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RE: [ga] Getting Heard by the ICANN Board


Dominik,
what you say about Atlarge and NCUC is true. The problem is that the ICANN structure is a no-Member system built in a way everything is locked for class membership protection, the same at the IETF where RFC 3774 call this the problem of an "affinity group". This developed with ICANN itself. They are Roberto Gaetano, Harald Alvestrand, Danny Younger as GA Chairs in our area, Vint Cerf and Allesandro Pisanty for the Board, Karl Auerbach and Vittorio Berthola for at large, Peter Dengate Trush for the ccTLDs, etc. Vint and Harald took also care of the IETF relations (Harald chaired it). Same with relations with ISOC, the various constituencies (controlled by some well identified persons at IPC [Steve Metallitz], BC [Marilyn Cade], NCUC [Milton Mueller]) GNSO, ASO, etc. Then they create committees together with people they amalgamate to the affinity group) - except Karl Auerbach, "the first atlarge" the pariah they respect. They maintain odd relations with the size creeping Staff lead by Paul Twomey who is a permanent member of the BoD and will stay after Vint and Alessandro are gone (unless they change the By-Laws). They shelter their relations (and various ties with the USGovernment) behind a document logorrhea which permit them to always be more complex than their opponents. And if they are not Danny Younger is here to create and point out new complexity.


For example I chair the eldest non-profit interested in International Network (created in 1978). I am denied its registration to NCUC saying that ... it does not exists, because I could conflict with Danny Younger there who represents ISOC-NY there, while all the other ISOC Chapters ar belonging to the ALAC.

Most of the people involved in this Saga who shared in the WG-Review, the IDNO, the icannatlarge, etc. generous efforts are gone after they understood there was nothing to do against the ICANN creeping legal mollusc, but to replace it. Most dropped the issue and some still lurk here (hi! Joop, Sotiris, Dassa, etc.) a very few like me engaged into making it, leading to the IGF through the lengthy WSIS process.

Today two visions are opposing in order to upgrade the decentralised model we organised in 1978/1884, and which is described in RFC 920 and 1591 of Jon Postel and ICANN ICP-1 document. This follows the revision process engaged by Stuart Lynn (the President before Paul Twomey) to correct the over centralisation initiated by the first President (Michael Roberts).

( 1) there is an US/ICANN focalisation where the IANA becomes the reference for the on-line systems, and progressively for the world through the US Internet leadership. This option as been agreed in Tunis, subject to the practical limitations imposed in RFC 4646 which creates the IANA registry to be used to organise it. Most of the ICANNeers adhere to that vision as it insures the survival of ICANN and its support by the Internet US mammoths gathered in the Unicode consortium which wrote RFC 4646.

(2) the natural technical evolution of the Internet usage that the Internet technology can less and less support with important address, routing, language issues and user centric autonomies. This leaves us with two options (a) a multinational or (b) InterNAT network, and most probable (a) _and_ (b) single future. Both means that ICANN is going to become the US Internet International Agency managing the domestic and international extension of the US Internet.

This means that stabilisation will come the day we can merge the US centralisation into the global multilateralisation in a way truly acceptable to all. This calls for the US side to address the current destabilisation by the demands of Google pople who want too much control over the IANA RFC 4646 registry. This way they expose the IETF inability to manage that registry proprely (over a few registration failures). Another destabiisation is the inability of ICANN/IETF/IANA to understand the problems involved in the Multilingual Internet, spam, and IPv6 and to solve them. This in particular results from the disinterest of the IETF in the ICP-3 ICANN document calling for an IETF experimentation of the Internet evolution, in liasing with ccTLD, and in pariticipating to the WSIS and IGF, a general lack of architectural (common) vision by IAB, IRTF, ITU, NSF and a priority put on the survival of the DN Industry which needs to be, and will be under the user/technologu pressure, completely revised to fee the user's needs, rather than the cybesquatters ones.

jfc

At 13:25 18/12/2006, Dominica Filipp wrote:

I've realized that I'm still lacking some information about the internal
processes at ICANN.

We have several constituencies of which at least two should be
representing the registrant interests - NCU and (non-voting) At-Large. I
don't know what the connection of the constituences to the board members
(who are eligible to make final decisions by voting) is like. If, for
instance, the info/org/biz agreement was approved unanimously, does it
mean that NCU (as a voting constituency) voted for the agreement and
thus failed in approaching the registrant interests?

What is the GNSO (which list we're subscribed to) role in all that? Can
I find anything like organizational tree chart on the ICANN page?

Maybe a bit dumb questions out here... but I'd like to get to know...

thanks

Dominik



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