Re: [ga] Paper on the Release of Deleted Domains

[Jeff Williams <jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Richard and all former DNSO GA members or other interested
stakeholders/users,

  It is clear and has been for several years now that the separation of
Registry and registrar was not well thought out from a contractual and
logical basis.  It is also clear that any advantage that the registrars
can
get they will try to get as a matter of good business expectation and
practice.  However when ICANN whom along with DOC/NTIA
has oversight authority, knows of a existing abuse or method or of
any sort, and refuses to act, than they are neglecting their
responsibility
to the public regarding a public resource.  Here enlies the crux and
solution to the WLS or WLS-like "Registrars/quasi-Registrars" to
which Richard rightly refers to.


Richard Henderson wrote:

>    Copy of Paper sent to Bhavin Turakhia and Tim Cole for
> presentation/discussion at Capr Town meeting:
>
> Dear Bhavin and Tim,
>
> I submit the following paper (also posted at www.atlarge.org) on the
> release of deleted domains. I would appreciate it if you could
> distribute this paper and allow for its presentation at ICANN's
> Capetown meeting.
>
> I have been an active member of the At Large for several years and
> have contributed in detail on the development and evaluation of New
> gTLDs. It would be advantageous if the issue of releasing deleted
> domains could be clarified prior to the Agreements being created for
> the next round of gTLDs.
>
> I also have a good first-hand understanding of the Deleting Domain
> market and processes, having monitored for a number of years.
>
> In my presentation, I review the status quo and offer a number of
> possible solutions.
>
> With kind regards,
>
> Richard Henderson
>
> *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
> *   *   *   *
>
> PAPER ON THE RELEASE OF DELETED DOMAINS (for ICANN's Meeting in Cape
> Town):
>
> "PROCESSES FOR FAIR ACCESS TO DELETING DOMAINS AND A FAIRER MARKET FOR
> ESTABLISHED REGISTRARS"
>
>
>
> For some time, the market for selling deleted domains has been
> substantially captured by secondary agents who use selected or created
> registrars to increase their access to the Registries at the time
> names are released. This has arguably handicapped the rights and
> opportunities of people to a fair and open process, using the
> registrar of their own choice. In the past year this process has
> resulted in the creation of approximately 100 "shell" registrars set
> up solely for the purpose of increasing access to Registries for their
> parent company. This, in turn, may have contributed to the decision of
> certain bona fide registrars to take matters into their own hands and
> develop their own policies for the re-distribution of domain names
> which were previously registered with them.
>
> The leading "catcher" of deleting domains used to be Snapnames. They
> succeeded by using a fairly large number of registrars to run scripts
> and snap desirable deleting names. Snapnames got their cut and the
> Registrar got their cut. But they succeeded because statistically if
> you have the largest number of registrars running scripts for a
> deleting domain name, then you get the reputation as the best company
> to pay into to get the name you wanted.
>
> Then POOL.com emerged, with what was arguably a better business model
> than Snapnames because you didn't have to pay anything up front - only
> if you got the name (provided you could outbid any other people who
> also wanted the name). To succeed in this business, POOL needed to
> have more registrars working for them than Snapnames had working for
> them.
>
> Initially Namescout was used as a proactive registrar and "holding
> warehouse" for these incoming names. POOL realised they needed more
> registrars to run their scripts for deleting names, so what you got
> was a proliferation of new registrars who were set up with the
> intention of running scripts for deleting domains. The more
> registrars, the more chances of getting names, so just create scores
> of new registrars for your company!
>
> In short, I imagine most of these new "Registrars" are just the same
> registrar, operating under a different name, but getting extra
> privileges and extra access to the Registries to obtain deleting
> domains.
>
> ICANN seems to have unquestioningly accredited all these "registrars".
> But then, other registrars have operated very similarly before, like
> Domain Bank which seemed to set up Domain Pro as an extra "registrar"
> so they could have a second "short list" to submit to the .info
> Landrush 2 and the .biz launch. Both DomainBank and DomainPro operated
> from the same offices with the same phone numbers and the same
> accounting outlet, but they "counted" as 2 registrars, so they got
> twice as many lists into these newly launched TLD round robins when
> they launched. Just think what fun and games the 98 "Namescout/POOL"
> registrars will have if there are more round-robins for .eu or .travel
> in the future!
>
> In its MoU with the Department of Commerce, ICANN is obliged to ensure
> the fair distribution of domain names to the internet public. I wish
> to offer a number of Proposals which may make the market in Deleting
> Domain fairer both for the public and for mainstream registrars who
> help maintain the smooth running of the DNS, and do not merely exist
> to exploit registrar privilege and access to Registries and capitalise
> on the deleting domains market.
>
> PROPOSAL 1: FAIRER AND CLEARER INFORMATION FOR THE INTERNET PUBLIC.
>
> At present, the deleting domains market is dominated by a fairly small
> number of buyers who have understood the processes and cornered the
> market for premium deleting domains. The ordinary member of the
> public, or average company, may well be unaware of the names which are
> "On Hold", then "Expired", then in "Redemption", then "Pending
> Delete". I propose that Registries should be obliged to publish lists
> of ALL domains which have expired, reached redemption, and finally are
> pending delete (with clear date provided for when they will be
> deleted). These lists should be published and accessible on their
> Registry websites so that ordinary internet users do not have to
> scrabble around, scouring DeletedDomains.com or other sites to glean
> their needed information. There seems to me to be no good reason why
> we cannot "open up" this part of the information - at Registry level -
> so that the whole world can easily see which domains are coming up for
> deletion. What possible reason can there be for not creating this open
> public access?
>
> PROPOSAL 2: REGISTRY AUCTION OR ROUND ROBIN MODELS FOR DELETING
> DOMAINS
>
> The round-robin method used at the time of the .info Landrush and the
> .biz2B demonstrate that it is possible to operate a process where
> names which are becoming available can be distributed *through
> registrar applications* in a manner which might more fairly reflect
> the market reality of existing registrars and their relative size and
> contribution to the DNS industry.
>
> (i) Release of Deleting Domains through a Registry-level "Round Robin"
> model: coupled with the open lists from Registries proposed in
> PROPOSAL 1, deleting domains could be released in monthly "batches"
> using a Round-Robin model. This would enable registrants to apply
> through their regular registrars, rather than getting a released
> domain through an unknown entity with the problems that may occur. It
> would also entirely by-pass companies like POOL.com and Snapnames,
> whose services (in my view) are not really needed and tend to distort
> the market in these names. Certain problems would need to be resolved
> if the Round-Robin model was to work in a manner which was helpful to
> registrants and fair to Registrars... In the Landrush 'Round-Robins'
> it became clear that the process could be "gamed" by some registrars
> (like Signature Domains and DomainPro) submitting unusually short
> lists and effectively queue-jumping those registrars who opened their
> lists to all the public. To overcome this, I propose the insertion of
> "blanks" in each Registrar's list to top up their actual applications,
> so that all registrars have a statistically identical chance of
> procuring a particular deleting domain. The market would then reward
> registrars in proportionate relation to the number of customers they
> can attract.
>
> (ii)Release of Deleting Domains through a Registry-level "Auction"
> model: a possibly simpler model would be an Auction of all deleting
> domains at Registry level, coupled to the advance posting of names by
> the Registry (proposed in PROPOSAL 1). To protect the interests of
> Registrars, each bidder would be required to nominate a Registrar of
> choice, to whom payment would be made and through whom the name would
> be registered, in the event of winning the auction for that name. The
> impact of this process would be to exclude the secondary market profit
> made by companies like Pool.com and Snapnames, and reward Registrars
> and Registry directly. It would also redress the balance in favour of
> regular and well-established Registrars, because people would tend to
> nominate a Registrar they knew, trusted, and possibly already used. It
> would render the 100 or more "shell" registrars superfluous, because
> why would people want to nominate these completely unknown entities?
> The auction model might be set up on a name by name basis, as names
> came up for deletion; or the deleting domains could be batched on a
> weekly or monthly basis. Once again, the whole process should be based
> on open advance access to information, and open access to the process
> of obtaining a domain name.
>
> PROPOSAL 3: ADOPTING THE 'TUCOWS' MODEL FOR INCLUDING PREVIOUS
> REGISTRANTS IN THE PROFITS FROM DELETED DOMAIN SALES.
>
> I am by no means sure about this third proposal, but I offer it for
> discussion and consideration. Under the plan recently floated by
> Tucows, domain names due to expire/delete would be offered for auction
> prior to this process, and a share of any profit would be distributed
> to the previous registrant. This model could also work if the Auction
> was operated at the Registry level that I propose in PROPOSAL 2. At
> present the DNS is hindered by the large number of domains that get
> "warehoused" by mass-registrants. I believe that a model that offered
> a proportionate share of the profits from the deleting domains market
> to current registrants might have the effect of freeing up the supply
> and creating more fluidty in the domain market (so that a higher
> proportion of domains might actually get used). I am not wholly
> convinced by this proposal because it may add complexity to a process
> which should ideally be simple.
>
> I thank you for reading, and perhaps discussing, this Paper. I
> particularly commend PROPOSAL 1 and PROPOSAL 2(b) to you. In all my
> comments, my uppermost thought is what will make the supply of the DNS
> most open and fair for the people who actually want to use it. In
> addition, I recognise the role and livelihoods of established
> registrars (who provide a wide range of services beyond just grabbing
> deleting domains) and who deserve a process which reflects their
> commitment to the wider DNS market and its services. In achieving
> this, I advocate the removal of secondary businesses like Snapnames
> and Pool from the process, and the disempowering of the scores of
> "shell" registrars which have recently distorted this part of the
> market (and may also create havoc when .eu and .travel finally come
> onto the market with round-robins etc for the launch of their names).
> By using a Registry auction, where bidders nominate their regular
> Registrars, there will be little further need for these recently
> created registrars which have merely come onto the scene to 'game' the
> system.
>
> With kind regards,
> Richard Henderson
> www.AtLarge.org
> richardhenderson (at) ntlworld.com
>

Regards,

--
Jeffrey A. Williams
Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 134k members/stakeholders strong!)
"Be precise in the use of words and expect precision from others" -
    Pierre Abelard

"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
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