ICANN Transcription
GNSO Next-Gen RDS PDP Working Group
Tuesday 23 August 2016 at 1600 UTC

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https://community.icann.org/x/jg6sAw
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http://audio.icann.org/gnso/gnso-nextgen-rds-23aug16-en.mp3

Coordinator: Recordings connected. You may now proceed.

Michelle DeSmyter: Great. Thank you. Good morning, good afternoon, good evening.
Welcome to the GNSO Next Generation RDS PDP Working Group call on the 23rd of August 2016 at 1600 UTC.

In the interest of time today, there will be no roll call as we have quite a few participants. Attendance will be taken via the Adobe Connect room. So if you're only on the audio bridge today, please let yourself be known now.

Geoffrey Noakes: This is Geoffrey Noakes with Symantec.

Michelle DeSmyter: Thank you Geoffrey, I would also like to remind all participants to please state your name before speaking for transcription purposes. Also please keep your phones and microphones on mute when not speaking to avoid any background noise. With this, I'd like to turn the call over to Chuck Gomes.
Chuck Gomes: Thank you very much. Welcome everyone. There's been a lot of great list discussion going on over the last week. Thanks for all of that. Much appreciated.

And we have in front of us the agenda. Does anybody have any questions or comments on the agenda? The SOI updates are always on there first. Does anyone have a statement of interest update? Okay. Thank you very much on that.

Let's go right to - then to Agenda Item 2, which is to finalize the updated problem statement. And if we could please post the version I asked to be posted, which was the one with my responses to (Aden)'s comments and his additional responses there.

As that's coming up, we'll just pause a second for that to be in front of us. Now we are not going to try to do live editing on this during the call or at least we'll minimize that because doing live editing with 38 people is kind of a futile exercise.

I remember back on the GNSO Council when we used to try to do live editing. We learned that was not the way to go. And this is an even bigger group. So we're not going to try to do that.

But we're hopefully going to have some good discussion. I'm going to try to guide that discussion so that we can hopefully move towards some finalization of this.

Now what I want everybody to focus on first is the very last sentence of the statement. And I'm going to read it. Note that this problem statement is meant as a tool to aid in discussion consistent with but not a constraint on the working group and its charter.
I ask each of you to keep that in mind as we're having this discussion today. And I just got a - I'm going to digress a moment. I just got a message that my computer's about to restart beyond my control. So I may be out of the - out of Adobe for a little while.

So and that's going to happen in about four minutes. So I wish I had some control over that. I don't. Anyway, let's get started. And so again, please keep that last sentence in mind.

Now let's start off with the first paragraph. Okay. You can see there that the marked out portion is - was done by Greg Aaron. Okay. And that portion just literally quoted our charter.

As you can see, (Aden) suggested that we go back to the language that the small group had provided. What I'd like to ask on this is does anyone - I mean to me I don't think it's terribly significant which way we go. The charter language was a nice safe way to go, as I said.

But also, I fully recognize that the small group had worked pretty diligently in developing that language in the first sentence. And I don't think that one varies significantly form the other. But I would welcome anybody that disagrees with that.

Anybody - so my inclination if there are no strong objections in this particular paragraph would be to go with the language that the working group proposed, which is what's in there now. And if there are no strong objections to that, that's what we will do.

Again, the small group really did do a lot of (editing) on that. And they came up with a pretty good sentence. And I don't think it's inconsistent with our charter or with where we want to go.
Let's go then to the second paragraph. And (Aden) just made one final addition there. I asked the question, you know, what policy are we talking about because certainly if we leave that in there, that would - we need to clarify that.

I didn't think the addition was needed. And (Aden) himself was okay with that. Does anybody have any problem with deleting that added clause in defining this policy? Okay. And thanks for confirming that in the chat (Aden).

Okay. And again, in about a couple minutes I won't be seeing the chat so I'll need some help there. Michele, please speak up.

Michele Neylon: Michele for the record. This is more of a grammar point. If you remove in defining this policy, you then end up with a grammar conundrum. So the sentence should be the core problem that will need to be resolved - need to be solved - that just sounds weird saying we'll be resolving the tension among the varied and competing views of step blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.

So I've got both solved and resolved in the same sentence. It just sounds a bit ridiculous.

Chuck Gomes: Yes. Agreed. So…

Michele Neylon: Which is just - which is just me being me in a public place. So the core problem will be - the core problem will be resolving the tension. I think will need to be solved is kind of redundant unless I'm over thinking this.

Chuck Gomes: Yes. No. I think you raise a good point. I think it's probably an easy fix. Mark, you have a fix for that? Or…

Marc Anderson: No. I just wanted to remind people that there was some feedback the other day regarding whether our problem is resolving the tension because the tension will never go away. It's more creating a policy, which accommodates
the tension (or) if that point of view really caught on or not. But I think there's some truth in it.

Chuck Gomes: So are you suggesting we use the word accommodate instead of resolve?

Marc Anderson: I'm having a problem with the word tension. I don't think…

Chuck Gomes: I got that.

Marc Anderson: …tension ever goes away. And yes. So…

Chuck Gomes: The reality is though Mark we do have tension. And we're going to have to deal…

Marc Anderson: Yes.

Chuck Gomes: …with that tension. We may never - you're correct. We may never resolve it. But we're going to have to deal with it. So any suggestions in terms…

Marc Anderson: I would suggest accommodating.

Chuck Gomes: …of how to fix that? Excuse me.

Marc Anderson: Yes. I like the word accommodating better than resolving. And it also does fix the sort of the way it scans so you don't have solving and resolving next to each other.

Chuck Gomes: Thanks. Appreciate that. Holly, go ahead.

Holly Raiche: I was just going to suggest - it's Holly Raiche for the record. I was just going to suggest the word addressing, which takes away the resolve, resolve and doesn't suggest we've solved it. But we have addressed it. Just a suggestion.
Chuck Gomes: Mark, how do you like the word - does addressing sound okay to you?

Marc Anderson: I think it's better, yes.

Chuck Gomes: Yes. I like that too. So...

Marc Anderson: I like addressing.

Chuck Gomes: …Greg, go ahead.

Greg Shatan: Greg Shatan for the record. I actually prefer accommodating and not addressing. Addressing - accommodating indicates that at least we’re going to take ultimately kind of give something to each of the - those with competing views and that there's, you know, this will result in something that is going to have some acceptance among the varied and competing views of stakeholders.

Whereas addressing kind of like giving due consideration to something so that you can address them and reject them completely. So accommodating I think reflects the consensus driven nature of what we do better than addressing. Thanks.

Chuck Gomes: Thank you Greg. Alan, go ahead.

Alan Greenberg: Thank you. I wasn't going to wade into this because I think we're spending far too much time on this. But nevertheless, I disagree with Greg. Accommodating implies we are resolving, we are taking - we're taking into consideration and making sure that we are acting on it.

I think addressing, considering - there’s a whole bunch of words where it says we have to factor it in but somebody may well not get what they want out of this. Everyone will likely not get what they want out of this. And in the overall problem statement I think we have to be cognizant of that. Thank you.
Chuck Gomes: So I'm going to bring this one to a close because I agree with you Alan that we're spending too much time on it. The core problem will need to be - the core problem that will need to be solved will be to deal with the tension among the varied and competing views, et cetera.

So I'm going to say to deal with. And if somebody has strong objection to that, you can - you're welcome to put something in the chat or in email. But let's go with that keeping in mind that last sentence of the whole statement, okay, of the whole document. So I didn't pick anybody's favorite word. I tried to avoid that.

Okay. Going to the next paragraph. We won't worry about the minor edits there. A controversial thing there is claimed to - adding claim to and there was debate on the list. As you can see in (Aden)'s comments that he thought there was kind of an equal support for that in there and opposed to that in there.

Just for a quick survey, and I'll probably have to have somebody look at the - I'm still in Adobe at the moment. But if you're opposed to this - to that being in there, would you put a red X in Adobe and the - Jeff, you're welcome to speak up. Just get a - I just want to get a sense, so. And I was going to do the green check. Go ahead. We can do them both at the same time.

How many - if you're in favor of that being there, put a green check like (Aden) did or red check if you're opposed. The rest of you I will assume are indifferent. Okay. Just allowing a little bit more time.

And I - this is not intended to be a vote or anything. But just to get a sense. And a lot of people - most people really don't care one way or the other. There seem to be more that are strongly opposed to it than for it. So let's delete that. And again, read that last sentence. Okay.
Now going to the last sentence of that paragraph. There was a lot of discussion on the different groups. There were two groups proposed. Two camps were talked about and so on.

I really think it's - and by the way, you can remove your red X's and green checkmarks now in Adobe. The - I really think that the - even talking about camps is problematic in the sense that we're probably going to leave one out.

I think (Andrew) said it better than I did in a comment I made in terms of this. So if there are any strong objections to just deleting that last sentence instead of going down the path of talking about two camps or three camps or more camps or whatever or groups of the global population. Is there anything we're going to lose if we just delete that sentence?

Okay. The other edits I think in that paragraph are - the one that's important is whether we talk about registrants or not. And there was some real recent discussion on the list in terms of that.

The - I asked Rob, and I don't know if Rob ever joined the call. He hadn't the last time I checked. I don't see him on here. But he had suggested to delete registrants in that first part. But my question was don't registrants have a vested interest in an RDS. Seems like they do.

So the - but again, rather than trying to make this perfect, is there anybody that has a strong argument for removing registrants in that first part? Michele.

Michele Neylon:  Sorry Chuck. I'm being a bit slow and stupid. Michele for the record. You're talking about the first sentence agree to consumers (comma), the domain name industry.

Chuck Gomes:  Yes.

Michele Neylon:  Is that the sentence you're talking about…
Chuck Gomes: Yes.

Michele Neylon: …or the second sentence?

Chuck Gomes: That sentence right now.

Michele Neylon: Oh, okay. No. I have no issue with the term registrants being in there. Sorry. I thought you were talking about the second sentence.

Chuck Gomes: Thanks. We can go to the second sentence if you want to comment on that.

Michele Neylon: Yes. The second sentence I have no issue with. It's the third sentence I have an issue with.

Chuck Gomes: (Unintelligible).

Chuck Gomes: I don't understand why that's there. I mean the - I mean the first - the sentence these stakeholders have varying requirements regarding the particular date which should be (collect) on the conditions under which should be viewed.

That covers everything. That covers every type of potential, you know, usage, collection, et cetera. I mean it covers all possible things. Yet for some reason there's an example cited about anonymity and -- I can't even pronounce that word -- pseudonymity. I don't understand why that's there. I don't see what purpose that serves. Thanks.

Chuck Gomes: Would anybody like to respond to that? This is Chuck. Go ahead Mark.

Marc Anderson: No. In the spirit of conciseness, I would say that we could delete that verbiage. We don't want to lose the idea that the privacy concerns are sort of
an outlier. That, you know, there's a large business group of people, you know, driven by (business) needs who have one set of requirements.

And then there are other people who have slightly different requirements. And as far as I can tell, those other people are driven by anonymity or pseudonymity.

So while I am okay with deleting that if this is going to be consumed by people outside of our working group, it may be of value to leave it in. So I'm just throwing that out there.

Chuck Gomes: Thank you Mark. Michele, go ahead and respond.

Michele Neylon: Thanks. Michele for the record and what have you. Just to Mark. I actually disagree with you because I mean I have an interest in privacy. I don't have an interest in anonymity or pseudonymity. I don't see the two as going hand in hand.

So my personal - I have no interest in being anonymous. But I also - but I do value my privacy. So if, you know, whatever I get up to in the comfort and privacy of my home, I would view as being something that I, you know, will protect.

But the fact that I live where I live or that I say whatever I say in public isn't some - I'm not interested in being - to see anonymity and pseudonymity are an extreme whereas protecting, respecting privacy is a right and entitlement. I don't see people as having a right to be anonymous. Sorry. I don't see people having…

((Crosstalk))

Michele Neylon: But yes. I just see the line - there's a big different between the two.
Chuck Gomes: Michele, this is Chuck. I have a question for you. Understand that you don't want anonymity or pseudonymity. But do you think there are some in the community who do?

Michele Neylon: Some yes. But I don't think they're the same - they're a subset of the group of people who would have concerns around privacy. But they're a subset. They're not the master set.

Chuck Gomes: Okay. So this is Chuck again. So but notices what this says. Says there are some who desire that. So that's all it's saying that there are some. It's not saying it's a big clause or anything (unintelligible).

Michele Neylon: Yes. But I mean what I'm - the thing here is though what - based on what Mark was saying, you know, Mark's saying that you've got people, you know, commercial interests want, you know, very high levels of transparency, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

My counter to that is that you have people who want privacy. That is not the same as anonymity, which is a complete extreme. It's beyond that.

Chuck Gomes: Thank you.

Michele Neylon: I don't know if that's what (unintelligible). Sorry.

Chuck Gomes: That's okay. Thank you Michele. Stephanie, go ahead.

Stephanie Perrin: Thanks very much. Stephanie Perrin for the record. I hate to disagree with Michele but I think the construction we have is quite nice. I believe it also accommodates the requirement for anonymity that some law enforcement have in their access to the system. And that's a non-trivial problem.

They do not - their searches to be identifiable. That's an issue they have to resolve further down the road. So there definitely are plenty of people who
want anonymity or pseudonymity. And we can haul out the records if you like. But bear in mind that we’re also talking about access to the system for these anonymous or pseudonymous and therefore (unintelligible).

I just would like to draw attention to my discomfort with the second paragraph when we talk about while accounting for rules, regulations and laws. Accounting for? Right now we have a (nucleus) conflict with laws that I gently suggest is crazy.

And accounting for doesn't say respecting or in adherence to or, you know, whatever.

Chuck Gomes: Are you…

((Crosstalk))

Chuck Gomes: Are you saying - suggesting changing the word to respecting instead of accounting for?

Stephanie Perrin: Yes. Yes. Respecting the rules, regulations and laws. Yes. (Unintelligible).

Chuck Gomes: Because we have a lot of hands up in the queue. If anybody objects to that edit, just speak out right now saying I object. Seems like a pretty safe edit to me. And then let's get back to the topic at hand. And Alex Deacon, you're next.

Alex Deacon: Yes. Hi everyone. Can you hear me?

Chuck Gomes: Yes.

Alex Deacon: Thanks. Alex Deacon speaking for the record. So I just - I wanted to agree with Michele that I think it's best that we remove the last two sentences starting with for example.
You know, given the last sentence of the statement, which Chuck has reminded us I think it's safe and clear if we do, you know, if we do remove those last two sentences. Thanks.

Chuck Gomes: That's Alex Deacon. Andrew.

Andrew Sullivan: Thank you. It's Andrew Sullivan. On the original question that you were asking about taking registrants out of - well really any of these cases, I think that that would be a bad idea.

And the reason I think that is because of - I think that if there's anybody who has an interest in how this data works, it's the people whose data it is. And it's irrelevant whether they're involved in this discussion or whether they are even aware that Whois exists. The point is that they have an interest in that and we need to - we need to attend to that interest maybe ahead of everybody else.

Chuck Gomes: Thanks Andrew. Alan.

Alan Greenberg: Thank you. Alan Greenberg. I support what Andrew just said in terms of registrants. I also support removing the last sentences. We are going down a rat hole I'm afraid of everyone wanting to put their favorite cause there.

We know there are people who believe everything should be completely anonymous. We know there are people who believe that if you choose to register a domain name, you are exposing yourself to the world and everything should be known about you completely publicly.

Clearly those two positions will not coexist and everything in between. I don't see why we need to identify the details in this statement of - the problem statement. That's what this whole PDP is about.
And if we're trying to - if we're trying to put capsules of each of the arguments in here to make sure they're covered, I just think we're in a position where we're going to lose. So I'll keep it clean and let's have the discussions and arguments in the PDP, not in the statement of work. Thank you.

Chuck Gomes: Thanks Alan. Greg.

Greg Shatan: Greg Shatan for the record again. I also think that we should lose the sentence that begins for example. I think this is but one example of many. And picking one example and elevating it above others creates at best a peculiar atmosphere around that issue.

If we're going to have examples, let's have (ten). But then this becomes a whole different document. I think we need to keep this document at the - at a single high level and not get down to cases or particular requirements. You know, that's for a - this is merely a problem statement. Once we start, you know, getting down to the next level, it starts to become something else. And we should save ourselves from that. Thanks.

Chuck Gomes: Thanks Greg. Alex Deacon, is that an old hand? Go ahead Alex Deacon.

Alex Deacon: Yes, sorry.

Chuck Gomes: Okay. That's all right. All right. So I guess it's time for the Chair to make a command decision rather than dragging this on further. Let me take a look at the chat real quickly since I'm still in Adobe.

I personally just to let people know my own personal thing, I don't have any problem with that sentence. I think it does add clarity. But there's also value in keeping it simple.
I assure you we're going to deal with the issue of anonymity and pseudonymity. And those who have a need for that just like we will with all the other needs and interests with regard to (an IDS).

So I'm going to suggest that we delete that sentence and make half of you mad and make half of you happy. So let's delete that and let's try and close this off as this problem statement keeping in mind the very last sentence of the statement.

So thank you very much for the time spent on this and thanks again for the small group that worked on this.

Man: Chuck. Chuck, it's...

Chuck Gomes: And (Donald), you get the last world.

(Donald): I'm speaking pseudonymously but I actually support the removal of the sentence. Thank you.

Chuck Gomes: Thanks. Alan.

Alan Greenberg: Chuck, can we have clarity? Several of us said remove all of the sentences starting with for example. You just said remove the last sentence. Which one are we - which are we removing?

Chuck Gomes: Thanks Alan. I had already made the decision that we were going to delete the last sentence. So in my mind that was already gone. So...

Alan Greenberg: Okay. Thank you.

Chuck Gomes: …everything from for example is deleted. But thanks. I appreciate you clarifying that.
Alan Greenberg: Thank you.

Chuck Gomes: Yes. No problem at all. Okay. Let's go now to the next agenda item. And for the rest of the meeting we're going to look at some use cases and we're going to start with a use case for - from Geoffrey Noakes. And Jeff, I assume you're still not in - are you now in Adobe Jeff? It looks like you are.

Geoffrey Noakes: I am in Adobe and I'm on the conference call.

Chuck Gomes: Good. Great. Well Jeff, it's over to you to do a brief overview of the use case that you submitted. It's been out there for I think a couple weeks. And if you would do a brief overview and then we'll entertain questions and comments on it.

Let me remind everyone that we're not trying to create perfect use cases. So our goal is not to wordsmith the use case and make sure we all agree on everything in it but rather to generate discussion so that we have a good background before we get into deliberation.

And the plan is to discuss use cases in one more meeting and then hopefully start our deliberations. So Jeff, it's all yours. And then let me - before you take off, I'm going to - so that I get this problem with my computer restarting out of the way, I will be out of Adobe for the next five or ten minutes. But I will still be on audio. Go ahead Jeff.

Geoffrey Noakes: Thanks Chuck. So this workgroup is tasked in part with answering the question who needs access to registration data and why. I want to make the case today for why certificate authorities commonly known as CAs need access to Whois and presumably RDS data.

SSL certificates, also known as TLS certificates, do two things. They encrypt things meaning that they ensure that the information that's being sent from a browser to a Web server is encrypted and is unavailable to an eavesdropper.
And they do authentication meaning that they digitally sign a certificate that associates a domain name with a Web site and usually an organization, sometimes a person.

When an SSL certificate is active, any user knows who he or she is sending their information to and that it's encrypted. Because of that, SSL forms the basic sense of trust on the Internet. It's proven itself over 20 years and it is hugely scalable.

They are - certificates are part of the layered approach to security and they act as safeguards for all users of the Internet, businesses, consumers, governments, education and commerce. There are about six million of them today.

There's an industry organization called the CA Browser Forum. As you might guess, it's made up of certificate authorities and browser providers and a couple other people are in there like Oracle who makes Java.

And the CA Browser Forum expresses the standards that need to be complied with. And in it, it specifically calls out for the use of Whois data. So any change to that will mean that the - any change of Whois being replaced by RDS or something like that will need to be adapted by CAB Forum.

The main business related use case, not the standard but the business related use case that creates the need for SSL certs is the PCI, the payment card industry.

And in their DSS, the data security specification, Requirement 4.1 requires encryption for data in motion meaning data that's being sent from one client or a device like a PC or a cell phone or what have you to Web server.
SSL certs are almost always used when a site is dealing with login credentials so that your username and password are encrypted along the way. They're also used for almost any other type of a personally identifiable information whether it's healthcare or what have you.

So CAs use Whois and presumably already have as one of multiple sources of information to authenticate or validate or vet the identities of who is applying for a certificate.

And by far Whois is the first place we all start with mainly because the digital certificate will be tied to a specific domain name and we start with what is known about that domain.

From that point our processes, our automated processes and our analysts, the humans, they act as detectives using the clues, if you will, that begin with Whois data and lead us to a point where we can assert that we know who this cert is being issued to and here's how we know that we know that.

We also use other tools - other data sources like domain tools, Dunn & Bradstreet, the Secretary of State filing department - filing documents; sometimes we event deal with notarized documents. And all of these things essentially contribute to our assessment of the certificate application.

Let me give you an example. You - there's a well-known company called 7-Eleven. You know, people, you know, buy gas and food and what not there. And their official name is the Number 7, hyphen, Eleven spelled out E-L-E-V-E-N.

But you can imagine that there are all sorts of permutations that that might have. And so this ends up being a playground for phishers because they will apply for something like the Numeral 7, hyphen, then the Numeral 11 dot com. Well, that's clearly not the organization that you thought it was.
And so we use different types of certificates. They go by the names domain validated where the only thing we really know is the name of the domain for which a certificate will be issued. That constitutes about 76% of the six million searches that are out there.

Another form is called organization validated. And that's where we go in and we make sure that the certificate is going to the organization that we think it is. And then the final type of certificate type if EV for extra validated.

And beyond the OV validation, we actually validate that the person at the company who is applying for the certificate has the right to do so. This is also the type of certificate that turns the green bar or turns the address bar to green.

So CAs use - begin with Whois data. We relate that with other forms of data. We might make out of band phone calls and use other techniques so that we can reasonably assure that on that site traffic is going to the site that you wanted it to like the true 7-Eleven or the true PayPal or the true Google or the true Facebook rather than to a phisher site.

So why don't we pause for a moment here and I'll be happy to take any questions on this. I'll be Chuck is…

Chuck Gomes: Okay. I am back. Sorry. I was on - I had myself on mute and forgot. I'm back in Adobe. So thank you very much Jeff. And David's the first one with a hand raised. And by the way, I want to call attention to the discussion in the chat and while David's asking his question, you may want to look at what's in the chat. Sorry for the…

David Cake: Right. This is David Cake speaking. So my understanding is that there are sort of a lot of other main that sometimes completely bypass Whois entirely for domain validation. And obviously extended validation doesn't use the - it has to use mechanisms that go, you know, outside the IDS entirely.
So would it be right to say the main focus here is sort of organizational validation?

Geoffrey Noakes: That would not be true. And there’s echo on the line here Chuck. So strictly speaking, domain validation can be used for like highly automated processes. But as a practical matter, most legitimate CAs do more checking than is - than just for the domain.

For example, just this week we received a DV certificate request from Google. It’s actually a part of Google called Good Ventures. And this sets off warning flags because, you know, we know the folks at Google and by and large they do not do DV certs. So we will go the extra mile to make sure that this was really a legitimate person at Google or Google Ventures that needed this certificate.

The same thing happens with almost any bank. We know that banks - we know bank - the behavior of banks. And I think all CAs do. And when we receive a request for a DV cert from a bank, that raises our antennae up and we do more investigation of it.

Chuck Gomes: David, does that answer your question?

David Cake: I (unintelligible) I wasn't - not really. I mean I wasn't so much suggesting that DV certs were so easy that they did not - were not checked. I was suggesting that for example there are a lot of places you see domain validation where essentially you validate by demonstrating you already have control over that domain by putting something in the DNS and that essentially bypasses RDS. I mean I realize that that's not the only way.

Geoffrey Noakes: (Unintelligible) and that statement is true. People will often put the name of (this) company in the DNS so that they can prove that they have control over the domain.
David Cake: Yes. And so - I'm just saying in that case and I don't think that, you know, is becoming more common. It would mostly be the organization or validation that would be the use case where sort of you'd be suggesting use of the RDS as essential. I mean I realize it's used in other cases as well.

Geoffrey Noakes: It is. So it's an absolute requirement for OV and - for most legitimate CAs will go the extra mile to do more checking on DV than is just the domain. You know, because at the end of the day, here's what a phisher does.

You know, they go to some registrar and they apply for some domain name. And by and large if it's available and they do this with a fraudulent or a stolen credit card, if the domain exists and the card works, the ICANN registrar makes the domain name available to them.

And the next thing that they do once they have control over that domain is they apply for a certificate like a DV certificate. They can prove that they have control over the domain because they were the ones that set it up. And so now we've got a registered new domain on the Internet paid for with a stolen credit card and the only thing you know about that organization if anything is the domain name, period.

And so once phishing and breach has happened, there's very little information to do any investigation on.

David Cake: Okay. That's interesting but I'm pretty sure that in such a case you could pretty easily get a domain validation certificate from - by, you know, by simply demonstrating control over the domain.

And anyway, I mean I'm interested in what you think - where you will draw this line of that sort of legitimate CAs and whether you're sort of, you know, whether you think services like say the (less encrypt servicer) are someway not legitimate.
Geoffrey Noakes: I think they are legitimate. The ones that I'm talking about are - in the past there have been CAs that have not done the correct things. There were problems with DigiNotar and TURKTRUST in the past.

There are about 200 - I think 200 CAs that are in the trust (stores) of most browsers now. And if anybody was to look at those, you would say who are these people and why are they in here.

David Cake: They - I am well aware. Just wanted to clarify what you were - whether you were saying that there was a problem with particular times of domain validation. Whereas I'm certainly well aware there are problems with particular CAs. Thank you. You've answered my question.

Chuck Gomes: Thanks David. This is Chuck again. Let's go to Greg.

Greg Shatan: Thanks. Greg Shatan for the record. More of an observation than a question. But I think we get into somewhat mushy or dangerous ground when we start questioning how stakeholders or users use this and suggesting that they should do it another way.

That's not to cut off all discussion of that but it seems to be I think, you know, an underlying suggestion that we shouldn't allow this and that they should go find another way to do this.

That for instance if we were building RDS - if Whois was a bridge, rather than replacing it with - for these people who were just telling you to go kind of walk through the stream to the other side, it may be possible. It's not certainly the way they do things.

And there are, you know, certainly it's - decisions are made that this is a, you know, available and maybe the best available way to accomplish things at the level they are. And so, you know, I just find it a little peculiar to kind of attempt
to - it feels sometimes like de-legitimize the kind of standard business practices that work and have worked and are generally accepted.

Again, it's kind of a balance between exploring alternatives, trying to get better educated and kind of insinuating that, you know, they shouldn't do it this way. They should do it another way. Thanks.

Chuck Gomes: Thanks Greg. Let's go on then to Michele.

Michele Neylon: Yes. Thanks. Just Greg's point. I have to disagree with him. I mean the reality is that just because something is technically possible now doesn't mean it's legitimate and will always be legitimate.

And I understand, you know, that there is a line around some of these things where, you know, there's nothing wrong what somebody's doing per se but just because they've been doing it in a particular way for a long time doesn't mean that what they've been doing is really a legitimate use of the data.

I mean the reality is if Whois goes away in the morning and it's replaced with some form of RDAP with RDS and all that, there are literally thousands of Web sites and Web services that will cease working. They will stop working overnight.

And how long it takes people to actually redo them and recode things in order to get them working with an alternative to Whois is anybody's guess. You know, the reality is looking at, you know, some of the questions and queries that people have been raising around the functionality of this.

I mean in some cases we could (start around) and say well okay, this particular use case yes, you've been doing it for years. But maybe you really shouldn't have been doing that. Maybe you're, you know, maybe that isn't appropriate.
I mean for example, if I was living in a large built up city and I used binoculars to peek in through the window of my neighbor's apartment because my neighbor had an awful habit of getting undressed there or something. I mean I don't know.

I'm not sure if that's exactly appropriate use of binoculars. And the fact that just because I could do it for a long time doesn't mean I necessarily should do it in the future.

But the other side to that as well is that looking at the different kind of use cases and everything else, I mean just I think people are trying to understand in many cases, you know, why things are being done the way they are. What's the differences?

I mean looking at say the example around CAs, it's complicated. I mean a lot of people - a lot of people don't understand the SSL certs and that's why they don't understand why some companies will sell an SSL cert for five dollars euros, whichever currency you're comfortable with and others are going to sell them for a couple of thousand.

And, you know, there's a whole range of different - there's a whole range of different types of business out therefore different things. And I just think, you know, just because we're exploring things and poking them a little bit and kicking the tires isn't necessarily a bad thing. It shouldn't be (feared). Thanks.

Chuck Gomes: Thanks Michele. And then let's keep in mind that we're not deliberating on requirements yet. So let's not get ahead of ourselves here. So are there any other comments or questions on this use case? Okay. Unless he's joined without joining Adobe, I don't think Rob Golding is on the call. Rob, are you on the call? Okay. He thought he was going to be. And that's why I moved his use cases or the examples he gave up.
We’re going to skip that and go to the first use case that Michele presented quite a long time ago now; several weeks ago now. And so we’re going to look at - if we can bring up the use case on transferring a domain name. I'll ask Michele to give a brief overview of that and we'll discuss that use case. Go ahead Michele.

Michele Neylon: Thanks Chuck. Michele for the record. And just - Mark, just so you're aware, I currently don't own any binoculars. And if I did, I wouldn't be looking - I wouldn't be that interested in looking into your window.

Okay. So transferring a registered domain to a new registrar. The basics around this, you need to - if you want to transfer - move a domain from one registrar to another for any number of reasons, it could be pricing, could be that you're consolidating all of your domains with - in a new place. Could be any number of reasons why you're doing it.

So the use case - so which to transfer a domain registration to a new registrar, they must contact the losing registrar to ensure the domain is unlocked the (unintelligible) is issued and the Whois information is correct.

They must then contact the new registrar and raise a transfer request. We'll then provide an EPP code. I'll receive a valid transfer request. The receiving registrar will check that the EPP is valid. The domain is unlocked and the (domain) contact email address is valid.

Transfer authorization email will be sent to the (admin) contact by the gaining registrar. The registrant will need to confirm or deny this transfer request as outlined in the email.

Once confirmed, the transfer will proceed within five days. To complete this process, the registrar will need the EPP, sorry, EPP key. The domain status - the domain creation date and expiration date and the email address for the (admin) contact listed on the Whois.
So the main use case is, you know, transferring domain - register domain to a new registrar. The - okay. In the list there it says (unintelligible) as the registrant. Could be the registrant or their - or somebody acting for them.

Interacting with registry. Gaining registrar, losing registrar. And the data elements are listed out there. Transfer with EPP key. And the domain status - this is important. I mean it is - I mean the simple reason for that is the domain in a status where it's okay for it to be transferred.

It goes into a bit more detail but I'll skip ahead to (that). So registrar needs to provide the gaining registrar with a valid EPP or transfer authorization code; sometimes referred to as a domain (secret). I mean depending on who you're dealing with you'll see different terminology.

So this is going to be issued by the losing registrar. The gaining registrar has to validate this with the losing registrar. So sometimes of course get fat fingers - people provide - put typos in when they're providing it. So it failed.

The gaining registrar will check the domain status is okay or is on lock for transfer. The domain is locked. Has locks on it of some kind. Then transfer the domain may not be possible.

Gaining registrar has checked the domain. Is not past expiry and the creation date is greater than 60 days. If the domain is under 60 days old, we cannot - it cannot be transferred to a new registrar. And if it is too far - if it is - if it's expired within 30 days of expiration, you should be able to transfer it. But it can become problematic. And if it's gone past the 30 days, forget it. You won't be able to transfer it.

Gaining registrar will send a transfer authorization email to the listed email address and then (contact Whois). Sometimes from - so the gaining registrar
will kind of try to pull that off from Whois particularly with .com and .net domains.

And if the email address is not a valid email address, then the transfer won't proceed because it won't get the email. That's pretty much it. There's an example below you can have a look at. Not terribly exciting. So if anybody has any questions, please go ahead.

Chuck Gomes: Thanks Michele. This is Chuck. Now I just want set a little context for this particular use case because there's a huge amount of GNSO history with regard to transferring of domain names.

In the early 2000s there were certain problems - there were quite a few problems that were experienced when people wanted to transfer their domain names. And I think there were also problems of registrars blocking transfers.

So a policy - a registrar domain name transfer policy was developed as a policy earlier in the 2000s. And then I say more recently but it's really taken place over the last, I don't know, seven or eight years. There were a series of four or five PDPs that reviewed the original transfer policy and the transfer dispute policy.

And the latest implementations of revisions that were recommended as consensus policy to transfers I think are just about all implemented if not all implemented at this stage.

So what we're dealing with here, this process that Michele outlined in quite a lot of detail has been the result of a lot of policy development work and approved consensus policy over the last several years.

So just - that's just context here. And certainly Whois, as Michele pointed out, has been a part of that being used by the - by registrars and registrants as well in terms of executing a transfer.
So I'll be quiet. I just wanted to provide a little bit of context there. These aren't random procedures that are being used but they are the result of a lot of GNSO policy work including approval of consensus policies by the Board.

So does anybody have any questions or comments on this use case? Go ahead Stephanie. Stephanie, are you on mute? Not hearing Stephanie.

Michele Neylon: Stephanie might be on mute. Let's wait. While she's dealing with that, just speaking as a registrar, the kind of common issues we run into are incorrect EPP keys, the domain being locked or the domain not being 60 days older - old or older. Stephanie, are you on now? No. Okay.

Chuck Gomes: She's typing, so.

Michele Neylon: Okay. If she wants to put something in the chat, then maybe we'll come back to her. But if not, can we move on to the next use case?

Chuck Gomes: Sure. Let's go ahead and move to the next one, which is domain name deletions. And Michele, I don't think it's necessary to give quite as much detail as you did on the transfer one. You can provide more detail if there are questions asked that need it. Go ahead.

Michele Neylon: No problem. Okay. So this is - the scenario here is, you know, domain names that have a finite life - life span. You cannot register a domain name forever. And so the kind of issues around domain deletions. Somebody - a very common scenario would be somebody wanting to register a domain name that's already registered and just waiting to see when the domain is going to become available to register. Just keeping an eye on that deletion date.

And sure, you could potentially go to the existing registrant of the domain name and make an arrangement to transfer the domain. But, you know, why would you pay let's say 500, 1000, $2000 for a domain name that nobody's
likely to actually want or you could just wait until the domain became available again and you could register it at standard renewal price.

The other thing as well that's kind of around deletions is just people monitor their own domain names and just keep an eye on when - what's going on with them.

And from our - like from the registrar side you often get people who forget to renew domain names and then they're wondering why their domain has stopped working.

Just going to the chat there, I see Stephanie's asking is there a difference when there's a proxy registration. This is in relation to the last use case, which was around transfers. Short version - short answer not really. And longer answer - as long as the email address - as long as the email is functional, it doesn't really matter.

The obvious downside though of course being that if somebody has - if somebody is using let's say our Whois privacy proxy service and transfers the domain to another registrar and is no longer paying us for the Whois privacy proxy service, then that's a bit of a problem because they're not authorized to use it and nor are they paying us for it. So that would be a bit of a problem. In terms of technically, no. And I see - okay. Greg, you've got your hand up. Go ahead.

Greg Aaron: Thank you Michele. This is Greg Aaron. So I was reading the transfer use case. And it sticks very narrowly to the technical implementation of how a transfer takes place. But there's some additional policy language that should also be taken into consideration.

The new consensus policy on inter-registrar transfer says things like the registered name holder and the admin contact are the parties that can
approve or deny a transfer request. That's as per who is listed in the Whois. And there's some other aspects of the policy that touch on Whois.

So I think we're missing some relevant information out of the use case. What I'll do is - I had summarized that back in March. I'll send it up to the list again.

Michele Neylon: Okay I think. And yes (Lisa). To (Lisa)'s query, EPP code is the same as the auth code or the auth info code. Okay. I mean the use case was written a couple years ago. Any changes to transfer policy wouldn't be reflected in - I mean you could go into more detail about the - I mean the current policy allows for either the admin or the registrant to authorize the transfer or to deny it.

There's also an entire policy about who can deny it, why they can deny it and everything else. So if people want more detail on there, that's fine. And (Lisa)'s saying on the chat this - the suggestion that would be published in the RDS definitely shouldn't be.

It might be - it might be - I mean no actually. Now I'm trying to think of - no. Hell no. It'd (be a terrible) idea. I see (Scott) saying this - saying no. Greg, is that an old hand? It seems an old hand.

Greg Aaron: Yes.

Michele Neylon: Okay. Does anybody have any questions on the deletion of a domain use case? I assume not. On the EPP auth code being available in the RDS, speaking as a registrar, I would be incredibly upset if anybody suggested putting it in there. That would be a really terrible idea. That would be terrible - (it shouldn't be). That would be a horrible idea.

I'm not sure - I can't - if somebody can tell me why they think it's a good idea, I would love to hear about it. And we do reserve the right to laugh at you.
Domain name deletions - okay. No questions on this one. Is everybody happy with that one? Okay.

And the next one was DNS changes I think. So that's pretty simple. Just checking the DNS change - updating a domain's DNS primarily it's the name server entry, which I should be more precise in saying DNS records because the DNS - sorry, the name servers as opposed to DNS would be more precise.

You know, if you want to find out where your domain name is being managed, the first place you might want to have a look is you'd look at the Whois and see which name servers the domain name is using because ultimately that can either tell you either the hosting company or the registrar that you're using or the DNS service you're using.

And then if you need to update where things are pointing in terms of the actual DNS records themselves, then whoever is managing those name servers would be the place to go. That's pretty straightforward. I don't know if anybody has any queries or questions on that one.

Just for those of you keeping an eye in the chat, there's a bit of discussion around (off info) codes and registrars' obligations and everything else. And does anybody have any queries about the updating of the name servers? I assume not. So we can just move on to the next one, which was domain name (mentions) renewal.

So here pretty straightforward. If a domain as previously stated, you know, domains don't last forever. We - the registrar will send the registrant or the billing contact for the registrant, excuse me, a renewal notice in advance.

There is quite a bit of policy around which - who gets sent what. But essentially the domain needs to be renewed. The - we as the registrar would
have access to the billing contact, contact details; in other words, whoever is actually paying the bill.

The billing contact details might not appear in Whois at all. And that could be completely different. And, you know, as - just as a side note as well, data protection laws will complicate who can or can't be contacted on not just data protection but also just kind of general business practice. We're not going to start responding to queries from random punters about who's paying their bills or when.

And, you know, people will as part of the kind of maintenance of domain names check to see how's the renewal data updated after they've paid their bill. That's pretty straightforward. Does anybody have any queries or comments on that one?

Chuck Gomes: Okay. Well thanks Michele for going through these and appreciate that very much. And we're going to spend one more week in our meetings talking use cases. Rob Golding did not make it to this meeting. We were going to include his examples in this meeting. We'll try to do that next time if he's available to join us.

And (Elaine) has one that she has submitted that we'll talk about next time. And I think there are a few others still pending. And then hopefully after the meeting next week we can move to our deliberation phase.

Again, our goal is not to try and discuss all possible use cases but hopefully we've had a fairly representative sample of different kinds of uses that are happening today and that may happen in the future or not depending on what requirements we agree on.

So what I'd like to do next is before we talk about next week's meeting any further is to just briefly talk about the meeting in Hyderabad. The Subsequent Procedures New gTLDs PDP Working Group and our working group are both
going to be allowed to have four hour in person working group sessions in Hyderabad. Okay.

And I'm - I didn't - I should have looked this up before the call. But (Lisa), what day is that? The meetings start on Thursday and what day and date is - are the two working groups going to meet?

One of the meetings will be from 9:00 to 1:00 - 9:00 am to 1:00 pm. The other working group will meet from 2:00 pm to 6:00 pm; four hour in person meetings.

And of course for both of those meetings there will be remote participation. So the - what we're trying to decide is which one will going the morning and which one will go in the afternoon. And we will be - we the Leadership Team will be working with the co-Chairs of the other working group to try and resolve that.

But one thing that would be helpful for me, and note that (Lisa) put in the chat there it's the first day on Thursday will be the two face to face meetings, one in the morning, one in the afternoon.

And it won't start too early in the morning, 9:00 am. And what that will amount to - the time zones will - shouldn't be too much of a problem for those of us who are there in person.

But it will be difficult for some who are participating remotely; in particular those in the Americas may have some - for either the morning or the afternoon one there will be different ones that will have the most undesirable times for participating remotely. So what would be - and you may be seeing a doodle poll on this in the next few days. Please respond to that if that does happen.
What I'd like to do right now for those of you that are in Adobe and on this call realizing that that's a subset of the full working group. If you are definitely or quite definitely going to participate in the Hyderabad meetings remotely, could you put a green checkmark by your name in the Adobe because if we're not having a lot of remote participation, we don't need to worry about this too much because it'll only be remote participants.

So there are - I think I'm seeing a few. Okay. I'm just going to glance through those again. I see Alex Deacon, Greg Aaron, Marc Anderson, Marina Lewis, (Natalie Coupay), Rod Rasmussen, Susan Prosser, (Terry Stume). Okay. Good. That's helpful. So there's enough that we need to be concerned. So it might be useful to do a doodle poll to get more specific data in terms of that.

Now for those of you who put a green checkmark in there, if you'd remove that and do one more thing for me if you would. How many of you are on the Western part of the Americas? If you would put a green checkmark in there, that would be helpful.

So I'm just curious because the implication - so there's three or four - looks like three or four from the Western. How many - please remove those checkmarks. And how many of you are in the - on the Eastern part of the Americas? If you would raise your - put a checkmark in there.

Okay. So it's kind of evenly - well, a little bit more on the Eastern part it looks like. Okay. All right. That's kind of helpful. And then we as the Leadership Team will decide whether to do a doodle poll or not and then try to come to terms with the other working group so that we can deal with that.

Enough on that unless there are any questions or comments. The next meeting will be at our regular time - same time as today next Tuesday. And we will hopefully wrap up our discussion of use cases in that meeting. And so in the meantime, a discussion on list is encouraged and hopefully we're not too far off from getting started with our deliberation on possible requirements.
So and to (Maxim)’s comment in the chat, remote participation is not only a good idea, it's a must for all of these meetings. So - and staff's been doing a good job of providing that for several years now.

And okay. So we have I think an opportunity to end our meeting a few minutes early. Give you a little bit of time back. Thanks everybody for participating. Is there anything that I have neglected to cover? All right. Well have a good rest of the day and a good rest of the week. We'll talk again next week. Bye. Meeting adjourned.

Woman: Thank you. Again, the meeting has been adjourned. Operator, please stop the recordings and disconnect all the lines. Everyone have a great remainder of your day.

END