RE: [ispcp] Fwd: [dssa] Requesting Public Comments

["tony holmes" <tonyarholmes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Mikey

I think that's a very important and reasonable request. 

So, can I join Mikey in asking for a volunteer ISP member to lead on this?

Thanks

Tony

 

From: owner-ispcp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-ispcp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of Mike O'Connor
Sent: 27 September 2012 18:00
To: ispcp@xxxxxxxxx
Subject: [ispcp] Fwd: [dssa] Requesting Public Comments
Importance: High

 

hi all,

 

now that i've to ally confused everybody with my apology for missing a call
that doesn't exist, let me add further to your workload.

 

we, the DSSA (DNS Security and Stability Advisory working group) would
really benefit from some public comments on our report.  since i'm a
co-chair of the working group, and pretty much wrote the whole report, i'm
reluctant to be the rapporteur for us on on this one.  but it turns out that
lots of people in the working group must have felt the same way and the
result is that we got ZERO public comments.  zip.  nada.  nothing.

 

so we're fanning out to our respective constituencies and asking that they
try to get something submitted during the "reply" comments period, which
ends just after Toronto.  here's a little note that i sent out to the WG.
could i impose on some of you to craft something?

 

sorry to bother you twice in one day, but this one is actually fairly
important.  one important aspect of this is to get a feeling for whether
this cross-constituency group is actually working well, because it might be
a good model for others.  but it's hard to hold it up as a model if there
aren't any reactions to the work that it did.  :-)

 

thanks,

 

mikey

 

Begin forwarded message:





From: "Mike O'Connor" <mike@xxxxxxxxxx>

Subject: [dssa] Requesting Public Comments

Date: September 27, 2012 10:20:43 AM CDT

To: DSSA WG <dssa@xxxxxxxxx>

 

 

Hi all,

Just a note to highlight that it would be extremely helpful if your
respective constituencies and supporting organizations could contribute
public comments regarding the work of the DSSA so far.  The initial public
comment period is closed and the reply-period is going to close just after
the Toronto meeting, so time is drawing short.  Especially given that we'd
like to review those comments *during* the Toronto meeting.

Here are a few points to consider when you lobby your respective
organizations:

-- The comments don't necessarily need to be long.  A simple "the DSSA is
doing fine" would suffice in a pinch, although some words explaining why
would be helpful.  Since the DSSA is one of those cross-community working
groups, we could use some guidance as to whether we're doing that work in a
way that is satisfactory.

-- The DSSA made some fairly interesting observations in its Phase 1 Report
and it would be good to get a sense from your respective organizations as to
whether we're on the right track.  I've included the picture-book Executive
Summary in this post to remind you of the high spots.  Again, "you're doing
fine" is an acceptable response although again a few words of support would
be welcome.  

And of course the most important comments are those that take issue with
something we've done -- we will listen to those and try to set ourselves on
the right track.

Here's a link to the Public Comment Forum for our work.  Please encourage
your membership to contribute.

 
http://www.icann.org/en/news/public-comment/dssa-phase-1-report-14aug12-en.h
tm

Thanks,

Mikey

1. Executive Summary


This is the first of two reports from the DNS Security and Stability
Analysis working group.   The goal of this document is to bring forward the
substantial work that has been completed to date and describe the work that
remains. 


This has been in many respects a "pioneering" cross-constituency
security-assessment effort that has developed knowledge and processes that
others will hopefully find helpful and can be reused in the future.


The DSSA has:

*	Established a cross-constituency working group and put the
organizational framework to manage that group in place
*	Clarified the system, organizational and functional scope of the
effort
*	Developed an approach to handling confidential information, should
such information be required for certain assessments
*	Selected and tailored a risk-assessment methodology to structure the
work
*	Developed and tested mechanisms to rapidly collect and consolidate
risk-assessment scenarios across a broad and diverse group of interested
participants
*	Used an "alpha-test" of those systems to develop the high-level
risk-scenarios in this report.  Those scenarios will serve as the starting
point for the remainder of the effort

 

Work that remains:

*	Perform a proof of concept to refine and streamline the methodology
on one broad risk-scenario topic with the goal of reducing cycle time and
making it more accessible to a broader community
*	Roll the methodology out to progressively broader groups of
participants to introduce the methodology to the community and further
improve the process and tools on the way to completing the assessment

 

1.1. Key findings


The DSSA has a number of observations to share with the community after
completing the first phase of its work.  Those observations are summarized
here, presented in more detail in the body of this report and in some cases
presented in even more detail in the Appendix.   The working group has also
developed a series of tools that can be used by any DNS provider to conduct
risk assessments.  Those tools, and extremely detailed documentation of the
assessment, are available on the working group wiki.


1.1.1. Risk Scenarios


The DSSA has analyzed five broad risk scenarios.  These will be explored in
more depth during the next phase of the effort.  Those scenarios are:

*	Gaps in policy, management, or leadership lead to splitting the root
*	"Reductive" forces (security, risk-mitigation, control through
rules, etc.) lead to splitting the root
*	Widespread natural disaster brings down the root or a major TLD
*	Attacks exploiting technical vulnerabilities of the DNS bring down
the root or a major TLD
*	Inadvertent technical mishap brings down the root or a major TLD

 

1.1.2. Scope

The DSSA analyzed several scope issues that needed to be resolved in order
to complete the work. 

*	Scope of "the DNS" used by the working group
*	The functional context of the DSSA within a broader risk management
framework
*	The organizational context of the DSSA vis a vis the SSR-RT and
DNRMF efforts

 

1.1.3. Approach


The DSSA also embarked on developing methodologies that were required in
order for the working group to complete its assignments.  These methods may
be useful in other contexts, both inside and outside of ICANN.   These
include:

*	A protocol for handling confidential information
*	A tailored "compound sentence" risk-assessment methodology based on
the NIST 800-30 and 800-53 standards
*	An approach to risk assessment that accommodates the unique security
assessment requirements of the multi-stakeholder DNS ecosystem

 

1.1.4. Remaining work
The DSSA realized that a detailed assessment of the risk scenarios it has
identified is likely to take a substantial amount of time.   The DSSA, after
consultation with its chartering ACs and SOs, broke its work into two
phases.  This report summarizes the work to date, while the next phase will:

*	Take that work to a more detailed level,
*	Refine the approach and methods developed so far, and
*	Explore whether it is feasible to transition this one-time effort
into an ongoing function to maintain an up to date assessment of DNS risk.





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