Supplemental Report on the new gTLD Subsequent Procedures Policy Development Process (Additional Topics)

Status of This Document

This is a Supplemental Report to the Initial Report of the GNSO New gTLD Subsequent Procedures (SubPro) Working Group, which covers five (5) additional topics that required additional deliberations, and is being posted for public comment.

Preamble

The objective of this Supplemental Report to the Initial Report is to document the Working Group’s deliberations on additional issues identified and preliminary recommendations, potential options for recommendations, as well as specific questions for which the Working Group is seeking input. These topics were considered by members of the SubPro Working Group as a whole.

This Supplemental Report is structured similarly to the Initial Report, especially in that it does not contain a “Statement of level of consensus for the recommendations presented in the Initial Report.” As with the Initial

This Final Report may be translated into different languages; please note that only the English version is authoritative.
Report, the Co-Chairs continue to believe that it is pre-mature to measure the level of consensus of the Working Group members, and that doing so could have the unintended consequence of locking Working Group members into positions of support or opposition prior to soliciting public comment from the community on those recommendations. To form such definitive positions at this early of a stage could have the adverse effect of being less open to modifications to those positions as a result of community input.

After a comprehensive review of public comments received on this report, the Working Group will deliberate further on the preliminary recommendations contained herein. Once that is completed, the Co-Chairs will conduct a formal consensus call on all recommendations before the Working Group integrates these additional issues into its Final Report.

Therefore, comments on any preliminary recommendations, options and/or questions presented are welcomed and encouraged. In addition, in some cases the Working Group was unable to reach preliminary recommendations. The community, therefore, should not limit itself to commenting on only the preliminary recommendations, options, and questions specifically identified in the Initial Report, but on any other items that may not have been adequately addressed. For example, if there is an option you believe the Working Group should consider, but that option is not presented or even discussed in the Initial Report, please let us know that new option in detail, along with any background, context and supporting documents.
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1 Executive Summary

1.1 Introduction
On 17 December 2015, the GNSO Council initiated a Policy Development Process and chartered the New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Working Group. The Working Group (WG) was tasked with calling upon the community’s collective experiences from the 2012 New gTLD Program round to determine what, if any changes may need to be made to the existing Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains policy recommendations from 8 August 2007.

As the original policy recommendations adopted by the GNSO Council and ICANN Board have “been designed to produce a systemized and ongoing mechanisms for applicants to propose new top-level domains”, those policy recommendations remain in place for subsequent rounds of the New gTLD Program unless the GNSO Council decides to modify those policy recommendations via a policy development process. The Working Group is chartered to develop new policy principles, recommendations, and implementation guidance or to clarify, amend, or replace existing such elements.

A Call for Volunteers to the Working Group (“WG”) was issued on 27 January 2016. The WG held its first meeting on 22 February 2016 and has met regularly since that time. With over 250 members and observers in the SubPro Working Group, and dozens of issues to address regarding the 2012 New gTLD Program, the SubPro Co-Chairs divided up the work into a set of “Overarching Issues” and five Work Tracks. Each of the five work tracks covered a number of related issues with the help of one or more Co-Leaders. The WG issues its first Initial Report, containing the output of the Working Group on the Overarching Issues as well as preliminary recommendations and questions for community feedback from Work Tracks 1-4, on 3 July 2018. This Supplemental Report contains additional issues that were deemed to warrant additional deliberations by the WG.

1.2 Preliminary Recommendations
As noted in the Preamble, this Supplemental Report does not contain a “Statement of level of consensus for the recommendations presented in the Initial Report. In addition, in some circumstances, the WG did not reach agreement on preliminary recommendations and instead, have provided options for consideration and/or questions to seek input for further deliberations. Similar to the Initial Report, rather than including the set of preliminary recommendations, options, and questions in the Executive Summary, they will be made available in a table in Annex B.
Please see Annex B for the consolidated table of preliminary recommendations, options, and questions.

1.3 Deliberations and Community Input
The WG reached out to all ICANN Supporting Organizations (SOs) and Advisory Committees (ACs) as well as GNSO Stakeholder Groups (SGs) and Constituencies (Cs) with a request for input at the start of its deliberations, which included a specific request for historical statements or Advice relating to new gTLDs¹. All responses received were reviewed by the WG and incorporated into deliberations for each of its Charter questions. The WG also sought to identify other community efforts that either might serve as a dependency to its work or simply an input to be considered. These efforts included the Competition, Consumer Trust & Consumer Choice (CCT) Review Team and the PDP on the Review of All Rights Protection Mechanisms in All gTLDs, among others.

The WG also sought input via called Community Comment 1 (CC1)² and Community Comment 2 (CC2)³. At ICANN62, the WG engaged the community on the specific topics contained in this Supplemental Report.

1.4 Conclusions and Next Steps
This Supplemental Report will be posted for public comment for approximately 40 Days. After the WG reviews public comments received on this report, it will complete this section documenting any conclusions based on the overall findings of the report and integrate into a singular Final Report.

¹ See outreach and inputs received on the Wiki here: https://community.icann.org/x/2R6OAw
² See Community Comment 1 outreach and inputs received, on the Wiki here: https://community.icann.org/x/3B6OAw
³ See Community Comment 2 outreach and inputs received, on the Wiki here: https://community.icann.org/x/Gq7DAw
2 Deliberations of the Working Group

2.1 Auctions: Mechanism of Last Resort

   a. What is the relevant policy and/or implementation guidance (if any)?

   Implementation Guideline F: If there is contention for strings, applicants may:

   i) resolve contention between them within a pre-established timeframe

   ii) if there is no mutual agreement, a claim to support a community by one party
       will be a reason to award priority to that application. If there is no such claim,
       and no mutual agreement a process will be put in place to enable efficient
       resolution of contention and;

   iii) the ICANN Board may be used to make a final decision, using advice from staff
       and expert panels.

   b. How was it implemented in the 2012 round of the New gTLD Program?

   Implementation Guideline F spoke more about the alternatives to auctions of last resort
   and did not reference auctions specifically. However, research was completed by the
   Implementation Team (a collection of staff members supporting the policy development
   process)\(^4\)\(^5\) and guidance was sought from auction experts about how auctions could
   be used to make clear and binding decisions. Auctions were anticipated to be used to
   resolve contention and further, expert advice was expected in implementing the
   mechanism.

   Along with the first draft of the Applicant Guidebook, ICANN published an Explanatory
   Memorandum\(^6\) that examined the different mechanisms of last resort that could be
   used to resolve a contention set. This included the use of comparative evaluations,
   chance and auctions. The paper concluded for a variety of reasons that auctions should
   be used as a last resort in resolving contention set. Although there were a large number

\(^4\) See Implementation Team working document from 5 December 2006 here:
https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/filefield_6371/gnso-pdp-dec05-staffmemo-14nov06.pdf
\(^5\) See Implementation Team working document from 19 June 2007 here:
of changes to the Applicant Guidebook between that first version and the final version, the use of auctions as a last resort to resolve contention sets did not change.

That said, it was hoped that parties involved in string contention would be able to come to a voluntary agreement to resolve the contention prior to being forced into an auction conducted by ICANN (or its designee). However, there were a number of obstacles that were put into place (some intentional, others unintentional) that prevented parties from reaching mutual agreement. The settlement between parties was expected to result in the withdrawal of all but one application for the string. In addition, applicants were precluded from making material changes to their applications, which prevented many types of voluntary arrangements (such as the creation of a joint venture) which would have been the natural result of a mutual agreement. The ability to create a joint venture is explored in greater detail in section 2.4, Change Requests. In practice, settlement between parties was often completed through private resolutions of contention sets, including private auctions, as described in greater detail in section 2.2, Private Resolution of Contention Sets (including Private Auctions). A more detailed description of the implementation and rules around Auctions: Mechanism of Last Resort can be found in section 4.3 of the Applicant Guidebook.

After an open procurement process, Power Auctions was selected as the vendor to perform ICANN auctions of last resort. Auction procedures were based on an ascending-clock auction methodology and New gTLD Auction Rules were developed to supplement the guidance provided in the Application Guidebook.

The auction process was self-funded, with proceeds from completed auctions covering expenses due to the provider. Any proceeds in excess of expenses were set aside until the Cross-Community Working Group on New gTLD Auction Proceeds determines how the funds should be utilized. As of the writing of this report, ten auctions of last resort have been completed with net proceeds of over $233 million USD.

This topic was not specifically identified for review in the Final Issue Report, but the Working Group believes it is important to give the topic some consideration.

c. What are the preliminary recommendations and/or implementation guidelines?

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8 See the CCWG Wiki page here: [https://community.icann.org/x/yJXDAw](https://community.icann.org/x/yJXDAw)
2.1.c.1: Many in the Working Group believes that ICANN auctions of last resort should remain in place within the program.

2.1.c.2: However, the Working Group considered whether there should be additional options for applicants to voluntarily resolve contention sets by mutual agreement before being forced into an ICANN auction of last resort. The Working Group focused mainly on allowing applicants to change certain elements of their applications as a potential way to resolve contention sets earlier in the process (Please see recommendations in section 2.4 of this report on Change Requests, which discuss aspects like changes to the applied-for string and forming a joint venture).

d. What are the options under consideration, along with the associated benefits / drawbacks?

2.1.d.1: Different Types of Auctions. Some Working Group members proposed alternative ways to implement an auction. One such suggestion was to utilize a sealed-bid auction, or sometimes known as a Vickrey auction, where in this instance, applicants would submit their single highest bid upon application submission. If an applicant’s applied-for string is in contention, the highest bidder would be placed first in the queue to have their application evaluated and if successful, would pay the second highest bid to ICANN. It was suggested that this type of auction allows for applicants to bid the precise value of the string. This could almost entirely eliminate contention sets at the beginning of the application process. Some noted concerns that evaluators, knowing the value placed on the string by an applicant, could be biased in some manner. Others noted that utilizing a different form of auction is still a mechanism that relies heavily on having deep pockets. It was also noted that this form of auction would need to consider how it handles Applicant Support and community-based applications. Finally, others raised concerns about ICANN securing this highly proprietary information and it was acknowledged that this would need to be factored into the mechanisms that support this auction style.

2.1.d.2: Alternatives to an Auction.

○ 2.1.d.2.1: Request for Proposals. Some Working Group members proposed alternatives to auctions of last resort. The Working Group discussed the possibility of having a request for proposals process that could be used to resolve contention sets. Such an approach could
potentially involve third-party evaluators. One proposal was put forward to establish criteria around diversity that could be used as a basis for awarding the TLD. For example, priority could be given to applicants applying for their first TLD, applicants that are more community-focused rather than commercially-focused, and minority-supported applicants.

○ 2.1.d.2.2: Random Draw. Another possible alternative discussed was the use of a determinative drawing mechanism to select a “winner” in the contention set, noting that a drawing is simple, effective, and fair. A determinative drawing seems to eliminate a number of issues with resolving string contention in that it does not favor those with the most money, it does not result in losing applicants receiving a financial benefit (e.g., in the case of most private resolutions), and it could eliminate comparative evaluations. However, it was pointed out that running a determinative drawing could be encountered issues with being considered a lottery and would require proper licensing.

○ 2.1.d.2.3: System of Graduated Fees. One Working Group member suggested that a system of graduated fees could be established for each additional application submitted by an applicant, which could reduce the size of the pool of total applications and perhaps limit the number of applications that ultimately end in an auction of last resort. Another Working Group member noted that a system of graduated fees would favor larger entities with multiple applications and might also affect applicants’ strategies in relation to the formation of applicant entities.

e. What specific questions are the PDP WG seeking feedback on?

● 2.1.e.1: The preliminary recommendation above states that auctions of last resort should remain in place. However, some participants in the Working Group believe that auctions of last resort are inherently unfair and should be modified, restricted or modified. One of the main arguments is that auctions reward only those with the most amount of money rather than those that may best operate the TLD in the public interest. In addition, they believe that auctions discriminate against applicants in the developing world who may not have the resources to complete in an auction. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide a rationale for your response.
2.1.e.2: Should other aspects (e.g., non-financial) be introduced to make auctions of last resort more “fair”? One mechanism that has been mentioned is to consider auction bids from an entity in the Global South as double or triple that of the same bid from an entity not from the Global South. For example, a bid of $100 from an entity in the Global South could be comparable to a bid of $200 from a bidder on the same string that was not from the Global South. Why or why not?

2.1.e.3: What, if any, other measures should the Working Group consider to enhance “fairness”?

2.1.e.4: Some participants in the Working Group believe that auctions of last resort should be eliminated and replaced with a comparative evaluation process. Some examples include a request for proposals (RFP) process that advantages community-based applicants, minority-supported applicants, or other factors yet to be determined or relying on a drawing. Do you believe that a comparative evaluation process, a determinative drawing, or some other mechanism could replace auctions of last resort? Why or why not?

2.1.e.5: Some participants noted that auctions of last resort could allow a deep-pocketed applicant to secure all strings within a given market. One potential solution raised was to place a limit on the number of auctions an applicant could participate in though others argued that limiting the number of applications would be considered anti-competitive and difficult to enforce. Do you agree that the identified issue is of concern and if so, what do believe is a potential solution?

f. Deliberations

This topic was initially introduced on 25 June 2018 at ICANN62, during the Working Group’s second face-to-face session, with further consideration during Working Group calls. The Working Group debated both the pros and cons, considered alternative options and brainstormed possible solutions/ideas to reduce the overall need for using methods of last resort.

The Working Group examined whether to continue the use of auctions of last resort or whether to eliminate their usage. Both sides drew upon the idea of fairness but each had a different approach to this concept. Those in support of keeping the auction processes argued that the mechanism is fair and provides an equal-opportunity method to resolve contention sets. Those opposed to auctions stated that auctions are not fair. From this perspective, auctions are too restrictive as they focus solely on financial means when they should be focused on principles of community and diversity in the TLD ecosystem.
Some Working Group members proposed alternative ways to implement an auction. One such suggestion was to utilize a sealed-bid auction, or sometimes known as a Vickrey auction, where in this instance, applicants would submit their single highest bid upon application submission. If an applicant’s applied-for string is in contention, the highest bidder would be placed first in the queue to have their application evaluated and if successful, would pay the second highest bid to ICANN. It was suggested that this type of auction allows for applicants to bid the precise value of the string. This could almost entirely eliminate contention sets at the beginning of the application process. Some noted concerns that evaluators, knowing the value placed on the string by an applicant, could be biased in some manner. Others noted that utilizing a different form of auction is still a mechanism that relies heavily on having deep pockets. It was also noted that this form of auction would need to consider how it handles Applicant Support, community-based applications, and objections, and other program mechanisms. Finally, others raised concerns about ICANN securing this highly proprietary information and it was acknowledged that this would need to be factored into the mechanisms that support this auction style.

Some Working Group members proposed alternatives to auctions of last resort. The Working Group discussed the possibility of having a request for proposals process that could be used to resolve contention sets. Such an approach could potentially involve third-party evaluators. One proposal was put forward to establish criteria around diversity that could be used as a basis for awarding the TLD. For example, priority could be given to applicants applying for their first TLD, applicants that are more community-focused rather than commercially-focused, and minority-supported applicants.

Another possible alternative discussed was the use of a determinative drawing mechanism to select a “winner” in the contention set, noting that a drawing is simple, effective, and fair. A determinative drawing seems to eliminate a number of issues with resolving string contention in that it does not favor those with the most money, it does not result in losing applicants receiving a financial benefit (e.g., in the case of private auctions), and it could eliminate comparative evaluations. However, it was pointed out that a determinative drawing could be considered a lottery and would therefore be disallowed without proper licensing.

One Working Group member suggested that a system of graduated fees could be established for each additional application submitted by an applicant, which could reduce the size of the pool of total applications and perhaps limit the number of applications that ultimately end in an auction of last resort. Another Working Group member noted that a system of graduated fees would favor larger entities with multiple applications and might also affect applicants’ strategies in relation to the formation of applicant entities.
Working Group members raised additional considerations regarding proposed alternative models. Some Working Group members stated that techniques for evaluating and selecting a "winner" should not involve evaluation of content as this has implications on the Principle of Freedom of Expression and could implicate the ICANN Bylaws prohibition on regulating content. Working Group members also raised the concern that making decisions based on criteria like diversity or community-focus may not be within the scope of ICANN's mission and impinges on the Principle of Applicant Freedom of Expression. Another Working Group member stated that the process developed from the 2012 round was carefully designed to avoid holding “beauty contests” to select winners and losers.

One Working Group member provided the opinion that it is important for any successful applicant to have the resources to fund the marketing of the gTLD. Otherwise, it may not gain enough registrations to survive as a stand-alone gTLD. Another noted that there is a distinct difference between having funds to market a TLD and having the funds to win a multi-million-dollar auction and also fund a marketing program for the TLD. From this perspective, it should not be presumed that a substantial marketing budget is an absolute requirement or measurement of success, noting specific examples like communities that have built awareness among constituents throughout the application development.

The Working Group discussed the idea that if auctions are ultimately retained as a method of last resort for resolving contention, there could be opportunities to mitigate differences in economic and social conditions of applicants. For example, ICANN could look at different ways to structure the bidding process to take these factors into account, such as introducing a multiplier (e.g., bids could be considered double the actual amount, where an applicant bid of $10,000 USD is treated as $20,000 USD against others in the contention set) for certain string or applicant attributes.

Another potential issue identified with auctions, both last resort and private, is that potentially, a company with the deepest pockets could secure all strings with a certain market, giving it substantial control of that market. The WG discussed putting limits on either the number of applications in total for a round or from any individual applicant (see section 2.2.5 of the Initial Report on Application Submission Limits) and preliminarily decided against imposing such limits. However, that submission limit would not preclude establishing some form of limit in regards to auctions of last resort where for instance, an applicant could participate in five auctions.

The Working Group thought it might be beneficial to look at private methods for resolving contention prior to reaching a mechanism of last resort. One example provided was that two applicants in contention could be permitted to form a joint venture to operate a TLD together. Another example provided was that an applicant could change the applied for string if it was found to be in contention.
One Working Group member raised that if additional types of application changes are permitted for standard applications in subsequent procedures, it is important to consider the potential impact on community applications.

This line of discussion is closely connected to topic Application Change Requests, discussed in Section 2.4 below.

In further considering methods of resolving contention, it was suggested that contention sets could be disclosed earlier in the process, allowing applicants to make informed decisions before they have spent large sums of money in the application process. It was also suggested that applicants in contention could be given additional time to work together to try to privately resolve the string contention.

The Working Group also discussed the issue of auction proceeds, noting that the New gTLD Auction Proceeds Cross Community Working Group (Auction Proceeds CCWG) is working to develop a set of recommendations for a mechanism to distribute auction proceeds from the 2012 application round. While the Auction Proceeds CCWG is focused on funds already collected, fund distribution for subsequent procedures could follow a different model. One Working Group member pointed out that for subsequent rounds, there would be no reason that ICANN could not redistribute proceeds to the “losers” of an auction rather than creating a designated fund to distribute elsewhere. Another Working Group member stated that ICANN’s non-profit status and related legal and fiduciary obligations could prevent ICANN from redistributing funds to auction participants.

The Working Group considered how outcomes of the Auction Proceeds CCWG may impact this Working Group’s perspective on the role of auctions of last resort. One Working Group member raised that if the CCWG produced recommendations that Subsequent Procedures Working Group members opposed, this could impact further deliberations on whether there should be auctions of last resort in the future.

g. Are there other activities in the community that may serve as a dependency or future input to this topic?

None identified at this time.

2.2 Private Resolution of Contention Sets (including Private Auctions)

a. What is the relevant policy and/or implementation guidance (if any)?
Implementation Guideline F: If there is contention for strings, applicants may:

i) resolve contention between them within a pre-established timeframe

ii) if there is no mutual agreement, a claim to support a community by one party will be a reason to award priority to that application. If there is no such claim, and no mutual agreement a process will be put in place to enable efficient resolution of contention and;

iii) the ICANN Board may be used to make a final decision, using advice from staff and expert panels.

b. How was it implemented in the 2012 round of the New gTLD Program?

Per the Applicant Guidebook section 1.1.2.10, Module 4, and in particular, section 4.1.3, self-resolution was encouraged before relying on ICANN-managed methods of contention resolution (i.e., Community Priority Evaluation or Auction: Mechanism of Last Resort). The Applicant Guidebook suggested that string contention may be resolved by one or more applicants withdrawing until there is a single applicant remaining in a contention set, though it did not seek to place any substantial limitations in that regard. Joint ventures, which materially changed the applying entity, were discouraged (and string changes were disallowed). It was envisioned that the majority of contention sets would be resolved by the parties involved, rather than relying on Auctions of Last Resort. For the 2012 round, this was indeed the case, with over 90% of contention sets being self-resolved.

Based on input from applicants in the 2012 round of the New gTLD Program, applicants resolving their contention privately through various means, including private auctions, was common. Private resolution, including private auctions, were not a formal part of the 2012 round of the New gTLD Program and accordingly, there were no policy recommendations or policy guidance on the subject.

There are also no public statistics on how many contention sets were resolved by way of private auction versus other methods of private resolution. In private auctions for example, the majority of the proceeds collected went to the losing parties in the auction. Some have asserted that applicants involved in numerous contention sets have purposely lost in certain private auctions, collected their portion of the proceeds, and then leveraged those funds for private auctions of other higher priority TLD applications. There is a fear amongst some in the community that in future new gTLD procedures, applicants may submit applications for the purpose of collecting funds in private auctions or other types of private resolution.
The recently closed comment period on the Initial Report sought feedback on whether rules should be established to disincentivize “gaming” or abuse of private auctions. The Working Group did receive feedback by a number of community members, as well as the ICANN Board. The group has not had a chance to deliberate on this feedback as of yet but provides appropriate excerpts below for the benefit of the community as they consider this topic:

**ICANN Board – full comment at** [https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/comments-gtdl-subsequent-procedures-initial-03jul18/2018q3/000046.html](https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/comments-gtdl-subsequent-procedures-initial-03jul18/2018q3/000046.html)

Regarding question 2.7.4.e.2 on “gaming” or abuse of private auction, the Board believes that applications should not be submitted as a means to engage in private auctions, including for the purpose of using private auctions as a method of financing their other applications. This not only increases the workload on processing but puts undue financial pressure on other applicants who have business plans and financing based on their intention to execute the plan described in the application. In particular, we are concerned about how gaming for the purpose of financing other applications, or with no intent to operate the gTLD as stated in the application, can be reconciled with ICANN’s Commitments and Core Values.

**IPC – full comment at** [https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/comments-gtdl-subsequent-procedures-initial-03jul18/2018q3/000063.html](https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/comments-gtdl-subsequent-procedures-initial-03jul18/2018q3/000063.html)

The IPC believes it would be beneficial to study abusive behavior and/or gaming that may have occurred in the 2012 round, as well as further resolution mechanisms outside of auctions.

**ALAC – full comment at** [https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/comments-gtdl-subsequent-procedures-initial-03jul18/2018q3/000065.html](https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/comments-gtdl-subsequent-procedures-initial-03jul18/2018q3/000065.html)

At this point, the community does not know enough about abuse that may have occurred in the 2012 round of auctions, both ICANN and private ones. Even the legality of private auctions is in question. A study should be completed to resolve these issues. Alternatively, ICANN should explore other contention resolution mechanisms outside of auctions that may serve as more equitable (e.g., like a draw).

**RySG – Full Comment at** [https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/comments-gtdl-subsequent-procedures-initial-03jul18/2018q3/000052.html](https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/comments-gtdl-subsequent-procedures-initial-03jul18/2018q3/000052.html)

The Registry Stakeholder Group believes that insufficient discussion and analysis has yet taken place in the Subsequent Procedures PDP WG on the important topic of considerations for resolution of contention sets. These include auctions of last resort, private auctions and other alternatives although a lottery solution seems to have been rejected, but without sufficient explanation as to the basis.

The SubPro WG has never considered the legality of private auctions. Some
members of the RySG think SubPro WG should consider the legality of such auctions as part of its work going forward.

Without significant completion of the work from the CCWG new gTLD Auction Proceeds it is difficult to assess the opportunities and risks of successful last resort auctions. While the auctions of last resort have worked as a process, there may need to be additional transparency processes put in place.

Known issues that have been discussed in the Sub Pro PD WG include;
- During the 2012 new gTLD application round, the private auction process was not created until after applications were submitted. However, in subsequent procedures, applicants will be aware of the potential financial benefit of ‘losing’ in auction and it may become a commonplace component of an applicant’s application strategy
- Concerns that private auctions are not in the public interest because the proceeds are shared by auction participants
- All auctions favor well-funded applicants and communities and minority interests are underrepresented
- The legality of Private Auctions have not yet been considered or determined.

We are mindful also that private auctions have permitted competitors to split among themselves hundreds of millions of dollars that might otherwise have been put to use for the public benefit if such auctions were held by ICANN as auctions of last resort. While acknowledging concerns about private auctions, the Initial Report contains one short paragraph, addressing none of these concerns in detail and providing no substantive advice or recommendations. In light of the magnitude of the issues raised by private auctions an updated and complete initial report should be considered as any final report that does not address the many issues surrounding private auctions should be considered deficient.

The RySG observes that several CC2 comments have been filed, but we do not believe sufficient investigation or deliberations on these comments, or the issues they raise, have occurred, nor has the Sub-Pro PDP WG, to our knowledge, obtained sufficient data upon which appropriate deliberations could take place.

However, it has been noted that private auctions are not the only way in which applicants in a contention set could obtain financial benefit by losing. Accordingly, this section which was focused on private auctions originally, has been expanded to consider private resolution of string contention more broadly.

**c. What are the preliminary recommendations and/or implementation guidelines?**
2.2.d. A number of Working Group members expressed concern about the use of private auctions and other forms of contention resolution in subsequent rounds of new gTLD applications. More specifically, they are concerned that there will be some applicants that apply for new gTLD strings for the sole purpose of being paid to withdraw their applications in a contention set for which the applicant would receive compensation greater than the application fee. Thus, many Working Group members are opposed to the usage of private resolution mechanisms to resolve string contention in future new gTLD procedures and recommend that measures should be put into place to prevent their occurrence in the future. However, others think that private resolutions may be acceptable.

○ Implementation Guidance under discussion: Should the Applicant Guidebook and program Terms & Conditions should be amended to state that resolution of string contention via private resolution, where a party is paid to withdraw, is disallowed. If so, should the future base Registry Agreement should include a provision that states that if a registry operator is shown to have taken part in a private resolution for their given string, it may result in having that TLD taken away from them?

2.2.d.1: A number of Working Group members expressed concern about the use of private auctions and other forms of contention resolution in subsequent rounds of new gTLD applications. More specifically, they are concerned that there will be some applicants that apply for new gTLD strings for the sole purpose of being paid to withdraw their applications in a contention set for which the applicant would receive compensation greater than the application fee. Thus, many Working Group members are opposed to the usage of private resolution mechanisms to resolve string contention in future new gTLD procedures and recommend that measures should be put into place to prevent their occurrence in the future. However, others think that private resolutions may be acceptable.

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2.2.d.2: Several Working Group members believe that a simple “no private auction” rule could easily be circumvented with other forms of private resolutions of contention sets that amounted to compensating one or all of the other losing members of a contention set. Thus, they proposed a second option of banning all forms of private resolution of contention sets. This would mean modifying Implementation Guidance F by not allowing parties to mutually agree on how to resolve a contention set. All contention sets, by definition, would be resolved through the mechanism of last resort (described in Section 2.1. above).

2.2.d.3: A third option a Working Group Member proposed was allowing certain types of private resolutions, but disallowing others. For example, as discussed in several sections of the Initial Report and in this Supplemental Initial Report, many Working Group members favored allowing applicants in a contention set to change their applied-for-string if that change is mutually agreed by the members of the contention set and the newly changes strings (a) were
reasonably related to the original applications and (b) did not move the applicants’ newly selected strings into a different contention set. Under this option, the Working Group member proposed that changes would need to be approved by ICANN. Another Working Group member noted that under this option, any proposed newly selected string that ICANN intended to approve would need to be (a) subject to name collision risk assessment, (b) put out for public comment and (c) open to established Objection procedures (note, this line of discussion is also found in section 1.4, on Change Requests). If parties are found to have engaged in non-acceptable forms of private resolution, that will result in (a) the application not being allowed to proceed – if a Registry Agreement was not signed by the time it is discovered, or (b) forfeiture of the registry (if after a Registry Agreement is signed). Some members of the Working Group, however, were not comfortable in putting ICANN in a position of approving (or disapproving) mechanisms of private resolution.

e. What specific questions are the PDP WG seeking feedback on?

- 2.2.e.1: Do you believe private resolutions should be continued in the future? If so, should the funds be distributed amongst the remaining applicants within the auction or in some other method i.e. charity, ICANN, etc? If so, what methods are most appropriate?
- 2.2.e.2: Do you believe that issues with private resolutions are, generally speaking, equally problematic across different types of TLDs? Do you believe that the type of TLDs may be a factor in determining whether private resolution should be allowed? Does the type of TLD have any impact on the options above?
- 2.2.e.3: Do you agree with many Working Group members who believe that prohibitions in the Applicant Guidebook, Terms & Conditions, and in the Registry Agreement are the best way to prevent private resolutions in the future. In other words, participation in a private resolution, including private auction, where applicants may profit from withdrawing their applications would result in a cancellation of your application (if discovered during the application process) or forfeiture of its TLD (if it is discovered after the TLD is awarded). Do you agree? Do you believe other suggested mechanisms (e.g., increasing application fees), may be more effective, or could be used in tandem?
- 2.2.e.4: If you agree that private resolution overall is potentially problematic, do you believe that there is any practical way to prevent private resolution that allows losing applicants to receive a financial benefit? Or is the issue with private resolution one that requires a complete ban? Or is it impossible to prevent
private resolutions, and they should therefore be allowed (as noted in option 2 above)? Please explain.

- **2.2.e.5:** Do you believe instead that there are practical ways to allow some forms of private resolution but disallow others, as indicated in option 3 above? What would be the acceptable or non-acceptable forms of private resolution and why? Who should determine whether parties in a contention set have or have not engaged in non-acceptable forms of private resolution and how would such a determination be established?

- **2.2.e.6:** Some believe that if an application fee for a TLD were high enough, it would deter applicants from applying for TLDs with the intent of profiting from a private resolution. Do you believe that increasing application fees will have that effect? Why or why not? If you agree, at what amount would application fees need to be set at to deter applicants from applying for TLDs with the intent of profiting from withdrawing their applications (e.g., rough estimate or instead, criteria by which an amount could be established)?

### f. Deliberations

This topic was initially discussed on 25 June 2018 at ICANN62 during the Working Group’s second face-to-face session and was later considered further in Working Group discussions. Of note, on the 2 October 2018 Working Group call, concerns were raised about the limited focus of the original topic, which was previously focused exclusively on private auctions. It was noted, with a fair amount of vocal agreement, that private auctions are merely one method in which losing applicants in a contention set are able to derive a financial benefit from losing. This was identified as the underlying issue with private auctions - an applicant can lose in a private auction but can be rewarded financially for having participated, which in turn could incent speculative application submissions. It was pointed out that this incentive, of losing in a private auction for financial gain, could happen in many other types of private resolutions (e.g., negotiation of private sale or payoff to withdraw). As such, it was stated that if private auctions were banned by policy recommendations, the underlying problem may still persist in the form of other private resolutions. It was therefore suggested that unless all private resolutions are banned, not just private auctions, the underlying problem will not have been eliminated.

As a result of this discussion, this section has been broadened to consider other forms of private resolution, such as private sales, negotiations, and other mechanisms to privately resolve contention.

This broadening of the issue did not seem to diminish the general agreement that speculative applications are problematic. While no solution has yet been reached to
address the underlying issue presented by speculative applications, it was suggested that perhaps there is in fact a middle ground solution. Working Group members supported the idea that the WG should seek to find such a middle ground solution rather than conceding that there will either be speculation and profiting from withdrawing applications or private resolutions will be banned altogether. One such suggestion was to disallow private resolution with the exception of a finite list of mechanisms, with ICANN serving as the evaluator. Private resolution outside of the acceptable mechanisms and without approval from ICANN would result in forfeiture of the application, or the registry if already delegated. While this was presented as merely a suggestion to stimulate conversation on possible middle ground solutions, it was met with opposition, on the basis that ICANN should not determine what is an acceptable private resolution.

The Working Group discussed the purpose and impact of private auctions and other private resolutions. One challenge to fully understanding how and why private auctions and other private resolutions occurred in the 2012 round, as well as the impact, is that these mechanisms were, by nature, private. Some Working Group members considered private auctions and other private resolutions to be a form of “gaming” the system, signaling that they believed it was a defect in the program that does not serve the public interest. With the process of private auctions and other private resolutions in the 2012 round not known ahead of time, there was less chance of “gaming.” With the process and potential benefits now known, the Working Group anticipated that there could be a sizeable increase in speculative applications for the sole purpose of participating in private auctions and other private resolutions. Those who oppose restrictions on private auctions and other private resolutions pointed out that there is currently no data supporting the idea that applicants submitted applications with the sole purpose of profiting from private auctions and believe outreach to the private auction providers may be warranted. However, others have noted that even if the behavior did not occur in 2012, that could be because the notion of potential financial benefit from losing was not yet widely understood.

In terms of potential consequences of private auctions and other private resolutions, it was noted that if an applicant is forced to spend a significant amount of money to win a private auction or other private resolution, it may weaken their financial position to operate a TLD, and therefore could have an impact on stability. Working Group members also raised concerns about reputational harm that private auctions and other private resolutions could bring to ICANN and the New gTLD Program, noting that their prevalence and usage could give the impression that the program is an opportunity for speculators, with no interest in running a TLD in the public interest, to instead apply and seek to make a significant profit.

Some Working Group members stated that they do not support restricting the use of private auctions and other private resolutions on principle. From this perspective, it may not be appropriate to use policy to abridge the freedom of parties to privately resolve
contention as they see fit, noting the all participants in a private auction, and other private resolutions, enter the arrangement voluntarily. In addition, one Working Group member raised that the recommendations coming out of the Auction Proceeds CCWG may impact the Subsequent Procedures PDP Working Group’s perspective on private auctions, and therefore the Working Group should not make any recommendations to prevent private auctions at this time.

From another perspective, even if it were desirable and possible to effectively restrict private auctions and other private resolutions, this would not prevent one applicant in a contention set from paying another member of a contention set to withdraw an application, an outcome that is functionally similar to a private auction.

Working Group members considered whether there could be a means to require that all auctions and other private resolutions occur in public. Some Working Group members suggested that it would be difficult to prevent auctions and other private resolutions from going “underground.” One member proposed that the Applicant Guidebook or Terms & Conditions could state that private auctions and other private resolutions are not permitted. The Registry Agreement could state that a TLD could be taken away from a registry if it was found that the registry participated in private auction or other private resolutions. This threat alone could deter the practice.

The Working Group explored other possible means of discouraging private auctions and other private resolutions in subsequent procedures. The Working Group discussed whether raising application fees could reduce the number of private auctions and other private resolutions that take place. Some noted that while higher fees may discourage the submission of speculative applications, they would also have an impact on the ability of legitimate applicants to apply for TLDs. Others pointed out that a higher fee may not even discourage speculative applications because the windfall from losing auctions or other private resolutions is potentially significant relative to the cost of the increased fee.

Some indicated that the intent of an applicant could be inferred by reviewing the volume of TLDs applied for, with the idea that an applicant with a few TLDs are less likely to be applying with the intention of entering into private auctions and other private resolutions versus applicants who may apply for a portfolio of TLDs. Others disagree, pointing to the percentage of TLDs purchased versus sold of some of the larger registry operators.

One Working Group member suggested that the Working Group may want to do additional research on ways that private auctions are discouraged in other industries to extract lessons learned.

Members of the Working Group suggested that if the financial benefit of private auctions and other private resolutions is eliminated by having the funds donated to a
charity instead of transferred to another applicant, it could eliminate the financial incentive and help ensure that applicants apply for TLDs for legitimate purposes. However, it was noted that enforcing this requirement would be challenging.

The Working Group discussed that another way to reduce the number of private auctions and other private resolutions could be to encourage those in contention sets to resolve contention by other means. This idea of encouraging resolution of contention before it reaches auction, private or last resort, and other private resolutions, is similar to that noted in section 2.1 of this report on auctions of last resort. That section also discusses alternatives to auctions of last resort, such as relying on a determinative drawing, which some envision would make that resolution method more palatable to applicants, thus reducing the incentive to turn towards private auctions and other private resolutions. Another mechanism suggested in section 2.1 of this report is the Vickrey auction, also seen as reducing or eliminating the need for ICANN auctions of last resort, as well as private resolutions. While the WG did not envision that private auctions and other private resolutions would be eliminated by establishing a more palatable alternative to auctions of last resort, a reduction seems likely. WG members also discussed allowing joint ventures in cases of contention, believing it could reduce the pressure to resolve contention through private auctions and other private resolutions. This line of discussion is closely connected to the topic of Application Change Requests, discussed in Section 2.4 below.

**g. Are there other activities in the community that may serve as a dependency or future input to this topic?**

None identified at this time.

### 2.3 Role of Application Comment

**a. What is the relevant policy and/or implementation guidance (if any)?**

Implementation Guideline C: ICANN will provide frequent communications with applicants and the public including comment forums.

Implementation Guideline Q: ICANN staff will provide an automatic reply to all those who submit public comments that will explain the objection procedure.

**b. How was it implemented in the 2012 round of the New gTLD Program?**

In section 1.1.2.3 of the Applicant Guidebook, it called for a comment period on all applications, called the Application Comment period. This period was to open when all
applications were publicly posted on ICANN’s website. Comments were to be specific to individual applications and where applicable, related to the relevant panel (e.g., evaluation element).

Comments received within the specified period (the Applicant Guidebook indicated 60 days), would be considered by the relevant evaluation panels. Panelists would perform due diligence on the comments and seek clarification from the applicant if necessary (e.g., where the comment could impact scoring). In those instances, applicants were given the opportunity to respond to the relevant application comments.

Application comments were not to be considered formal objections and any comments related to objections would not be considered by the Initial Evaluation panelists. However, objection-based comments could play a role, albeit limited, during relevant objection proceeding. Application comments directed at the Limited Public Interest and Community objection grounds were forwarded to the Independent Objector.

Public comments designated to Community Priority Evaluation (CPE) could be taken into account by the evaluation panelist during CPE.

Governments could utilize the application comment tool, but the tool was not a substitute for formal consensus GAC Advice.

The application comment system was also utilized for application change requests, Public Interest Commitment (PIC) statements, and complaints about code of conduct violations of an evaluation panelist.

In some circumstances, public comments needed to be submitted by certain deadlines in order to be considered by the relevant evaluation panel or process. The general public comment forum remained otherwise open throughout the entire process.

The Program Implementation Review Report (PIRR) contains statistics on the number of application comments received, as well as for which areas of evaluation.

c. **What are the preliminary recommendations and/or implementation guidelines?**

- 2.3.c.1: The Working Group supports continuing the guidance in Implementation Guideline C, particularly around the provision of comment forums. However, the Working Group believes that the mechanism and system could be further optimized.
  - Implementation Guidance under consideration: The system used to collect application comment should better ensure that the email and name used for an account are verified in some manner.
○ Implementation Guidance: The system used to collect application comment should support a filtering and/or sorting mechanism to better review a high volume of comments. The system should also allow for the inclusion of attachments.

- 2.3.c.2: ICANN should be more explicit in the Applicant Guidebook on how public comments are to be utilized or taken into account by the relevant evaluators, panels, etc. and to what extent different types of comments will or will not impact scoring. In addition, to the extent that public comments are to be taken into account by the evaluators, panels, etc., applicants must have an opportunity to respond to those comments.

d. **What are the options under consideration, along with the associated benefits / drawbacks?**

None identified at this time.

e. **What specific questions are the PDP WG seeking feedback on?**

- 2.3.e.1: The Working Group has noted that while there was a cutoff for application comments to be considered by evaluators, the cutoff for Community Priority Evaluation was far later in the process, allowing for a much longer period of time for comments to be received for this evaluation element. The longer period of time allowed was due to the timing of CPE (i.e., only after program elements like Initial Evaluation, Extended Evaluation, and objections conclude). Is this, or other factors, valid reasoning and/or fair to have the comment period for CPE extend longer than for Initial Evaluation? Do you believe it makes sense to shorten this particular application comment period, perhaps just having it run in parallel to the Initial Evaluation comment period?

- 2.3.e.2: In the 2012 round, applicants were given the opportunity through Clarifying Questions to respond to comments that might impact scoring. From one perspective, this may have reduced the incentive for applicants to respond to all input received through the public forum, including comments that may be perceived as negative. Do you consider this an issue that needs to be addressed? If so, what measures do you propose in response to this problem?

- 2.3.e.3: If there is a application comment period prior to evaluations, should applicants be given a certain amount of time to respond to the public comments prior to the consideration of those comments. For example, if there is a 60-day public comment period, should an additional time period of 7-10 days be added
solely for the purpose of providing an opportunity for applicants to respond to the comments if they so choose?

f. Deliberations

This topic was initially discussed on 25 June 2018 at ICANN62 during the Working Group’s second face-to-face session and was later considered further in Working Group discussions.

The Working Group discussed whether the public comment mechanism and process served its intended purpose and whether there were potential areas for improvement in subsequent procedures. Working Group members generally agreed that the public comment period gave the broader ICANN community an opportunity to submit feedback about applications. Working Group members provided input on ways that the public comment mechanism could potentially be made more robust.

One of the issues discussed was the ability of applicants to respond to comments. One Working Group member stated that some of the comments received were frivolous complaints and that it was difficult for applicants to respond to these comments in an open manner and challenging to correct false assertions in real time. It was noted that applicants were able to respond to comments in the public comment fora but were not required to do so. They were only required to address comments in cases where evaluators determined that the comments, after having conducted due diligence on them, may impact scoring of the application; in these cases, a Clarifying Question was issued to the applicant. Noting that the current implementation allows for optional applicant response and only requires response when comments may impact scoring, the Working Group did not come to agreement on whether changes were needed in this regard.

Working Group members raised that it was possible to submit comments in the public forum without revealing one’s true identity. In the 2012 round, commenters supplied a name and email address, but the identity of the commenter was not verified through any additional measures. Some Working Group members pointed out that it was therefore possible to provide a name that did not match the identity of the person submitting the comment. One Working Group member raised the question of whether this process should be modified in subsequent procedures to ensure that commenter are who they claim to be.

Working Group members considered the functionality of the systems supporting application comment. One Working Group member stated that it would be helpful to allow the use of attachments in application comment submissions. Another shared that some applications received a large number of comments, and it was sometimes difficult
in the 2012 round to review these systematically. It was suggested that some type of filtering mechanism could allow for more effective review of comments.

The Working Group discussed the length of the application comment period, at least in respect to Initial Evaluation, and considered whether 60 days from the posting date of the public portion of applications was a sufficient period of time. Per the Applicant Guidebook, the time period for application comment on Initial Evaluation is subject to extension, which was the case in 2012 where the period was extended 45 additional days. There were no concerns raised about this period.

The Working Group raised and discussed concerns about the public comment period for community applications and asked if it was fair that the public comment period for community applications remained open longer than the public comment period for standard applications. Some in the Working Group also stated that it was unclear if and how comments received late in the community application process were taken into account in the evaluation of applications. It was noted that this topic may belong in discussions related to community applications, as there are differences between community and standard application processes, notably that levels of support or opposition were taken into account in the evaluation of community applications which was not the case for standard applications. It was noted by staff that the length of the comment period was established to allow sufficient time for comments to be collated and considered by evaluators. The difference in length of the comment period was a byproduct of where Community Priority Evaluation was performed (i.e., after Initial and Extended Evaluation, objections, and near the end of the evaluation process).

  g. Are there other activities in the community that may serve as a dependency or future input to this topic?

None identified at this time.

2.4 Change Requests

  a. What is the relevant policy and/or implementation guidance (if any)?

No relevant policy or implementation guidance.

  b. How was it implemented in the 2012 round of the New gTLD Program?

There are many reasons applicants may wish to change aspects of their applications during the application and evaluation phases of the New gTLD Program. This is especially the case where the application and evaluation periods could last several
years. These changes range from the substitution of personnel, corporate name changes, address changes, acquisitions/mergers, changes of officers/directors, etc. Some of these changes are more material than others and some were more substantive than others.

On 5 September 2012, ICANN published criteria for considering and evaluating change requests. Requests were considered against a set of seven criteria and if approved, were published for a 30-day comment period. After enough data was available and after careful consideration the 30-day comment period was removed for certain types of change requests (e.g., changes to confidential parts of the application, updates to the application as a normal course of business, like contact information, stock symbol, etc.). The seven criteria were:

1. Explanation: Is a reasonable explanation provided?
2. Evidence that original submission was in error: Are there indicia to support an assertion that the change merely corrects an error?
3. Other third parties affected: Does the change affect other third parties materially?
4. Precedents: Is the change similar to others that have already been approved? Could the change lead others to request similar changes that could affect third parties or result in undesirable effects on the program?
5. Fairness to applicants: Would allowing the change be construed as fair to the general community? Would disallowing the change be construed as unfair?
6. Materiality: Would the change affect the evaluation score or require re-evaluation of some or all of the application? Would the change affect string contention or community priority?
7. Timing: Does the timing interfere with the evaluation process in some way?

An Application Change Request Process and Criteria page was established\(^{10}\) with a subsequent advisory\(^ {11}\).

For statistics on the number of change requests submitted, during what aspect of the evaluation process, and approval rates, please consult section 1.4.3 of the Program Implementation Review Report and New gTLD micro site page\(^ {12}\).

\(^{10}\) See here: [https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/global-support/change-requests](https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/global-support/change-requests)

Depending on the nature of the requested change, some would require re-evaluation if received after the completion of Initial Evaluation. For instance, substantive changes to the technical or financial portions of the application would be more likely to require re-evaluation than changes to contact information.

While the change request was beneficial in some regards, by allowing applicants to cure deficiencies or concerns (e.g., from GAC Early Warning), the timing of change requests created operational challenges, sometimes requiring redundant reviews, delays in processing, and operational costs. There were also challenges around change requests for applications self-identified as community-based, where certain changes that could impact community priority evaluation were not allowed.

c. What are the preliminary recommendations and/or implementation guidelines?

- 2.4.c.1: The Working Group believes that at a high-level, a criteria-based change request process, as was employed in 2012, continues to make sense going forward. However, the Working Group believes that some operational improvements should be made.
  - Implementation Guidance under consideration: ICANN org could seek to provide guidance on both changes that will likely be approved and changes that will likely NOT be approved.
  - Implementation Guidance under consideration: ICANN org should also set forth the types of changes which are required to be posted for public comments and which are not.
  - Implementation Guidance under consideration: ICANN org should set forth in the Applicant Guidebook the types of changes that would require a re-evaluation of some or all of the application and which changes would not.
  - Implementation Guidance under consideration: The Working Group believes that several types of change requests that were disallowed in 2012 should be allowed in subsequent procedures under certain circumstances. The types of change requests for which some members of the Working Group believe should be allowed under limited

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12 New gTLD Change Request page here: https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/global-support/change-requests#statistics
circumstances are set out for public comment below in section (d). Please see section (e) for specific questions about these options.

d. What are the options under consideration, along with the associated benefits / drawbacks?

- 2.4.d.1: One of the types of changes that some members of the Working Group believe should be allowed are certain application changes intended to resolve string contention. For example, if there is string contention and each of the applicants in a contention set agree, then applicants should be allowed to 1) create joint ventures or 2) have a limited ability to select a different string, which must be closely related to the original string.
  
  o Implementation Guidance: ICANN org may determine that in the event of a joint venture, re-evaluation is needed to ensure that the new entity still meets the requirements of the program. The applicant may be responsible for additional, material costs incurred by ICANN due to re-evaluation and the application could be subject to delays.

  o Implementation Guidance: Some examples to consider in allowing for a new string to be selected include prepending/appending a new element to the original string or selecting a string that is closely related to the class/sector of the original string. ICANN org must perform a re-evaluation of the new applied-for string in all string related evaluation elements (e.g., DNS Stability, String Contention, etc.) and the application for the new string would be subject to string related objections (e.g., String Confusion Objections, Legal Rights Objections, etc.). Another Working Group member noted that in allowing for a string change, the new string would need to be (a) subject to name collision risk assessment, (b) put out for public comment and (c) open to established Objection procedures. The applicant may be responsible for additional, material costs incurred by ICANN due to re-evaluation and the application could be subject to delay.

  e. What specific questions are the PDP WG seeking feedback on?

- 2.4.e.1: Section (d) above outlines possible application changes that could be allowed in subsequent procedures and corresponding implementation guidance that the Working Group is considering.

  o 2.4.e.1.1: Do you agree with allowing these types of changes? Why or why not? Does the implementation guidance above seem reasonable if these changes are allowed? The implementation guidance asks that ICANN provide better clarity on what types of changes will or will not be allowed and also what changes may require re-evaluation. Do you have
suggestions on how to provide more precise guidance? Would this guidance replace or complement the seven criteria (see section (b) above for reference) above?

- 2.4.e.1.2: If these changes are allowed, what are the potential risks or possibilities for gaming these types of changes? How can those risks be mitigated?
- 2.4.e.1.3: For the limited ability to change the applied-for string, what do you believe should be the criteria in considering such requests? Are there examples of where a change of an applied-for string should NOT be approved?

- 2.4.e.2: What role should public comment play in determining if a change request should be granted?
- 2.4.e.3: Reflecting on the seven criteria utilized for considering change requests in 2012 (see section (b) above for reference), do you have specific changes that you would suggest being made to those criteria for usage in the future?

f. Deliberations

This topic was initially discussed on 25 June 2018 at ICANN62 during the Working Group’s second face-to-face session and was later considered further in Working Group discussions.

The Working Group reviewed the process ICANN used in the 2012 round to evaluate change requests and discussed whether this same system might be appropriate for subsequent procedures. Some Working Group members felt that going forward, it would be helpful to have a list of types of changes that an applicant could make to an application. Others added that it would also be useful to have a list of types of changes that are definitely not allowed. One Working Group member noted that a review of Clarifying Questions from the 2012 round could assist in identifying changes that were and were not permitted in the 2012 round.

One Working Group member noted that information is available about changes that were allowed but less information is available about change requests that were rejected, which might affect the Working Group’s thinking. The Working Group member suggested that since we cannot anticipate all the types of change requests that might be submitted, it might make sense to use criteria (as ICANN did) rather than try to enumerate the different types of changes. From that perspective, it was suggested that it might make sense to review and amend the existing criteria used in 2012, though no specific issues or recommendations have yet to be identified.
The Working Group considered types of changes that should be permitted in subsequent procedures. Some members felt that it should be possible for applicants to form joint ventures after the initial applications have been submitted. This could be particularly useful in cases where two or more applications are in contention. Working Group members noted that allowing applicants to change the application to form a joint venture could be a way to find creative win-win solutions for those in contention. It could also result in fewer private auctions and auctions of last resort, which many Working Group members viewed as a benefit. One Working Group member had concerns about some of the details for allowing joint ventures. The Working Group member asked what factors would lead to re-evaluation, what happens during re-evaluation, and what happens if the joint venture were to dissolve prior to contract signing.

One Working Group member suggested that applicants should be permitted to change the proposed business model for the TLD during the application process, believing that it is unclear if that type of change was disallowed during the 2012 New gTLD Round or whether there were restrictions on those types of changes. The member suggested that the evaluation process used for the Registry Services Evaluation Process (RSEP) could be used as a model in evaluating these requests.

The Working Group also discussed whether applicants should be able to submit a request to change the applied for string. Some Working Group members felt that this would be beneficial, particularly in cases where two or more applications were in contention, and could reduce the need to for auctions of last resort. One Working Group member provided as an example that string contention, and the possibility of an auction of last resort, could have been prevented for .sas in the 2012 round if applicants had more flexibility to change their applications (e.g., one applicant would get .sas while the other could potentially choose .sasair).

Another Working Group member suggested that the WG should review why it was not permitted to change the applied-for TLD to avoid contention in the 2012 round, as this may inform the group’s deliberations. A key reason raised included concerns about applicants essentially submitting a placeholder application, aware that they might be able to change their applied-for string after submission, which is viewed as a gaming concern. While there appeared to be support to allow a change of string in some limited circumstances, the Working Group noted that criteria would be needed to prevent gaming. Others noted that allowing string changes would also introduce operational challenges for anything related to the applied-for string. For instance, ICANN org would likely need to perform a re-evaluation of the new applied-for string in all string related evaluation elements (e.g., DNS Stability, String Contention, etc.) and the application for the new string would be subject to string related objections (e.g., String Confusion Objections, Legal Rights Objections, etc.). Another Working Group member noted that in allowing for a string change, the new string would need to be (a) subject to name collision risk assessment, (b) put out for public comment and (c) open to established
Objection procedures. Accordingly, the applicant could be responsible for additional, material costs incurred by ICANN due to re-evaluation and the application could be subject to delay.

g. Are there other activities in the community that may serve as a dependency or future input to this topic?

None identified at this time.

2.5 Registrar Support for New gTLDs

a. What is the relevant policy and/or implementation guidance (if any)?

Recommendation 19: Registries must use only ICANN accredited registrars in registering domain names and may not discriminate among such accredited registrars.

b. How was it implemented in the 2012 round of the New gTLD Program?

The 2007 Final Report, the Registrar Constituency (RC, and now known as the Registrar Stakeholder Group, or RrSG), noted in relation to introducing new gTLDs that, "...new gTLDs present an opportunity to Registrars in the form of additional products and associated services to offer to its customers. However, that opportunity comes with the costs if implementing the new gTLDs as well as the efforts required to do the appropriate business analysis to determine which of the new gTLDs are appropriate for its particular business model."

The gTLD Registries Constituency (RyC, and now known as the gTLD Registries Stakeholder Group, or RySG) noted in relation to Recommendation 19 that, "...the RyC has no problem with this recommendation for larger gTLDs; the requirement to use accredited registrars has worked well for them. But it has not always worked as well for very small, specialized gTLDs. The possible impact on the latter is that they can be at the mercy of registrars for whom there is no good business reason to devote resources. In the New gTLD PDP, it was noted that this requirement would be less of a problem if the impacted registry would become a registrar for its own TLD, with appropriate controls in place. The RyC agrees with this line of reasoning but current registry agreements forbid registries from doing this. Dialog with the Registrars Constituency on this topic was initiated and is ongoing, the goal being to mutually agree on terms that could be presented for consideration and might provide a workable solution."

Section 2.9 of the Registry Agreement implemented Recommendation 19 above. It states “All domain name registrations in the TLD must be registered through an ICANN
accredited registrar; provided, that Registry Operator need not use a registrar if it registers names in its own name in order to withhold such names from delegation or use in accordance with Section 2.6.\textsuperscript{13} In addition, Registry Operator must provide non-discriminatory access to Registry Services to all ICANN accredited registrars that enter into and are in compliance with the registry-registrar agreement for the TLD; provided that Registry Operator may establish non-discriminatory criteria for qualification to register names in the TLD that are reasonably related to the proper functioning of the TLD.

In addition, Specification 9 which requires Registries that are Affiliated with Registrars or vice versa, to adhere to a Code of Conduct, which among other things, requires Affiliated Registries and Registrars to maintain structural separation and separate books and records\textsuperscript{14}. Only so-called .Brand TLDs that execute Specification 13 or TLDs for which all registrations are registered to the Registry Operator and/or its Affiliates are exempt from that Code of Conduct. In all cases, whether exempt or not, only ICANN Accredited Registrars may be used to register names within the TLD.

Although there is a requirement for Registries to use Accredited Registrars, there is no requirement that all ICANN-Accredited registrars must carry any particular new gTLDs. It was, and continues to be, up to registrar discretion. As such, some new gTLD Registries have complained that this model of having to sell through ICANN Accredited Registrars has made it difficult for them to try new and innovative models because the distribution channel that they are required to use is unable or unwilling to implement the new gTLD Registry’s requirements. On the other hand, some members of the working group, including ICANN Accredited Registrars on the other hand argue that they should not be forced to distribute TLDs for which they do not believe a commercial market exists or for TLDs that require extensive time, development and resources to implement which could easily outweigh the fees generated from registrations in that TLD. Failure to do market place assessment, including surveying registrars about viability prior to applying should not become a registrar issue. As a result, it is believed that in some instances (e.g., locale, type of TLD, etc.), it may be difficult to get a registrar to agree to sell certain TLDs.

Another concern voiced is that ICANN forcing registrars to carry any and all TLDs is a distortion of the marketplace. While every TLD wishes to be carried by as many registrars as possible, the economic reality is this will not happen. For ICANN to insert

\textsuperscript{13} Section 2.6, which refers to Specifications 5 and 9, allows the registration of up to 100 names without the use of an ICANN Accredited Registrar necessary for the operation or promotion of the TLD.

\textsuperscript{14} Work Track 2 looked at the topic of Registrar Non-Discrimination, which you can find in Section 2.10.2 of the Working Group’s Initial Report. There, you can see that the Work Track requested and received information from Contractual Compliance, which looks at both audits and complaints received related to vertical integration. Please consult that section for relevant data.
itself in this market dynamic will only artificially prop up registries that otherwise should fail.

ICANN-Accredited Registrars have also made the point that some TLDs are tough for them to distribute because certain gTLD Registries require that the Registrars establish deposit accounts for each TLD and maintain minimum balances in those accounts so that when a registration is made in a TLD, the Registry can immediately deduct the Registry fees from that account. This is the model that was traditionally in place for TLDs prior to the 2012 Introduction of new gTLDs and is often referred to as “Prepayment.” There are some registries, particularly those participating in the 2012 new gTLD round that have allowed registrars to register names (on behalf of their registrants) without drawing down on a deposit account, but rather have relied on the payment of periodic invoices after names are registered. This is referred to as “Post Payment.”

Section 2.10.2 of the Initial Report, on Registrar Non-Discrimination, discusses the topic of vertical integration in detail. This section deals with whether there should be any additional exceptions to the requirement that gTLD Registries use only ICANN-Accredited Registrars and whether there are any measures that can be taken to assist those new gTLD Registries that are unable to attractRegistrars to carry their TLDs.

c. **What are the preliminary recommendations and/or implementation guidelines?**

None at this time.

d. **What are the options under consideration, along with the associated benefits / drawbacks?**

2.5.d.1: The following proposals have been discussed by the Working Group as options which can be pursued if there is support from the community to do so. Many of them require substantial resources by ICANN. No cost benefit analysis on these options have been performed and the Working Group is seeking input from the community on these proposals.

- 2.5.d.1.1: ICANN org could select a “last-resort” wholesale registrar that would provide resellers with the ability to sell TLDs that lacked market interest and/or have their target markets in regions or verticals lacking ICANN-Accredited registrars. In order to not burden ICANN org or the selected registrar with making initial deposits for TLDs, only registries allowing Post Payment terms would be eligible for this resource.

- 2.5.d.1.2: ICANN org could provide a “clearinghouse” for payments between the registries and registrars that operate in different currencies.
2.5.d.1.3: In order to assist smaller registries during their launch period, ICANN could allow an increase to the number of names that can be registered without the use of an ICANN-Accredited Registrar. Expanding the number of names while at the same time allowing these names to be registered for purposes other than the promotion or operation of the TLD could allow these smaller registries to “get off the ground” and gain the momentum needed to become attractive enough for ICANN Accredited Registrars to carry.

2.5.d.1.4: The Applicant Guidebook could note that there may be some benefit to potential applicants in communicating with ICANN accredited registrars before submitting an application, so that they fully understand potential market and technical integration issues that might be encountered.

2.5.d.1.5: Some members of the Working Group also proposed that the Registry contract should bundle the capacity of becoming an Accredited Registrar.

e. What specific questions are the PDP WG seeking feedback on?

2.5.e.1: Please comment on each of the proposal set forth above. What are the pros and cons of those proposals? Should any or all of them be adopted? Why or why not?

2.5.e.2: Are there any other proposals that could assist TLD Registries that have difficulty attracting ICANN Accredited Registrars?

2.5.e.3: Should ICANN even get involved in assisting Registries or is this outside the scope of ICANN’s mission, bylaws, or mandate? Please explain.

2.5.e.4: The Working Group has not yet found a way to identify whether a TLD with low market performance has low performance due to lack of demand or lack of sales channels. How could the underlying issues be identified?

2.5.e.5: Does ICANN forcing registrars to carry TLDs or designating registrars as “registrars of last resort” pose challenges to compliance oversight of these entities? Should registrars be liable for compliance actions for TLDs for which they did not want to carry but were forced to? By handpicking a few selected registrars as “last resort” does this create the possibility for compliance to go easy on them because ICANN needs them to play a specific role in the marketplace?

f. Deliberations

This topic was initially discussed on 25 June 2018 at ICANN62 during the Working Group’s second face-to-face session and was later considered further in Working Group discussions.
As a foundational consideration, the Working Group discussed whether the issue should be treated as a policy issue or a subject that should be addressed by market forces. The Working Group generally agreed that it is difficult to establish whether an underperforming TLD is suffering from “product defect,” (the TLD would not attract many registrations even if it was readily available at an attractive price) or from “channel defect” (the TLD is not successful because deficiencies in the market structure prevent registrations). Some support was expressed for treating this issue as a policy concern, although one Working Group member stated that it may not be ICANN’s responsibility to address every aspect of this issue through policy, and that some problems faced by registries should be resolved through market forces.

The Working Group discussed the issue of market standardization. The Working Group noted that registrars are less likely to adopt niche TLDs or TLDs that are operated in a unique manner. Some Working Group members supported the idea that standardization (e.g., simple and straightforward pricing, the same renewal pricing, the same expiry process, etc.) could promote registrar adoption of TLDs and reduce concerns about TLDs that are unable to attract registrar resources. From another perspective, it is not realistic for there to be a standard pricing model across TLDs and indeed, placing restrictions on pricing is generally seen outside of ICANN’s remit. One Working Group member suggested that the Applicant Guidebook should encourage potential applicants to interact with ICANN accredited registrars before submitting an application, so that they fully understand potential market and technical integration issues that might be encountered. However, others noted that in some cases, the parent company of the registrar may also itself be, or own, a registry, in which case care should be taken in considering that input, as the registrar could represent a competitor.

The Working Group discussed possible policy measures that could address the issue of registries with insufficient registrar resources. The Working Group discussed the possibility of a “must-carry” obligation, under which ICANN could require registrars of a certain size to sell domains under these TLDs. Another way to look at this issue is to consider that registries must use ICANN-accredited registrars, but how about the reverse, where ICANN-accredited registrars must support registries? Working Group members noted that they could only possibly support this option if there was clear evidence of a sales channel defect, because in many cases, the decision for a registrar to carry a registry’s TLD will be based on the business opportunity, potential challenges in dealing with a registry, terms of contracting with the registry, and other factors that may be unique to each registry.

An additional proposal was put forward in which wholesale registrars carry all gTLDs that request it. ICANN would pay wholesale registrars to be the “last-resort” registrars who would develop and support integration of these gTLDs. One of the benefits identified for this proposal is that it would allow gTLDs to reach markets for jurisdictions or verticals that have few or no accredited registrars. One Working Group member
stated that ICANN should not spend money subsidizing the development of gTLDs, some of which may be poorly conceived or poorly funded. From this perspective, if ICANN wanted to help potential registrants identify registrars that carry certain TLDs, it could create an online resource providing information about which registrars carry certain TLDs. Another member raised a concern that a registry might have unreasonable requirements, such as a very large and non-refundable initial deposit, and ICANN would be required to pay the bill.

A third proposal focused on the number of names that a registry can allocate directly. Currently, registries are permitted to allocate up to 100 names directly for purposes of operating or promoting the TLD. The limit could be raised to allow a TLD to grow enough to attract market interest from registrars. Working Group members suggested a new limit of 5,000 or 10,000. A variant on this proposal would be to include Registrar Accreditation as a benefit of all registry contracts.

Working Group members identified additional issues that might be addressed through policy measures. First, the fact that many TLDs require deposits result in registrars selecting a small set of TLDs to carry, with a focus on those that have clear market demand. Second, currency issues can create challenges for registry-registrar business relationships in certain jurisdictions. To address these issues, a proposal was put forward for a payment clearinghouse sitting between willing registrars and registries, where a single deposit could vouch for a larger set of smaller TLDs, and where local currency could be used for both parties of a contract. One Working Group member pointed out that in the current environment, there is nothing stopping registries from switching from a pre-pay to post-pay model. From this perspective, some issues should be left for market forces to resolve.

g. Are there other activities in the community that may serve as a dependency or future input to this topic?

None identified at this time.
3 Conclusions and Next Steps

3.1 Preliminary Conclusions
As noted in the Preamble, the WG did not seek to take formal consensus calls on any preliminary recommendations contained in this report.

3.2 Next Steps
After a comprehensive review of public comments received on this report, the Working Group will deliberate further on the preliminary recommendations contained herein. It is possible that as a result of the deliberations, there may be additional supplemental reports released by the Working Group seeking additional public comments. Once all of that is completed, the Co-Chairs will conduct a formal consensus call on all recommendations before the Working Group issues its Final Report.
4 Background

4.1 Process Background
On 25 June 2014, the GNSO Council created the New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Discussion Group. On 1 June 2015, the Discussion Group delivered its final deliverables with the GNSO Council.

- In response to the deliverables of the Discussion Group, on 24 June 2015, the GNSO Council resolved to request an Issue Report. In the Final Issue Report, ICANN staff recommended that the GNSO Council commence a PDP on New gTLD Subsequent Procedures.
- On 4 December 2015, ICANN staff published a Final Issue Report for the GNSO Council to consider the commencement of a Working Group.
- On 17 December 2015, the GNSO Council initiated a Policy Development Process and chartered the New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Working Group.
- On 21 January 2016, the GNSO Council resolved to adopt the charter of the Working Group.
- On 27 January 2016, a Call for Volunteers was issued for the Working Group and the WG held its first meeting on 22 February 2016.
- On 3 July 2018, the WG published its Initial Report for public comment\(^{15}\).

4.2 Issue Background
The New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP Working Group was tasked with determining what, if any changes may be needed in regards to the existing GNSO’s Final Report on

Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains. As the original policy recommendations as adopted by the GNSO Council and the ICANN Board have “been designed to produce a systemized and ongoing mechanisms for applicants to propose new top-level domains,” those policy recommendations remain in place for subsequent rounds of the New gTLD Program unless the GNSO Council would decide to modify those policy recommendations via a policy development process. The work of the PDP follows the efforts of the New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Discussion Group (DG), which identified a set of subjects for this PDP to consider in their deliberations. The DG anticipated that the WG might complete its work by:

- Clarifying, amending or overriding existing policy principles, recommendations, and implementation guidelines;
- Developing new policy principles, recommendations, and implementation guidelines

4.2.1 Related Work by the GNSO and the Community

Several efforts within the community have connections to the work of this WG, which include but are not limited to:

- Competition, Consumer Trust & Consumer Choice Review Team (CCT-RT)
- The Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) reviews of previous guidance provided regarding the New gTLD Program and their determination if new advice may be needed.
- The Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) has several working groups, focusing on community applications, underserved regions, and geographic names.
- The Cross Community Working Group on the Use of Country and Territory Names (which concluded its work)
- PDP on the Review of All Rights Protection Mechanisms in All gTLDs
- PDP on Protections of IGO and INGO Identifiers in All gTLDs

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5 Approach Taken by the Working Group

5.1 Working Methodology
The New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG began its deliberations on 22 February 2016. It conducted its work primarily through weekly conference calls, in addition to email exchanges on its mailing list, with further discussions taking place during scheduled sessions at ICANN Public Meetings. All the WG’s meetings are documented on its Wiki (https://community.icann.org/x/RgV1Aw). The Wiki also includes mailing list archives (http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/gnso-newgtld-wg/), draft documents, background materials and input received from ICANN’s SO/ACs and the GNSO’s Stakeholder Groups and Constituencies. The WG worked collectively to review a set of overarching issues and also divided into five (5) work tracks to review the remainder of the items in its Charter. The overarching issues and the outputs from Work Tracks 1-4 formed the basis for the WG’s Initial Report, published on 3 July 2018. Work Track 5, on geographic names at the top-level, will publish a separate Initial Report.

The WG worked at the plenary level to address a set of five (5) additional topics that it determined needed additional consideration. Those topics form the basis for this Supplemental Report.

5.1.1 WG Membership
For brevity of this report, the members of the New gTLD Subsequent Procedures full WG can be found on the WG’s Wiki17 or a snapshot in time can be found in section 5.1.1 of this WG’s Initial Report.

17 For Work Track membership see (WT1: https://community.icann.org/x/tw2bAw; WT2: https://community.icann.org/x/ww2bAw; WT3: https://community.icann.org/x/vw2bAw; and WT4: https://community.icann.org/x/ww2bAw)
6 Community Input

6.1 Summary of Input
For brevity of this report and to avoid providing duplicative information, please consult section 6 of this WG’s Initial Report.
## Working Group (WG) Charter

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<th>WG Name:</th>
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<td>Chartering Organization(s):</td>
<td>GNSO Council</td>
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<td>Charter Approval Date:</td>
<td>21 January 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name of WG Chair:</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<td>Name(s) of Appointed Liaison(s):</td>
<td>Paul McGrady</td>
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<td>GNSO Council Resolution:</td>
<td><strong>Title:</strong> Approval of the charter for the PDP WG on New gTLD Subsequent Procedures</td>
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## Important Document Links:

- Annex A of the ICANN Bylaws - [https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#AnnexA](https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#AnnexA)

## Section II: Mission, Purpose, and Deliverables

### Mission & Scope:

The New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP Working Group (WG) is tasked with calling upon the community’s collective experiences from the 2012 New gTLD Program round to determine what, if any changes may need to be made to the existing *Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains* policy recommendations from 8 August 2007\(^\text{18}\). As the original policy recommendations as adopted by the GNSO Council and ICANN Board have “been designed to produce a systemized and ongoing mechanisms for applicants to propose new top-level domains”, those policy recommendations remain in place for subsequent rounds of the New gTLD Program unless the GNSO Council would decide to modify those policy recommendations via a policy development process. The work of this WG follows

the efforts of the New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Discussion Group (DG), which identified a set of issues for a future PDP-WG to consider in their deliberations. The DG saw the issues to address in this Working Group as:

- Clarifying, amending or overriding existing policy principles, recommendations, and implementation guidance;
- Developing new policy recommendations;
- Supplementing or developing new implementation guidance

In addition to the work of the DG, a number of review efforts are underway which may have an impact on the future work of this WG. Therefore, this WG should not be limited to the issues identified by the DG and should take into account the findings from the parallel efforts external to the WG.

As part of the WG deliberations, the WG should consider at a minimum, the elements below, which are found in further detail in the Final Issue Report. These elements have been organized in groupings suggested by the DG that may facilitate establishing teams to undertake the work. However, additional work methods, such as those described in the Final Issue Report, or other methods identified by the WG may be more appropriate to undertake the work. The list below in this charter is a starting point, and a suggested method of organization, but it is not intended to be exhaustive or impose constraints on this WG on how it operates or the issues it discusses, provided that the issues are directly related to new gTLD subsequent procedures. This WG may need to supplement this list, or reorganize it, to meet the needs of the WG as it moves deeper into the substantive policy discussions. If additional materials topics are identified, the WG should inform the GNSO Council, especially if amendment of this Charter is required. The fact that some issues are listed in the Final Issue Report and Appendices to the outputs of the DG, as opposed to inside the text of this Charter, is not intended to elevate some issues over others; the high-level issues below are simply to provide an illustrative guide to the issues that this Working Group will consider.
- **Group 1: Overall Process / Support / Outreach: Principles A and C; Recommendations 1, 9, 10, 12 and 13; Implementation Guidance A, B, C, D, E, M, N, O and Q; New Topics “Different TLD Types”, “Application Submission Limits” and “Variable Fees”**
  - Cancelling Subsequent Procedures: Should there in fact be new gTLD subsequent procedures and if not, what are the justifications for and ramifications of discontinuing the program?
  - Predictability: How can changes to the program introduced after launch (e.g., digital archery/prioritization issues, name collision, registry agreement changes, public interest commitments (PICs), etc.) be avoided?
  - Competition, Consumer Trust, and Consumer Choice: Did the implementation meet or discourage these goals?
    - *Note that per Section 9.3 of the Affirmation of Commitments, there is to be a community driven review of the New gTLD Program’s impact on Competition, Consumer Trust, and Consumer Choice, taking into account the recommended metrics as identified by the Implementation Advisory Group for Competition, Consumer Trust, and Consumer Choice (IAG-CCT).*
  - Community Engagement: How can participation from the community be better encouraged and integrated during the policy development process, implementation, and execution?
  - Applicant Guidebook (AGB): Is the AGB the right implementation of the GNSO recommendations? If so, how can it be improved to ensure that it meets the needs of multiple audiences (e.g., applicants, those monitoring the policy implementation, registry service providers, escrow providers, etc.)
  - Clarity of Application Process: How can the application process avoid developing processes on an as-needed basis (e.g., clarifying question process, change request process, customer support, etc.)
  - Applications Assessed in Rounds: Has the scale of demand been made clear? Does the concept of rounds affect market behavior and should factors beyond demand affect the type of application acceptance mechanism?
Accreditation Programs: As there appears to be a limited set of technical service and Escrow providers, would the program benefit from an accreditation program for third party service providers? If so, would this simplify the application process with a set of pre-qualified providers to choose from? Are there other impacts that an accreditation program may have on the application process?

Systems: How can the systems used to support the New gTLD Program, such as TAS, Centralized Zone Data Service, Portal, etc. be made more robust, user friendly, and better integrated?

Application Fees: Evaluate accuracy of cost estimates and/or review the methodology to develop the cost model, while still adhering to the principle of cost recovery. Examine how payment processing can be improved.

Communications: Examine access to and content within knowledge base as well as communication methods between ICANN and the community.

Application Queuing: Review whether first come first served guidance remains relevant and if not, whether another mechanism is more appropriate.

Application Submission Period: Is three months the proper amount of time? Is the concept of a fixed period of time for accepting applications the right approach?

Support for Applicants From Developing Countries: Evaluate effectiveness of Applicant Support program to assess if the criteria were properly designed, outreach sufficient, monetary support sufficient, etc. In particular, was there enough outreach in developing economies to 1) contribute to the design and nature of the process and 2) to ensure awareness of the opportunity afforded?

Different TLD Types: Does the one-size-fits-all application and review process hamper innovation? Should things such as the application process, requirements, annual fees, contractual requirements, etc. be variable based on the TLD type? For instance, should an existing Registry Operator, that is fulfilling the requirements of its Registry Agreement, be subject to a different, more streamlined, application process?

Application Submission Limits: Should there be limits to the number of applications from a single applicant/group? Consider if the round could be restricted to a certain
applicant type(s) (e.g., from least-developed countries) or other limiting factor.

- Variable Fees: Should the New gTLD application fee be variable based on such factors as application type (e.g., open or closed registries), multiple identical applications, or other factor?

- **Group 2: Legal / Regulatory:** Recommendations 5, 10, 14, 16, 17 and 19; Implementation Guidance I, J, K and L; New Topics “Second-level Rights Protection Mechanisms”, “Registry/Registrar Standardization”, “Global Public Interest” and “IGO/INGO Protections”

  - Reserved Names: Review the composition of the reserved names list to determine if additions, modifications, or subtractions are needed (e.g., single letter, two letters, special characters, etc.). Evaluate if the implementation matched expectations (e.g., recommendations of the Reserved Names Working Group). Review whether geographic names requirements are appropriate.

  - **Note,** the GNSO/ccNSO-chartered Cross Community Working Group on the Use of Country and Territory Names as Top-Level Domains is focused on a policy framework for country and territory names and efforts should be made to avoid duplicative work. In addition, capital city names, city names, etc. may also warrant discussion.

  - Base agreement: Perform comprehensive review of the base agreement, including investigating how and why it was amended after program launch, whether a single base agreement is appropriate, whether Public Interest Commitments (PICs) are the right mechanism to protect the public interest, etc. Should the Article 7.7 review process be amended to allow for customized reviews by different registry types?

  - Registrant Protections. The original PDP assumed there would always be registrants and they would need protecting from the consequences of Registry failure, although it may not make sense to impose registrant protection obligations such as EBERO and the LOC when there are no registrants to protect, such as in a closed registry. Should more relevant rules be established for certain specific cases?

  - Contractual Compliance: While no specific issues were identified, contractual compliance as it relates to New gTLDs may be considered in scope for discussion,
though the role of contractual compliance (i.e., enforcing agreements) would not be considered within scope.

- Registrar Non-Discrimination: Are registrar requirements for registries still appropriate?
  - *Note, the development and implementation of Specification 13 for .brands was agreed to by the GNSO Council but deemed to be inconsistent with the historic Recommendation 19 because brands had not been considered in the original PDP.*

- TLD Rollout: Was adequate time allowed for rollout of TLD? When should recurring fees due to ICANN begin?

- Second-Level Rights Protection Mechanisms: Proposing recommendations directly related to RPMs is beyond the remit of this PDP. There is an anticipated PDP on the "current state of all rights protection mechanisms (RPMs) implemented for both existing and new gTLDs, including but not limited to the UDRP and the URS...". Duplication or conflicting work between the New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP and the PDP on RPMs must be avoided. If topics related to RPMs are uncovered and discussed in the deliberations of this PDP, those topics should be relayed to the PDP on RPMs for resolution. To assure effective coordination between the two groups, a community liaison, who is a member of both Groups, is to be appointed jointly by both Groups and confirmed by the GNSO Council.

- Registry/Registrar Standardization: Consider whether the registry/registrar relationship should have additional standardization and regulation.

- Global Public Interest: Existing policy advice does not define the application of “Public Interest” analysis as a guideline for evaluation determinations. Consider issues identified in GAC Advice on safeguards, public interest commitments (PICs), and associated questions of contractual commitment and enforcement. It may be useful to consider the global public interest in the context of ICANN’s limited technical coordination role, mission and core values and how it applies specifically to the New gTLD Program.
• **IGO/INGO Protections:** The PDP for Protection of IGO and INGO Identifiers in All gTLDs and PDP for IGO-INGO Access to Curative Rights Protection Mechanisms are expected to address a number of issues. While no additional work is envisioned, if there are any remaining or new issues for discussion, they could be deliberated in the context of this PDP.

• **Closed Generics:** Should there be restrictions around exclusive use of generics TLDs?

**Group 3: String Contention / Objections & Disputes: Principle G; Recommendations 2, 3, 6, 12 and 20; Implementation Guidance F, H, P and R**

- Applicant’s Freedom of Expression: Examine whether GAC Advice, community processes, and reserved names impacted this goal.
- String Similarity: Were string contention evaluation results consistent and effective in preventing user confusion? Were the string contention resolution mechanisms fair and efficient?
- Objections: Review rules around standing, fees, objection consolidation, consistency of proceedings and outcomes. Review functions and role of the independent objector. Consider oversight of process and appeal mechanisms.
- Accountability Mechanisms: Examine whether dispute resolution and challenge processes provide adequate redress options or if additional redress options specific to the program are needed.
  - *Note that the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) is comprehensively reviewing accountability mechanisms, so a portion of this topic may be beyond the scope of the New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP*

- Community Applications: Was the overall approach to communities consistent with recommendations and implementation guidance? Did the Community Priority Evaluation process achieve its purpose and result in anticipated outcomes? Were the recommendations adequate for community protection?

**Group 4: Internationalized Domain Names: Principle B; Recommendation 18**

- Internationalized Domain Names and Universal Acceptance: Consider how to
encourage adoption of gTLDs. Evaluate whether rules around IDNs properly accounted for recommendations from IDN WG. Determine and address policy guidance needed for the implementation of IDN variant TLDs.

- Note that the Universal Acceptance Steering Group has community support to lead the Universal Acceptance efforts and that conflicting effort and outcomes should be avoided.

- **Group 5: Technical and Operations: Principles D, E and F; Recommendations 4, 7, and 8; New Topic “Name Collisions”**
  - Security and Stability: Were the proper questions asked to minimize the risk to the DNS and ensure that applicants will be able to meet their obligations in the registry agreement? Should there be non-scored questions and if so, how should they be presented? Were the proper criteria established to avoid causing technical instability? Is the impact to the DNS from new gTLDs fully understood?
  - Applicant Reviews: Technical/Operational and Financial: Were Financial and Technical criteria designed properly to allow applicants to demonstrate their capabilities while allowing evaluators to validate their capabilities? How can the criteria be streamlined and made clearer?
  - Name collisions: How should name collisions be incorporated into future new gTLD rounds? What measures may be needed to manage risks for 2012-round gTLDs beyond their 2 year anniversary of delegation, or gTLDs delegated prior to the 2012 round?

The WG, during its deliberations, should keep in mind that making substantive changes to the New gTLD Program may result in significant differences between registries from the 2012 round and future rounds. Where significant differences are identified, the WG should discuss the benefits to be realized from recommended changes against any possible negative impacts, such as creating an uneven playing field. As outlined in the PDP Manual, recommendations may take different forms including, for example, recommendations for consensus policies, best practices and/or implementation guidelines. The PDP WG is required to follow the steps and processes as outlined in Annex A of the ICANN Bylaws and the PDP Manual.
Objectives & Goals:
To develop an Initial Report and a Final Report addressing the issue of New gTLD Subsequent Procedures to be delivered to the GNSO Council, following the processes described in Annex A of the ICANN Bylaws and the PDP Manual.

Deliverables & Timeframes:
The WG shall respect the timelines and deliverables as outlined in Annex A of the ICANN Bylaws and the PDP Manual. As per the GNSO Working Group Guidelines, the WG shall develop a work plan that outlines the necessary steps and expected timing in order to achieve the milestones of the PDP as set out in Annex A of the ICANN Bylaws and the PDP Manual and submit this to the GNSO Council.

Section III: Formation, Staffing, and Organization

Membership Criteria:
The Working Group will be open to all interested in participating. New members who join after work has been completed will need to review previous documents and meeting transcripts.

Group Formation, Dependencies, & Dissolution:
This WG shall be a standard GNSO PDP Working Group. The GNSO Secretariat should circulate a ‘Call For Volunteers’ as widely as possible in order to ensure broad representation and participation in the Working Group, including:
- Publication of announcement on relevant ICANN web sites including but not limited to the GNSO and other Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committee web pages; and
- Distribution of the announcement to GNSO Stakeholder Groups, Constituencies and other ICANN Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees

Working Group Roles, Functions, & Duties:
The ICANN Staff assigned to the WG will fully support the work of the Working Group as requested by the Chair including meeting support, document drafting, editing and distribution and other substantive contributions when deemed appropriate.

Staff assignments to the Working Group:
• GNSO Secretariat
• 2 ICANN policy staff members (Steve Chan, Julie Hedlund)

The standard WG roles, functions & duties shall be applicable as specified in Section 2.2 of the Working Group Guidelines.

Statements of Interest (SOI) Guidelines:

Each member of the Working Group is required to submit an SOI in accordance with Section 5 of the GNSO Operating Procedures.

Section IV: Rules of Engagement

Decision-Making Methodologies:

(Note: The following material was extracted from the Working Group Guidelines, Section 3.6. If a Chartering Organization wishes to deviate from the standard methodology for making decisions or empower the WG to decide its own decision-making methodology, this section should be amended as appropriate).

The Chair will be responsible for designating each position as having one of the following designations:

- **Full consensus** - when no one in the group speaks against the recommendation in its last readings. This is also sometimes referred to as *Unanimous Consensus*.
- **Consensus** - a position where only a small minority disagrees, but most agree. [Note: For those that are unfamiliar with ICANN usage, you may associate the definition of ‘Consensus’ with other definitions and terms of art such as rough consensus or near consensus. It should be noted, however, that in the case of a GNSO PDP originated Working Group, all reports, especially Final Reports, must restrict themselves to the term ‘Consensus’ as this may have legal implications.]
- **Strong support but significant opposition** - a position where, while most of the group supports a recommendation, there are a significant number of those who do not support it.
- **Divergence** (also referred to as *No Consensus*) - a position where there isn't strong support for
any particular position, but many different points of view. Sometimes this is due to irreconcilable differences of opinion and sometimes it is due to the fact that no one has a particularly strong or convincing viewpoint, but the members of the group agree that it is worth listing the issue in the report nonetheless.

- **Minority View** - refers to a proposal where a small number of people support the recommendation. This can happen in response to a Consensus, Strong support but significant opposition, and No Consensus; or, it can happen in cases where there is neither support nor opposition to a suggestion made by a small number of individuals.

In cases of Consensus, Strong support but significant opposition, and No Consensus, an effort should be made to document that variance in viewpoint and to present any Minority View recommendations that may have been made. Documentation of Minority View recommendations normally depends on text offered by the proponent(s). In all cases of Divergence, the WG Chair should encourage the submission of minority viewpoint(s).

The recommended method for discovering the consensus level designation on recommendations should work as follows:

1. After the group has discussed an issue long enough for all issues to have been raised, understood and discussed, the Chair, or Co-Chairs, make an evaluation of the designation and publish it for the group to review.
2. After the group has discussed the Chair's estimation of designation, the Chair, or Co-Chairs, should reevaluate and publish an updated evaluation.
3. Steps (i) and (ii) should continue until the Chair/Co-Chairs make an evaluation that is accepted by the group.
4. In rare case, a Chair may decide that the use of polls is reasonable. Some of the reasons for this might be:
   - A decision needs to be made within a time frame that does not allow for the natural process of iteration and settling on a designation to occur.
   - It becomes obvious after several iterations that it is impossible to arrive at a
designation. This will happen most often when trying to discriminate between Consensus and Strong support but Significant Opposition or between Strong support but Significant Opposition and Divergence.

Care should be taken in using polls that they do not become votes. A liability with the use of polls is that, in situations where there is Divergence or Strong Opposition, there are often disagreements about the meanings of the poll questions or of the poll results.

Based upon the WG's needs, the Chair may direct that WG participants do not have to have their name explicitly associated with any Full Consensus or Consensus view/position. However, in all other cases and in those cases where a group member represents the minority viewpoint, their name must be explicitly linked, especially in those cases where polls where taken.

Consensus calls should always involve the entire Working Group and, for this reason, should take place on the designated mailing list to ensure that all Working Group members have the opportunity to fully participate in the consensus process. It is the role of the Chair to designate which level of consensus is reached and announce this designation to the Working Group. Member(s) of the Working Group should be able to challenge the designation of the Chair as part of the Working Group discussion. However, if disagreement persists, members of the WG may use the process set forth below to challenge the designation.

If several participants (see Note 1 below) in a WG disagree with the designation given to a position by the Chair or any other consensus call, they may follow these steps sequentially:

1. Send email to the Chair, copying the WG explaining why the decision is believed to be in error.
2. If the Chair still disagrees with the complainants, the Chair will forward the appeal to the CO liaison(s). The Chair must explain his or her reasoning in the response to the complainants and in the submission to the liaison. If the liaison(s) supports the Chair's position, the liaison(s) will provide their response to the complainants. The liaison(s)
must explain their reasoning in the response. If the CO liaison disagrees with the Chair, the liaison will forward the appeal to the CO. Should the complainants disagree with the liaison support of the Chair’s determination, the complainants may appeal to the Chair of the CO or their designated representative. If the CO agrees with the complainants’ position, the CO should recommend remedial action to the Chair.

3. In the event of any appeal, the CO will attach a statement of the appeal to the WG and/or Board report. This statement should include all of the documentation from all steps in the appeals process and should include a statement from the CO (see Note 2 below).

Note 1: Any Working Group member may raise an issue for reconsideration; however, a formal appeal will require that that a single member demonstrates a sufficient amount of support before a formal appeal process can be invoked. In those cases where a single Working Group member is seeking reconsideration, the member will advise the Chair and/or Liaison of their issue and the Chair and/or Liaison will work with the dissenting member to investigate the issue and to determine if there is sufficient support for the reconsideration to initial a formal appeal process.

Note 2: It should be noted that ICANN also has other conflict resolution mechanisms available that could be considered in case any of the parties are dissatisfied with the outcome of this process.

Status Reporting:
As requested by the GNSO Council, taking into account the recommendation of the Council liaison to this group.

Problem/Issue Escalation & Resolution Processes:

(Note: the following material was extracted from Sections 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Working Group Guidelines and may be modified by the Chartering Organization at its discretion)

The WG will adhere to ICANN’s Expected Standards of Behavior as documented in Section F of the ICANN Accountability and Transparency Frameworks and Principles, January 2008.

If a WG member feels that these standards are being abused, the affected party should appeal first to the Chair and Liaison and, if unsatisfactorily resolved, to the Chair of the Chartering Organization or
their designated representative. It is important to emphasize that expressed disagreement is not, by itself, grounds for abusive behavior. It should also be taken into account that as a result of cultural differences and language barriers, statements may appear disrespectful or inappropriate to some but are not necessarily intended as such. However, it is expected that WG members make every effort to respect the principles outlined in ICANN’s Expected Standards of Behavior as referenced above.

The Chair, in consultation with the Chartering Organization liaison(s), is empowered to restrict the participation of someone who seriously disrupts the Working Group. Any such restriction will be reviewed by the Chartering Organization. Generally, the participant should first be warned privately, and then warned publicly before such a restriction is put into place. In extreme circumstances, this requirement may be bypassed.

Any WG member that believes that his/her contributions are being systematically ignored or discounted or wants to appeal a decision of the WG or CO should first discuss the circumstances with the WG Chair. In the event that the matter cannot be resolved satisfactorily, the WG member should request an opportunity to discuss the situation with the Chair of the Chartering Organization or their designated representative.

In addition, if any member of the WG is of the opinion that someone is not performing their role according to the criteria outlined in this Charter, the same appeals process may be invoked.

**Closure & Working Group Self-Assessment:**

The WG will close upon the delivery of the Final Report, unless assigned additional tasks or follow-up by the GNSO Council.

**Section V: Charter Document History**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>21 January 2016</td>
<td>Adopted by GNSO Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Contact:</td>
<td>Steve Chan</td>
<td>Email:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Translations: If translations will be provided please indicate the languages below:
### Table of Recommendations, Options and Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Text</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Auctions: Mechanism of Last Resort</td>
<td>Preliminary Recommendation</td>
<td>2.1.c.1: Many in the Working Group believes that ICANN auctions of last resort should remain in place within the program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Auctions: Mechanism of Last Resort</td>
<td>Preliminary Recommendation</td>
<td>2.1.c.2: However, the Working Group considered whether there should be additional options for applicants to voluntarily resolve contention sets by mutual agreement before being forced into an ICANN auction of last resort. The Working Group focused mainly on allowing applicants to change certain elements of their applications as a potential way to resolve contention sets earlier in the process (Please see recommendations in section 2.4 of this report on Change Requests, which discuss aspects like changes to the applied-for string and forming a joint venture).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Auctions: Mechanism of Last Resort</td>
<td>Option</td>
<td>2.1.d.1: Different Types of Auctions. Some Working Group members proposed alternative ways to implement an auction. One such suggestion was to utilize a sealed-bid auction, or sometimes known as a Vickrey auction, where in this instance, applicants would submit their single highest bid upon application submission. If an applicant's applied-for string is in contention, the highest bidder would be placed first in the queue to have their application evaluated and if successful, would pay the second highest bid to ICANN. It was suggested that this type of auction allows for applicants to bid the precise value of the string. This could almost entirely eliminate contention sets at the beginning of the application process. Some noted concerns that evaluators, knowing the value placed on the string by an applicant, could be biased in some manner. Others noted that utilizing a different form of auction is still a mechanism that relies heavily on having deep...</td>
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</table>
pockets. It was also noted that this form of auction would need to consider how it handles Applicant Support and community-based applications. Finally, others raised concerns about ICANN securing this highly proprietary information and it was acknowledged that this would need to be factored into the mechanisms that support this auction style.

2.1 Auctions: Mechanism of Last Resort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>2.1.d.2.1: Request for Proposals. Some Working Group members proposed alternatives to auctions of last resort. The Working Group discussed the possibility of having a request for proposals process that could be used to resolve contention sets. Such an approach could potentially involve third-party evaluators. One proposal was put forward to establish criteria around diversity that could be used as a basis for awarding the TLD. For example, priority could be given to applicants applying for their first TLD, applicants that are more community-focused rather than commercially-focused, and minority-supported applicants.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Option</td>
<td>2.1.d.2.2: Random Draw. Another possible alternative discussed was the use of a determinative drawing mechanism to select a “winner” in the contention set, noting that a drawing is simple, effective, and fair. A determinative drawing seems to eliminate a number of issues with resolving string contention in that it does not favor those with the most money, it does not result in losing applicants receiving a financial benefit (e.g., in the case of most private resolutions), and it could eliminate comparative evaluations. However, it was pointed out that running a determinative drawing could be encounter issues with being considered a lottery and would require proper licensing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Option</td>
<td>2.1.d.2.3: System of Graduated Fees. One Working Group member suggested that a system of graduated fees could be established for</td>
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each additional application submitted by an applicant, which could reduce the size of the pool of total applications and perhaps limit the number of applications that ultimately end in an auction of last resort. Another Working Group member noted that a system of graduated fees would favor larger entities with multiple applications and might also affect applicants' strategies in relation to the formation of applicant entities.

| 2.1 Auctions: Mechanism of Last Resort | Question | 2.1.e.1: The preliminary recommendation above states that auctions of last resort should remain in place. However, some participants in the Working Group believe that auctions of last resort are inherently unfair and should be modified, restricted or modified. One of the main arguments is that auctions reward only those with the most amount of money rather than those that may best operate the TLD in the public interest. In addition, they believe that auctions discriminate against applicants in the developing world who may not have the resources to complete in an auction. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide a rationale for your response. |
| 2.1 Auctions: Mechanism of Last Resort | Question | 2.1.e.2: Should other aspects (e.g., non-financial) be introduced to make auctions of last resort more "fair"? One mechanism that has been mentioned is to consider auction bids from an entity in the Global South as double or triple that of the same bid from an entity not from the Global South. For example, a bid of $100 from an entity in the Global South could be comparable to a bid of $200 from a bidder on the same string that was not from the Global South. Why or why not? |
| 2.1 Auctions: Mechanism of Last Resort | Question | 2.1.e.3: What, if any, other measures should the Working Group consider to enhance "fairness"? |
| 2.1 Auctions: Mechanism of Last Resort | Question | 2.1.e.4: Some participants in the Working Group believe that auctions of last resort should be eliminated and replaced with a comparative evaluation process. Some examples include a request for proposals (RFP) process that advantages community-based
| 2.1 Auctions: Mechanism of Last Resort | Question | 2.1.e.5: Some participants noted that auctions of last resort could allow a deep-pocketed applicant to secure all strings within a given market. One potential solution raised was to place a limit on the number of auctions an applicant could participate in though others argued that limiting the number of applications would be considered anti-competitive and difficult to enforce. Do you agree that the identified issue is of concern and if so, what do believe is a potential solution? |
| 2.2 Private Resolution of Contention Sets (including Private Auctions) | Option | 2.2.d.1: A number of Working Group members expressed concern about the use of private auctions and other forms of contention resolution in subsequent rounds of new gTLD applications. More specifically, they are concerned that there will be some applicants that apply for new gTLD strings for the sole purpose of being paid to withdraw their applications in a contention set for which the applicant would receive compensation greater than the application fee. Thus, many Working Group members are opposed to the usage of private resolution mechanisms to resolve string contention in future new gTLD procedures and recommend that measures should be put into place to prevent their occurrence in the future. However, others think that private resolutions may be acceptable. |

- Implementation Guidance under discussion: Should the Applicant Guidebook and program Terms & Conditions should be amended to state that resolution of string contention via private resolution, where a party is paid to withdraw, is disallowed. If so, should the future base Registry Agreement should include a provision that states |
that if a registry operator is shown to have taken part in a private resolution for their given string, it may result in having that TLD taken away from them?

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<tr>
<th>2.2 Private Resolution of Contention Sets (including Private Auctions)</th>
<th>Option</th>
<th>2.2.d.2: Several Working Group members believe that a simple &quot;no private auction&quot; rule could easily be circumvented with other forms of private resolutions of contention sets that amounted to compensating one or all of the other losing members of a contention set. Thus, they proposed a second option of banning all forms of private resolution of contention sets. This would mean modifying Implementation Guidance F by not allowing parties to mutually agree on how to resolve a contention set. All contention sets, by definition, would be resolved through the mechanism of last resort (described in Section 2.1. above).</th>
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<tr>
<td>2.2 Private Resolution of Contention Sets (including Private Auctions)</td>
<td>Option</td>
<td>2.2.d.3: A third option a Working Group Member proposed was allowing certain types of private resolutions, but disallowing others. For example, as discussed in several sections of the Initial Report and in this Supplemental Initial Report, many Working Group members favored allowing applicants in a contention set to change their applied-for-string if that change is mutually agreed by the members of the contention set and the newly changes strings (a) were reasonably related to the original applications and (b) did not move the applicants' newly selected strings into a different contention set. Under this option, the Working Group member proposed that changes would need to be approved by ICANN. Another Working Group member noted that under this option, any proposed newly selected string that ICANN intended to approve would need to be (a) subject to name collision risk assessment, (b) put out for public comment and (c) open to established Objection procedures (note, this line of discussion is also found in section 1.4, on Change Requests). If parties are found to have engaged in non-acceptable forms of private resolution, that will result in (a) the</td>
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</table>
application not being allowed to proceed - if a Registry Agreement was not signed by the time it is discovered, or (b) forfeiture of the registry (if after a Registry Agreement is signed). Some members of the Working Group, however, were not comfortable in putting ICANN in a position of approving (or disapproving) mechanisms of private resolution.

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<tr>
<th>2.2 Private Resolution of Contention Sets (including Private Auctions)</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>2.2.e.1: Do you believe private resolutions should be continued in the future? If so, should the funds be distributed amongst the remaining applicants within the auction or in some other method i.e. charity, ICANN, etc? If so, what methods are most appropriate?</th>
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<tr>
<td>2.2 Private Resolution of Contention Sets (including Private Auctions)</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>2.2.e.2: Do you believe that issues with private resolutions are, generally speaking, equally problematic across different types of TLDs? Do you believe that the type of TLDs may be a factor in determining whether private resolution should be allowed? Does the type of TLD have any impact on the options above?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2 Private Resolution of Contention Sets (including Private Auctions)</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>2.2.e.3: Do you agree with many Working Group members who believe that prohibitions in the Applicant Guidebook, Terms &amp; Conditions, and in the Registry Agreement are the best way to prevent private resolutions in the future. In other words, participation in a private resolution, including private auction, where applicants may profit from withdrawing their applications would result in a cancellation of your application (if discovered during the application process) or forfeiture of its TLD (if it is discovered after the TLD is awarded). Do you agree? Do you believe other suggested mechanisms (e.g., increasing application fees), may be more effective, or could be used in tandem?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2 Private Resolution of Contention Sets (including Private Auctions)</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>2.2.e.4: If you agree that private resolution overall is potentially problematic, do you believe that there is any practical way to prevent private resolution that allows losing applicants to receive a financial benefit? Or is the issue with private resolution one that</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2 Private Resolution of Contention Sets (including Private Auctions)</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>2.2.e.5: Do you believe instead that there are practical ways to allow some forms of private resolution but disallow others, as indicated in option 3 above? What would be the acceptable or non-acceptable forms of private resolution and why? Who should determine whether parties in a contention set have or have not engaged in non-acceptable forms of private resolution and how would such a determination be established?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2 Private Resolution of Contention Sets (including Private Auctions)</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>2.2.e.6: Some believe that if an application fee for a TLD were high enough, it would deter applicants from applying for TLDs with the intent of profiting from a private resolution. Do you believe that increasing application fees will have that effect? Why or why not? If you agree, at what amount would application fees need to be set at to deter applicants from applying for TLDs with the intent of profiting from withdrawing their applications (e.g., rough estimate or instead, criteria by which an amount could be established)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3 Role of Application Comment</td>
<td>Preliminary Recommendation</td>
<td>2.3.c.1: The Working Group supports continuing the guidance in Implementation Guideline C, particularly around the provision of comment forums. However, the Working Group believes that the mechanism and system could be further optimized.</td>
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<td>• Implementation Guidance under consideration: The system used to collect application comment should better ensure that the email and name used for an account are verified in some manner.</td>
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<td>• Implementation Guidance: The system used to collect application comment should support a filtering and/or sorting mechanism to better review a high volume of comments. The system should also allow for the inclusion</td>
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<td>2.3 Role of Application Comment</td>
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<td>Preliminary Recommendation</td>
<td>Preliminary Recommendation</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3.c.2: ICANN should be more explicit in the Applicant Guidebook on how public comments are to be utilized or taken into account by the relevant evaluators, panels, etc. and to what extent different types of comments will or will not impact scoring. In addition, to the extent that public comments are to be taken into account by the evaluators, panels, etc., applicants must have an opportunity to respond to those comments.</td>
<td>2.3.e.1: The Working Group has noted that while there was a cutoff for application comments to be considered by evaluators, the cutoff for Community Priority Evaluation was far later in the process, allowing for a much longer period of time for comments to be received for this evaluation element. The longer period of time allowed was due to the timing of CPE (i.e., only after program elements like Initial Evaluation, Extended Evaluation, and objections conclude). Is this, or other factors, valid reasoning and/or fair to have the comment period for CPE extend longer than for Initial Evaluation? Do you believe it makes sense to shorten this particular application comment period, perhaps just having it run in parallel to the Initial Evaluation comment period?</td>
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<td>Question</td>
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<td>2.3.e.2: In the 2012 round, applicants were given the opportunity through Clarifying Questions to respond to comments that might impact scoring. From one perspective, this may have reduced the incentive for applicants to respond to all input received through the public forum, including comments that may be perceived as negative. Do you consider this an issue that needs to be addressed? If so, what measures do you propose in response to this problem?</td>
<td>2.3.e.3: If there is a application comment period prior to evaluations, should applicants be given a certain amount of time to respond to the public comments prior to the consideration of those comments. For example, if there is a 60-day public comment</td>
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period, should an additional time period of 7-10 days be added solely for the purpose of providing an opportunity for applicants to respond to the comments if they so choose?

2.4 Change Requests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preliminary Recommendation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.4.c.1: The Working Group believes that at a high-level, a criteria-based change request process, as was employed in 2012, continues to make sense going forward. However, the Working Group believes that some operational improvements should be made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Implementation Guidance under consideration: ICANN org could seek to provide guidance on both changes that will likely be approved and changes that will likely NOT be approved.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Implementation Guidance under consideration: ICANN org should also set forth the types of changes which are required to be posted for public comments and which are not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Implementation Guidance under consideration: ICANN org should set forth in the Applicant Guidebook the types of changes that would require a re-evaluation of some or all of the application and which changes would not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Implementation Guidance under consideration: The Working Group believes that several types of change requests that were disallowed in 2012 should be allowed in subsequent procedures under certain circumstances. The types of change requests for which some members of the Working Group believe should be allowed under limited circumstances are set out for public comment below in section (d). Please see section (e) for specific questions about these options.</td>
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2.4 Change Requests

| Option |
| 2.4.d.1: One of the types of changes that some members of the Working Group believe should be allowed are certain application |
changes intended to resolve string contention. For example, if there is string contention and each of the applicants in a contention set agree, then applicants should be allowed to 1) create joint ventures or 2) have a limited ability to select a different string, which must be closely related to the original string.

- **Implementation Guidance:** ICANN org may determine that in the event of a joint venture, re-evaluation is needed to ensure that the new entity still meets the requirements of the program. The applicant may be responsible for additional, material costs incurred by ICANN due to re-evaluation and the application could be subject to delays.
- **Implementation Guidance:** Some examples to consider in allowing for a new string to be selected include prepending/appending a new element to the original string or selecting a string that is closely related to the class/sector of the original string. ICANN org must perform a re-evaluation of the new applied-for string in all string related evaluation elements (e.g., DNS Stability, String Contention, etc.) and the application for the new string would be subject to string related objections (e.g., String Confusion Objections, Legal Rights Objections, etc.). Another Working Group member noted that in allowing for a string change, the new string would need to be (a) subject to name collision risk assessment, (b) put out for public comment and (c) open to established Objection procedures. The applicant may be responsible for additional, material costs incurred by ICANN due to re-evaluation and the application could be subject to delay.

| 2.4 Change Requests | Question | 2.4.e.1: Section (d) above outlines possible application changes that could be allowed in subsequent procedures and corresponding implementation guidance that the Working Group is considering. |
| 2.4 Change Requests | Question | 2.4.e.1.1: Do you agree with allowing these types of changes? Why or why not? Does the implementation guidance above seem reasonable if these changes are allowed? The implementation guidance asks that ICANN provide better clarity on what types of changes will or will not be allowed and also what changes may require re-evaluation. Do you have suggestions on how to provide more precise guidance? Would this guidance replace or complement the seven criteria (see section (b) above for reference) above? |
| 2.4 Change Requests | Question | 2.4.e.1.2: If these changes are allowed, what are the potential risks or possibilities for gaming these types of changes? How can those risks be mitigated? |
| 2.4 Change Requests | Question | 2.4.e.1.3: For the limited ability to change the applied-for string, what do you believe should be the criteria in considering such requests? Are there examples of where a change of an applied-for string should NOT be approved? |
| 2.4 Change Requests | Question | 2.4.e.2: What role should public comment play in determining if a change request should be granted? |
| 2.4 Change Requests | Question | 2.4.e.3: Reflecting on the seven criteria utilized for considering change requests in 2012 (see section (b) above for reference), do you have specific changes that you would suggest being made to those criteria for usage in the future? |
| 2.5 Registrar Support for New gTLDs | Option | 2.5.d.1: The following proposals have been discussed by the Working Group as options which can be pursued if there is support from the community to do so. Many of them require substantial resources by ICANN. No cost benefit analysis on these options have been performed and the Working Group is seeking input from the community on these proposals. |
| 2.5 Registrar Support for New gTLDs | Option | 2.5.d.1.1: ICANN org could select a "last-resort" wholesale registrar that would provide resellers with the ability to sell TLDs that lacked market interest and/or have their target markets in |
regions or verticals lacking ICANN-Accredited registrars. In order to not burden ICANN org or the selected registrar with making initial deposits for TLDs, only registries allowing Post Payment terms would be eligible for this resource.

| 2.5 Registrar Support for New gTLDs | Option | 2.5.d.1.2: ICANN org could provide a "clearinghouse" for payments between the registries and registrars that operate in different currencies. |
| 2.5 Registrar Support for New gTLDs | Option | 2.5.d.1.3: In order to assist smaller registries during their launch period, ICANN could allow an increase to the number of names that can be registered without the use of an ICANN-Accredited Registrar. Expanding the number of names while at the same time allowing these names to be registered for purposes other than the promotion or operation of the TLD could allow these smaller registries to "get off the ground" and gain the momentum needed to become attractive enough for ICANN Accredited Registrars to carry. |
| 2.5 Registrar Support for New gTLDs | Option | 2.5.d.1.4: The Applicant Guidebook could note that there may be some benefit to potential applicants in communicating with ICANN accredited registrars before submitting an application, so that they fully understand potential market and technical integration issues that might be encountered. |
| 2.5 Registrar Support for New gTLDs | Option | 2.5.d.1.5: Some members of the Working Group also proposed that the Registry contract should bundle the capacity of becoming an Accredited Registrar. |
| 2.5 Registrar Support for New gTLDs | Question | 2.5.e.1: Please comment on each of the proposal set forth above. What are the pros and cons of those proposals? Should any or all of them be adopted? Why or why not? |
| 2.5 Registrar Support for New gTLDs | Question | 2.5.e.2: Are there any other proposals that could assist TLD Registries that have difficulty attracting ICANN Accredited Registrars? |
### 2.5 Registrar Support for New gTLDs

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
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<tr>
<td>2.5.e.3: Should ICANN even get involved in assisting Registries or is this outside the scope of ICANN's mission, bylaws, or mandate? Please explain.</td>
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<td>2.5.e.4: The Working Group has not yet found a way to identify whether a TLD with low market performance has low performance due to lack of demand or lack of sales channels. How could the underlying issues be identified?</td>
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<td>2.5.e.5: Does ICANN forcing registrars to carry TLDs or designating registrars as &quot;registrars of last resort&quot; pose challenges to compliance oversight of these entities? Should registrars be liable for compliance actions for TLDs for which they did not want to carry but were forced to? By handpicking a few selected registrars as &quot;last resort&quot; does this create the possibility for compliance to go easy on them because ICANN needs them to play a specific role in the marketplace?</td>
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