WHOIS Working Group
Teleconference
TRANSCRIPTION
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http://audio.icann.org/gnso/whois-20070711.mp3
http://gnso.icann.org/calendar/#jul

Attendance:
Philip Sheppard - WHOIS wg chair
Yaovi Atohoun - observer
Carole Bird - observer
Patrick Cain - observer
Bertrand de la Chapelle
Steve Delbianco - CBUC
Claudio Digangi - observer
Avri Doria - Nom Com appointee to Council
Wout de Natris - observer
David Fares - CBUC
Christopher Gibson - observer
Lynn Goodendorf - observer
Doug Isenberg - IPC
Susan Kawaguchi - CBUC
Dan Krimm - NCUC
Steve Metalitz - IPC
Philip Sheppard: Welcome everybody to the call. The prize role of who is on the call will be reported in the notes. And so far I see Glen de Saint Gery, Dan Krimm, Lynn Goodendorf, Avri Doria, Susan Kawaguchi, Pat Cain, John Nevett, Margie Milam, Steve Metalitz, Bertrand de La Chapelle, (Claudia de Ganghi), Wout de Natris, Michael Warnecke, Steve Del Bianco. My apologies if my pronunciation failed on any of those.

Today, we’re following on some of the discussions we had at production meeting in San Juan. We got a new version of the report 1.3 to look at which attempted to clarifying composite the earlier version to report so that things were coming together as it is being discussed.
And what I want everyone to try to achieve today was to go to three maybe four issues that seem to me also to be as we fast talking about in San Juan is for the critical part issues whereby one decision on those may lead to the certain implications following that. And in particular the choice on the agenda following some of the discussions that’s being on the list since at - in San Juan.

If we don’t finish today in the hour in front of those we will continue on such discussions on the call next week. And in addition after that would then be to verify the report as a whole in terms of where we got agreement just to check if that is actually the case. So if not, make changes to the level of wording there.

So I hope that sounds okay for everybody in terms of the mode of operandi.

Man: Uh-hmm.

Woman: Okay.

Man: Sorry to interrupt. I just wanted to state that (Pablo Silva) just joined the phone call from Burberry.


Man: Sorry to interrupt.

Philip Sheppard: That’s fine.
So to kick-off which sound to me - and this put us on from discussion we have in San Juan, section 2.6 of the current report talks about the relationship between OPOC and the existing tech and admin contact. We heard earlier I think some convincing argumentation from both about the strong side and certain logic users as to the usefulness to certainly continuing with the tech contact.

And I think to me what was just missing was argumentation that was clear in terms of the distinction between the existing administration contact and the possible future OPOC.

So I just wanted to have - initiates a little bit discussion on that first to see if going forward, we should say either we shall continue to be a distinction and this is a distinction. So we write this in the report to make recommendations and maybe in the future there is two roles could be put together if such distinction can’t be made. Who would like to address that issue?

Steve Metalitz: This is Steve. I'll be glad to get in the queue.

Philip Sheppard: Okay. So Steve to kick off. Who else for the queue?

(Ross): Yeah, Philip this is (Ross) please.

Philip Sheppard: (Ross), who else? Okay. That's fine let's kick off with this. There's Steve.

Steve Metalitz: Thank you, yeah. Certainly it could be the case that there will be some redundancy here between OPOC and the admin contact. There might well not be though. And, you know, the idea that a piece of data that
now is publicly accessible would not only become only accessible through some other methods but also will disappear entirely is a bit unsettling to those who depend on access to these data.

So I mean I could see why in many cases it would add anything if we sustain to get as the OPOC and obviously, you know, getting access to that in the case where the OPOC failed in its responsibility when you needed to go, you went to review of step or whatever you wouldn’t gain anything. But there would be cases where you would gain something and some more data to be able to try to get in contact with registrants.

So I have some uneasiness about this. I guess my senses that if the - if we get the responsibilities and roles of the OPOC right and we may not have a big issue with eliminating the admin contact but as, you know, at any support for that a sort of conditional on what the come is of the roles and responsibilities of the OPOC.

Philip Sheppard: Okay. Steve that’s obviously, I mean the working assumption that I think we have here is that if this person went forward then there will be an OPOC for everybody regardless of the nature the registrant have. And then simply the display of that data we changed be limited in the case of a natural person. And therefore for natural person you would see - you would not see display of admin and tech data. You only see the OPOC.

And if this merging were made in the case you would see full data display. But instead of seeing admin you would now see OPOC would be one scenario.

Steve Metalitz In the case of a legal person?
Philip Sheppard: Yes, yup.

Steve Metalitz: No, excuse me, I'm sorry, excuse me, a natural person. I'm confused there.

Philip Sheppard: Yes what I was saying if the working condition at the moment is that OPOC has sort of universality. So that both legal person and natural person would appoint in OPOC.

Steve Metalitz: Mm-hm.

Philip Sheppard: Therefore for natural person that display would be limited and you will not see the OPOC contact. And in the case of a legal person you would either see admin and the OPOC or in the simplified world you would only see one contact to which would put over the two roles. I mean that would be the scenarios as I see this.

Steve Metalitz: Thanks for that explanation. I mean, I think in the legal person arena doesn't make that much difference. But in the natural person arena where you would have the OPOC and if the OPOC fail in its responsibilities we would be reluctant to give up the chance to have access to admin, to admin contact.

Philip Sheppard: Okay. Because potentially that would be - depending on the nature or the way the registration was done maybe a different contact address.

Steve Metalitz: Yeah.

Philip Sheppard: Yeah, okay. (Ross)?
(Ross): Yeah. I think the – well, there’s a couple of things. First off, I think data collection is completely separate issue from (unintelligible) WHOIS question in general are dealing strictly with issue and not data collection. Certainly if an OPOC contact is created with the collection practice (unintelligible) I believe.

Philip Sheppard: Uh-huh.

Man: Certainly within…

Philip Sheppard: Okay. Which would mean we might write recommendation but it wouldn’t necessarily be a recommendation for that to be looked at to be necessarily be a recommendation of the group.

(Ross): Yeah, I'm just…

Philip Sheppard: Okay, yeah.

(Ross): ...(unintelligible). As it relates in technical and operational point of contact patients, I think we sort of losing sight here one of the original proposition for me and establishing this contact type when the original goal was to make the WHOIS more useful, broad range of use not to make it more complex.

I don’t - I’m not sure that I understand why we would want to add a third contact type to any of this (unintelligible) when we could simply be looking at changing the responsibilities of administrative points of contact. It doesn’t seem to make sense to publish a third contact data if the proposition is to merge the administrative and technical
responsibilities and augment those responsibilities and show up those responsibilities then I think what we’re hearing around the OPOC replacing those contact details would be useful.

But in terms of simply adding a third contact point, I think we’re just leading to confusion and complexity. This is completely unwanted.

Philip Sheppard: Okay. So your - if it further went ahead your simplest proposal would be that potentially what we currently are calling the admin contact. We could simply give those responsibilities to what we’re currently - what we are describing as the role of OPOC.

(Ross): No. To be (unintelligible).

Philip Sheppard: …and they would become one is that the idea?

(Ross): To be explicit - one of the things is that merging responsibilities of the administrative and technical contact as well as augmenting it with the additional responsibilities and in this document is the least complex pass forward.

Philip Sheppard: All right. So you first have all three merged? Okay.

(Ross): No my preference would be to get rid of the operational point of contact and keep the administrative and technical contact. But failing that I think merging them is next most sense.

Philip Sheppard: Okay. And the (unintelligible) is mine. That move - that was different to the conclusion (unintelligible) start calling in users I think in the San Juan meeting. But…
(Ross): No, I speak for myself.

((Crosstalk))

Philip Sheppard: I’m sorry. Who was that?

Avri Doria: This is Avri, can I get into the queue?


Avri Doria: Okay, yeah. I just had one comment at when I was in the group before talking about OPOC, I had always understood it as a role with responsibilities and had basically seen it as something that anyone of those three other contact would have basically an extra role assigned to it which was the OPOC role as it got to find and understood later.

And basically did - never saw as a new thing for an additional thing but basically you took one of the other existing entities in the record and this was a role that was assigned to them. And then it enables the other outcomes.

Philip Sheppard: Okay.

Dan Krimm: Hello. This is Dan.

John Nevett: Philip, this is John, could I be added to the queue?

Philip Sheppard: Dan and John, yeah. Anybody else on the queue?
Man: (Unintelligible).

Philip Sheppard: Say again your name please?

Avri Doria: I think that was Yaovi.

Yaovi Atohoun: Yeah Yaovi Atohoun.

Philip Sheppard: Yeah, Yaovi. Okay, Yaovi, thank you. Dan go ahead.

Dan Krimm: Yeah. So I guess what Avri is saying is that the OPOC would be sort of like a flag on tech or admin contact as they might exist now. My comment is that the tech and admin context right now seem to be sort of informally described there - there with a label but to my knowledge we don’t have any formal responsibilities assigned to any particular person who gets labeled with the tech or admin label.

So what would be new about the OPOC is that there are actually formal responsibilities being defined by this group for that particular role. I think that’s were a lot of the more interesting considerations come to play.

I’m not sure or why loosing an admin display in the case of domains whose registrants are natural persons but necessarily, you know, be an owner it’s a removal of information above and beyond the intent which is to actually protect the personal privacy of natural person and in such case one would expect to actually lose a little bit of access - that’s the whole point of creating the OPOC in the first place.
So just to answer (Steve’s) comment, you know, once it’s expected to give up a little bit in this whole framework because that’s what the definition of the framework is.

Philip Sheppard: Okie doke.

Man: Philip, if I could just get in the queue please.


John Nevett: Thanks. I have a quick question and a quick comment. The question is in the report on the section and I think earlier (unintelligible) certain registers making - taking position at (unintelligible). I was wondering which registers took that position so that way we could coordinate if necessary.

So the question and then the comment is that I think from what I’m hearing I support (Ross’s) comment that this group should be talking about what we display. We should not be dealing with what information is collected obviously by definition if we say an OPOC should be displayed then we will need to collect that.

But short of that, you know, the report now says that the technical contact should be - should continue to be collected and I think we should really take a close look at the report and make sure that we’re talking about display and not collections.

Philip Sheppard: Okay, and where are drawn on the sort of simplification as (Ross) was discussing?
John Nevett: I support (Ross’s) comment.

Philip Sheppard: Okay. Like I say we’re all misty moving in the direction of simplification so long as that doesn’t loose out any ability to actually contact people. I think that’s’ like what I say (unintelligible) everyone (unintelligible) so far.

Woman: Philip, can you add (Carol) to the queue.

Philip Sheppard: Okay. (Carol)

Yaovi Atohoun: This is Yaovi, can I get in the queue?

Philip Sheppard: Indeed Yaovi, and your next to speak. Go ahead.

John Nevett: Is there a way you can answer my question, Philip.

Philip Sheppard: I can answer your question. (Unintelligible) with the registrars?

John Nevett: Yeah, yeah.

Philip Sheppard: I remember Margie was in the room, I think maybe you can give some point.

John Nevett: I was in the room but you said that the - I don’t make any statement on this issue…

Philip Sheppard: Okay. And I think probably start with (unintelligible) referring to Margie. Would that be correct Margie, are you on the line?
Margie Milam: Yes. Yeah are we talking about the (unintelligible) between second administrative contacts and…

Philip Sheppard: Yes and you were in favor of retaining those in addition to OPOC.

Margie Milam: Yeah, I'll explain why is it (unintelligible).

Philip Sheppard: Okay. Yaovi, if you'll fair with me, that would need an explanation I think. Just go ahead, please Margie.

Margie Milam: Okay, sure. Sometimes the reason of the difference between the tech and an admin contact is the example where there’s a hosting company involved in registering the domain name. And so it’s frequently the case that you may have one person as the technical contact and that’s the actual, you know, company that’s hosting the content versus the administrative content that’s actually the registrant, you know, that set us controls the content.

So just want to make sure that, you know, there’re still the ability to have you know more than one contact because in the suppose situations it may have difficulty getting hold of the registrants if you merged them.

Philip Sheppard: Right. (Unintelligible) so you think…

Yaovi Atohoun: The policy proposal Margie to this builds out the - can specify the multiple contact.

Philip Sheppard: Yes. So Margie you’re concern is with redundancy more than anything else.
Margie Milam: Yeah my concern is I just don’t want to loose out the, you know, where there is a need for separate contact and that, you know, if registrars are clear about this - the ability to designate more than one. You know, I’m not sure how…

Philip Sheppard: Okay.

Margie Milam: …clear is this at this point.

Philip Sheppard: All right. Okay and in terms of supposing admin and OPOC in the registry. You’d be more comfortable with that, would you?

Margie Milam: Yeah, yeah.

Philip Sheppard: Yeah, Okay. Thanks very much. Yaovi, you’re next to speak.

Yaovi Atohoun: Yeah, I think the same comments based on the - so document we have - the background document. It’s said that OPOC removed the current and (unintelligible) technical contact and require a (unintelligible).

So you have some information there where. I think the idea to begin was to simplify and to remodel the administrator and technical and bring in - bring OPOC now. So I just want to point that out that in the background document the idea was to maybe to merge or to remove technical (unintelligible) and to have now one contact if it is OPOC.
Philip Sheppard: Absolutely that was in the background document and that’s why we’re discussing everything. Thank you very much for bringing that to our attention. (Ross) again.

(Ross): Yeah, just I want to pull up that same point actually there’s a - I heard there’s repeated, repeated, repeated it’s driving me crazy at this point.

The intention of introducing the Operation Point of Contact was not to remove data from WHOIS. It’s simply recognition that the administrative and technical contacts were completely ill-defined that registrants didn’t understand the roles and responsibilities of contact.

And perhaps now was a reasonable time to take a look at the roles and responsibilities of the administrative and technical contact and enhance those with some definition. In the stake that the draft is that of the original policy proposal need was they set and we can call this something else.

We can specify many of them and call them something else. And it has now been characterized as a purpose of the OPOC is remove data from the WHOIS and that’s (unintelligible). So for the benefit of everybody’s who’s listening I hope that we don’t continue to perpetuate that - that fault.

Philip Sheppard: Okay. But (unintelligible) all the simplification of roles along of those roles can be well defined. Is that correct?

(Ross): I would not be - yes, yes.

Philip Sheppard: Okay. (Carol) you’re next.
(Carol): Thank you and I have to say that really helps a great deal (Ross). And I’m going to apologize if I miss part of the points because I stepped into the teleconference with my (unintelligible). For me I think there is a big difference between the issue of display and collection.

I agree with the comments that were made with regards to that. If we’re dealing with display I understand the distinction. If we’re dealing with collection the very real concern with regards to - if we don’t collect the information that we have in the past because as Margie said there is a very big difference between who you hired to do your technical versus the person that’s actually the registrant.

So I think I’m echoing some of the comments that have previously been said. I’m just a little bit concerned that if we are looking at simplifying the roles that we lose what’s really something that at some point in time helps us identify who the real point of contact is when we’re doing an investigation which tends to be more often than not the admin versus the technical. But that’s just a side issue if we’re only looking at the display versus the collection.

Philip Sheppard: Okie-doke. All right. Listen there’s someone who wants to speak, I think…

Dan Krimm: Philip, this is Dan, just one final comment.

Philip Sheppard: Yeah. Off you go, yeah.

Dan Krimm: It really depends on the registrant, how they use this field right now, it’s very informal. There may not be a separate tech contact or admin
contact, you know, just duplicating data for the registrant. So, I think we should at this point hold off on characterizing anything in terms of the use of this field right now in terms of the data that's collected and displayed.

It can vary and, you know, I know that registrars struggle with the task of trying to verify that this data is actually correct and that's one of the reasons that we're trying to come up with this paradigm that protects privacy because there'd be much less and sent it to falsify such data in order to protect privacy which people are doing informally right now.

Philip Sheppard: Okie-doke. (Unintelligible) what are project contract with Maria in the next version of the report I think is to summarize most of our discussion as part of implementation options that might take place where - if OPOC proposal to go forward. But I think that with an emphasis on clarification of roles and simplification in terms of the data collection and display where possible. Is that acceptable to all?

And then comment to (unintelligible), we were trying to so much more meaty subjects to the verification and consent of the OPOC. If you look in the account report, this is sections 2.3 and 2.4 where the report for the moment tries to separate out the two slightly different points. So it will be actually the way they're implementing maybe similar.

The point will be one should there be a requirement for the email address of the OPOC to be verified at the time of registration as an active address. The second point on consent is should there be a need for whoever is behind to that email address for them to consent in some way to being a pointing an OPOC by the registrant.
And I think if I can kind attempt to characterize some of the arguments from the audience side, I have this feeling that the issue had a bad actor now standing behind that OPOC and that address was equally meaningless and some registrations at the moment, it doesn’t seem to advance the consumer protection side of OPOC so that at least seem to be a step forward.

And on consent, I think it was more probably more to do then with the fact the OPOC is going to be given certain roles and do you need at some point to have consent on behalf of that individual in - by some means or other, and if it (unintelligible) not to done by a consensual email or response or some other type response can it be done contractually between the registrar and the registrant. The consent may be filed if you're expecting some roles and responsibilities.

And I believe on the other side, the arguments against that where the process mechanism is actually a verification of an active email address and a consent to be in OPOC system, will be it universal in behalf of registrars. It would impose difficulties both in time and cost. And therefore the question is, is that proportional to the benefit that would be had from (unintelligible) systems?

So let me take a queue to speak on one side or the other on this item. So let’s start off.

Dan Krimm: Philip, this is Dan.

Philip Sheppard: Yes Dan. Who else?

(Ross): Hey, let's start with any question on this issue, I mean the queue,
Philip Sheppard: Well, (Ross), okay. Who else?

Michael Warnecke: Philip, this is Mike.

Philip Sheppard: Mike, yeah. Who else?

David Fares: David Fares.

Philip Sheppard: David Fares. Anybody else?

Steve Del Bianco: Steve Del Bianco.

Philip Sheppard: Steve Del Bianco. Anybody else?

Okay. Let's start with that queue for the moment. Dan?

Dan Krimm: Yeah. It seems to me that whether we need the verification consent depends on what we finally agree as to the responsibility to the position. So there's a dependency here…

Philip Sheppard: Yup.

Dan Krimm: …that we may not be able to determine until we actually nail down other responsibilities. My personal feeling is that the OPOC should be essentially liable to the registrant and the registrant liable to the registrar. And any time the verification should flow through the registrant.
Philip Sheppard: Okay. I mean I think that’s an interesting word looking at it. There was certainly be a simplification there and maybe when we get to look at the (unintelligible) they maybe a (unintelligible) talking of which we have lost next year.

Dan Krimm: Yes - would I - the question is I would ask is - I don’t believe that (unintelligible) satisfactory answered. What I don’t understand is what this proposal is trying to address. I understand the mechanics of the proposal. I think I understand its implications. I think I understand its benefits and I even understand its drawback.

But I what I don’t understand is why this is being proposed and what’s the goal of this set of mechanics and this set of process is trying to address. And we hope that level of understanding is not something that I’m - all comfortable as any successive and unnecessary given that we’re - it appears to me that we’re trying to implement something that optimizes event the behavior of the bad actors. And I hope that clarification is just not something I can support.

Philip Sheppard: And your concern is one of the - that the mechanics to do this in terms of cost of or the other time log that would entail. What’s the main area that concerns you of?

Dan Krimm: I think I’ve been pretty (unintelligible) registrant behaviors are required the mechanics that required it, there’s probably two or three or more things that I’ve talked about (unintelligible).

Philip Sheppard: Okay. Thanks. Mike, you’re next.
Michael Warnecke: Yeah. My concern is that I think we do need to have a consent mechanism in there because I think we previously agreed that the legal relationship would be governed by treating the OPOC as an agent of the registrar. And in like there's some sort of consent by the OPOC to represent the registrant, I think it would be much more difficult to establish an agency relationship.

Dan Krimm: Philip, can I get back in the queue? This is Dan.

Philip Sheppard: All right. Dan, you are back on the queue.

Michael Warnecke: Okay Mike, so you’re…

Man: (Unintelligible) so I can get in the queue.

Philip Sheppard: (Unintelligible).

Man: Yeah.

Man: And then (Adam) as well.

Philip Sheppard: (Adam). Okay. Okay Mike. So you’re main concern then - is that the OPOC we’ve agreed already is I think as agent for the registrant and that you need some acknowledgement that the OPOC is happy to be the agent of the registrant in essence.

Michael Warnecke: Yeah.

Dave Fares: Thank you. I want to caveat Mike (unintelligible) I don’t have the benefit of having (unintelligible) and I don’t know if what I’m saying is reiterating our past discussions. But we need - from my perspective, as a company, the OPOC is going to create another layer that we have to go through to be able to identify who the registrant is. And therefore we need to ensure that there is an appropriate means for us to be able to contact and the like means - perhaps it means for us to be able to contact the OPOC if this is indeed implemented. And that means we need some sort of email verification.

Secondly -- that there’s this slight (unintelligible) in order that. And secondly, I agree with what Mike said regarding the need for consent. That also say, Dan had mentioned that, we don’t know what the obligations are but I think we’ve all agreed that there need to be some obligation assumed by the OPOC. If there are, we need some consent that the OPOC is willing to abide by those obligations and can fulfill them.


Steve Del Bianco: It’s an implementation question that is largely for (Ross) and the other registrants but if we study carefully what (unintelligible) put together in the month May document or proxy registrants. We came to understand that the proxy took on certain understanding that they would need to reveal information if they were presented with a request they would need to reveal the registrants.

So we got the understanding that the proxy if not agency has certain responsibility and therefore that it was a - it was a fair interpretation to
say that an OPOC would also have responsibilities and enable to acknowledge those responsibilities.

I think earlier in the call we talked about that being an agent. So mechanically speaking isn’t it the same thing you do today in the sense of getting consent to be the agent that you do for proxies. What we are talking about with respect to the OPOC.

And secondly by then acknowledging or replying to an email wherein they make that consent, doesn’t that automatically get us for free but verification that they have a valid email address since the email try to obtain consent is replied to properly that automatically implies to have a valid email address and that they’re responding to it.

Philip Sheppard: Yeah, I think you’re right. I tried to separate out the points because that’s separate in terms of the activity. But I think certainly in terms of implementation they would not actually come together.

Steve Del Bianco: And that makes it simpler and I guess the other question is - for the registrars on the call that do you not see the proxy - an OPOC processes as being similar to each other.

Philip Sheppard: Mm-hm.

John Nevett: Could - should we response Philip?

Philip Sheppard: Was that John?

John Nevett: Yeah, sorry.
Philip Sheppard: Okay. Let me (unintelligible) safe matters because…

John Nevett: Okay.

Philip Sheppard: it’s apparently the same topics. First, if I made then I’ll take the time and - (Adam) haven’t spoken yet and I’ll come to you, if it’s fine. Next.

Man: Thanks Philip. Well my feeling listening to the discussion and the feeling was also present in San Juan is that people are addressing different layers of the problem sometimes. And I would like mostly as an observer here to just to point to a question that was raised about the purpose of the OPOC.

I hear this question coming over and over and I must confess that it took me sometime to understand exactly what was the general goal. At the contribution to have clarify things and correct me if I’m wrong my feeling is that I’ve heard basically three elements.

One element is the problem of compliance with national laws regarding privacy protection for individuals. This is mostly a question of shielding the visibility of the data and providing the good relay and potentially revealing certain cases.

The second level that I understood mostly in the last meetings and in San Juan is the notion of the dimension of polishing somehow the proxy services that can be applied to legal entities as well. For the first one is purely for individual (unintelligible). The second element is really potentially polishing or regulating more the proxy services that have been merged.
And the third thing that I heard for the first time here today and I think is worth mentioning because I never heard it before is clarifying and strengthening the roles and responsibilities of the admin and tech contacts. These are three different elements and as - in as much as I’m surprised that late in the process there are still questions about the purpose of the OPOC.

I wanted just to submit those three categories because as far as I’m concerned this is how I tried to examine it a bit from the outside.

Philip Sheppard: Mm-hm.

Man: And I hope it helps.

Philip Sheppard: Yup. Thank you very much for that indeed. And (Adam) is next.

(Adam): Yeah. I just wanted to try and perhaps answer the question that you put on this item in the agenda you sure to ask whether this is a critical path or simply nice to have and I think that that also sort of - by doing so also answer (Ross’s) question as to, you know, why we’re doing this.

And I think it comes down in a sentence or two to - if we don’t have the OPOC and someway agreeing to take on these responsibilities and in some ways that’s, you know, happen higher than the registrant. We don’t really have any assurance that we have an OPOC in the sense that we would define OPOC. Whatever it is - whatever we say - the rights and responsibilities of the OPOC are on. And as someone earlier said we may not have those fully defined yet but we know that there’s going to be some responsibilities.
We don't have any sort of assurance that that response would ever actually be done because we don't know that the OPOC ever agreed to do that. And, you know, if you leave it down to the level of the registrant has to enter into this agreement with the OPOC then you are going after the registrant for having not entered in the agreement with the OPOC as that's a violation.

In order to get to the OPOC when the whole point of the OPOC is that you can find the registrants. You can't sort of have this zigzag back and forth sort of circular process where ultimately we want to be able to find or - and communicate with it, et cetera the registrant. And it doesn't help us if we have another reason why we don't like the registrant, i.e. because we didn't enter into this contract with this consent contract whatever with the OPOC.

You know if we can't find them in the first place we just don't have a system and we can throw this whole proposal out if we don't have any sort of, you know, assurance that the OPOC is actually going to fulfill the responsibilities or any obligation really to do so.

So that's why I think this is what - however robust or lean the responsibilities of the OPOC are, we need some of the OPOC in some way agreeing. And to address (Ross's) timing issue, I think we, Margie and I hit this on the list. It doesn't have to happen necessarily before the domain is registered or possibly even before the domain goes live.

It can be the kind of thing where the domain is registered, the email goes out to the OPOC and if it's not returned within some reasonable period of time, two, three, five days whatever, then what happens well
it doesn't need to be that the registration failed. It can be that the registration reverts back to displaying the registrant's information.

So, you know, we can solve that timing issue potentially but if we don't have some sort of agreement to do the responsibilities, we don't really have a system.

Philip Sheppard: Okie-doke. Dan, you're next and then John.

Dan Krimm: Yeah.

Man: (Get me into the queue) as well.

Philip Sheppard: Thank you. All right, okay.

Dan Krimm: I take (Adam's) comments seriously. And first of all I would say that my personal feeling now differs between verification consent. I think that's perfectly reasonable to institute and auto-verification system on the email for an OPOC. And if it's not verified, it can be flagged as not verified or something like that.

But I think the greater framework here is that it's a question of liability and enforcement, who is liable for misstatements of fact and the data in terms of the data collection and what should be the process for enforcement of violations. And - now this is where I would point to the liability.

You know, if the registrant chooses to designate an OPOC that's not going to, you know, fulfill whatever responsibilities we plan to define for it then the enforcement still ultimately becomes, you know, a - or could
be and this is where we're discussing in the third point in the agenda today could be the wrap some kind of take down procedure by the registrar on the domain.

So while that is a - it could be seen as an accepted remedy in some cases, you know, it becomes an effective point of enforcement and - but it goes - essentially goes through the registrant because it’s the registrant’s interest in keeping the domain operating.

So you have a liability and the enforcement pointed at the same point regardless of whether you've revealed any data. You know, I think that that’s a system that could work.

Philip Sheppard: Okay. Well that may be - (unintelligible) the other question is an interesting one. I mean ultimately I guess we will all agree that the registrant is a the (unintelligible) liable and it then becomes part a question of enforcement indeed and what we want to enforce is to whether or not it helps all is irrelevant for the OPOC to give consent and that may be perhaps something that any lawyers in this group could help us with. But thank you for raising that.

Now, with (Charles), John and then Wout?

Woman: Philip, would you put me in the queue, this is…

Man: Yeah, Philip, if I could ask you to stop doing that, please. John's speaking on behalf of (Networks) and (Ross) is speaking in behalf of (unintelligible). It’s probably the 15th time that I’ve…
John Nevett: Yeah. I’ll defer to (Ross) at this point. I just stepped out for a minute so I didn’t hear a couple of the last comments. But I just wanted to answer Steve del Bianco’s question, but I’ll defer to (Ross) if he could respond to…

Philip Sheppard: Okay. So (Ross) on behalf of Tucows, I forget.

John Nevett: Thank you.

Lynn Goodendorf: Philip, could you put me in the queue? This is Lynn Goodendorf.

Philip Sheppard: Yeah, you’re in the queue. Yup.

Margie Milam: This is Margie, I’d like to be in the queue also.

Philip Sheppard: Sorry, is that Margie?

Margie Milam: Yes.

(Ross): This is (Ross), I would like to be in the queue also, please.

Philip Sheppard: And that’s …

Chris Gibson: And Chris Gibson.


(Ross): Yeah, Steve, to answer questions about (Paul’s) document, I think it’s going to recognize that that document is written from the context of a
service that has been there out in the open market by a specific commercial actor. It has no legal significance whatsoever in terms how the relationships between the various players should exist from a policy perspective.

So to extrapolate that into some sort of a finished statement around the OPOC being an agent of the registrant is I think a little bit misguided at this point.

Certainly the, you know, the term agent has come up the couple of times in this conversation and over the past few weeks. My question about that concept is under what jurisdiction, I mean, we now defining the agent status? And what body of law should we fall back on? Or is the intent to actually create our own body of substitute agency but of what law around this that we will institutionalize this contract (unintelligible) the latter? I’m just - I can’t buy into the scope of that concept.

Philip had mentioned that ultimately the registrant is liable and I think that’s a very important point for us to sort of keep in mind here. A lot of this proposal from what I can understand seems to be intent on spreading that liability around such that those with concerns can kind of mitigate all of the risks as much as possible. I don’t think that this is appropriate behavior.

Registrant is liable. Registrant (unintelligible) in their name. If they do not live up to their contract, whether or not their address is published in the publicly accessible database is irrelevant to that concept. Whether it makes it one of more difficult for (unintelligible) for property actor to serve notice on that person is largely irrelevant to that.
If the registrant is misbehaving, if the domain is being misused, then that name should be revoked. I think this is very, very simple concept. And spreading (unintelligible) to all of those complex arrangements, through those complex arrangements, it doesn’t add up for me, I think I leave the other points for someone else who want to speak.


Lynn Goodendorf: Yes. I think that falls right in line with what you’ve just said (Ross). In our day to day work as we contact registrar for a legitimate purposes, I’m trying to visualize what recourse or what step we take if we contact an OPOC and they reply that they have no idea of what we’re talking about and that they in fact have no relationship to the registrant. What would our next step be? Would it be to contact the registrant and have their name revoke? Would that be our next step?

(Ross) I would always presume that that would constitute an act of (unintelligible) and that the name would revocation procedure (unintelligible).

Lynn Goodendorf: I’m sorry. Could you speak up? I couldn’t quite hear you now.

Philip Sheppard: (Ross) is saying that if the OPOC was not fulfilling their requirements or you couldn’t contact then that would constitute inaccurate data and therefore the existing provisions that take down would apply.

Lynn Goodendorf: And what exactly would be the procedure?

Philip Sheppard: (Ross).
(Ross): Somebody that’s got the most recent contract memorized would have to speak to that. I’m out of the loop on that. It’s essentially…

John Nevett: The WHOIS breaks procedure.

(Ross): It’s data accuracy (unintelligible).

John Nevett: Yeah. Registrant can - let’s say a complaint to the ICANN process. We have to 15 days - no, it’s a - we have certain time period to send a note, for example we send we being the (unintelligible) send email, we try to call the registrant to inform them of the inaccurate data allegation. If they don’t correct it or show that it is in fact accurate then we have the right to take action. Then we do. Okay?

Lynn Goodendorf: So, how many times do you think would typically be required?

John Nevett: In the current process? It’s probably at least 30 days.

Lynn Goodendorf: So, again, in this scenario, if we have contacted an OPOC and they reply that they have, you know, that they are unaware of this obligation and that they don’t know what it’s about, then we would be looking at 30 days.

John Nevett: You’d be at the same position you are today with inaccurate WHOIS information. So you have a bad actor that you’re dealing with and today they put inaccurate WHOIS information and you can’t contact them, you’d be in the same position under OPOC as they put in that inaccurate OPOC information.
Philip Sheppard: Okay. Thank you for the clarification. As we move in and pass on the work, I assume could have captured the text of that agreement and include it in the next report. That (unintelligible) and Margie you’re next in the queue.

Margie, are you still with us? I’ll come back to you. Wout?

Margie Milam: Oh, sorry. Takes me a minute - takes me a while to get my mute off.

Philip Sheppard: Oh sorry Margie is with us, so up to you again Margie.

Margie Milam: I just wanted to comment at and need some posting regarding kind of this operationally how it would get at the OPOC consent. I wasn’t really addressing what the business is (unintelligible) consent. But just came out of the San Juan meeting. You know, as registrar, we, from time to time, have obligations to go out to our customer base to act for them to verify the WHOIS data.

And once a year, we have this WHOIS data, WDR-PS, whatever it is called procedure. When we gout to our registrant and say, you know, “This is your WHOIS, please confirm if accurate.” And then if it isn’t accurate say, they get back to you.

And so my point in the postings was that we have mechanics in placed already to go to our registrant and to get them to do various things depending upon what the ICANN policies require. And so that was one of the suggestions was that it could - you could theoretically get an email verification from the OPOC in order to get their consent if that’s what the policy requires?
Philip Sheppard: All right. And today, I mean, if you try to - if you got completely inaccurate data and you try to make your contact then you get nothing back, do you institute to take down yourself within 30 days or do you wait until the net expire of the domain name registration in terms of when the money runs out?

John Nevett: This is John. There is no formal policy on how to - whether we need to take any action first of all which I take is one of the benefit of the OPOC proposal was that we said it requires registrars to take action. So certain registrars will take action, certain registrars won't.

Philip Sheppard: Okay.

John Nevett: And then the action is dependent again on the registrar's contract with their registrants and their own internal policies. So, some will actually delete the name. Some will put them in deep freeze so they can't be use and they can't be access by that registrant until the expiration date. So it really depends on the registrant and registrar relationship.

Philip Sheppard: Okay.

John Nevett: Thank you for question.

Philip Sheppard: Okay. Thanks for that. Who's next? Wout?

Wout de Natris: Yes, thank you. I have two questions. The first is I'm got a bit confused at the beginning of the conference is that when a law enforcement agency need to access data, who do they go to, to the OPOC or to the registrant?
Philip Sheppard: With your first point of call will be different depending on if they are natural or legal person in ICANN.

Wout de Natris: Okay. And if it is a legal person, then you go to the OPOC?

Philip Sheppard: Yes.

Wout de Natris: And that’s the…

Philip Sheppard: Because you have nobody else to go to.

Wout de Natris: Okay. And the…

Philip Sheppard: For the-if they are natural person, yes, then you will only have the OPOC to go to.

Wout de Natris: Okay, the natural person. So that would mean that the natural person would choose his OPOC or does the registrant choose the OPOC? Because I’m a bit concerned here…

Philip Sheppard: The registrant chooses the OPOC.

Wout de Natris: Okay. So there’s always a link in between. Because at this time, we do not think more or less directly contacted the person we’re investigating. Is that correct?

Philip Sheppard: Exactly. Yes. The natural person in advance if you wanted to do anything, the registrant would have to point to the OPOC and the WHOIS data that you will see will only let you have - will only be giving you the email address of the OPOC. So that would be the first the point
of contact that you have, there'll be nobody - there'll be no other email address to contact.

Wout de Natris: Okay and then the OPOC cannot contact the registrant because that's the part we don’t want to happen of course.

Philip Sheppard: Well that becomes a separate issue. If you are pursuing certain investigations, I mean what we’re discussing here mostly is in case - is the case where the OPOC will immediately be relaying information to the registrant and an action taken accordingly if necessary.

Wout de Natris: Okay because most of the time we probably do not want the OPOC to …

Philip Sheppard: Right.

Wout de Natris: Contact there…

Philip Sheppard: In which case it falls into in to this separate category that described in section six which is essentially where there is a request from the likes of yourself directly to the registrar concerning un-displayed data records in which the OPOC place no part at all.

Wout de Natris: Okay.

Philip Sheppard: And that was the function of having described the OPOC as an agent and appointed by the registrant that it made no sense to have the OPOC in some individual position where they are being required to do one thing but they’re acting for somebody else.
Wout de Natris: There’s (unintelligible) way because (unintelligible). Okay the second is
would like reflect with (Ross) awhile back I think maybe in half an hour
but it was on - more or less probably on sales regulation, who is
looking at the accuracy of data and the draft that that there was
something that we would not like to do but what we’re looking at is the
same topic as with ISPs and content who is best equipped to do so.
And how do you want to keep law enforcement of the internet more or
less.

And (unintelligible) station somewhere in between because that’s what
we’re looking at this small ones to some sort of self regulation on
accuracy of data also. And if - my question is who is the best equipped
to do this. Would it be the OPOC or the registrar?

(Ross): The ISPs.

Philip Sheppard: So the ISP.

Wout de Natris: The ISP when somebody’s who’s hosting the domain name …

(Ross): Well if the conversation I’m serious is still the same I know I have …

Philip Sheppard: Go ahead (Ross). (Unintelligible).

(Ross): The conversation keeps turning back to the application of the domain
name which is the use of the domain name in conjunction with the
email address or a website or et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

The most honest answer I can give you on that subject is that those
are the things that you are worried about that we should worried about.
And the ISP the web hosting company is the most logical place to take those complaints.

Speaking of complaint about a fishing attack to someone within the ICANN has is like sending the fire engine to the wrong house. It doesn’t make the most sense. It can be helpful in occasions I’m not going to argue against it but it isn’t. But all of these services are hosted by ISPs and web hosting companies and they are the ones ultimately who can actually solve these problems first hand.

Wout de Natris: So (Ross) when I got to and look into WHOIS data and it says Yogi Bear 33 it’s (unintelligible) what is it do you know the (unintelligible).

Philip Sheppard: Yeah.

Wout de Natris: And who is responsible for taking down that name? Who is the one who said okay that’s Yogi Bear and you’re welcome?

Man: Specifically on accurate issue that registrar. It’s a registrar

Wout de Natris: Right. That’s what I’m (Unintelligible).

((Crosstalk))

Philip Sheppard: If it’s (unintelligible) to do with the WHOIS data then (unintelligible) withdraw.

Man: I don’t think there’s any debate on that point.
Philip Sheppard: If it’s connected with (unintelligible) only connected with something in relation to the content of the website. And (Ross) is saying…

Wout de Natris: No analogy there's also a discussion ISP in content…

Philip Sheppard: Okay.

Wout de Natris: …that should be on the ISP side. But that's also a form of self regulation and the accuracy of data is also a discussion on self regulation more or less. Because otherwise because I’m addressed to step in and do it one day we all want to avoid that as I understand.

Philip Sheppard: Uh-huh, absolutely.

Wout de Natris: That’s why the ISP came in as another example.

Philip Sheppard: Okay, thank you for raising that. Chris, your next on the queue.

Chris Gibson: Hi thanks. A couple of quick questions and points. One I wasn’t at the ICANN meeting and so I don’t how much the question of this loose referral to agent role is has been discussed. I'm not sure if that’s the right model to think about it agency under, you know, different systems of law allowed the agent to bind the principle. There maybe fiduciary duties. I don’t think this is a model where fiduciary duty is appropriate way to think about it OPOC versus the registrant.

It’s a contractual service of course and that leads to my second point which is one about liability and incentives. I think we are talking about a critical path to have at least something like consent because without it
we've created a new layer without providing any incentives in the systems for OPOC to act in a particular way.

I think there's been some discussion about because the registrant is ultimately liable. They are supposed to be somehow sophisticated enough to be able to select OPOC that will carry out certain duties. I would say in this system it can't be the registrant that has somehow the knowledge to know that. It has to be built into the system that the OPOC itself has some incentives.

And I believe in the proxy model the proxy might from the system point of view treated as the registrant and therefore has incentive to act in certain ways. If we don't have any liability on the OPOC, I don't see how this system has created any incentive for OPOCs to act in a particularly responsible way. And I don't see that putting a liability on the registrant is sufficient for a registrant to somehow in the market place choose this some.

And the last comment was in the self-regulatory system. I do think we have to think of each link in the system and build the system in which the incentives are appropriate and right now, I see that of course with the idea of accreditation being shut down and I understood that it was that we've left a system with the weak link because there aren't any incentives built into it and we can't rely on somehow sophisticated domain name registrants to be able to know what they're supposed to be in putting or place a responsibilities on their OPOC.

So I think it's better than self regulatory system that it's done in the design of the system itself. And so therefore, I think it is a critical path that we have acknowledgement and consent at the minimum.
(Ross): Philip, if I may please.

Philip Sheppard: Yes (Ross).

Avri Doria: This is Avri, can you put me in also.

Philip Sheppard: Avri, anybody else in the closing minutes to call? Who else?

Steve Metalitz: This is Steve Metalitz.

Philip Sheppard: Steve, anyone else?

Bertrand de La Chapelle: Bertrand also.

Philip Sheppard: Bertrand. Okay (Ross) again.

(Ross): This is - you know, I just – I can't leave the statements made on that last comment. There are many examples of (unintelligible).

Philip Sheppard: Hello. Thank you. (Unintelligible) got to move on next (unintelligible) please lead the way and carry on (Ross).

(Ross): There are many example and regulations there where it isn't spread around and it works quite nicely. For instance if I lend my someone my car and they go through red light and the red light camera take a snap shot of my car going to the red I as the car owner get that ticket.

That's a system that works very, very well. Everybody that drives my car doesn't have to be especially licensed and receive a notification
and consent form to drive my car. The - because I assume when they
drive my car that if they’re behaving badly that I will receive the ticket.

You know, I just don’t - I really don’t understand the need for that
added complexity to do anything possible to the registrants
accountable for the use of the domain at all level.

Wout de Natris: That can't be true because if I do an investigation (Ross) of something
on two counts and one as your client, you don't want to receive the
sign you want your client to receive the sign. Is that correct or not?
Sorry to interrupt by the way.

(Ross): That’s okay. Talking about the registrant being liable for the use of the
domain - not the registrar, not the OPOC, not anyone else about the
registrar?

Philip Sheppard: Okay so (unintelligible) to consent then you owe the verification but
you are concerned about mechanics of verification, I think is that the
summary?

(Ross): I see (unintelligible) this thing both (unintelligible) on this.

Chris Gibson: Can I make two quick comments, this is Chris.

((Crosstalk))

Philip Sheppard: (Unintelligible) the queue if I may, I had Avri, next?

(Ross): And just to - let me clarify that I’m talking about verification. I mean
verification of the relationships. Not verification of the data.
Philip Sheppard: (Unintelligible) verification in this context I simply meant verification of an active email address of the time of the registration.

(Ross): Right. We have accuracy provisions into the extent that they're appropriate. We'll continue to use them and if that policy (unintelligible) to be (unintelligible) and then lets do that through a different process.


Avri Doria: Hi. I just want to make a brief. One of the previous speakers said that we have all accepted the notion that - or everyone had accepted the notion that we did not want government having to step in at any point and that we wanted this all to be self regulated.

And I would want to argue that we don’t necessarily have that agreement and that I think in things that I’ve heard other people say, they basically said they want to leave things to the rule of law and law enforcement and not impose on necessarily strict self-regulation that prevents any need for nations or law to step in. So not arguing the case either way, I just don’t think we necessarily have all of us agree into that point.


Steve Metalitz: Yes just briefly on this issue of putting a liability solely on the registrant. If we have to look at how this works today, if that, you know, if that system worked, it wouldn’t have this much inaccurate data in WHOIS as we would have. And we also wouldn’t have because the registrant is responsible to do that where you heard about that thirty day or more
process even when it works, and it doesn’t work at least the third of the
time it is required in order to enforce the accuracy obligation.

And if registrant liability worked, we also would have no privacy issue
about natural person’s named as administrator are technical contacts
because every registrant has signed an agreement that says he has
obtained the consent of those people to put their names in WHOIS as
the administrative and technical contact.

So I guess under that theory, if there is a privacy issue, those
administrator of the technical contact people should be suing the
registrant for failing to live up to their obligations or perhaps the
registrar should be proceeding against the registrant if the admin and
technical contacts include natural person whose consent was not
obtained.

I think this is enough to show that the (unintelligible) the registrant isn’t
working. And that is (unintelligible) on this (unintelligible) it would be
work. I mean obviously there are some cases where.

(Ross): So why are we hearing about these accuracy issues now Steve? This
is - I don’t understand.

Steve Metalitz: What on accuracy issue?

(Ross): We can’t load these policies. You know what, go ahead just continue
on.

Steve Metalitz: I’m done.
Philip Sheppard: Okay.

John Nevett: Philip, if I could make a comment, this is John.

Philip Sheppard: John, okay I’ll let you to the end of the queue. I got Bertrand and (unintelligible) John let me probably need to call it a day as well.

John Nevett: Thank you very much.

Philip Sheppard: But it’s over an hour. Bertrand.

Bertrand de La Chapelle: Yeah. Thanks Philip. Actually my comments relate to something different than the discussion that is just happening but I wanted to raise them before the meeting ends. One thing I was concerned in the document is that the relay function seems to be applicable only when there is a case of actionable arm.

And I’m wondering whether this shouldn’t cover as well the cases where you want to contact the owner of the domain name who may be a natural person for purposes of asking whether this domain name is available or whatever other question you want to ask, and the relay function should be functioning in that case as well, I suppose.

The second thing is that…

Philip Sheppard: I think that is an interesting case actually. There was a - I had an implementation check books I think and there was another category which I think captures the points you’re making.

Bertrand de La Chapelle: Yes, but the reason why I raised…
Philip Sheppard: It could be very, very good safe reasons for one thing to contact the registrants at all. You’re actually right, yup.

Bertrand de La Chapelle: No, absolutely but the reason why I raised this is that the text itself says the group discussed what would be a typical nature of such request, and the working definition of the individual who request goes immediately as if it were the only case.

Philip Sheppard: Yeah. (Unintelligible).

Bertrand de La Chapelle: There can be a legal request and there can be a set of direct requests.

Philip Sheppard: Okay.

Bertrand de La Chapelle: The other element is that in the (reveal), it’s also taken almost for granted that this only comes when the relay function has failed. And I suppose that there could be instances where a very quick action is needed and the (unintelligible) could be functioning a bit like the fast track processes in courts work at least in France or other country.

Philip Sheppard: Okay, thank you very much. Chris.

Chris Gibson: Yeah, a couple of quick points. One, I think it is important to point out that an example that person receives the ticket when they are driving. It demonstrates two features that we have to bear in mind. One is that we are talking about an international space, not something that occurs
in a particular country and the cost of (unintelligible) let’s say to go and find someone who is involved in a fishing attack.

If you aren’t relying on some sort of self-regulatory system that allows you to get access to a certain data under - on certain circumstances can be enormous, can be very costly and so it is important to think about creating a system with the appropriate incentives so that you don’t have to do it and just fall back to, you know, going to the certain parts of the world dealing with the national authority there. It will become much more costly.

And second, using as the example of receiving a ticket and the driver being responsible that’s based on a system where someone has registered their licensed plates and that registration system that is usually involves some form of national or local department of motor vehicles. That’s precisely the type of system that would then need more burdens on, for example, registrars.

If you are going to say they’re essentially serving that role and they would be the ones that would be in the backroom we’re not saying they need more infrastructure because we haven’t imposed or found a way to create incentives for OPOC to operate and act responsibly.

Steve Metalitz: Because we’re not registering to make it today.

Philip Sheppard: Okay, thanks. And John last word on this call.

John Nevett: The only point I want to raise is that in the current report we talked about these agent - agency relationship and I agree with the speakers who say that’s taking this OPOC too far and just a response to Steve.
Most registrars do not have a proxy service. And certainly there are solutions do not have a proxy.

Philip Sheppard: Yeah, I think - in response to the (unintelligible) I think we have got to that word description I mean not necessarily it has to have the same thing as you might have a national legal regime in terms of what’s the agency’s responsibility is.

John Nevett: Yes.

Philip Sheppard: But (unintelligible)…

John Nevett: Exactly, because the agency…

Philip Sheppard: It was characterized in the description now as opposed to somebody who was accredited which was the - together as part of our discussion.

John Nevett: Okay, yeah. Under US law agency has a special meaning.

Philip Sheppard: Yup.

((Crosstalk))

John Nevett: See if we can remove that.

Philip Sheppard: The one thing in that (unintelligible). Okay, well, I think we have to call it’s an end for today’s call. It’s been very useful. I’ll wok with Maria and to give out an amended version of our existing report to try to capture some of the nuances and certainties that we’ve had on this call - on the two areas that we’ve discussed.
It maybe useful on list if any of you felt inclined to discuss the question free which will be a subject for our next call in terms of the reveal option versus an on request rapid take down or (unintelligible) take down by (unintelligible) when we lay all potential remedies fail.

And that’s what it is looking again at the nature of the roles of the OPOC. For me, the difference there is from at - extent at what point might you have a system that is only to do with the requestor, the OPOC and the registrant and at what point are you (unintelligible) to involve the registrar.

And I think there needs to be some clarification and distinction as to what point you’re going to the registrar. If you have a system which always seems to end up quite rapidly to the registrar I suspect that maybe overly heavy for (unintelligible) request that may come this way but I think could be a useful subject for debate on list to help inform in our discussion next week on the same time.

So thank you all very much for participating. I hope also by then Maria (unintelligible) when can we have that report on authentication methods out by then?

Maria Farrell: Yes you will. I'm actually expecting to have a draft of it available to the group by early next week.

Philip Sheppard: Okie-doke, thank you very much (unintelligible).

Man: Thank you.
Man: Thanks a lot.

Woman: Bye.

Woman: Bye.

END