0.0%	1	3.1%	1	4.0%	1	2.8%	0	0.0%	3	1.8%
	Not Applicable	0	0.0%	1	3.1%	0	0.0%	1	2.8%	0	0.0%	5	3.0%
	total	63	86.3%	29	90.6%	21	84.0%	30	83.3%	13	92.9%	148	88.1%
	no answer	10		3		4		6		1		20	

	•						ľ	1	1	1			
	Not Significant at All	11	15.1%	5	15.6%	5	20.0%	5	13.9%	2	14.3%	23	13.7%
Ability to	Significant	15	20.5%	9	28.1%	6	24.0%	10	27.8%	3	21.4%	35	20.8%
redact 	Very Significant	18	24.7%	3	9.4%	1	4.0%	5	13.9%	6	42.9%	42	25.0%
sensitive data	Critical	19	26.0%	11	34.4%	9	36.0%	9	25.0%	2	14.3%	42	25.0%
elements	Don't Know	0	0.0%	1	3.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.6%
from	Not Applicable	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.8%	0	0.0%	6	3.6%
submissions	total	52	71.2%	24	75.0%	16	64.0%	25	69.4%	11	78.6%	126	75.0%
	no answer	21		8		9		11		3		42	
	Not Significant at All	2	2.7%	4	12.5%	4	16.0%	3	8.3%	1	7.1%	12	7.1%
	Significant	21	28.8%	9	28.1%	7	28.0%	9	25.0%	2	14.3%	42	25.0%
Personal	Very Significant	23	31.5%	7	21.9%	7	28.0%	13	36.1%	7	50.0%	60	35.7%
satisfaction	Critical	17	23.3%	7	21.9%	2	8.0%	4	11.1%	3	21.4%	28	16.7%
from improving	Don't Know	0	0.0%	1	3.1%	1	4.0%	2	5.6%	0	0.0%	2	1.2%
WHOIS	Not Applicable	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.8%	0	0.0%	4	2.4%
	total	63	86.3%	28	87.5%	21	84.0%	32	88.9%	13	92.9%	148	88.1%
	no answer	10		4		4		4		1		20	
	·												
	Not Significant at All	39	53.4%	14	43.8%	11	44.0%	15	41.7%	5	35.7%	91	54.2%
	Significant	10	13.7%	9	28.1%	6	24.0%	7	19.4%	4	28.6%	26	15.5%
	Very Significant	4	5.5%	1	3.1%	2	8.0%	3	8.3%	2	14.3%	11	6.5%
Public credit	Critical	2	2.7%	1	3.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	7.1%	2	1.2%
for participating	Don't Know	5	6.8%	3	9.4%	1	4.0%	4	11.1%	1	7.1%	8	4.8%
	Not Applicable	1	1.4%	1	3.1%	1	4.0%	2	5.6%	0	0.0%	8	4.8%
	total	61	83.6%	29	90.6%	21	84.0%	31	86.1%	13	92.9%	146	86.9%
	no answer	12		3		4		5		1		22	
								•					

The	Not Significant at All	14	19.2%	7	21.9%	6	24.0%	6	16.7%	4	28.6%	37	22.0%
opportunity	Significant	23	31.5%	11	34.4%	8	32.0%	13	36.1%	4	28.6%	59	35.1%
to interact	Very Significant	16	21.9%	6	18.8%	4	16.0%	7	19.4%	3	21.4%	34	20.2%
with my	Critical	5	6.8%	3	9.4%	1	4.0%	1	2.8%	2	14.3%	7	4.2%
peers and	Don't Know	2	2.7%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	5.6%	0	0.0%	5	3.0%
counterparts	Not Applicable	1	1.4%	1	3.1%	1	4.0%	2	5.6%	0	0.0%	5	3.0%
at other	total	61	83.6%	28	87.5%	20	80.0%	31	86.1%	13	92.9%	147	87.5%
organizations	no answer	12		4		5		5		1		21	