RE: [ga] ALAC statement on resolution of non-existing domain name s
- To: "Neuman, Jeff" <Jeff.Neuman@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: RE: [ga] ALAC statement on resolution of non-existing domain name s
- From: Karl Auerbach <karl@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2003 13:50:17 -0700 (PDT)
- Cc: "'Vittorio Bertola'" <vb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "'ga@xxxxxxxx'" <ga@xxxxxxxx>
- In-reply-to: <A9DECB0B8A01A54DBECC03B25D29513C562A1F@stntexch03.va.neustar.com>
- Reply-to: Karl Auerbach <karl@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Sender: owner-ga@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
On Tue, 16 Sep 2003, Neuman, Jeff wrote:
> Just one question....the ALAC has reached the conclusion that "this practice
> raises grave technical concerns" but cannot define those technical concerns.
I agree that the word "grave" is incorrect. I believe that it is too mild
a word to describe the implications of the recent actions of certain
I define ICANN's obligations of "stability" to be to maintain the net in a
condition such at IP packets may move with reliabily and with dispatch
from any source IP address to any destination IP address, and that DNS
queries processed by the upper tier of DNS servers are answered reliably,
promptly, and accurately.
I remember back in May when Neulevel did something quite similar to what
NSI has done. Neulevel's act was a so-called "experiment" in .biz and
.us. ICANN only learned about it after the fact from the press.
Apart from the technical concerns - which have been itemized in detail on
NANOG and the IETF mailing lists (as well as in a several page e-mail I
sent to the ICANN board back in May of this year) - there are also legal
considerations. For example, by camping on all unregistered names, the
registry is arguably representing itself as the holder of all trademarks
that are not embodied in domain names.
It is indeed true that the Internet Standards do not prohibit what has
been done. But then again, there are no Internet Standards prohibiting
denial of service attacks.
ICANN operates expressly for the benefit of the public (in theory anyway.
;-) That obligation ought to be implied through the chain of contracts
onto registries and registrars who operate under ICANN's franchise.
Because of the recent actions, various carriers and user communities have
already put into place a number of self-protective mechanisms. Some of
these mechanisms may eventually be removed, some will not. The net effect
is that yet another chunk (of IP address space, of routability of packets,
etc) of open internet has been damaged and will remain damaged for a long,