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Re: [ga] Proposed ICANN "Expedited Transfer Reversal Policy" could disrupt secondary market for domain names
- To: George Kirikos <gkirikos@xxxxxxxxx>, GNSO GA Mailing List <ga@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, ssene@xxxxxxxxxxxx, icann-board@xxxxxxxxx, participate@xxxxxxxxx, rod_beckstrom@xxxxxxxxx
- Subject: Re: [ga] Proposed ICANN "Expedited Transfer Reversal Policy" could disrupt secondary market for domain names
- From: "Jeffrey A. Williams" <jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2010 15:02:51 -0500 (GMT-05:00)
George and all,
I also am appalled, but you should know by now that this is the typical
manner in which ICANN effects policy making. The factual history clearly
demonstrates that usually ICANN has already determined what the policy
will be, forms a WG of some sort to discuss it for the appearance of
some level of openness and transparency, than regardless of the input
or concerns that may be revealed or articulated, goes ahead and makes
the decision it had previously determined it was going to make in the
first place.
-----Original Message-----
>From: George Kirikos <gkirikos@xxxxxxxxx>
>Sent: Jun 23, 2010 11:10 AM
>To: GNSO GA Mailing List <ga@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>Subject: Re: [ga] Proposed ICANN "Expedited Transfer Reversal Policy" could
>disrupt secondary market for domain names
>
>
>The ITRP just had a conference call, and I was basically ganged up on for
>pointing out all the flaws in the proposed ETRP (Expedited Transfer Reverse
>Policy).
>
>How will businesses and consumers be affected when folks can simply undo a
>legitimate transfer "at will", without due process, within 6 months? How will
>an escrow work if the prior owner can simply claim "hijacking" and undo a
>transfer, when it's simply a case of seller's remorse? We see irrevocable
>transfers in the real estate industry, and that market works fine, because
>people are *proactive* about security. Here, the folks pushing for this flawed
>proposal seek to implement a *reactive* policy that *will* be misused.
>
>I'm totally appalled at how they want to create a huge loophole in policy,
>that will have collateral damage which is much bigger than the "problem"
>they're trying to solve.
>
>A transcript of what went down should be available later at:
>
>http://brussels38.icann.org/node/12502
>
>To see why this policy is flawed, consider the following scenario:
>
>1. Example.com is registered at GoDaddy, to Party A.
>2. Party B agrees to buy the domain name for $1,000, and transfers it to
>Tucows legitimately.
>3. Party B builds up a large website, investing millions of dollars (perhaps
>it was Microsoft, who has bought domain names like kin.com and docs.com in the
>aftermarket, or B&N, who bought nook.com in the secondary market).
>4. 6 months later, Party A gets seller's remorse, and decided to invoke the
>policy, claiming the domain name was hijacked, and the domain name is returned
>immediately to GoDaddy (the original registrar), under the full control of
>Party A again.
>5. Tucows (the new registrar) and Party B can't do anything about it, to
>dispute the use of this policy, as its currently proposed!
>
>(there exists a "TDRP" Transfer Dispute Resolution Procedure in place now that
>*does* have due process, but some folks seem to think it's not good enough)
>
>Fact: If there's a real dispute, one side is lying! It should be up to a court
>to decide, not simply getting involved and undoing a legitimate transfer!
>Remember, the original registrar (GoDaddy in the example above) had every
>opportunity to authenticate Party A's desire to transfer the domain name to
>Tucows (where Party B wants it to be) BEFORE the domain name took place! The
>domain could be unlocked only after talking to Party A by phone first, for
>example. Or some other "executive lock" procedure (VeriSign lock is just one
>example of many). The EPP code could be sent by SMS, for example. There are
>myriad ways to be proactive about security, and I'm 100% in favour of those.
>
>The workgroup pretends fraud exists only by "domain hijackers", and seems
>incapable of seeing fraud within the community of domain sellers. One need
>only look at the case of Nelson Brady and SnapNames, to see what kinds of
>frauds are possible. It's bad enough when you have to deal with that kind of
>fraud, but then to add a brand new risk, of legitimate transfers being undone
>simply upon a *claim* of hijacking??!!? (not *proof* or a court order or some
>other due process)
>
>I find it simply unreal that these serious concerns are not being taken
>seriously, and are being brushed aside by this workgroup.
>
>Sincerely,
>
>George Kirikos
>http://www.leap.com/
Regards,
Jeffrey A. Williams
Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 300+k members/stakeholders and growing,
strong!)
"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
Abraham Lincoln
"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is very
often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt
"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
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