EN

Alejandro Pisanty:	Okay, we're ready to start; it's one past 10 a.m. The way we will proceed now, if you all agree is go straight to the work that we have to do, which means we will start drafting our report. Our purpose for this part of the meeting as we remember is to start getting the draft report. It will be a very initial raw stage with lots of work only flagged to be done instead of already done. More detailed document analysis, I mean all the formal interviews will still be pending.
	We should spend a few hours on this and then when we're done we will dedicate some time to drafting the interview questions and the list of people we have to interview. Those are the outcomes that we expect to have from today's meeting. I will have a roll call, please. So will everybody introduce yourself. It's important also for the recording once, we try to make use of the recording to identify the voices of people who are in so those present in the room could I please beg you to introduce yourselves. Starting here.
Patrick Jones:	Patrick Jones, ICANN staff, part of the Security Team and available as a resource to the SSR RT.
Denise Michel:	Denise Michel, ICANN staff.

Dongman Lee: Dongman Lee from RSEC.

Xiaodong Li: Xiaodong Li, that's it.

Jeff Brueggeman: Jeff Brueggeman, AT&T.

Olof Nordling: Olof Nordling, ICANN staff.

Alice Jansen: Alice Jansen, ICANN staff.

Simon McCalla: Simon McCalla, Nominet UK.

Alejandro Pisanty: Alejandro Pisanty.

David Cake: David Cake, NCUC Electronic Frontiers, Australia.

Hartmut Glaser: Hartmut Glaser representative for the ASO from ICANN.

Andres Phillipe: Andres Phillipe, (inaudible).

Alice Munyua: Alice Munyua, from Kenya, GAC

Jim Pendergast: Jim Pendergast, Galway Strategy Group, silent observer.

Alejandro Pisanty: And I also welcome the presence in the room of Mr. Michael Moran from INTERPOL. Okay, so now what just.

Olof Nordling: Just a note that we do have a bridge, but we don't have participant on the bridge as yet.

Anders Rafting: Thank you sir, hallo?

Olof Nordling: Apologies for that, who's on the bridge?

Anders Rafting: It's Anders from Sweden and I'm on the GAC.

Alejandro Pisanty: Welcome Anders, very glad to have you here. And I know you're going deep into the night or something, right?

Anders Rafting: It's very early here.

Alejandro Pisanty: Heroic effort which we really, really thank you for. Okay, the way that I think we can proceed now, is we'll have first Team One describe their work and we will be asking everybody to help take notes so that the comments made about the documents that will be described begin to go down as the draft version 0 of the draft report. We already have a few notes of myself and we have notes from Simon and Jeff, but we'll try to make this now into one coherent set. So, you go, Simon? Simon will take the lead now.

Simon McCalla: Thanks Anders, okay we'll try to be relatively brief on this and just take about ten minutes to go through where we are with Team One. Firstly the Team One role was to take a look through fundamentally what is kind of loosely termed governance of ICANN when it comes to SSR, resiliency of DNS. Just calling it governance is perhaps too tight a definition, but fundamentally our job was to try and go down and look at what did we see as ICANN's remit. ICANN's scope of responsibilities when it came to SSR, SSR matters. Where do they think ICANN should reach

out to? Who was involved, who were the players and how did ICANN kind of relate to those players, if you like.

Members of the team where Anders, Hartmut, Xiadong, Alice and myself. We had fabulous support and I just want to say thank you to the ICANN staff and in particular Alice and Olof who supported us fantastically through our all calls and making sure that the Wiki was kept up to date and all the errors that we made as we uploaded things onto the Wiki were corrected.

The approach that we took as a team, was to firstly agree that we felt that the best thing we could do was to start going down the fantastic list of documents that Denise put together for us. And take a look and do a very sort of high level scan in you like of those documents and just try and pull out of those the important information for SSR purposes. It was an interesting exercise and we felt that the best way to do that was to create a template, which we did. We kind of circulated amongst the team a template, a review template, which we have here. I think some of the rest of you may have already seen it, but I'll just bring one up on screen.

So essentially the template would be, it was just a very high level summary of any document that you were reading, so regardless of what the document was, there's a summary of that document. Then any specific key points relating to Security, Stability and Resilience that were within the document, bearing in mind our agreement was to look at governance. Any other key points, a conclusion about the document and then a very brief scoring framework which would ask how relevant is the document to SSR?

How useful is it to the team overall? Is it controversial? Is it accurate? Is it detailed? Those kind of questions and we scored them with a view to them being able to pull together a sort of matrix of which were the most useful documents for digging into later as we look at specific questions and issues.

So that template was our methodology. The team then kind of worked for about the next six to eight weeks using that template to fill in the details. Let's just bring it back up on screen there. What you can see here is a grid of the analysis that was done here; and just a huge, huge thank you to everybody in the team who contributed. As you can see particularly Xiadong who is Mr. Analysis, who managed to get through something like 12 different documents in that time, which is absolutely fantastic. And put the rest of us to shame I might add. But as you can see we've got quite a good library now of … we're still waiting for Hartmut's first one but I'm sure it's going to be fantastic when it arrives.

It's quite a good library of analysis of those documents and the idea is to get through, on a page, everything in some of those documents. Some of those documents are 90 to 100 pages in size and if you go through some of the big details reports, it took a week and a half to summarize that down to a page in some cases. If you haven't had a chance to read some of these, some of them are really worth a look at just to get a flavor for what was going on with those documents. So that's what we did and that's the state of play as of this week, and thank you generally, we're still submitting some of these during the week as well so that's been fantastic.

I thought what it might be useful to do is just briefly skip down the team and just if Anders if we could start with you and just in two or three minutes tell us what you found in some of your analysis over this period.

Anders Rafting: Yes, I happened to look at the [ARIANA cycle] and its continuity paper, which I'm especially interested in I must say. I work with similar things in Sweden and the com operators in (inaudible) where you have a big exercise in the autumn 9th September and November where an extraordinary incident happened and destroyed much of the infrastructure and the operators had to take actions to cooperate with – the theme is "cooperate."

Now I looked at this exercise that ICANN did with [Text Watch IANA], if I compared it to the IANA training, each exercise is rather slow but none and that my opinion is that there should be more of these in the future and perhaps further and more parties involved. So the controversial amounts of (inaudible) that the documents, a lot of the contribution, the records fixed on the standing of the Schedule K is that they are not reliable, but they show continuous (inaudible).

Next I looked at what the ICANN has, that they count on from (inaudible) 11, 2010; and that such a document was so heavily referred to. Also the English system document of course, I think Simon also had looked at a printout version of that so that's it and

talked about that. At the time, my conclusion was that the document is, all of it was valuable for the SSR team at the seminar they gave they put this out as one page and also in it is the top list of their abilities (inaudible). However, they said they can't (inaudible) wouldn't, doesn't make any difference in what ICANN can control and what objectives ICANN then would directly influence to achieve its goals.

There are twelve pages I looked at plus a new strategy for cyberspace. And that paper talks about things that, it's a paper about precedent that was (inaudible), it's dated May 2011 and titled *Prosperity, Security and Openness in the Networked World*. It starts each chapter with a verse by Obama and inter alia stating that IT came back together to build cyberspace that is open, interoperable and reliable so these four words are coming back over and over again in the paper.

So my conclusion of that revelation is that document is of limited (inaudible). However it was understanding of the English government effect, and there is an open (inaudible) which were providing information on occasion to groups and such. That's the time looking up too far, thank you.

Simon McCalla: Thanks Anders. Xiaodong, do you want to give us a very quick rundown of the sort of high level things that you found and you analysis?

Xiaodong Li: I think there are a lot of document have been written down by the past two months. I think I try to cull my memory, is okay? In this team I pick out the sections sevenfold to review document related to the ISEC, I think I am a fresh new person for eyes and abilities for ISEC, if I am wrong you can correct me.

I also have two documents left so I haven't got a whole view of ISEC. When I am reading, I was reading the document and I tried to think about four questions. The first is what is ISEC? And the second one is what is the responsibility of ISEC and what's the role of ISEC in the reseller operation? The second thing is what's the relationship among ICANN, ISEC and the reseller operators? Last question I was considering is to check if the procedures and the materials, which is disclosed by the ICANN for reseller operation and I maintain that it is enough not for the reseller rescue security and stability. I think there is the one task for reaching to know.

From my reading and understanding, I think now I try to summarize the critical important issues that I found. For the governance for the relationships among ICANN and ISEC and reseller operators, I have seen that not all of the reseller operators have agreement, maybe some kind of agreement or some document which was signed by ICANN and reseller operators. So I saw that in the document list provided by ICANN is only agreement between ICANN and reseller operators. Not all of the reseller operators had signed some kind of agreement or document with ICANN. I know that some operators publish some kind of

agreement with ICANN on their website but in this document list I haven't seen that.

It seemed that no very clear procedures to describe how the (inaudible) agreement in turn and there are not enough accountable materials for resellers' maintenance so I think that's, I wonder if that document is provided ICANN is enough to know more about the resellers and ISEC. I think, from my understanding I think the reseller space very, very, very important for the DNS system, security and stability and resilience. So we should make sure that the governance for resellers, operators and ISEC and ICANN may be also including other kind of organizations is enough to make sure the sure the security and stability for resellers, so that's my finding.

Simon McCalla: Thank you for these. Okay. Was there anything else that you wanted to capture in some of the other analysis that you did was there any other things other than the ISEC review or are you comfortable there?

Xiaodong Li: No.

Simon McCalla: Okay, that's fantastic, thank you. Alice do you want to just briefly talk about the AOC review you picked out.

Olof Nordling: Before you go..

Simon McCalla: Yeah, please go on.

Olof Nordling: I'm sorry Xiaodong asked, he asked for comment and I was going to provide a response, but if that's out of order I'll.

Alejandro Pisanty: No let me just try to make sure that we can use this discussion, this is only a procedural information which is what Xiaodong has written before and said now is very, very vital part of the SSR RTs eventual report, I don't mean say this is a documented text, it goes into the discussion. The same applies, by the way to what Anders has already said and sent in writing before.

So I just want to make sure that we begin taking these texts into a draft report and this doesn't mean that we are saying this is the final text, we need the discussion with Bill, I will keep it in time and content, but certainly we are not trying to be monolithic thinking here so we will have to record that dissenting views as well, but we're not just tracking a conversation, we are really doing an audit and we have to make sure that what goes down in the audit is very serious so if we have one opinion and a dissenting opinion let's take them to the best point possible of knowledge,

questions that are asked, research that has to be done and then of course record both a consensus opinion and a dissenting opinion if we don't reach full consensus.

That, please it's open.

Xiaodong Li: I just want to clarify, it's my findings only, based on the document list provided by ICANN.

Simon McCalla: Again, procedurally what we asked the team to do was to summarize the points of view found in the documents, rather than the points of their own personal points of view, so although inevitably it is very difficult to be completely objective about that, even if we become subjective. We tried to be as much as possible, summarizing the documents rather than creating a personal statement. I certainly hold my hand up in some of my documents, I couldn't help making comment as part of it, but that was the intention.

Alejandro Pisanty: Sorry, just to be sure, the review is not a librarian's review. A librarian's review would just tell you what the text says. Our review has to tell ICANN and the community how effective risk management for the DNS is. How effectively it's rules are written down and how effectively it is implemented. So we will have opinions, we will not only have descriptions of the text, but we'll

have opinions and that's what we're here for and the face to face meeting has the value that we can really exchange these opinions very fast and see how far we get, but we won't get bogged down discussing the first paragraph and never getting anywhere else, that's my only caveat so please let's get this discussion.

Simon McCalla: Yes, and I think we sort of very much that this would inform, by doing this kind of review this would inform that discussion and that we would just be able to create opinion from these. So I don't want to say that we shouldn't create opinion be any means. Alice, do you want to talk about the AOC review?

Alice Munyua: Yes, very briefly because it's a very brief document and very high level as well. It reaffirmed the key commitment to preserving security and stability and actually sets the foundation and outlines the mandate of the review teams, all of them, not just this one. Goes further and acknowledges the importance of the, you know, the evolution of the internet for idn ccTLDs and others, but basically that's it, yeah.

Simon McCalla: Fantastic, thank you that was great. From my own perspective, I took a look at two key themes, one was the sort of main bylaws and mission of ICANN and how that applied to the strategic plan. So I looked at the draft strategic plan that Anders then reviewed

the final version of that, and then took a look at the operating plan and budget and then spent a bit of time on SSAC.

The key things that came out during that analysis were shown right down in the status report which we submitted to the team, but fundamentally a few things, was really, firstly SSR is the number one goal in ICANN strategic plan. They mention straight away a 100% DNS uptime being a goal and that was something that very clearly came out discussing with RSAC was how can you have that goal if you're not actually responsible for the operation of that. Is that unwise to put a goal like that as your primary goal. So I think there are some really interesting work around that.

Again, a lot of my things came out where how are you tracking and measuring success against strategic plans? Do you have clear, does ICANN have clear objectives that can be measured and tracked. Again, I think the theme of ICANN's remit, possibly being interpreted as being too wide. I'm not sure it actually is too wide, I think it is very easy to interpret that it is very wide. For me there was a theme about trying to tighten up that remit and being really clear and communicate that really, really well, I think would be enormously helpful. The budget was an interesting one, again it was quite hard to pin down exactly where the money was going when it came to SSR, that's not because I'm sure those numbers don't exist it just wasn't easy to see from the documentation.

ICANN has a staff of 10 people dedicated to SSR, which is quite significant, some of those in the room here and some very talented folk they are. I think I felt that it was really important that clear

objectives were set for that team and that team could account for those objectives. It ties back into that theme about strategic plan. So just pointing out specifically the recruitment of (inaudible) again, it crops up as one line in the strategic plan with no justification for hiring a cryptography expert, again not particularly clear to me, so I think there is some clarity needed around that.

Interestingly, some of the money set aside for SSR was spent on Nairobi security arrangements, instead of coming out of the core meeting budget and as we know the Nairobi security was expensive, so given that they went over budget on SSR last year, it's kind of like was that the right thing to do because it kind of implies the scope creep of SSR. In actual fact they spent money that should have been spent on meetings into that budget.

So it was interesting use of SSR money there. Again, SSAC, RSAC relations came into play, you know SSAC is clearly seen as working quite well, as Xiaodong picked up, I think the RSAC needs looking at and being very very aware and very mindful of the politics of that and the RSAC, the people that are in RSAC far outdate ICANN and that's a really important thing to remember is that SSAC was formed as part of ICANN, but the reseller folk were there long before ICANN was around and so in terms of that relationship, that's a really interesting one and clearly a bit of a minefield to go into.

ICANN's relationship with IANA also came up quite a bit and particularly, obviously with the Notice of Inquiry in the air and the further Notice of Inquiry. Some really key things there I think are

worth digging into and I think will form the basis of some of the questions that we'll put into the draft report, so hopefully some useful analysis there.

Hartmut, was there anything you wanted to cover? I appreciate there is no document in here but any of the work you've looked at?

Hartmut Glaser: Between San Francisco and now I've lost traveling, half of my time so it was very difficult but I started to look at documents and probably with the next two or three weeks I will have some information and will share with you.

Simon McCalla: Fantastic, thank you.

Alejandro Pisanty: For that I think that what will be useful is that we make a decision together with you whether you will be a second pair of eyes looking at some of these documents, adding comments to them or taking up documents that others haven't read to add to the comments that will go eventually into a report.

Hartmut Glaser: I see that Simon sent a proposal for every one of us to have two or three documents that I will go through.

Simon McCalla:	Great right before I open to any questions to the floor, I just want to say again, thank you to everybody who contributed, everyone worked really hard and collaboratively and it was hugely appreciated. There's a really good body of work here, so just a massive thanks to Team One for all the work that they did. Really, just before I close, are there any questions for us as a team or any questions for particularly … ?
Olof Nordling:	Not to dwell on the RSAC issue, but I think what you were saying was that some of the questions about the documentation were actually brought up in what you were reviewing, and was that part of the Working Group analysis that you reviewed. I'm just trying to understand what is out there already that maybe had an opinion on this issue, or looked at it? That make sense?
Alejandro Pisanty:	Yes.
Simon McCalla:	Thank you for a very concise answer. Sorry, did you want to say something.
Patrick Jones:	Yes, Patrick Jones, Security Chief. So I just wanted to get a clarification on the document summary that you were reading

from. Was that the FY10 budget analysis, or was that your analysis of what we had published for our FY11 period?

Simon McCalla: I think it was what you published for FY11 so the icon is on the FY11 operating plan and budget document.

Patrick Jones: So one of my takeaways from talking with the community about our FY12, Security, Stability and Resiliency framework as well as some of the feedback from the references to SSR in the FY12 budget is it would be really helpful for Security Team or another part of the organization to at some point come back and provide some kind of data to show the community either a status on where we are in the things that we say we get budget for and when there is something that is completed it is more clear for the community to see that we've either completed the things that we were given budget to go out and work on.

I think that's along the lines of the comments from the ccNSO and the Registry Stakeholder group and from some others, business community. So you will start to see that even before you consider it as some of the guidance in the review teams work, so just note that that's coming from Security Team at least in this year and also as part of the materials requested I know I had provided to Sub-Team Two, so Jeff Brueggeman, a scorecard of FY10 and our team progress on the things that we said were priority areas for that

period and I've promised to deliver a similar type of scorecard for FY11 and I will get that to the review team.

If you haven't already seen the FY10 scorecard I'd be interested to know if you find that format useful? Because that would be the same type of format that I would use going forward.

Simon McCalla: I have not seen yet, that would be hugely useful and just also to clarify as well I think, sometimes when you review things like this and you make statements like it would be really helpful to see objectives and goals, that's not to say there aren't objectives and goals, or that the team isn't delivering some fantastic stuff and I don't want for two seconds that to be the impression, I think it is just about helping find that clarity to better go "Oh great, I can see the goals I can see what was achieved" that was kind of my point there.

Jeff Brueggeman: I just find that, Patrick, that was a very helpful format, it actually scores things according to kind of green, red, yellow, in progress and unfortunately it was something that AUTEF didn't have a chance to review, so I think that it would be something that we would look at as part of our next steps here, I think would be.

Male Speaker B: And Patrick you had mentioned to me that the fiscal year 11 is being available as well so that will be helpful.

Simon McCalla: Thanks I think that will be really useful when we just dig into this section I think we're going to pull those together and say actually here was the working hypothesis is that perhaps the objectives and goals aren't as clear then to be able to run through those documents might be incredibly useful in that analysis.

Patrick Jones: And to add a final bit of information about the structure of SSR in the overall budget, it cuts across horizontally the organization, so that it is actually, Security Team represents just one pillar and the staff dedicated to security from the Security Team is much smaller than those who have some connection to SSR in the rest of the organization, so I would, there is some percentage of IANA staff of DNS operations group, DNSSEC, Implementation and those who work with Key-signing infastructure, L-Route, if I didn't already mention that.

Some aspect of compliance such as on SSR and so in one sense it is good that all of that is combined in a way, but in the same time it makes it difficult for the community and for this review team to try to distill that down and I think that might be another thing going forward that would be helpful to the community and also helpful for the organization to be very clear on what makes up the greater umbrella.

Simon McCalla: I absolutely agree, I think it is one of those things that it is easy to create a conspiracy around the fact that you can't see information so it's kind of, as you say, it's happening and it's spread across and actually it's that challenge of trying to make that really transparent and open.   Some people say "ah, I get and I see where that 7 million or 10 million is going and I can see that okay a small chunk of that is sent to Rick Lamb and a small chunk sent to Joe Abley as well as the dedicated security staff" so you know I totally sympathize with that.

Alejandro Pisanty: So here's two points which I think will help us all make progress on this issue.   First Patrick, the last part you mentioned is what I call the "Smiling Receptionist" problem, which means that you may say that you have a friendly receptionist at the office, as you are actually increasing the security and stability of the whole system because people will not be angry when they leave the office and lambast ICANN because they don't get the warm welcome, symbolizing that a large part of the budget can be sliced and diced any way you want, so if this were a human resources review you would probably put millions dollars in worker happiness and if this were an environment review you would be putting millions of dollars, you know the cupping the whole thing and saying that the "Smiling Receptionist" makes people not step on the gas when they leave and therefore you're also contributing to reduce the carbon footprint of ICANN.

But that said, we would be well served by having the clear cut parts clear cut and understanding and having a clear statement that says the rest is fuzzy by design, it cannot be make more precious without actually outright lies, first.   Second point here, I think that at some point, like today, or Monday, we have to decide on a stable document basis. We have to decide on a cut-off point.

I mean, this is like any other audit. At some point you say, "well you know I know you are reshelving your inventory, I know you are straightening your accounts all the time, at some point you know I take your books, look at them and report on the state of the books that day" so we should establish that firmly as soon as possible after this meeting because otherwise we're going to waste our time. We're going to always be running in circles.

There is always going to be an improved document with vitamins and minerals that's just about to be released. There is a child friendly, and eco-friendly version that is coming up next week and the week after it so we have to decide on a cut-off point and do the analysis on those documents and whatever improvements appear later then we will do them by tracking changes to the cutoff. I hope we will find this approach more pragmatic, even though we all know that there will always be some improvement. It's like waiting for a better computer, a better car. Jeff Brueggeman.

Jeff Brueggeman: I agree with what both of you were saying, I just wanted to add a process point here. As I said ATEFF was going to look at the

implementation, including the status reports on the SSR and Rodney was going to look at somewhat of the organization issues and I think both of those areas are things where you can start with the documentation, but you also, I think, need to add the in person discussions with the staff to get the sense of these issues that I think Alejandro was correctly pointing out.

So I think it is just, in my view a question of we haven't had that so the analysis is more than just document review and some of these issues you really want to get that sense of well how do you structure the budget and you know some of the things that Patrick is raising, so I think we need to put it on our list of next steps. Part of this is the fact that we weren't able to get to that level of digging into the issue to have that point.

Simon McCalla: Yes, I agree, I think one of the things about the rough documentation and having watched the ccNSO review the SSR plan is that people do have a habit of looking at what's written and then commenting on it and I think you're right if one of the things that we can serve as the SSR RT is even if it is helping clarify documentation I think we've achieved a quite a big deal.

Alejandro Pisanty: The next question here is again procedural but much more big than procedural. It is what text goes down into the report from these last 40 minutes work?

Simon McCalla:	Okay, so I think we've submitted a status report into the team, and Jeff has captured some of the key themes in the draft outline document that we'll be reviewing so what I would suggest we do, is when we go down those key points with Jeff, if there is anything that we feel Jeff has not been able to put into that report yet, or has missed, then we can capture those. But I would suggest that Team One just keep their eyes and ears open as we go down that and make sure if we've missed any key things or points they can add it in.
Alejandro Pisanty:	For time management and for output purposes here we have lunch at half past twelve, right now it is just past half past ten. I would like to see text on screen at some point. That's at least you know the scraps that will make the text. I think that what we have seen already for example, can just be assembled into a text. Simon's summaries, Xiaodong's, and Anders' contributions.
	They actually call down for me right now as our present status texts. That means that there are many challenges there for example the text that Xiaodong has written is very challenging for a member of our team, a valued member of our team who is Bill Manning and it is challenging to the roots of our management community in general, so we could devote some time to discuss that thing and see whether we can get, I will say better text in the

sense that it's text that is more acceptable for the whole team as an output that you would actually have to sign eventually.

But you know, again barring that caveat that we will have to have some discussion, I think we really need to begin deciding what goes in text and we'll have to have on screen our draft. I don't know if you all agree. So I don't know how to proceed right now, whether we should go on to Jeff and the report from Subteam Two and have this general overview of what's going in there and then go back to square one with Simon's report and begin to see paragraph by paragraph what we believe can go into the text.

I will propose to you that we don't discuss things in lots of detail because our aim today is scope, not depth. And I would even say that quality stands also to a side, what we want to know more is what contents are there, we'll get them in depth and we'll get improved quality, but what we must not leave without is things that we already know what we want to say, we have to see them on screen. Do we all agree? So do we go then to Jeff.

Jeff Brueggeman: I think my suggestion would be to be, especially because it's really just Bill and I and I think as we saw some of what Simon's team had done it gets a little bit into implementation and some of what we, especially of what Bill's is going to talk about with the SSR plan get a little bit into scope so I think having the quick overview of what we found as well can be a good starting point for the discussion.

So Bill had looked at the actual SSR plan and I think both read a little bit of fiscal year 11 and the PowerPoint that is out for common on fiscal year 12 and then also wanted to provide some further information on the RSAC, in light of the meeting we had the other day.

Bill Manning: Since I just really started to do some serious document reading and extraction in the last couple of days with regard to the plan itself, the driver for me was the distinction between as Rodney pointed out at our last meeting in San Francisco, the scope of our work, which is the security and stability and resilience of the DNS as viewed through the lens of ICANN's limited technical oversight.

So if you take that and then you look at the SSR plan, one point, one observation becomes very clear in that a lot of the ICANN's SSR work is focused on things other than SSR for the DNS. It's SSR for the organization and so pulling those two pieces apart and focusing on just the DNS specific ones is intriguing and we'd actually need to go back and look at what Simon did and said.

Okay, so the limited technical scope versus what ICANN is actually doing, how did ICANN get to where it is from where it's mission and charter and by-laws statements say that it should be. Are some of this in scope or out of scope and we can sort of make some judgment calls there about how they got there. So I've got some ideas about how that works and which pieces actually I think still remain in scope and which ones were sort of thrown at

ICANN, basically a baby was thrown out and ICANN caught it and didn't really know what to do with it so they kept it.

That's not necessarily a bad thing but that is simply, we need to document how those things came into existence. So there's probably four pages of random notes which I have not put together in cohesive text and sent out.

The other piece which came up in some discussions earlier this week, was a little bit of clarity or an attempt at a little bit of clarity on RSAC and the root operators and their relationships with ICANN. I put some text together with some references and sent that around to the SSR Two Team list earlier today, Xiaodong, you probably should have seen that before you did your report on RSAC or did your analysis of RSAC because you were only looking at RSAC from the monochromatic lens of the documents you were given from ICANN, you didn't actually look into the rest of the community or see what was actually out there.

That stuff is now available so we can try and fold that back in. I think that actually answers some of the things that Alex you've been concerned about vocally, for a while. Whether that's right or wrong, it at least clarifies the position about why things are the way they are. So that's the extent of my input thus far.

Jeff Brueggeman: So as I said, the others parts of the implementation that we looked at were kind two, well I guess in three areas. One was going to be the implementation of the SSR plan, Bill's looking at the SSR plan

itself both in terms of scope as you said as well as you know I would say the plan sets the priorities for ICANN on SSR so kind of evaluating that and then Autep was going to look at how is the plan being implemented so we now have the status reports from Patrick so I think that is ripe for one of the next steps that we should have is to dig into the status and the implementation of the plan.

Rodney is looking at how security is being handled within the ICANN organization, with a particular focus on the security staff, but not limited to that. We had talked about maybe at least including compliance as a component of what could be looked at as well. I think Rodney thought that we have the basic organizational documents but he also thought this would lend itself to doing some in-person interviews, especially with Jeff now coming on board face-to-face in Washington. So would still put that as a recommended step the next step to do that, if we can get the commitment from Rodney to get that done fairly quickly.

Then the third element which is something that I had done, and I don't know if this is on the Wiki or not, but I had looked at security and how it was being addressed in some of the public proceedings. So I looked at the public comment proceeding on the SSR plan itself, on the DNS CERT proposal as an example of an issue that brought up kind of what is ICANN's role on security. In the new gTLD process and also looked at the new DNS, or DSSA Working Group and I'd say a couple of high level impressions were that obviously I think ICANN has a very commendable, transparent process for putting things out and drafting, getting comments and

so you can tract the evolution there and there are summaries of all the common proceedings and there are also attempts to show where input was incorporated into the ICANN document.

However, I do think, and Bill you had originally noted this. There has been a very low level of participation from the community on the SSR plans and things like that. I think the new format this year that is more of a PowerPoint rather than a report may be was an attempt to try to make it accessible. I also think the Working Group itself, the core mission is to enhance the profile of SSR issues in the broader community, particularly within the GNSO and make more connections on SSR issues there.

But I think one kind of tentative, straw man recommendation I had is that maybe it's something in part of our review, is to get some community comment or try and re-invigorate some public comment on the issues of what is ICANN's core responsibility and the big issue of how they're prioritizing their security work in the SSR plan itself, given the limited participation that's happened to date. So that's kind of what the implementation group looked at

Alejandro Pisanty: Several points here. First, I'll go back to Bill's participation. I think it is very valuable and the documents you provided and the pointers you provided are very important. We'll probably not be able to come out with a unified opinion about root server management and communications and relationships between root server operators and the impact on security and stability. It will be

very hard even if we find ourselves in a unified statement that's not vague, but specific enough instead of being, okay we agree on almost nothing and we state that.

It will still be hard for that document to be satisfactory to all parties. There may be people in the GAC for example who would be unhappy with the outcome and we're not writing reports to please everybody, but to fulfill a mission. So we need to go into more depth, not necessarily right now, but certainly over the coming weeks in order to find a way to describe the variables involved in root server management, with relationships involved and find where a way to describe credibly how parts of those arrangements actually enhance the stability of the DNS for example. How they don't and whether the documentation is satisfactory.

One possible outcome is that the review team agrees that the arrangements are solid, useful, robust enough, but that documentation to prove it is insufficient. You know we have a whole spectrum of possible outcomes there. As days go by this issue becomes clearly underlined as one of the important issues that we have to deal with so getting a very solid report that can at least not be challenged for being counter-factual is very important. We may, I mean people may know not like the facts, even we as a team together may not like the facts, but what must make sure is that all the facts are properly described and accounted for, that's one point.

Second, more generally for this section of your participation, Jeff and Sub-Team Two. Again my very stark question is what goes down on the report. What text goes down on the report? So let's also have it on screen very soon today in the session and we can elaborate. I mean we know that draft from today will still be a very long way from the final, but we have to have it; particularly coming back to the root server section, we should leave today with text that incorporates both views expressed by Xiaodong and many others that the challenge of the present model, at least for lack of documentation and we should look as well as that to incorporate Bill's text that describes much more the way it works and its contribution to peace of mind and the value to ones who have the text what we actually have to do further.

But I think both of your contributions are particularly valuable. This is a sensitive issue, like few others, for the report so let's get a practical way of recording the work that has already been done and moving forward with it.

Xiaodong Lee: I think have a comment about the Review Team work. For Team One for governance, there is a lot documents to review, but our commission is to separate into different sections and different kind of issues. Different sections is saying different working scope. So I think that after review of the documentation maybe we can provide a summary for such scope. Actually not only for only one document. We use a template to write down the summary for every document we have reviewed but I think this is not enough.

For me, I reviewed over 10 documents. I need to try to recall in my memory for every document I have reviewed. I think that for me when I finish the review for RSAC, that maybe I try to make a summary for RSAC

For example, maybe for the ICANN SSR, it also needs a summary for this section so we need to make it easier to get a summary for SSR review team.

Alejandro Pisanty: Let me try to see if I can take a more general conclusion from this what you are saying, which is I don't think that for any of the vital documents that we're reviewing the summaries we have are already the work that we have to do. They are pointers, they tell us about the importance of doing priority and timing for doing one of them in more depth or earlier than others, but we have to go in depth and do those documents. What we record today for the draft will maybe an open, will be a paragraph or two and when we finish the report those paragraphs will only be the opening paragraphs of the section that reviews things like the SSR plan.

Once we have this before our eyes we will begin to be able to prioritize and to hand over tasks to specific members of the team to provide a first draft in more detail now.

Jeff Brueggeman: I just had a thought of as we've been going through the list, it seems like there are things that we haven't looked at yet, and

maybe one question is what should we, so contracted parties, I was talking with Hartmut this morning about the ASO, you know the RARs, I think we had a good meeting with The GAC, maybe a question would be law enforcement maybe, and maybe these are different levels of priority, but it did strike me that there are potentially other things that should be at least on our list of potential things to look at.

Simon McCalla: Yes, I think that to be clear as well, with Team One our plan was to try and get down the entire list of documents. I think what you see up on the screen there and the summary was as far as we got, which is only right and it wasn't a particularly accurate, I don't think we ever sat down and prioritized the documents. I think our plan was start at the top, finish at the bottom and I think we just kind of, you're absolutely right Jeff, we missed some of those points which I think would serve us well to possibly focus in quite quickly on those if we can and come back with some analysis to feed in. I think it would be really useful.

So we're just trying to talk about next steps really.   So I think the idea was to go, Jeff here probably makes sense is he was to lead us through this. To try and focus back on a draft of the issues, sort of by team and then   to work through some questions affectively that we might start asking.

Jeff Brueggeman:	So I think Alejandro I think you had raised a good point earlier in the week, which is we had divided the work up, functionally to avoid duplication, but we need to also start thinking about the report itself and in that sense we thought it was worth trying to refine the organization and not get hung up on the Working Groups as driving what we're doing.
	So although there is maybe a general correspondence to it, we really tried to think about it in terms of looking back at the affirmation of commitments paragraph that relates to our review team, are we answering the key questions that were directed to answer and since Rodney is not here, he took us back to that five times in San Francisco and we always found it helpful to look back at that so it seemed like it was maybe we could still rely on kind of the three general categories of issues, but I think they're a little bit different than the way that we had maybe done the work and as we found some of time he was looking at was in, yeah anyway.
	Let's look at from a fresh perspective as if this is an outline for how the report would actually be structure. With that, the first set of issues is kind of the scope of ICANN's SSR responsibilities and I like the way that you have talked about the layered concentric circle, the core set of responsibilities. There are areas where ICANN exerts influence either directly through contracts or more indirectly with the RARs and the root zone operators, right. There is different levels of arrangements broadly and then there is a further sphere of ICANN being part of as Jeff was saying this morning a much larger set of organizations and entities that have

some impact on security of the DNS and governments and law enforcement have kind of fallen in my mind to that category.

So that would be the questions that we're trying to answer are how do we think about ICANN's scope of its responsibilities and then there are a number of ways to dig into that question, in looking at the information that we've reviewed. To your point I think that maybe what we should do is maybe start to capture what is our view of that question almost like a building block from all these different perspectives and then we can maybe have a review about what we think.

Olof Nordling: More open-ended discussion.

Alejandro Pisanty: Sorry to interrupt. What is our view of the answer to the question, not any more, I mean a view of the question still keeps us in project phase, which you certainly have to be but we'll know much more what the project is if we start saying what's the present status of our reply to each question.

Jeff Brueggeman: So I don't know Simon, maybe, I think the first starting point of my view is always the foundation for ICANN's responsibilities as articulated in formal documentation like the AOC bylaws and things like that, so do you have maybe a starting point based on that of how ICANN's technical mission is to defined?

Simon McCalla: Yes, just thinking that. I wonder whether too, we sort of talked about posing a questions which we would then have to answer, or hypothesis if you like and I wonder whether this too is a hypotheses which is there clarity around ICANN's SSR responsibilities, are clear and are they well-articulated and I'd like to capture Bill's point which is where and I'm shooting from the hip here as I make the question, but it's kind of where is it that the responsibilities have kind of evolved rather than their limited technical issue and Bill, maybe you can articulate that better for me.

Bill Manning: So if you look at the by-laws and the mission in the charter it clearly states ICANN has a limited technical role in the management of the DNS and certain parts of the DNS. It doesn't really give ICANN any operational responsibility. So as you look at the actual statements from the Charter and the Bylaws, we say that's what that is and then you look at SSR through that lens and you see what the actual landscape of ICANN is. There is a lot of stuff and actually in the current SSR plan it actually has these sort of transitional boundaries about influence and control.

So ICANN has control over a small set of things and influence over some and is cooperative in a large number. So you can kind of view that as a continuum. And then if you actually start to drill down and say the things you actually control, how did you get that

control? Is that something that came from the Mission and Charter, or was it something that your client gave to you? The client in this case being Department of Commerce.

It said, "Here, do this for me," and ICANN said "Ah, sure." So some of those things happened, in that context. Others occurred in the context of an evolutionary step so things like the DNS signing tools and the RPKI signing tools are a natural evolution of their management of those resources as opposed to "Here, handle these operations."

And so pulling the separation or clearly identifying the separation of core things from their inception, evolutionary things that came from that and additional tasks that were given to them by the community or their client in lieu of any other place to put them, is probably useful to separate those things out and say, this is where we think things currently sit and then if you look at the SSR plan as a whole and ask the question is a strong ICANN equivalent to a strong DNS, you get an answer which is probably no, but a weak ICANN is detrimental to a strong DNS. So there is a second order of effect between the organization and the service. Drawing the connections there I think is a useful activity.

Simon McCalla: Thank you I think it is really important. I'm trying to see if we can capture a few sentences that would effectively become a work package for somebody to go and work on here. So a hypothesis that somebody's either got to approve or disprove. So I'm just

thinking about what you just said and whether we say, I'm trying to find the working here, help me out anybody else who can think of it, but is there clarity, is it clear where ICANN has deviated from its original state of responsibilities and are you clear on the reasons why that document moved. Do you see where I'm coming from on that?

Bill Manning: For me that's clear. Putting it crisply into a sentence or two. I have a tough time making it short, but I know what it is, but I'd have to talk about it for a while and maybe sit at a white board and draw and have some smarter people look at it to come up with the crisp definition.

Alejandro Pisanty: Let's have the non-crisp one.

Bill Manning: Again? I just gave it to you over the last 10 minutes.

Alejandro Pisanty: Just put it into the text and so we'll tease it out in the coming weeks.

Bill Manning: Okay.

Alejandro Pisanty:	I mean, both the in favor and the against texts have to coincide. If we have the in favor, the in favor, we have both, both. If we only against, whatever we have goes into the text today.
Jeff Brueggeman:	I mean it seems like Bill, what you're saying is that ICANN as an inherently kind of complex job or responsibility in this area for a number of reasons, one of which is it's got direct responsibilities that exceed what you would have thought just reading their initial bylaws and reason for being, right? So even with this core set of core responsibilities you know if you look at what they're actually responsible for under the IANA contract and things, it wouldn't match up with what your expectations are, not necessarily with the original bylaws, so that's an interesting observation.
	Then it is even further complicated by the fact that they're on a spectrum of that security of the DNS is a much broader issue than they are directly responsible for. So maybe the hypothesis is it's a very complex issue but it also argues for being very clear about the different types of responsibilities that they exert because it's such a complex issue.
Bill Manning:	So the thing that I really don't want to do is don't want to try and inflict value judgment about whether it is right or wrong, I want to say objectively, this is what it is, this is how it got there. Once we get those things down, then we can start looking at

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recommendations, the value judgments after we have the dispassionate stuff.

Alejandro Pisanty: I'll try to make it even easier, we are going to express value judgments. Our work would be useless otherwise. I mean, if it is just a narrative of what it is in documents it's just too expensive. So we are going to express value judgments, the thing is the value judgments are not going to say is this good or bad, or right or wrong, but contributes to enhance or to endanger the stability, security and resiliency of the DNS within the scope for which ICANN is responsible.

So that gives you a clear measure, a clear error measure. It still is subjective, it still is a value judgment. There still is a huge difference of opinion. I have a huge difference of opinion with what you have said about ICANN for example. Even words like limit of technical remit and no operational responsibility have great room for interpretation, have very broad room for interpretation so getting this written in the draft tells us now we have to make sure that this statement is solid, shared or reported in the discrepancies, right?

So it gives us a method to work and it's good to have everything that everyone thinks that is substantial, material to the issues. Let's get it into the draft and we'll get a document in the end that takes account and leaves a trace of the discussion of these differing

points of view. If we arrive to a consensus, we'll have the consensus, if not we'll have the opposing polar positions reported.

Simon McCalla: I might make a suggestion just to keep us moving, what I suggest you do given that, what I actually think is great, let's just bang down the key issues into, we'll label this with a number, what I suggest is perhaps at some point today when we take a break we'll go back and we'll pick some of these off and we'll try and hone them down into a hypothesis that we can then take as a work package, so by the end of the day you'll have something a little smarter and neater to work on, but I think that the key is to, Jeff, I don't know if you agree with this, but to keep moving down these issues so we don't too much get caught up on one particular issue for half an hour and not move down the list. Does that work?

Jeff Brueggeman: Yes, and I do agree with what Bill is saying, and what Alejandro is saying, I think for each of these issues there is a documentation role that we're playing and saying we've looked at, we've surveyed the documentation, put it all together and done an analysis and explained what ICANN's remit is, but then that also leads to hypotheses or questions about is ICANN following and defining its scope consistent with what we see to be the documentation.

Number one, I'd say the other big question in this area, is what is the community view. Is there kind of agreement and understanding of that role and that's where the questions come in

that we're going to ask to The GAC and to others, in your list of questions, this is one of the big issues. What is your understanding, community stakeholder group, of what ICANN's role is, and do you think they are following it.

So we're getting, we inserting our analysis, but we're also getting other input to help evaluate and we may, to me there is a little bit of an open question that I don't know what the hypothesis is about how much confusion is there out there, or disagreement about what ICANN's role is. It is a little bit of an open question in my mind.

Simon McCalla: I think it is kind of what Bill said, the hypothesis is going to be somewhere along the lines of how much ICANN may have unintentionally deviated from their limited technical mission, and scope and then the analysis becomes well, this is what we think, this is what The GAC thinks, this is was RSAC thinks, etcetera, etcetera and then then we can draw a conclusion from that so I think there is something useful in that.

Alejandro Pisanty: So do we have in which we can share with Alice the actual paragraphs to have in text and insert them here?

Simon McCalla: My suggestions would be that if we can, is if we try and drive out a really tightly honed paragraph right this second I think we could get caught on each one and take too long. I'm wondering if we

would be better served by kind of capturing bullets like this on each of these and then we can just take maybe half an hour to try and hone these back and we'll come back to the group with each one and say, okay we think issue one the hypothesis is X, does that make sense?

Alejandro Pisanty: That makes sense.

Tim Cole: I guess maybe another issue that would fall into this section would be some of the questions about the relationships with the RSAC and the ASOs and contracted parties. Is there any hypothesis or starting point there?

Simon McCalla: Just again as a starter for Tim, we could put something on the lines of the hypothesis being ICANN has very differing relationships with groups that all have a responsibility for operational stability. Some of these are positive and some of these are less positive. Document these and establish feedback from the various communities or something like that, it's not really a hypothesis but that's the sort of flavor of it. Don't know if that makes sense, Jeff?

Jeff Brueggeman: You want to talk about the next steps for this issue now or should we wait until we try and frame up the overall questions first? What do you think?

Alejandro Pisanty: I think at this point it is better for, I mean it serves our purposes better to try to cover the whole scope and then come back to, I mean many of these things are now going to become questions, very much more focused questions. I mean it is not an open question like ICANN doing well, but it's are there relationships with the RSAC and the individual root server operators established in a way that contributes to enhance the stability, security and resilience of the DNS. That's a better question and we'll have even more detail because we already have Xiaodong's description and opinion and we have Bill's description and opinion so we can really make a small project out of answering each one.

Those are like one-week projects to come back with specific text and we'll have to decide once we have the whole document here, we will see that we have a hundred or hundred and fifty open questions. We'll have to decide which 30 or which 10 we answer first and the others will be lower priority and we may be, you know in a few months from now, we may decide that some of these questions remain open. We consider them of lower priority and go even to an appendix instead of the main body of the report. Further investigation required.

Bill Manning:	It's not really an opinion, it is a documentation of what happened, so there was no, I'm not expressing an opinion I just documented what occurred.
Alejandro Pisanty:	There's are interpretations or let's say after we get those facts straight we may still have an opinion of whether changes in that relationship, moving forward from that history is possible in ways that enhance or reduce the stability of the DNS and recommend those that favor it. Within this scope of the work of the review team of course. We're not tasked with reinventing ICANN but we're tasked with finding out how well it works with stability etcetera and how to improve it.
	To be very specific about this, I mean with RSAC and root server management. If we just insert Bill's email in an appropriate point of this page, I think we will already be very well served. Xiaodong's paragraphs about the root server management and Bill's paragraphs about root server management, we already have a very compelling story there and a useful project.
Simon McCalla:	So I guess a question is, do we split this into two here because I'm just wondering whether there's an issue about documenting or understanding the scope of all of its relationships with SOs and ACs is a more focused question about RSAC, I think. Would that be fair? Otherwise this is in danger of just becoming an RSAC question in its own right, rather than a document with a broader …

Jeff Brueggeman:	Well I think it sounds like the RSAC is further along because you haven't looked at the contracted parties in the other thing, so that's an open question whether the same... You may develop a hypothesis about those other arrangements but you're going to evaluate them the same way. This isn't a unique RSAC issue. Just, you haven't looked at the other things yet.

Okay, the next set of issues, again going back to the affirmation of commitments, notes the fact that ICANN has an SSR plan and directs that we are to evaluate the effectiveness of the plan and also look at whether ICANN is maintaining clear processes, so that seems to fall into two subcategories of issues. One is as we said, something that our group had looked at, which was looking at the implementation of the plan, which I think of as both: what are the priority projects that are identified in the SSR plan, are those the right ones; and then how are they being implemented in terms of the strategic plan and the annual budget process and the status reports that Patrick said that they are maintaining.

We're kind of doing an evaluation... so I would say one big question for us here is, has ICANN identified the right priorities in a way that is both consistent with its scope of responsibilities and likely have the most positive impact on enhancing the SSR. Secondly are they providing the resources and the follow through? Are they being successful in implementing their priority projects?

To me there is both aspects of it. I'm kind of testing the plan itself as it is getting into more detail and then testing the follow through on the plan. Then there is, I think, maybe a more general how is the ICANN security functions, how are those being performed, almost as an organization as well.

Alejandro Pisanty: Let's try to adjust, take the method you are using a step further. Let's change that question that you made, or any of the question you made into a statement, one possible answer, yes or no. And let it go down in the text.

Jeff Brueggeman: And Bill, I'm interested in your thoughts, my impression was that I thought that the plan was good in how it distinguished between areas that it directly controls and areas where its coming up with projects that relate to where it is more of an engagement or a cooperation. You may disagree with that, I do think that there is not as much of an element of which are the priorities so its got a number of things, but maybe my hypothesis going in is maybe there needs to be more of a prioritization.

Alejandro Pisanty: Turn this into crisp statements. Crisp statements would mean that in the second bullet under Key Issues you would have text that reads, the ICANN SSR plan for 2011-2014 has improved over previous versions by defining their responsibilities by layers.

The second statement that says it is still not specific enough to track responsibilities, or to track what you were minding to track, goals and resources. I don't mean is our final opinion, I only mean to use a very stark statement a very provocative statement that we make a project of responding based on all the hypotheses. You want to prove or disprove this statement. Let's not leave it as a question. Let's leave it as statements and you know either use the starkest one, even the most provocative one, even if we don't believe it is true, or the one that already has consensus.

Bill Manning: I may suggest that layers might be clarified by layers of influence.

Alejandro Pisanty: I agree with you on not using layers loosely. Probably spheres on influence would be better than layers, so we don't used the technical and meaningful word layers for something it's not meant. Do you agree, Bill? I totally agree not using layers except for Layer One, Layer Two...

Bill Manning: Having influence in there I think is a good idea, whether its layers or spheres, I'm not bound by geography. To Jeff, your point, I think that actually there's some subtle nuances once we start looking at how ICANN imparts or projects its influence at each of those levels as to whether that's appropriate or not but that is not something at this level. So as we start to drill down and look at

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individual pieces and say is the project influence of ICANN appropriate, for where they are.

Jeff Brueggeman: So you may identify some specific areas that you wouldn't highlight as questioning or disagreeing maybe with where they are.

Bill Manning: Right, I think in general the SSR plan is a fabulous piece of work. The ICANN staff did a yeoman's job pulling it together and its not horribly bad, or horribly wrong, but I think there are parts of it in which ICANN has been overly enthusiastic in it's approach to that particular sector or that particular problem space. And it's simply for us to identify where we think that they may have gone a little far or maybe not far enough.

Jeff Brueggeman: I think that's an important issue and Alejandro I actually think that based on the status reports that Patrick sent, I think they are doing a, I wouldn't raise a major concern about the level of specificity, again I would maybe go back to more of the prioritization of, okay I've got 20 things identified and you are tracking them. I think again, subject to looking at this further, my initial inclination would be I'd like to see maybe a little more prioritization of those initiatives within that. But I think they are making progress in putting more structure into the …

Alejandro Pisanty:	Give us a header for that section. A paragraph that opens that section.

Jeff Brueggeman:	I think I would start with what you said, I think its improved by defining the responsibilities by the spheres of influence and starting to have a structure process for documenting the implementation. I think the two things that we're questioning are #1 Are there some specific areas where they may be, as Bill said, over enthusiastic in where they're going? and #2 Should there be more of an effort to prioritize the initiatives under the plan?

Simon McCalla:	I wonder if it's worth, I think there is something about is it measurably, it comes from my being an outsider, is the plan measurable it's back being specific I guess, but is it measurable and are we tracking to those measures effectively in the plan? We could even go as simple as – Is the ICANN SSR plan smart? That would catch measurable, achievable.

Jeff Brueggeman:	I think that's a good … To me it's almost related to my reaction on the prioritization as I'm tracking individual things but how do I track the overall effectiveness and assess whether it's a smart plan. Somehow a more holistic vision is needed on an on-going basis as well. I think that is a good point.

Simon McCalla:	I second Bill's point, I want to capture Bill's point as well because I second that. Being, was on the ccNSO review team recently, was asked to consult on it and they kind of waded into that classic muddy water with a plan of – it's too wide, it's too broad, it's just a list of everything that they're doing, yadda, yadda, yadda – which felt very harsh and I think that's part of why you saw some of that feedback from The GAC and ccNSO.
	We were trying to say, the feedback I gave into it was just can't we be more specific, can't we be more measurable, but that cost lost in the choppier waters of perhaps some more vocal voices in the ccNSO so I think there is something here about just being kind of really precise about what we're trying to think about what you've been saying there. Which is about there is a whole ton of good stuff in here and how do we try and bring it out so that the community sees that ton of good stuff and it is specific and it's measurable?
Jeff Brueggeman:	And then I'd say, taking the next layer down, and I'm curious what you say, I mean to me there is a good linkage in how the SSR plan is linked to them, the Strategic Plan and the budget, so there is that. However, again, I think that we felt like we wanted to look more closely to understand the budget and I think that includes a discussion with the staff to understand better, you know in a more holistic way.

Okay, we can see some budget items here, but explain to us, how – what are all the pieces that should be considered? I guess my working hypothesis is there is good flow-through and linkage in the plan into things like the budget and the Strategic Plan and those priorities, but again we have questions about the priorities and the details of how that's being done.

Simon McCalla: Yes that would probably add clarity, yes priorities, clarity and maybe that's the same as details, Jeff.

Jeff Brueggeman: A strong theme in the business constituency comments on our review team and on the SSR plan is that they think there should be more focus on contract enforcement as for example. So we may get some specific issues that some stakeholder would raise within the priorities.

At this point, as far as ICANN as an organizational function, I don't think enough has been done for me to say there is anything that jumps out and with Jeff just coming on board, I think that is something that over the next two to four weeks we should get a better sense of what he sees as his priorities and how things are going to be, you know, both understanding the direction there to kind of assess that. Then I already made the point about from a clear process standpoint I think there is a lot of positive things to say about how this is a very transparent process and how of all these things are being developed.

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Again, the hypothesis would be it would be good to find ways to have more community input into these issues and maybe the Working Group might be one avenue that is going to be helpful in that area.

Alejandro Pisanty: Can we go down the list now? Just wait for Alice to finish I think. Done? Okay, thanks.

Jeff Brueggeman: We're testing you today.

Alejandro Pisanty: Was well into the 120 characters per minute. So we have something on the scope, we have something on the description of the layers of the responsibility, can you project the page further down?

Alice Jansen: Near the bottom?

Alejandro Pisanty: ICANNs, IANA and other operational DNS functions. We already have paragraphs to that in your side, right?

Jeff Brueggeman: That's back under #1, so you need to scroll down. I think we covered everything in the second section.

Alejandro Pisanty: I don't think so. Let me tell you why. We haven't even touched on the sequence of actions between NTAA, VeriSign and ICANN that give rise to changes in the route and that's a key area of investigation at the policy level first and then in implementation. We have to know what the rules are and see if they are secure enough, stable enough, they are not destabilizing themselves. There are things that, I mean recent events that tell us that there is something there.

In the FNY, in the Further Notice of Inquiry of IANA there's a very clear cut start and strong emphasis in saying that IANA staff should not take part in the policy development processes that affect IANA. That is read by some in the community as a signal that they actually apply criteria that they have. That means that there is some contention there between NTIA and IANA, we should know where it comes from.

I mean, going to a layer higher than say an integrated layer above the document, the whole FNY and the way the Department of Commerce of the US goes about it, are critical factors for the stability of the DNS so we have to boil them down to things that we can actually investigate at the document and at the implementation level. So I would go back there and say.

We have to get documentation of those procedures, make sure that they are known publicly and that they increase the stability instead of endangering it.

Jeff Brueggeman: So can you go over what you, which documents?

Alejandro Pisanty: The description of the procedures for changes in the route.

Jeff Brueggeman: Denise is that something that exists, somewhere? I mean is that laid out, I mean Simon, you looked at the IANA contract, is that something that is specified in there?

Denise Michel: I'm happy to look into and report back to you.

Simon McCalla: I want actually find out if we captured in Section One, sorry Alice, there was a question actually about is the relationship between ICANN and IANA clear and effective. Back to that scope piece, actually I wonder whether we capture that as a scoping issue.

Jeff Brueggeman: I guess I have a question about that, to me since the Affirmation of Commitments was issued by the Department of Commerce to

ICANN and it's to review ICANN's implementation, I question whether how the decisions that Department of Commerce is making are, to me that's beyond the scope of our review because it's not fair to hold ICANN accountable for what the Department of Commerce is or isn't doing with the IANA contract that ICANN is the vendor.

So we're evaluating, here's what you were told to do, are you doing it. But if we disagree with the way the contract was structured, that's a disagreement with the Department of Commerce and I'm not saying people shouldn't disagree with it, but to me that would be comments to be filed with the Department of Commerce and that NOI not something that we're reviewing when we're looking at is ICANN fulfilling its role? Alejandro do you have a different view on that?

Alejandro Pisanty: Yes, I have.

Bill Manning: So I want to go back to some of these questions about documentation about what this role is. In the root scale ability study, there was an indication in there that, or some documentation about the current process for editing, the editing function is – and the relationship between the parties.

There was intimated that there was some automation being planned in that report and in the current SSR plan they talk about RZM,

root zone management activity, which tells me that plan has actually come into existence and has been documented and maybe approved and is probably available under NDA with ICANN. I think that there is actually, if we can be a little bit more crisp, could you check about whether or not we can review the RZM documents?

Jeff Brueggeman: Well that certainly like an important, I mean Alejandro I think you pointed out there is a gap that we did not cover that process and that's key. If changes are being made to it then that could be a positive or it could be something that would raise concerns, right?

Alejandro Pisanty: This also goes to a question that Bill had set forth a couple of months earlier, which is whether ICANN was properly managing the risk of not getting assigned the IANA contract. Even if it now seems likely that the IANA contract will be signed with ICANN, you still have to ask whether ICANN is properly managing the risks that come from changes in the contract. So therefore we will have to look at the contract and the actual documentation of the procedures and then the implementation. And talking about the implementation you go straight into ccTLD land where there are comments about pace and the way in which changes in the root like delegation or re-delegation stuff or just you know changing ccTLD's fax number.

We are not going to go into an operations review. We're not going to go into a consumer satisfaction review at all, but we have to look at these issues insofar as they may create instabilities.

Simon McCalla: Is this a simple one, which is a question that just says, is there anything in the ICANN, IANA, and NTIA relationship that endangers Security, Stability and Resilience?

Jeff Brueggeman: Again, I would say that's too broad of a question because there's only so much that is within ICANN's control. I think the contingency planning is an interesting... I mean, I think, had they set up a good process to implement those functions is clearly a relevant question, then the question of contingency planning seems.... But I guess if you ask it too broadly I think it could be that the Department of Commerce is endangering the security and stability with how they've done it, but I wouldn't say, you know what I mean? So we have to hone in more specifically on ICANN's part of that equation to me. I think the process and the contingency planning as Alejandro described it to me fit within that part of it.

Simon McCalla: You're right Jeff, I'm just wondering whether the question would focus in on the ICANN part of that relationship, rather than, so you looked into actually this particular piece of the relationship is

endangering stability, however, it's not in ICANN's remit. This is DoC issue and it's not in ICANN's remit or purview to change this. That would be an appropriate conclusion to draw. I know what you mean, it's a broad topic.

Alejandro Pisanty: Let me just elaborate a little bit without trying to belabor the point because we have to move forward, but one of the ways this situation creates, I mean this part of ICANN's operations creates liabilities and security risks, stability risks mostly is that if it doesn't go well it causes complaints, for example, by ccTLD managers which get reflected in governments and which feed into IGF, ITU processes as well as into the GAC.

Those at least make ICANN spend a lot of cycles explaining again how things work in those fora and avoiding damage. It gets very serious when you get to that place and it's also important to understand whether ICANN actually has enough control to fulfill its responsibilities or it's in some way at the mercy of third parties. That key operational point for ICANN is putting things into the root.

Jeff Brueggeman: Alright, so the third area, you know obviously Martin's group was, you know we lost... Martin's there, so I would say we're a little behind on knowing exactly what is there but it seems like there are kind of two different ways to approach this. One is looking at the existing and emerging risks from a number of perspectives and I

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know Patrick has sent around and you've put on the Wiki, so external reports that look at DNS security.

Whether it was the DHS study and other things, we obviously have some technical expertise here to contribute to that so there's kind of the external view and then there is what level of contingency planning is ICANN already undertaking and there is a process question of – are they structured to do the risk management contingency planning within ICANN? I would say I don't know enough sitting here to have an opinion on whether they have accounted for existing and emerging risk. I did think that in the SSAC discussion that we had the idea that there was an acknowledgement I think by Ram Mohan, that there really should be a more comprehensive contingency planning done.

I think one of the documents we have is that there was an IANA, there was some contingency plan exercises within IANA so there is some experience there, but as far as ICANN doing a broader contingency plan that sounds like that is a recommendation that is pending before the Board to create a committee and to do that. My initial inclination that sounds like an essential important idea that we would recommend and endorse. I would say one of our next steps should be to get more information about exactly what is that proposal and what would that be?

Simon McCalla: Is there a question here about , just trying to frame it in a kind of hypothesis. Is risk management and contingency adequately

handled between ICANN SSR staff and their responsibilities and the supporting organizations that have an SSR agreement, something along those lines.

So it would be a question of taking a look at the 10 roles under SSR, plus also recognizing what Patrick said about you've got your Joes, and your Rick Lambs who also do this, so clearly there is a chunk there. And is SSAC suitably doing its job in terms of advising them on contingency, or is it too busy looking at operational issues to be gazing at the feet, you know whatever those are, there's a really interesting piece of analysis around that. Does that make sense as a single kind of hypothesis point?

Alejandro Pisanty: Let me try to make this more specific. Let me ask the ccTLD managers present whether they have procedures here that ICANN could use as examples, Hartmut or Anders. How do you manage the emerging risk management for your ccTLDs. I know we also have Xiaodong Li and Simon McCalla from the ccTLD community so if you want to jump in first Xiaodong.

Xiaodong Li: Maybe I'm misunderstanding, I don't know what is the relationship between the SSAC is the risk management.

Alejandro Pisanty: First of all let's write down that at least one member of the SSR RT is asking you that question. Who already had the interview with the SSAC.

Jeff Brueggeman: I may have misunderstood the discussion, but I thought what we heard there is that the SSAC was asked to do a contingency plan, a broad contingency plan exercise and they said that they felt that was beyond their mission, but there was a recommendation with the Board to create a Board level contingency planning function. Did others have that take-away from that discussion.

Bill Manning: I did have the take-away that it wasn't a contingency plan as much as it was a risk assessment of the DNS which is too big.

Alejandro Pisanty: Risk Management Framework.

Bill Manning: Right, which is way too big for ICANN to swallow and digest. It's way outside the scope of the narrow technical mission so if you actually drill down and say through the lens of the narrow technical thing that ICANN is supposed to have for its part of the DNS, then ask what are the risks to that small set of pieces.

Then that is doable and I actually understood from Patrick before he left the room that there is an ICANN Board resolution to set up

a Board committee to do some risk planning, which we should hear about this afternoon. Or tomorrow or whenever the Board meeting is. So they're starting to look at that, but I think that is really, the tiny scope is the risk analysis or the risk framework. Not necessarily the contingency plans.

Simon McCalla.   Yes and I think that just reflecting on that discussion as well I think that it is almost probably as separate point, but there was that very poignant point that Ram said, which was when they were asked to do a contingency planning exercise, ie root scaling, it was a fait accompli. They felt it was a fait accompli and they were just being asked effectively back up a decision that had already been made, rather than a proper assessment of the risks.

I don't know whether that is a separate question, where we go very specific on that one which is, was SSAC put under pressure to approve new gTLD expansion, or the hypothesis is, SSAC was put under pressure to approve the root scaling of new TLDs because you know that would clearly be a very controversial finding if we went back to the board and said, actually you force SSAC to say yes to this because the CEO had already approved the program publicly. That may be too heated that one but I just wanted to be able to capture it.

Jeff Brueggeman: Maybe a hypothesis should be that there should be a more structured way... One of my take-aways from that meeting is that

there a more structured way to make sure that the contingency planning and the SSR analysis is a more formalized part of ICANN decision making process. So that you don't get into a situation where it is brought up, kind of maybe, the perception was it was brought up later in the process where it was more difficult to raise a concern at that point.

Simon McCalla: I certainly think it is a politer way of putting it, yes.

Jeff Brueggeman: Well, it's more of a recommendation for, if there is concern that there may be a situation where either SSR issues aren't being adequately address or maybe addressed in a way that creates pressure to move forward, there should be a structure in place to make sure it's kind of a mandatory part of the process and that it can be done in an objective way, without feeling like the outcome is predetermined.

Simon McCalla: You're right, so perhaps the hypothesis is – ICANN's current process for expansion of the DNS is not suitably robust, is that the right word? Is not suitably procedural to capture risks prior to agreeing decisions that could affect SSR, something along those lines.

Alejandro Pisanty: Let's let it go down that way, I would also add RSAC to SSAC for their root scaling study as we were told in the meeting with the RSAC that they actually did work together in it.

Jeff Brueggeman: To summarize this section, we think that there is a definite need for contingency planning, we want to learn more about what is the pending proposal to do that, but that seemed to be an acknowledged recognition in our discussion with the SSAC that there should be something there and that it is broader than the SSAC's responsibility.

There is kind of a process concern and recommendation about using the root scaling as an example of something that we recommend that there be a more better process and then I think we are putting, in my mind as an open question, some analysis of some of these broader DNS risk papers, to see if that identifies anything, any specific issues that ICANN should be considering in its own risk management contingency planning. It is kind of TBD based on that further review.

Hartmut Glaser: Alejandro, you mentioned the ccTLD examples. Are you looking for let's say practical examples used by some countries or are you looking for documents. We can use by example...

Alejandro Pisanty: We are looking for the three layers. So for example if a ccTLD manager organization has procedures or a contract or something to explore emerging risks, if they have a contract with a company or a consultancy or they have their own security detail that does emerging risks surveillance, or they have just standard risk management procedures, contingency plans and so forth.

That would be important to the record to have as a reference. And it is also part of the ecosystem that I can say this review does impinge on the fact many organizations think that ICANN should provide them with support in areas like emerging risk to the DNS and ccTLDs are a prime example here. Some of this has come up in ccTLD training workshops for example.

Hartmut Glaser: Include secondaries, include risk recovery facilities.

Alejandro Pisanty: Contingency plan, as you mentioned having a secondary that you can actually activate as soon as you begin to have a DDOS attack for example, or ways to detect these attacks. We're training for the staff in the ccTLD in order to handle security, so what can you tell us about NIC-BR for example?

Hartmut Glaser: Well, we have a complete plan so I can probably detail and send something as an input, as an example as a model.

Alejandro Pisanty: This would be very useful for the report because it would first of all, it would clearly go into an appendix or into a square block text within the report, saying for reference, one example NIC-BR, the other CN-NIC for example, UK NOMINET, references and again there is a gap analysis there where we have to ask whether it is ICANN or not to fill. What can you tell us Andres, about .cz?

Andres Phillipe: You should hire a consultancy company for risk and values and we do it once in three years or something like that so we renew those risks and usually upon some risk when enter into each problem and try to somehow mitigate it.

Hartmut Glaser: In relation to the root servers, probably a very, very good example that I know, I don't know is there Autonomica the Sweden model. I think is very, very important. We can invite, how is the name of the manager in Sweden, no the CO of Nordit. Curtis, probably Curtis can be sent in, or could be interviewed. I think is a very, very good example that they use in Sweden. Not the SE, is the root server, the root server under control of Autonomica in Sweden, Stockholm.

Bill Manning: Lars Lemann from Autonomica is here, if we wanted to talk to him. They send someone to most every ICANN meeting generally as part of the Swedish government contingent.

Alejandro Pisanty: Alice can you show us the rest of the page? Any statements about the first two bullets there. ICANN's own assessments of existing and emerging risks and brother risk landscape including users that are not within the scope of ICANN's responsibilities.\

Bill Manning: The first bullet actually is an interesting one because other than the existence of the SSR where they identify some existing and emerging risk, I'm not sure that I would document and identify in a public place, risks that don't have a mitigation strategy identified. So if ICANN has such a list it's not in the SSR and I think they probably do. It would only be available under controlled release. So that is something else we might want to consider asking.

Alejandro Pisanty: Can you put that in one sentence that Alice can pick up?

Bill Manning: One sentence.

Alejandro Pisanty: I mean, something that we can record for today and then elaborate on.

Bill Manning: Known risks without mitigation documentation.

Alejandro Pisanty: I think that is a corollary to a larger statement, right?

Bill Manning: Right, but that's the one that is up there, their own assessments I think they're good for the ones that are public, but for the private ones, which exist, those are known risks without mitigation which they're not going to release publicly.

David Cake: Is this where we're going to discuss escrow and all that sort of stuff? The escrow program and there's both we should look at the ICANN's own arrangements with Iron Mountain and also the way by which third party escrow providers are certified.

Simon McCalla: This might be a slightly contentious one, I just wonder whether, again, I'm welcome to be shut up on this one. Just thinking my own Chief Executive is very keen on at the moment which is exploring the senior staff turn-over issue and whether that has an impact on this SSR, really given that a lot of expertize has left the organization of late. Is that impactful on SSR or are we stepping

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too wide or too narrow at that point, and again I would welcome people's thoughts on that.

Jeff Brueggeman: I think you should put it in. I think it's a real issue . Staff turnover.

Simon McCalla: I guess the question would be is the significant loss of senior staff in recent months a risk to SSR.

Jeff Brueggeman: Of recent months or in the future. If they lost most of their technical people.

Simon McCalla: Yes you're right, I guess it doesn't have to be, just the ones they have lost.

Jeff Brueggeman: If Joe Ebly and his team left, in a fit if pique.

Alejandro Pisanty: Let me try to formulate this in a slightly different way, which may be productive, which will be the the null hypothesis would be there are or there are not depending on your inclinations mechanisms to preserve institutional memory in the presence of staff turnover that affects stability, security and resiliency of the DNS.

That way we do not enter a controversy that is not ours, which is whether there is much or little or the right amount of staff turnover. There is no reason for us to enter into that discussion. We have seen statements that are you know all over the place from Maria Ferrells' statements that ICANN is being stripped of any knowledge to Rod's statements that this turn is reasonable and that the places where people are going are expectable and so forth.

So we don't need to enter that, but what is of concern is whether there are things like proper documentation available which is written all along the life of a worker within ICANN, that it is written in a way that be understood, that's it's made available, that it's easy to find for their successors or their bosses or their reports. Whether there is proper debrief when people leave.

Jeff Brueggeman: I also like the way you frame that because pursuant to Maria's question in the GAC meeting yesterday I don't think we want to look at institutional stability. You're focusing, I think, more on for security issues do you have the right procedures in place to make sure that it's not staff dependent. And then maybe another question would be do you have the right technical capabilities on the staff to do the job. But those are very specific and not kind of – to me we don't want to get into broader ICANN organizational issues here. But those are I think narrowly targeted to what we're looking at.

Alejandro Pisanty: It will take it a step further than out, you know I didn't hear Maria Ferrells' participation yesterday, I was referring to one in San Francisco.

Jeff Brueggeman: I meant Maria from the government of Sweden.

Alejandro Pisanty: Correct, Maria Häll, correct. Institutional stability is a concern, this I mean we cannot go as I said yesterday I think we all agree that we cannot go now and do all the political theory of political instability, the political science let's say of political instability risks for ICANN, but they are significant. Again, it's not only security in the IT sense it is stability. If people perceive as being capricious you know, you don't know the result you get will depend on who is on staff the day you ask for something.

Instead of having institution like procedures, that's a risk for the stability of the system in itself. But so, I mean, the way we boil it down to something that we can actually investigate and formulate instead of having even appearing to be biased where we are not and getting into fights which are not ours, is just to ask whether there are mechanisms to preserve institutional memory. Knowledge, management, what's in that?

Simon McCalla: I agree, I think. I'm troubled by this one slightly. I completely agree that's the right way to go about it, the challenge I have

around that one it's going to be a wild goose chase, I don't know a CIO and in 20 years of being IT director myself, I don't know that ever document what I do and document my institutional knowledge to a point where a new CIO can walk in and instantly without any risk to the organization. I certainly, when in organizations where you do have staff loss, the inevitable question comes up, are we stable and are we losing too much knowledge, do we have a problem here?

So I'm going to, I think there is an issue here that we have to explore, somehow. I just think we need to find a way, I think if we dodge it we're missing a trick here, but I agree we can't, perhaps it is too risky just to go out with that question, I don't know. I'm troubled by this. I don't think that approach works, for me, I just don't think it works, but I don't have a better suggestion, oddly enough, so that's probably not helpful.

Jeff Brueggeman: I think that for a placeholder to come back for further conversation this is a perfectly fine, we've got enough text here to refresh the memory, to go, oh yes, this is what we were talking about, this was the concern. So we haven't lost it, so we've captured the institutional memory of this conversation I think pretty well, thank you Alice. There was something else that came up in a discussion and it's not, let me recite the scenario for you and think about it in terms of contingency or the threats to the DNS.

ICANN has recently, this week, declared that the new gTLD process is unstuck and is proceeding apace and there are certain individuals who are going to proceed with applications for controversial TLDs like "dot gay" for example. Which is perfectly fine under certain jurisdictions and is patently offensive in others. If they proceed some nation states will go block.

There were lots of Working Group sessions about blocking and the DNS this week. If they proceed, and allow these TLDs to come into existence and the name space fragments and we have Balkanization of the internet, is that a threat to the DNS and then the trade-off is open and transparent market base driven versus stability of the infrastructure that they are chartered to protect. How do you capture that in a couple of sentences. Because that's a contingency planning problem. David, do you have good synthesis skills, can you get that down to...

Alejandro Pisanty: I have it more under systemic risk, including contingency planning.

David Cake: We should cover the contingency that blocking will occur and how it will, the system will deal with it, yes.

Jeff Brueggeman: As Alejandro says, is that a systemic risk?

David Cake: The risk of filtering parts of the DNS is system has always been there so it's not entirely, it's just made a bit more imminent.

Jeff Brueggeman: Generally not on a nation state boundary. Other than China and Australia I don't think anybody does it yet. And maybe Sweden.

David Cake: Yes, the problem exists.

Alejandro Pisanty: While we're not in an open to input session, Mr. Moran from INTERPOL offers to add information here and I think it is valuable, so...

Michael Moran: You said Sweden and you were dead right because Sweden, Norway, Finland, Italy, UK, New Zealand are blocking at DNS level, they are blocking DNS level for child abuse material. Then you get into other countries who surrounding moral and religious sensibilities are blocking at a much deeper level but also including DNS.

David Cake: I think technically, are they blocking at the domain name or the URL level?

Michael Moran: The UK is URL, New Zealand is URL, the other countries are blocking at domain. Simple poisoning on the local DNS server, with the return of stop, with the return of another (inaudible).

David Cake: Well I think we should include that in our remit then.

Simon McCalla: I just, the question I guess for me is, maybe undesirable absolutely [con-crypt] organization is not a stability issue and I don't have an answer for that. I'm just sort of uncomfortable.

Jeff Brueggeman: Certainly it is a stability issue because names no longer resolve consistently across the internet.

Alejandro Pisanty: Exactly, the end to end principle and a few other very basic principles of design are at stake here. When the results cannot be predicted just from the technical parameters. Sorry we have Alice Munyua.

Alice Munyua: Yes, I just wanted to support that idea that yes it is a stability issue and in fact the GAC has put out a very strong, well not very strong but a strong concern, especially the introduction of new gTLDs

because most of our countries audit cultural and sensitive, you know we'll be blocking even more strings as they get introduced. And so what the GAC is asking for, that we would like to understand whether there is going be specific hum of blocking the TLDs and whether there is going to be incremental increase in hum when multiple of them are blocked on a wide scale.

Jeff Brueggeman: So I guess at the end of the day the tension that ICANN has as an organization is revenue generation and openness and transparency in the TLD market, versus Balkanization of the internet.

David Cake: We don't need to go for the full Balkanization, I think. The question, just the fact that it is very easy for over-blocking to occur and big chunks of the DNS to not function as required is an issue.

Jeff Brueggeman: But if you posit blocking will exist, blocking will exist for what reason? The reason that blocking exists is because new entries are entered in to the name space which are offensive. Why are they entered, because ICANN allowed them. You can't get in unless ICANN says yes.

Bill Manning: I think the other question though is, blocking at the content layer can also be destabilizing so whether or not you have "dot gay" if

there countries that are trying to block individual material on websites and things like that, that they find offensive, it's almost a question of how you block and not whether you block. Having a domain name identifier for certain types of content, which may encourage more blocking at the DNS level.

David Cake: I mean the argument is probably that if it is blocking at the URL level it is not ICANN's problem, really. But if you are blocking at the domain name level, there are reasons why blocking and filtering exists and not necessarily. The fact that the filtering exists independent of the reasons why is a potential resiliency issue because it can be over-blocked. What we're probably going to see, I mean we're probably going to see people doing some filtering and blocking for a range of reasons on the domain name level so.

Simon McCalla: If I do something which I rarely do, which is take off my Policy IT Director head and just put my purely technical hat one for a sec, I guess, if people are using the DNS protocol correctly to block, the DNS is returning a valid response, not an error or not an NX domain or whatever else, my question is, is that a stability issue.

It may be objectionable and I may not like it, but that's two different things. So I say I'm taking off my policy hat for a minute, if UK or anybody else's servers are returning valid responses and within a timely manner, I'd argue the stability of the DNS is still

up. Whether the DNS is a desirable DNS is a different question for me and I just wonder whether that's a, you know?

Jeff Brueggeman:

Can I rat-hole just for a minute? May I rat-hole just for a minute into some technical stuff? Simon, it's not going to work, that's called monetizing things. If the UK name servers return a valid response within a timely manner, if the data is inaccurate it's wrong, it's bad and you are deceiving and committing fraud on some level.

When DNSSEC is deployed and people are validating even if you're returning a response, even if it is unsigned, it's clearly been manipulated by somebody not in authority. That reduces people's confidence in the data they get through the DNS and a destruction of confidence is a destruction of the value of the system overall. I'm, at a very high level, I am really concerned that ICANN is placing its priorities improperly simply to be able to continue to support the projects that it wants to support and is willing to damage the system a little bit or to allow the system to be damaged a little bit, just so that it can remain viable as an entity. And I don't want to talk about it around here, let's do it over lunch.

Simon McCalla:

Just for the record I completely agree. I just wanted to make sure we're clear about what we mean by stability I guess, that's all.

Jeff Brueggeman:	To take it back to a process where enough serious reservations have been expressed by GAC members and you know there was a paper that Dan Kominsky and others signed and people felt that it's certainly the type of issue that is thoroughly analyzed and considered and some work has been done in some areas and I think we can ask has that really been addressed in a systematic enough way, given the level of concern that's here. We don't have to decide amongst ourselves what their answer is, the question is, is it being thoroughly studied and understood, given that it clearly has the potential to be a very big issue.
Simon McCalla:	I think that maybe that's a more positive way to address that issue, is it argument for stability being well thought through by ICANN and its actions.
Alejandro Pisanty:	Again it's both on the outcome and on the process, whether the right stakeholders are being consulted, brought into the processes and so forth.
David Cake:	I was pretty much just going to agree with Jeff. We're talking about it way and it's obviously an issue that we need to look at even though, even if we may currently disagree as to our response, but also, we should look at the issue of the – I mean essentially

ICANN do they have a contingency plan for widespread blocking and how that will affect their on-going process.

Alejandro Pisanty: Okay, David can you give us a paragraph here. Or Bill, give us your paragraph.

Bill Manning: I think we should ask Alice to give the paragraph. I'll give it a shot and then Alice can refine.   The tension between expanding the name space and domain blocking, whether that fits under contingency or risk I'm not sure, but that I think encapsulates or crystallizes the concern that is that tension.

David Cake: I mean, I think that issue is important to consider, but we also need to consider just domain blocking generally, regardless of the impetus.

Jeff Brueggeman: Well it almost seems to go back to the root zone scaling issue too, of are these issues being considered and identified in an environment that allows for full objective consideration early enough in the process. Right, so the new TLDs in a way is just one example but the broader point is and I think David is raising a very important kind of second issue, which is, the risk is out there, is it being fully thought of in terms of a contingency plan and exercise

as well. And it was going to be there without, potentially without the specific new domain name program.

Alejandro Pisanty: Probably one more way to split it into parts that become tasks for the following weeks is to add a note there about marginal increase. Marginal I don't mean that it is minor, it's the delta, the increase of risk management needs brought in by the expansion of the gTLD space. We already have a concern and we ask whether ICANN is handling it properly and we have an increased concern because of new gTLDs and again have to ask whether that part is being handled properly, right?

Bill Manning: I'm not sure, I think I understand, but it's hazy.

Alejandro Pisanty: There's a concern about stability related to blocking at the DNS level. We ask whether ICANN is handling it properly. We may say it's doing 80% well.

Bill Manning: It has a plan.

Alejandro Pisanty: It has a plan, it has a process, it brings in stakeholders from different fields that are relevant and so forth. Now the introduction

of new gTLDs increases concerns about blocking. Are those increased concerns being properly handled? We have a baseline and an increase.

Bill Manning: Okay, so let me return it. There is currently a small population of TLDs that some filtering is occurring at the domain level today, intermittent or sporadic, however you want to put it, but there is some that occurs. When the population grows is the percentage of blocking consistent or does it go up?

Alejandro Pisanty: Again, what we're looking, we don't have to answer that as much as whether ICANN has proper ways to consider it. ICANN is the one that has to consider whether that goes up really fast or just in an incremental way and whether it has the processes and the stakeholders together and so forth to manage that risk.

Bill Manning: So there's actually then sort of two questions there, one of them is what do you do when there is a delta in the rate of blocking. So if there was a floor level of 2% blocking and all of a sudden it goes to 15, that's one thing. The second is that a 2% block over a population of 300 is manageable, is a 2% block over 3,000 or 30,000 or 3 million acceptable. So you actually sort of have two questions there.

Hartmut Glaser:

Different approach. I don't know how many CCs already joined the CCNSO probably 100, 120, I don't know, yes. But we have 250 country codes. I try to have a very strong relationship with the Africans and I discover that most of them don't follow 7 x 24 don't have contingencies, don't have secondaries, don't have no infrastructure. Not only Africa, probably other countries too, Latin America probably some of the neighbors of Brazil.

Is this in our concern, is that our mission to go in more details? We are looking to increase the gTLDs and we don't operate in a very good way. The CCs that we already in place for the last 25 – 30 years I think that it is a big lack of attention that we need to put on the table. I think that it is our mission to point this weak point of the internet. One internet that we are operating.

Alejandro Pisanty:

This has been a thorny question. One story of how the DNS CERT proposal by Rod Beckstrom and by ICANN came up is that ccTLD managers, you know these weaker operations of ccTLD managers. Some of them were in workshops that ICANN and ISOC have established to train ccTLD managers for specific security management DNS etcetera knowledge.

In at least one of these workshops they said that they just needed support, someone to call, someone to warn them of things coming up and that's where the DNS CERT idea first came up. And we did have the DNS CERT discussion as one of our parameters

following and tracking that discussion, it's important to understand how things are happening in the security/stability area.

So, although ICANN may not be specifically liable for things going wrong in the specific ccTLD, it is being called upon to provide assistance to ccTLD managers and let's say we go to our spheres of influence. So ICANN's strictly responsible only for the operation of one registry, which is the L-Root. It is responsible for very strong oversight of the operation of gTLD registries, within the contracts with each of them. The contracts include a lot of conditions that are related to stability, like the escrow provision and the threat of removing from business a non-compliant registrar or registry. Registrars are another story too.

You can actually be removed from the contracts and from the ability to make business. Why would that be different with ccTLDs. You don't have bilateral contracts, you don't have a lot of stuff, but they are registries, they drink directly from the Root so that has to be in the scope of the report.

Hartmut Glaser: Some of them have bilateral contracts but most of them have only an exchange ….

Alejandro Pisanty: An exchange of unilateral documents which is called the accountability framework. That's the most usual case. But even with a bilateral contract, it's very remote that ICANN will start a

re-delegation of its own because the ccTLD manager was not working well.   That's one of the remotest things.   It's not impossible but it's one of the remotest things.

Whereas I can go to a gTLD registry and tell them you're not complying there's a number of measures that can be applied and they can eventually be removed from the contract.   ICANN can terminate the registry contract and there's a procedure established of what you will do with the names on the operations.

Simon McCalla: As for me, speaking as a cc registry operator I mean this is a direct corollary of the RSEC debate, which is the cc's were handed out be Jon Postel and in a kind of sometimes arbitrary manner and sometimes just who he felt was the best person to run it at the time. A long way prior to ICANN stepping in, I think that's why that issue exists, and the CCs, you get the same flavor if you talk to the CCs about remaining fiercely independent.   In fact if you talk to Steve Crocker, Steve's view on CC independence, he said it's an absolutely vital part, he feels that this is a benefit to the ecosystem rather than a downside because his view is that you get diversity of approaches and that diversity of approaches leads to a health ecosystem.

Rather than the gTLD approach where you have one specific way of managing your domain or your zone and therefore if that is in anyway at fault then the whole system is at risk, so he's kind of

quite interesting, his positioning on that. This will be a thorny subject in just the same way tackling RSEC is.

The difference between tackling the RSEC debate is you're going to have 116 CCSN members on your back, which will be, not to mention my CEO who is the Chair. So just to be aware of the bit of the politics behind that one if we go into that.

Alejandro Pisanty: I definitely think we have to stay aware of those politics. They are very important. I completely consider, I won't say completely but I would consider very seriously the argument of diversity and so forth, but we also have the argument of weakness.

So one thing is the positive contribution to diversity by having different business models for ccTLD managers, different hardware/software/operating systems, bind or not bind as your DNS software, for profit, non-profit, flat, non-flat domain name spaces and so forth. And a different kind of diversity is having strong and weak operators. And weak operators are not a contribution to the stability, they contribute to the diversity but not to the stability, so that's the kind expression that we will have to make, or each will have to work with.

Okay, let's say build upon the diversity instead of against it, but build against our weaknesses instead of doing things that reinforce them or make them impossible to remove.

So let me again get procedural here, I think this is a good time for a break. It is the exact time for when our meal is appointed, but even if it weren't, I think that we have just worn ourselves out enough and we have really covered a huge territory. So we need and deserve a rest. Let's try to make it brief, 30 minutes, so that we can engage in after lunch what I'll propose to you is that we review this, I think we'll still have a bunch of work to do her, maybe we'll do it and maybe not all of it.

Then go to the interview questions and to the list of people and entities to be interviewed. We must make sure that we get them. We might even try to get the list of interviews or let's say the questions and interviews part first and then go back to this document so that our minds are more fresh by doing this other exercise if you'll agree.

And bon appetite.

Olof Nordling: The boxes in the corner are actually your lunch, so now you know.

Alejandro Pisanty: Yes I know, but we'll still take a break, we're not under such time pressure and we're really tired. We don't have to munch and work, we can munch and munch.

Simon McCalla: Can we FedEx one to Anders?

Olof Nordling:	Now will you use Group 5 fax to transmit physical. It's approaching breakfast, very early breakfast in Sweden, yes?

Anders Rafting:	Yes, I will have some breakfast now, thank you.

[break]

Alejandro Pisanty:	It's really a heroic effort, thanks for doing this. So we can start again? After a brief discussion with Jeff and Simon I think we are better off going back to the document taking it again from the top and there is going to be a number of things to add still. So you can make a list to start again, of course no haste.

Anders, thanks again for being there, it's really heroic that you have spent the whole night with us, superb, I hope that we are not disappointing you with the results. Would you like to make any comments?

Anders Rafting:	Thanks, no, it's not so problematic, three o'clock, it's early morning here. I haven't found that the day is about continuity here management at ICANN. It's around four points at midday.

EN

Alejandro Pisanty: Sorry to interrupt you, the communication is a little bit choppy, so it would be very useful if you spoke slow enough that your syllables are long because otherwise the syllables are shorter than the choppiness and we lose the signal and the meaning.

Anders Rafting: Okay.   Yeah, I have written down four points regarding improvement in contingency handling for ICANN. I can read the four points or shall I wait with that?

Alejandro Pisanty: Yes please.

Anders Rafting: Okay.   Imagine a disastrous incident happens, some kind of disastrous incident. #1 Identify how ICANN receives and conveys alarms when an extraordinary event occurs.   How do they communicate with NHIA and various INS constituencies? Perhaps also important, public uses.

#2 – Evaluate ICANN's capacity to cooperate with other involved stakeholders. NC, NHIA, VeriSign, IANA order to make a joint overall information profile in state of severe strain for a disaster. So a picture of how the situation is.

#3 – Assess ICANN's capacity to provide consistent information to an extraordinary events, and (inaudible) to be presented to public

and to mass media. The idea is to one channel from ICANN out to surrounding world and mass media if something very disastrous happens.

#4 – Evaluate and the need and relevance, the cooperation function for extraordinary events at the managerial level. For example, a Board within ICANN, a special Board that proactively in advance has been trained and prepared to take important decisions, to prioritize certain functions. That was my thoughts during your discussions. Thank you.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you Anders, these are all important points. Let me see if I got them right. In summary what you are saying is that in case of a major incident how does ICANN react, how does it communicate, how does it bring in other stakeholders into the fold and you mentioned something very interesting, which is to have a special Board or a subset of the Board that will be prepared to take important decision; to be like prebriefed, authorized, have clear answers and so forth, to take important decisions and prioritize actions and response. Did I get you right?

Anders Rafting: Yes, that's fairly correct. I can mail this to Alice Jensen if that is proper to do?

Alejandro Pisanty: Thanks, it's really valuable I think, it is all very much into contingency planning which is the area where we still have not made a lot of progress so it kick us off in very important directions, like, I mean, people usually think of contingency planning more at the technical level, operations level, maybe the company operations like business continuity plans, but you are thinking of people who might have to make decisions that are important enough to be Board decisions and you would like to see that already planned. Am I getting things right?

Anders Rafting: Yes, exactly.

Alejandro Pisanty: That's a very important line of thought, have proper authority always available.

Anders Rafting: Now I've sent this to Alice.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you very much. Send it to the mailing list and we'll all catch it if you can. Oh, it's on the chat, that's fine. If you stayed up all night we're not trying to create new complicated coordination tasks for you.

Okay, so if you all agree we should go back to the top of the text and I will hand it over first to Simon, if you agree? Just to take us

through the governance part, to see what we need... I think there is a bunch of things yet.

Simon McCalla: This may need to be a collaborative group effort. What I'll do, I'll rattle down the findings that came out of the status report that we did and we can just double check them off against whether they are captured under these headings, Anders at work, and then if there is anything that is missing we'll create a new question or hypothesis. Does that work, Jeff?

First thing that we had noted was the issue of the 100% DNS up-time stated in its goal. So it stated a goal that in principle this coordination of global DNS, ICANN actually has very little capability to actually influence that, either contractually or through it's existing relationships. Have we captured that issue in any of these hypotheses? Kind of opening that up really, if any ones got any.

Bill Manning: So, a procedural question. Are you interested in commentaries as you go through these or are we waiting for the end?

Simon McCalla: I think they're very valid. I think if it leads to us driving out another issue, very much so, yes.

Jeff Brueggeman: So 100% up-time for the DNS is vacuously true because you can't really tell when the DNS isn't there unless everything is turned off and we don't turn the internet off. So from the perspective of DNS operational things that ICANN does, do they in fact have a 100% up-time of the service, not the servers.   And do they publish metrics to give us that information. They can make the statement but we'd really like to see the metric, if they've got them. Otherwise that statement is not defensible.

Simon McCalla: I'd be inclined to agree on that. You're right, it's self-fulfilling by the very nature of the way the beast is and yet it's also very difficult to track and or be measured against.

Jeff Brueggeman: Except if you look at it from their limited operational thing which is L-Root and the INT Name Servers, and the zone generation process. If that is 100% up-time for those processes, can we see data that shows that in fact that is the case?

Simon McCalla: Is there a second question here which is along the lines of a hypothesis that says something along the lines that the stated aim of 100% DNS up-time is neither clear enough or measurable enough. ICANN needs to clarify its intent around that statement, true or false kind of thing.

Bill Manning:	I think that's true because I have seen service providers claim 100% up-time and you read the fine print and it says 100% up-time is a 95th percentile because we do in fact take the systems down 3% of the time over the year to do system maintenance. So 100% is actually 97% because we reserve some scheduled down time. So I want clarity into what the 100% really means.
Jeff Brueggeman:	So isn't that kind of, are we going through in any particular order or how are we going to...
Simon McCalla:	I'm just rattling down the status report sent out to the group and just see... So I'm going issue by issue to make sure we've captured, not captured. That was the theory.
	Do you mind if we catch that Alice, something around , how does ICANN define 100% up-time of the DNS. How does it intend to measure and influence that number. Where do we want it – anywhere in the top section will be fine. Actually, it's …
Jeff Brueggeman:	Isn't that really in the second?
Simon McCalla:	Yeah, you're right actually. So maybe second section, sorry Alice. Okay, while she's typing that, the next section I had was, it was a prime goal that lack of clarity around how the many of the goals and specifically lack of how progress is tracked and measured,

have we captured that. Could be down on that bottom one there, couldn't it? #3... not specific enough – track responsibilities, priorities and goals – do you think that captures that?

Bill Manning: Then we have the discussion that actually there is some tracking, which not everyone is seeing, so maybe that's one for further analysis.

Simon McCalla: I think we can leave that one. So the next one that I had was ICANN budget, which was a lack of clarity as to how the budget amount was broken down and then how that budget was tracked objectively to decide whether money had been spent well, if we captured that anywhere. I don't think we did, I think we skipped the budget. We talked about it, but then... So I think in terms of capturing something, lack of budget clarity, an exact breakdown of areas of spend and how these are tracked. Or expenditure, I think, but yes, expenses will do.

Okay, then there is a second one, it's either Part B of this or it could be a separate issue which is the clear definition of roles and responsibilities across the 10 people who are dedicated to SSR, plus also the SSR related roles of other staff, accepting Alejandro's point that they're going to be the "smiling secretary" condition as Alejandro calls it, but we're not going to go down to that level, but clearly we've got Joe Abley or a Rick Lamb, if they come under the SSR purview then that should be stated and it's clear.

There was a little piece about having a VP of cryptography, I don't know if that's too pointed or difficult a question to raise. Okay, so then we need a seven which is... just add it as a sub-point to that one, yes. That's right. Where is the need for that. It's not mentioned anywhere in the SSR plan that specific cryptography expertise is needed and yet it is the second most senior position in the organization in SSR itself. As far as I can see anyway.

Another point I captured around budget is probably a sub-point of the budget as well. Allocation of SSR funds to other budget parts, so in this case it was Nairobi. Nairobi personal security, including security of ICANN staff and delegates was funded from the SSR budget, not from the core meeting budget – and again that wasn't broken down, but it did take them significantly over budget in FY10.

Okay, the next one I had was the differing relationships and histories behind F-SEC and RSAC. I think we captured that, didn't we.

Alejandro Pisanty: Let's have individual and root server operators there.

Simon McCalla: Alice, where did we capture that issue, was it further down? Oh yes, we've got individual reseller/operator, there it is. Okay, so that was from my status report and Xiaodong or Anders, is there

anything I've missed that you guys captured and feel isn't on this list of roles/responsibilities/governance?

Bill Manning: I'm not sure that you're missing anything but I would like to get for my own self, a little bit of clarity about SSAC and RSSAC. RSSAC was an original committee formed when ICANN was formed in '98 and SSAC came along later, many years later.

Simon McCalla: It was from 9/11 wasn't it from a CEO request, I think.

Jeff Brueggeman: It was after M. Stewert Lynn came into, after his tenure ended, so it was after the first ICANN reorganization that SSAC actually was brought into existence. And the individual root server operators, I think Xiaodong, I think you've got that information now.

Simon McCalla: Sorry, Bill what was it you were thinking there, have we not captured it correctly, or?

Bill Manning: I don't know. I just, there's little bits and pieces all over there so the questions are there but the answers aren't.

Jeff Brueggeman:	We're also going to prioritize these now, because I think Alejandro made the point, we may end up with 50 questions, but it's getting to be a daunting list and I think it would be helpful to figure out which are the most critical.
Simon McCalla:	I guess we just need, I suppose, it may have been a decision, some people's minds already decided, but I guess the question is – is this too significant, if we were just to try and answer all of what we've written down, is this too significant a work load for us. It needs prioritization because we can't hope to get it all done in a timely manner, do you see where I'm coming from Jeff, there?
Jeff Brueggeman:	I guess I would suggest we have to prioritize. That doesn't mean we are saying we're not going to get to some things, but we talked earlier that we haven't examined the contracted parties and the RAR, I think there are things to me that – say in the first section – rise to the top of the list and some of the more specific issues, it's good to have a placeholder and we're not ticking them off at this point, but there's a certain amount of core work that seems to be needed.
Simon McCalla:	Okay, do we want to prioritize it – I guess do we want to carry on down the list, do we want to go down the whole list all the way down to the bottom and then come back and prioritize or do we

just want to prioritize this section? So I think, Xiadong, Anders, unless there is anything you guys want to add that we haven't captured in there, are we okay to go on to Section 2. Or anybody else for that matter, have we missed anything crucial in that first section?

Anders Rafting: Anders here. I just feel, I've been thinking you know that the original remit, it hit the language and terms of reference are not absolutely clear for the entity C and the RSSAC. It might be a risk, and so likely, but in that equipment (inaudible) between the Chairs, at least in Sweden operators forgot the one constituency over the other (inaudible). Thank you.

Simon McCalla: Anders, sorry you're coming across a little bit choppy here. I think what I heard was you saying do we want to examine the Terms of Reference for SSAC and RSSAC. Was that correct?

Anders Rafting: Yes. To mitigate the risk of a missing question because they are the things that one thing to the other to tell that.

Simon McCalla: Okay thanks, Alice could we just add... Anderscan you see it on screen? Alice just added that into Question 2. Xiaodong, did you say there was something we'd missed?

Xiaodong Li: I think that something is needed to clarify the relationship between ICANN and RSSAC and also the relationship between RSSAC with root server operator. I mean, we need to clarify. For the RSSAC root servers, the relationship between NTIA with ICANN, ICANN with RSSAC with end user. I mean all of the relationships need to be clarified.

Simon McCalla: Alice, I wonder if we just add the wording in there to, I think what you're saying is, effectively it's not just looking at ICANN to RSSAC. It's RSSAC to individual members or the root server operators. Their relationships.

Xiaodong Li: You've got... yes. That doesn't mean individual root server operators, but all of the root server operators, including the individual operators are organized, organizational operators, to clarify, what's their relationship between the ICANN with the rooter server operators, may it is, have a bridge with RSSAC, but we need to clarify, to make sure that the relationship is stable to mention the SSR.

Jeff Brueggeman: I don't want to jump ahead, but one idea would be to have Xiaodong and Bill actually try and draft up a summary of this rooter server/RSSAC issue in terms of what we know, the

information we got this week and what you had already reviewed and maybe what might be areas of common opinion or just kind of do a write-up on it, because I think this has been a really helpful discussion for me to hear what both of you have been commenting on.

Bill Manning: Would you like me to say something? Alright, so they've dimmed the lights, we need to light a campfire and I can tell ghost stories, it was very dark one night. I sent around, at least to the SSR-2 team and I sent a copy to Xiaodong, but the rest of you – I don't think have seen it – which basically describes how the system came into effect. Essentially what happened was that Jon Postel, while he was the IANA, individually picked root server operators. They didn't interact with each other very much, they interacted with John. John passed away. We were summoned to a meeting in Florida as part of an IATF and we all showed up, every organization that ran a root name server showed up – and we talked about what we were going to do. ICANN did not exist at the time.

So we had some discussions about what we were going to do and we came up with basically three points. There was nothing written from this meeting, this was a set of people getting together to figure out what to do after the death of a friend and how we were going to proceed as a community after that. About six years later, well before that – so we had basically come up with the agreement

that we would do no harm and that we would publish what the IANA told us, whoever ended up with the IANA.

But the binding commitment was to the IANA function, whoever held it. ICANN came into existence – Department of Commerce handed the IANA function to ICANN, initially as a temporary expedient and then it kind of grew from there. So at that point the operators said well since ICANN already organizationally holds this thing, we'll talk to them. But they were an autonomous before then.

That group consisted of other parts of the US government and non-US government actors. ICANN is a California not-for-profit corporation. When ICANN came knocking on the door and said please sign contracts with us, the US government agency said "No, we will not sign a contract limiting our liability or our ability to act with a California not-for-profit corporation." So they refused to sign contracts. Others said you're not the permanent IANA holder, we're not going to sign a contract with you. Basically this dragged on for a while and ICANN got frustrated and went away.

We reported to Commerce about what we were doing, Cathy Handley at the time and in 2004 I was subpoenaed to testify before a subcommittee of congress about the stability of the DNS and the root name server system. Along with people from ICANN and other folks. Copy of the testimony is intact and has been sent around with appropriate URLs, where I described what that original meeting was and our commitment to serve the data the IANA gave us and to serve our communities.

So the root operators really were focused on outward facing to the internet community, not inward facing back to ICANN. Now at the first ICANN meeting in Singapore, a member of the ICANN Board was tasked with creating a Root Server System Advisory Committee – and that Board member thought it was a really good idea to include the root operators in that committee and so we were all invited to join. RSSAC consists of the root server operators, plus representatives from ITF, ISOC, the GAC, others. So all those people are members of RSSAC.

So ICANN has a standing committee called RSSAC which has root server operator members in there, but not all root server operators have contracts with ICANN. Past that 2004 testimony, the individual operators were persuaded to document their relationship and so there is a list of URLs from each of the operators that says what their relationship is. VeriSign has a relationship directly with Department of Commerce on their operation of A. They're not going to sign something with ICANN on A operations because they're already contracted to Commerce. B went through and we tried to engage ICANN and ICANN refused to talk to us so we made a unilateral statement. You go down through the list.

Some people actually entered into contracts with ICANN, others did not. Some people entered into agreements with their user communities, which are documented. So there's a documented list about where each operator's stance was as the end of October, but the root operators are members of RSSAC, but not all root

operators have contracts with ICANN. They have contracts with other people for their operations. But that's documented, that's the history. That's the relationship. It's never been pulled together in one place before and I think this is the first time, in this document – if we are willing to put that in – that that's going to come out. I hope that's sufficient.

Simon McCalla: Personally I think that would be terrifically useful to have that in there, without and then I guess it's our job to say what would our recommendations be, if any, following having the information in one place.

Bill Manning: The tough part is what can ICANN do? Or what can governments do?

Alejandro Pisanty: Bill, I think this, I'm glad we've come back to this issue because I think we're making progress in general but also for work. The question that we cannot... I mean we can refuse to address the question or the issue, or the statement that lack of contracts with ICANN can for all root server operators destabilizes the DNS. Maybe we just don't agree on that statement – but I think we're at the point where we can say what we do have to answer is slightly different – and let's check this with Alice Munyua and Anders,

your opinion on this I'm going to say if you're available will be crucial from the GAC.

What is the oversight of root server operation, the oversight structure that exists over root server operators that enhances or that destabilizes the security of the DNS. If oversight is what's really the concern behind contracts and we... I know that part of your reply is very likely to be that oversight destabilizes, that's been an argument from the root server community which I am very appreciative of from my first contact on. Which is that if oversight brings uniformity in any way, homogeneity in any way – it goes against the value that is added by diversity, which includes hardware diversity, software diversity, operational diversity etcetera in the root server operations.

So, taking this a step further, I think that to have a brilliant chance of documenting the present state of root server operations, contracts, agreements, obligations and non-obligations and make our own judgment about how much that each part of that contributes to the stability and resiliency of the DNS. How much it works against – and leave that document. So we don't put the matter to rest, because people will still want to work on it, but at least we send the discussion a whole century further.

Bill Manning: The actual 2004 testimony does talk to that issue about trade-offs between a single set of responsibilities or a diverse set of responsibilities. One of the important things that came out of that,

is that every operator is contractually bound to somebody, but none of them are bound to a single point of control. So elaborating on that point as to the trade-offs as to a single platform or multiple platforms for risk management, risk mitigation it is probably worthwhile for another paragraph or two.

Jeff Brueggeman: I was just going to say as somebody who is new to this issue I've learned an enormous amount this week and I think this has been, you know, Bill you're making excellent points and Alejandro and I think part of what we're doing is putting facts and information out there. Another perspective is it has operated this way for a long time and if there is not evidence that there has been a problem – then you know that kind of says that's a countervailing consideration, but I think Bill, what you just said is, I think that's the first time it kind of clicked for me, is…

Well if they're accountable to someone, that at least is, if there is a perceived vacuum that they're not accountable, first it's helpful to just lay out the situation maybe different than what the common perception is. Then the question that you're asking is, what's our judgment on is that enough and what are the trade-offs? Almost the analysis and the facts are as important in the report. We may come down one way or another but we're laying this out, it's very helpful that, I would assume, if we're having this discussion there is a lot of other people who don't understand the history here either.

So thanks for all of this. I think has been really helpful.

Alejandro Pisanty: I agree fully with your statement. When Bill first said in one of our conversations, in our of our teleconferences, ICANN doesn't play well with others, I know that the reading from the rooter server community for many years at least, was ICANN doesn't play well with others means ICANN's not ready to be humble to act with us, would like for the root servers to disappear at most.

This has been, as you said, there is very, very long history here, we have to document what is important about it, not all the gory detail – in a way that doesn't invite further intervention. We have to be sure, I mean no report like this one is exempt from being political and a major audit like this one is an extremely political document. We'll have to be sure that we are not naively creating opportunities for bath players to have something to seize upon.

So we're not going to say well, you know, this is an informal market and it's nice and fun and colorful and spicy and that makes it better. We're going to make sure that it documents the way of it being warm and spice and informal actually makes it better for the purposes. As I said I don't think that we will be able to lay the matter to rest but at least we will have a platform of reference which is the 2011-2012 reference of how the way root servers are managed and related to the rest of the world can be evaluated. We will have our revelation but we will lay enough facts or enough

sources of information for people to make their own evaluations if they differ from ours.

The other thing, addressing Bill, maybe most of the arguments that were in the 2004 testimony are still the same and are still valid, but anyone who looks at it will have a right to say well that's a century ago in internet time, it's seven years. It certainly is a statement made before IDNs were put into operation. IDNs even at the gTLD level. Before IDN ccTLDs were put into operation. Before the massive expansion of the gTLD space was started or agreed upon at least and before the contractual relationship between the US and ICANN changed to the present status.

Before single government oversight of ICANN was removed by a shift to the affirmation of commitment. So there is enough environmental change that you would like to, it would be healthy to reassess the arguments. The conclusion may be the same, but the conditions against which you are testing it are much more demanding.

Bill Manning: That's probably true. I would like to illuminate a little bit the "ICANN doesn't play well with others." ICANN actually approached all of the root server operators with a standard blanket contract. At which point the root operators were, the operators for some of the roots servers who were US government agencies, looked at those blanket contracts and basically said, no. And ICANN.

Xiaodong LI: May I ask a question. The root server operators get their financial support from ICANN for root server operating. Yes or no?

Bill Manning: The only operator that gets financial support from ICANN is L.

Alejandro Pisanty: It is important to say that all others are institutionally and economically independent of ICANN.

Xiaodong Li: If no financial support from ICANN for root server operators, so it's really about for them having no contract or no agreement or no such kind of stable organization with ICANN.

Bill Manning: That's the position that most of them take, yes. In any case, basically the US government said, no and ICANN threatened agencies of the US government that they were going to come take their root name servers away from them and the US government said "Well, you're going to have to get past the armed guards first" and ICANN threw a fit. That's that piece.

                                          The secondary piece to actually address the points you raised Alejandro was with the evolution of the system I think that actually a critical point in the evolution of the system and this report will be

– what happens with the IANA recompete? Because the root server operators still all notionally bound to the IANA function and not to the organization. So if the IANA function is institutionalized inside ICANN it removes a lot of that tension that was there previously about not binding to the wrong party. Whatever we come up with now might change in September.

Alejandro Pisanty: As mentioned, I mean our question here is, the question is as you set it forward earlier, whether ICANN is doing something wrong by not considering recompete, a risk by this stage that's a little bit of an overstatement. It's basically, the best forecast is that it will be granted to ICANN under conditions that may be stabilizing or destabilizing and we'll probably do a better use of our efforts by looking at the conditions and also staying open because it's also a risk for us to look at the state of things today before we're finished with the reports the contracts will have been signed.

Bill Manning: Yes, but again remember that the agreements and statements that most of the operators have said are this organization, the University of Maryland, binds to – not ICANN – but to IANA and so they were formed prior to ICANN's existence. They recognize that until that's actually anchored and institutionalized inside ICANN that it may change and they don't want to have a contractual obligation with an organization that doesn't have any responsibility for the task. So that's separation.

Alejandro Pisanty: I think that as Jeff said, there's been a lot of learning on just this issue, which is very important and we know that some communities are sensitive to it, so maybe we should direct Alice to shut down and then make a proposal.

Xiaodong Li: I think is we consider Section 2 we discuss about the ICANN relationship with different kind of supporting organization or otherwise council. If we focus on that relationship so ICANN is, the relationship between ICANN with RSSAC or RSSAC with root server operators is one of the relationships we should consider. I have read that LC again about that Review Team, the task of the Review Team.

You know, you said they had terminology, actually the internet DNS which reviewed the security and stability and resiliency issue for the internet DNS. So what's the internet DS? It would include the root servers and the top level domains and also maybe some DNS hosting service providers; and also some recursive servers, so that means there is a hole in that DNS. So if we consider the security and stability issue for the hole in that DNS, so there are some many roles to discuss in that relationship. For example, the NDIA, ICANN and each ACOOSOs and the root server operators, the top level domain operators, and also the DNS hosting providers, also the ISPs we should clarify what's the relationship between them.

And also have a sentence to review that they should be consistent with ICANN's limited technical information. I also wonder, what is ICANN's limited technical information. So...

Alejandro Pisanty: Let me try to reply to that and also make a proposal procedurally. First we have to deal with the question of scope for your p,oint about global DNS. The DNS if we define it in the broadest way possible is as you said the root servers, the registries with contracts to ICANN, the registrars with contracts to ICANN, the registrars that don't have contracts to ICANN, the resellers and then individual ISPs and all the way to your home.

Some people run explicitly a DNS server at home, some people don't know they are running a DNS server, but it is in your ADSL modem, you have at least a cache for the DNS, a cache which holds in your house. No one really knows how many DNS servers there are if you try to count them that way, what software they run, when the last software patch was applied, what attack history they have suffered and so forth.

So we have to think of this from the point of view of scope of the review and decided whether we are going to find out, we're going to ask whether this can be found out, depending on our voices and what we want to achieve with the report. I don't think we can be conclusive right now, as we've been working, we know that we have to deal with the registries at least, including ccTLDs, that's

for sure and it's hard for us to ask for ICANN to deal with anything further out unless it is on a contingency planning basis.

Xiaodong Li: I think, you're right to really sort of focus on the root servers and the registries. I mean, you said top level domain, but you know my question is what's ICANNs limited technical information? You know, I remember in the Nairobi meeting that ICANN raised the DNS CERT. They wanted to do a DNS CERT. The DNS certification not only focusing on the users and registry, maybe focusing on the third level or first level and also including the recursory servers.

That is why they wanted to do the DNS CERT. If we only focus on the top level domains and root servers maybe it make no sense because there are so many public operators and root server operators they have the scale to maintain that to. I think if we define the working scope I don't think we should only focus on the root servers and registries.

Alejandro Pisanty: For practical purposes let's record that we have to continue.

Xiaodong Li: I'm sorry, I also give you some more information. I'm also a member of ISAC so if you have read that 50 ISAC reports it is very focused on different kind of DN registry issues. ISAC give the report to the Board and the Board can choose to accept it or

not, but I mean all of the reports, 50 reports, focused on different issues, even for the IPv6. So I think it's a big question for us with the working scope and if we define the working scope, the first one we should know, how many roots, how many kind organizations would be involved into the SSR Review Team?

I have listed that, also including the DOC, ICANN and different kind of AC and SO and root server operators, top level registries and recursive servers and ISPs And so the relationship if it's considered that Section 2 for the relationship. Maybe most of the problem is the relationship between ICANN and root servers, but we also need to consider ICANN with the registry. I think Hartmut raised the question about how to spot that registries in Africa or other areas don't have the capability to maintain the DN security. Yes, that's my concern.

Alejandro Pisanty: I think we'll take note of these issues and try to flesh them out because they definitely are part of the scope definition and I was counting on you, and I was going to ask you though, to see if you can put some of this in writing.

Jeff Brueggeman: Alejandro, I was trying to take notes as we were talking about what seemed to be the next work effort in this first section of the scope, because that's what I do, I write down the tasks, right? It seems like we're at different stages on some of this. That there is a stage that's ready to actually get into the writing on drafting what

ICANNs scope of responsibility is – based on the work that Simon's group did on, they looked at the by-laws, they looked at the affirmation of commitment, Bill looked at the SSR plan, so there's a piece that we're ready to write and we have a hypothesis.

Then there is the issue of the ARCSAC and the root zone operators where I think we've crystallized the issue but it needs to be written down. And then we really need to do a similar analysis for the ccTLDs and the RARs and then to some extent what Xiaodong is saying the other relationships that are outside of the direct influence or direct control but are in more of the influence.

And then I also think there is an element of getting the community perspective on ICANN's role, including – and there were comments filed in response to the questions that we put out on this already – and then further questions that we're going to talk about. Anyway, it seems like we have a writing task and the root zone analysis and then there is some more analysis to be done. But we're kind of, I feel like we have a good sense of what needs to be done on that issue.

Alejandro Pisanty: Yes, which we need to, so we'll mesh all that into a document after the meeting. Okay, so I think for this session we know a bit more what we have to investigate and write about, root server and practical relationships, oversights, accountability and so forth. And to try to write that in a concise and if not definitive, absolutely up to date way.

Next issue: Alice, can I ask you to show us the next page as soon as your hands are free? Dealing with a cold? Are you dealing with a cold? . . . Scroll down.

Here, where we say ICANN's I will go to the fourth bullet which is ICANN's arrangements with third parties, root server operators, registries and treatment of SSR issues. I think that here we have to look at a larger set of arrangements and agreements. This necessarily takes us to things like the security/stability related provisions of the registry and registrar contracts. The registry accreditation, the registry/registrar contract, no let me speak for a second, this is not dictation.

So the RAA and the RRA, the Registry Accreditation Agreement and the Registry Registrar Agreement are very important pieces of contractual material that have a direct impact on security and stability of the DNS. They are the basis on which for example an ill-behaving registrar can be put out of touching the root and stuff like that. So we have to look at those and they are policy. They are the result of policy development processes. They are not handed up, handed down from Mars, or completely voluntary, there is a process going there so they affect importantly the stability of the DNS.

We have a few other things at the contractual level that we have to look at. We have them in the list but we haven't looked at them which is for example, the escrow agreements. Not only the escrow part of the agreement with the registries and registrars but also the agreement between ICANN and a company, I think it is Iron

Mountain, it still is Iron Mountain which does the, which is where the escrow is deposited.

We have to look at the whole escrow landscape and procedures, including the contracts. These are extremely important for the resiliency and the stability of the system. They may not be as important in terms of security, but even as a response to a security incident they are important and certainly they are important for the resiliency. For something that happens, that resiliency becomes vital because that's where you recover the history of operations and regain continuity.

I don't know if you all agree, I mean these are terms of legal material. Not everyone of us, maybe only a few of us are actually equipped to go through it in detail. It is also plagued with US local legal language, references to Codes and Statutes and so forth, but we should at least mark it and there is some finger pointing here, while Jeff Brueggeman doesn't look, which points your way. Someone has found an American lawyer among us. So in that Section we'll just right down, look at the whole chain of escrow. We'll just make sure that it gets detailed.

Then in the last bullet of that Section. Perspectives of community stakeholder groups about what should be within the scope of ICANN's responsibilities in constructing (inaudible). There we will have to craft a questionnaire that is very smart. What to have there, for example, if you would just take today's discussions here, is we have to find a way in which we ask people like Hartmut

Glaser what they think should be the scope. Nothing general but with some specific points.

So for example, Hartmut was telling me during the lunch break something I believe is to a large extent right. Which is that small ccTLDs are unable to mount complete and powerful enough security and stability operations. They don't have the power to create and escrow contract with Iron Mountain, they don't live where there is a representative of Iron Mountain and they have lots of issues like that. They don't have enough personnel, enough staff so they have to rely. The want and have to rely on third parties and one of them should be ICANN.

You have on the other hand people, Jeff in the and I don't mean yourself, in the business constituency who find this an anathema. They just begin to cry foul when they hear that ICANN has requested to support the operation and capacity building of small developing country ccTLDs, because they say that's out of scope, that's invasion, that's mission crit, our money should be be spent some way else and so forth. So we have to be able to get both points of view and argue how each of them contributes positively or negatively to the SSR variants.

And we have the very specific tasks that follow which is, does the SSR plan extend beyond ICANN's basic remit? That's not necessarily a yes or a no question because you may have clauses. So anybody can think that some parts are over and above the remit and some parts are insufficient so we have to craft this in, I mean

this goes to the interviews and we have to craft the questions there very carefully.

So that, again, we can elicit all kinds of responses and either make that a very simple survey that we put up on line or make that a very person-to-person questionnaire, for some part of the population we do the generic on-line stuff and for others we go, actually travel to their homes to question them. Bill, you have your hand up?

Bill Manning: I do, I think that I would augment that bullet point with two words. Does the SSR plan extend beyond ICANN's basic remit and why? It's insufficient to ask somebody to say yes or no; you want to get their rationale and their reasoning behind why they have taken that position.

Alejandro Pisanty: The why is why you think it, not why you think ICANN, I mean, not why ICANN is doing it. That would be organizational psychoanalysis and not within our remit.

Bill Manning: That's right, that is beyond our remit. Our maybe it's how does it exceed, not so much the why. Specific examples where you think is exceeding.

Jeff Brueggeman: I could go, yeah, sure it exceeds its remit, let's move on the next question, but it exceeds its remit in this manner. I believe it has done these things or it hasn't done it but it says it's supposed to or whatever. Is the opportunity to get the commentary out.

Simon McCalla: Alejandro, sorry, point of process. So is this question here, is this superseding or sitting alongside the very first hypothesis that we we put up, was fundamentally meant to be this question.

Alejandro Pisanty: Repeat the question please?

Simon McCalla: So the....

Jeff Brueggeman: There's some duplication because I had done these as I was hearing things in our discussions this week and then I think what we did this morning was crystallize them even more.

Simon McCalla: So these aren't intended to be separate questions from the ones we've asked, fine thank you that's great.

Alejandro Pisanty:	We'll have to do a lot of clean-up for repetition among other things, but right now what we're trying to make sure is we have an exhaustive list, that we're not leaving out important issues. Okay, I don't think we need to go in any more detail after what we've said about development questions for root server operators and the ASAC role as, I mean we have already heard part of that we'll have to have now a formal recordable conversation with ASAC that goes through these issues.
	So we go to the second layer, that means the second column of our report, which is implementation. So, Jeff, this was your team, do you want to take us through it?
Jeff Breuggeman:	I guess what I've been trying to do is to take notes similar to what I did in the first section of the scope of kind of where do we seem to have enough information to get to start to draft an analysis and where do we think we need further information. It seems like, based on what Bill has started we're ready to start to draft an analysis of the SSR plan, including the priority projects that were identified and the status updates that we have some information from.
	I guess it's somewhat of a drafting and it's somewhat of a further review since because of AHTEFs unavailability, we haven't really thoroughly I don't think linked through the plan, the priority projects and the status updates to kind of, but we had some hypotheses that we talked about this morning about whether that

we think they've made progress in articulating more clearly what the projects are and tracking them and maybe one question was are they prioritized enough within that.

Bill Manning: Yes I think we do actually have to write something under key issues to create either the first bullet or the first point of illumination. In that the SSR plan as it currently exists, co-mingles DNS, SSR for the DNS and SSR for the organization. Teasing those two apart I think is, the first thing is to separate those out and say security, stability and resilience of staff members in an ICANN meeting is only vaguely tangential to the security and stability of the DNS operation. So we actually need to separate those pieces out of the current SSR plan and rank order them before we start asking these next sets of questions, which are the ones that are within our scope.

I really don't think we should be answering questions about whether or not staff protection and extraction are things that we should be considering. That's what I'd like to do first and make sure that that happens as part of this activity.

Alejandro Pisanty: Patrick, any comment there?

Patrick Jones: I think that I understand what Bill is asking about, and I guess the SSR framework that was most recently published covers a variety of areas, operational priorities for ICANN but what Bill is suggesting is that there is language in there that is more broadly focused toward registry/registrar security, SSR in the community and what the review team, I'm paraphrasing Bill, the review team's interest should be not so much on ICANNs internal IT security processes and plans but where it touches other parties in the ecosystem.

Bill Manning: Yes, that's correct, I mean you've actually in the slide deck, the May slide deck you actually have these sort of strip charts where you talk about where ICANN has an impact in that particular set of the ecosystem. In some places you have ownership and in some places you are simply consultative. Where you're simply consultative I think the review team is less interested in those areas than in the area where you actually claim ownership of an activity.

So that narrow technical focus is where I think we want to spend our energy. And the things that ICANN does within that narrow technical focus. That's what I think of as being under review.

Patrick Jones: So you're less interested in the areas that we noted as a observer of activities led by others that are happening in the ecosystem but the

areas that were listed as ICANN operational and ICANN collaborative, facilitating and coordinating?

Bill Manning: That's my personal impression and so when we're going through this piece I want to tease those things apart out of the SSR and then rank order what we look at. Not that we're going to not look at those other pieces, but that we spend energy on the core ones first.

Patrick Jones: That makes sense to me and I also agree with you that, I think even back in the Cartegena meetings we had said we're not going to look at ICANN as an organization and their security practices that may apply to meetings and things like that so.

Jeff Brueggeman: You're right Patrick, I think there is a component that's internal that we're not looking and then I agree with Bill I think we're starting from the inside of the concentric circles as the highest priority. Do you think we want to look at the entire security plan including the relationship to how you might be enhancing the security of the DNS through broader cooperative efforts, but I would not disagree with the prioritization there.

                      Then I think, Simon, you had touched on, you know while I think the 100% up-time is a specific issue, I think the broader issue is how the SSR issues flow into the strategic plan and that was the one component of it that I probably want to kind of have a more

holistic assessment of that strategic plan as it relates to SSR as well. Then there were areas that we had identified that we need further analysis.

One is how further analysis of the budget allocations and understanding how what's identified and Patrick this is an area where we thought it was really going to require probably some further discussion with the staff as we talked a little bit about this morning. Likewise on the organizational issues, to dig in more concretely on understanding how SSR functions are handled. I think we need to document some of what we talked about with the SSAC and I don't know, Simon was that something that was on your list or was reviewed, including the review that they went through last year, the; SSAC kind of function within ICANN.

Simon McCalla: I did cover it off, I think we definitely need to talk about it although the review is a fantastic review and says an awful lot so us regoing through the SSAC review I think probably would be a bit of a waste of time. I think what might be useful is given that they've also put out a report saying we have implemented the changes we don't even need to question that. I think the question is, it might be worth us asking, have we seen a positive impact of those changes now they've been implemented?

It's almost the next step, have they made a difference. Whether that's just interviewing the SSAC guys and the board I don't know whether that's a wider analysis.

EN

Patrick Jones: And I would think it's worth documenting some of the things that they talked about that they're trying to do to measure their effectiveness and things like that. Seem like positive things to me.

Jeff Brueggeman: We talked about documenting, I think we're probably ready to draft up somewhat of a how ICANN is managing SSR issues within its processes, including public comments on things. We had identified the issue of root zone scaling study and the DNS blocking issue as areas that would probably provide good case studies for looking at, is there a more standardized way that these issues could be addressed.

Then I think the other we had talked about was focusing on the public participation part within the relative lack of public comment on some of these SSR issues and maybe the DSSA Working Group is a step in the right direction on that.

Patrick Jones: Hey Jeff, can I add something? As you're looking at these, public input on documents like the SSR plan, it might also be good to note that even though in many cases there weren't a lot of public comments put in the form, that there was quite a bit of staff interaction while the documents were either in development.

So consultation with SSAC and then I think Ram mentioned in the meeting with SSAC yesterday how they felt that was very

productive where staff reached out to SSAC in advance of publication in order to make changes to the document and then after publication staff interacted with a small review team or working team from the ccNSO and did the same thing with at large and made efforts to proactively solicit input and comment. Even though it doesn't translate into postings into the forum it's an effort to more directly engage with those who are interested. It's like the business constituency and other groups.

Jeff Brueggeman: That's a good point. I actually had done the write-up for that and I did try and take note because I think the summary of the comments would also include those types of outreach efforts and I will go back and make sure that I include that but I think that is a good point.

So I think there are some things that are probably ready to be drafted, but clearly to me this is a big set of issues and there is a lot of work that's left to be done in some areas. This piece of it.

Alejandro Pisanty: Very good, thank you. Can we go then to Section 3? So here, that's where we have more uncharted territory, we have not done all the work needed. Patrick, yes?

Patrick Jones: Sorry if I'm suddenly coming back into the room and then contributing again, but this is another area where I think that recent report from the Department of Homeland Security and the IT Sector Coordinating Council that was DNS Risk Management Strategy refers quite a bit to various lowering of risk in some areas, includes reference to ICANN, might be a useful document.   As well as the very large and comprehensive INESA document that someone had distributed, was that Alejandro?

Documents like that I'm also aware that there is another document that you haven't received yet, that might be coming from ISOC that touched on threats and risks in the DNS. I'm hoping that they will be making that public at some point soon. I know from earlier in the day you said at some point you have to close off looking at that kind of specifics. This is a document that would fit in this area well.

Alejandro Pisanty: Let me first clarify the last statement. We need to have some closure on the basis of what inputs we use, but more importantly we have to have closure on the versions that we use. That was where I was mostly aiming. If we're going to look at the strategic plan there must be one version where we say, okay this is the one we'll work on and improvements are done. You have an improved version, okay, tell me your tracked changes version and I'll track those changes in our work. I won't start from zero or from scratch. Of course I mean as new documents become available we do have to take them in.

Here, Patrick we have an opportunity to make a blunt question. It's already included there as documents but let's go to our first bullet that is just above #4 on the screen. That says existing processes in place for ensuring that risks are identified and analyzed. Does ICANN and your security establishment have anything for that. Does the SSAC have anything for that does the Board have something for that?

Patrick Jones: So there is a Board Risk Committee and they met at this meeting and they'll be having a public report in the Friday session. They meet at every ICANN meeting and so I'm staff support to that Risk Committee and so maybe as an example the Review Team could look at the published minutes of the Board Risk Committee and if there is other, again that's documents, but those are all public, the minutes and the outcomes from the risk committee meetings and you might consider talking to the Board Members that sit on the Risk Committee.

Jeff Brueggeman: Patrick, something that came up that Ram mentioned in the SSAC meeting, was the... it sounded like a specific Board resolution that would establish a contingency planning process at the Board level or a new committee. Do you have any information about it or can you explain what's....

Patrick Jones: I'm actually hoping to hear more about that tomorrow myself. In the San Francisco meeting, the Board approved a by-law change to take out a requirement from SSAC to do a system wide risk analysis and instead they said that they would look at forming a Board level Working Group that would contribute to a system wide analysis of the DNS and I don't know the latest on it, but I believe it is on the Board's agenda for tomorrow. So hopefully in either the reports out of the Board Governance Committee or the Board meeting as a whole will provide more detail. I don't have the latest on what it is, but it is very current.

Alejandro Pisanty: Patrick, do I understand well, can you tell again what the Board decision was?

Patrick Jones: One of the recommendations from the original SSAC review was to take out a requirement in the by-laws for SSAC, that SSAC was responsible for a system wide DNS risk assessment. So as the last piece of the implementation for the SSAC review the Board took out that line from the by-laws and when they did that they made a separate resolution that there would be a group at the Board level that would look at forming a Working Group that might take further the system wide risk analysis and make it more of a community effort rather than just SSAC's responsibility but an effort where others in the community can contribute to it.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thanks, I had heard this and I felt that I had not understood well because it is such a delirious idea in my view. The Board removed, I'm going to use starker terms than you. When you say take out, my poor English is challenged by phrases that may be imprecise. The Board removed from the by-laws a requirement that the SSAC perform the risk assessment. Is that correct?

Patrick Jones: I was going to try to find the exact language from San Francisco because it is in the resolution, if you'll just give me a minute. From the San Francisco meeting in March there was a Board resolution to remove this by-law requirement for SSAC and instead there would be a Board Working Group formed that would take on the task, so that it would no longer be a task that solely with SSAC, but it would be a task that would be more representative of the larger community. I want to give you the whole language so that it is very clear and I will send that as an email to the Review Team mailing list.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you and we'll incorporate it verbatim in this document before....

Patrick Jones: And it is something that will be taken up in tomorrow's Board meeting and hopefully they will shed more light on this change and where it is going.

Alejandro Pisanty: So we should be racing to the public forum and raise hell about it, right? I know, so we should go en masse. I think this is, I mean I would like to understand the rationale behind it but it doesn't sound like.... So you don't have established possibility for that either, right, Patrick? I mean there's not staff responsibility for creating a comprehensive risk framework? It's removed from the SSAC, it's handed over to the community and there's a gap during which a Board Committee will be formed for oversight of the process by which the community creates a risk framework.

Patrick Jones: I'm waiting for more information as well as to where the next stage of the Board work is going to be, but for ICANN's key programs and initiatives, those are periodically reviewed at the risk committee level and then also raised from the risk committee level to the full Board. So for example, that includes the new gTLD program, that includes IDNs, DNSSEC, it's included things like IPV4 run-out and IPV6 encouragement. It's also included the discussion of system wide risks so that the DNS system wide risk assessment was one of the topics in the Board Risk Committee meeting on Sunday.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you, I think we need to record this very carefully and investigate it in detail and have opportunity to express an opinion. Hartmut.

Hartmut Glaser: It's my understanding that probably we don't have a complete list of all key documents. That's completely new for me. I was in San Francisco and don't remember. Probably we have a lot of other documents that are important for us. Is it appropriate that we request, and I am asking staff to help us, to discover other documents, key documents. Simon, the list that you sent to us in Sub-Team 1 let's say more general documents, where you go to all the archives that have the complete list of documents that already ICANN produced. My understanding is that we probably missed documents that are important for us.

Simon McCalla: That list of documents came from Denise and from Patrick and Patrick I think from memory that list was pretty much everything you guy could think of that was appropriate for the team at that point. Is, was that correct?

Patrick Jones: It was probably an initial look at the key documents but what we should do is take it up amongst Denise and myself and do a thorough check one more time to see there are other documents that should be brought to the attention of the Review Team. For example I can think that ICANN recently received SYSTRUST certification for the DNSSEC infrastructure. That just came out, it was just published on the IANA website about a week ago. You probably aren't familiar with that yet and given the travel to this

meeting, I thought I sent an email to the list so even though it was an email to the sub-team or to Jeff it might not have translated to the Wiki as the full document so we should look one more time again.

Hartmut Glaser: I discussed this morning, excuse me Jeff, I discussed this with you this morning the possibility that probably we receive some staff support preparing scorecards about key documents. I think sometimes it is difficult that we spend all the time going through all the documents. This is one, two, three pages is easy. But if we have the long document, probably if we can have resume or some scorecard or some help coming from the staff I think that this will be very helpful.

Simon McCalla: The only thing I would say about that, is I went through, I got a tremendous amount of value in going through some of these documents that I would never have looked at if somebody had said to me, Simon pick some documents, I would never would have picked the Operating Plan and Budget and yet I found that be going through it in person I found some really interesting stuff in there that I didn't expect to see and I think the danger of having somebody else do that is that they A) accidentally miss some key detail that could open up an interesting investigation or B) deliberately decide not to go down a specific avenue. So that's my only worry about having 3rd parties review documents.

Having 3rd parties help write up findings, you know helping take notes that we've done, I think is absolutely appropriate. I hear you, it's hard work, I think the reality of it is it is just hard work and I think we have to do it.

Alejandro Pisanty: Okay, anything further here? Anything we want to leave written down on the document?

Jeff Breuggeman: I just sent around kind of my running list to hopefully just help capture the discussion of each of the issues. It's really repetitive of this, but I tried to boil it down to what seemed to be action items, kind of thing. And I was going to say, Patrick, I think there were probably some other things you provided to my group like the status reports and things that could maybe go on the Wiki, although I'm not sure. Some of that you said maybe wasn't ready to be completely be put out there yet, but we can talk about that too.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thanks, but he has already sent the by-laws change.

Patrick Jones: Were you asking me to look at these real quick or are we having a break in the action?

Alejandro Pisanty: No, we're just reviewing the recent email by Xiaodong, by Olof and by Jeff. Okay, so most likely we're at the end of our efforts today for things that go into the document. This doesn't mean that this is a final but surely as we discuss a few other issues before leaving maybe a couple of paragraphs more will be dropped and also with Xiaodong Li's email and Jeff's email we'll have a few more things to work on.

When we started this session, you remember I said that I thought we should not leave this room without a set of questions for our questionnaire. But I think we have enriched our document to such a huge level that it is very hard to just go through it and say well these are the ten questions we need to ask from everybody. The only thing that we know about three questions we need to ask from everybody is: What's your name? Where do you work? That's the only commonality we can expect right now.

So it may be more practical right now to leave that task for the whole group and specifically a core group, one of the things that we have to do now is make sure we get organized for the next stage of work, we define it well and we assign it well. So the remaining tasks we'll slash, we'll not take up as a task creating a comprehensive list of questions. We should get organized, we should get organized and we should get shared first list of people and organizations we think we want to interview.

Maybe even marking what the main reason for interviewing them is, what the man focus of interview them is. That's important also because then we will be able to ask ICANN for support in specific cases as we don't have any status an independent entity so we cannot go around knocking doors, so we may need ICANN's hand to knock on doors and define it well. Which will also take us to disclosure, access to confidential information, issues and so forth.

Before we do that I have a motion from Simon which I fully endorse. Which is take a break. Take a very quick five minute break and then come back with fresh minutes and bladders to the task.

Simon McCalla: I suggest doing some star-jumps.

Alejandro Pisanty: We'll see you again in five – seven minutes.

[break]

Alejandro Pisanty: Okay, so we're ready to continue. First let me tell you that I find this session extraordinarily good. There has been lots of contributions, I think we can really believe that we are started in

our work in a production phase. We still have a lot to do but as we clean up this document and flesh out and separate the tasks that have to be derived from it and so forth we will find that we've done really an enormous amount of work that was not only made today, but it builds upon the work of everybody over the last six months, particularly some people who have had the time energy and clarity of mind of making very, very solid contributions.

The remaining tasks are getting a list of people to interview, getting organized – for getting organized I think that we have to also answer a question that Bill Manning just made to me privately which are what are the deliverables that we will set ourselves to have available for the Senegal meeting and some dates and times there so that these deliverables cannot only be made but actually be made useful for the community, which will mean that we will have to finish a couple of weeks earlier than the Senegal meeting if we want to make them available for public comment and have a much more lively session with the community input and so forth.

We are also going to meet to projectize, to do some project management, light weight but clear as we go forward. I think that we'll gain some freshness if we go first through the list of people we want to interview, people and entities and then come back to the hard task of getting organized. Or do you think so? How do you think? Go first through the list, so why don't we go along the table as a first approach, tell us who you think is important. Who, I mean persons or entities that we need to interview and what's the main thrust of each of them.

Okay, so Alice, what do you think, your first approach Alice Munyua.

Alice Munyua: Of course GAC, although I would go at the GAC both ways. Encourage GAC to have a GAC statement and also encourage governments to respond to the questionnaire at the national level as well, because then the question is, we'll ensure that we are getting a broader contribution to the questionnaire so at the two levels.

Simon McCalla: Just so I'm clear for the caption on the notes you're actually saying if actually GAC members approach their appropriate national bodies.

Alice Munyua: The way the GAC works that's the natural way the GAC works. You will have some governments responding to the questionnairs individually as governments, for example the Government of Kenya responding as the Government of Kenya to the questionnaire in detail at the same time...

Simon McCalla: As the Kenyan delegates.

Alice Munyua: Yes, yes, while GAC does so both the two levels.

EN

Alejandro Pisanty: What else do you think Alice?

Alice Munyua: And other ICANN constituencies like ccTLDs.

Jeff Brueggeman: Simon is there a process in the ccNSO or others on how to do that?

Alice Munyua: If you'll be sending that to the GAC I think, I'm not sure.

Simon McCalla: We would probably submit through Leslie I would suspect and then say we'd like to ask these questions and how would you go about it and then let Leslie decide whether she wants to submit that amongst them or, I mean I can ask her on the way home.

Hartmut Glaser: You have the council members from the ccNSOs, you could use a number, three or four from each region so it would be easier.

Simon McCalla: Yes, I mean it's 116 members at the moment by my count so probably that might be...

Hartmut Glaser: I mention only the Council, not all the – they are 15 or 16 on the Council. How many you are on the ccNSO? …... No, no, the Council.

Male: Oh the council is, ah...

Hartmut Glaser: Three from each continent.

Male: Yes.

Hartmut Glaser: So they are fifteen.

Alejandro Pisanty: Anders.

Anders Rafting: Sorry I was not completely paying attention because I was just reading minutes from the Board Risk Committee which I believe would be the right persons to talk to because they are doing some interesting stuff according to those minutes, so I think that...

                    And obviously we need to continue in discussion, what we have already started with RSAC and SSAC which I take as an unpleasant thing. Maybe, let us say RSAC plus the individual root

server operators because we discussed that issue, we don't know how this will evolve.

Alejandro Pisanty: Hartmut.

Hartmut Glaser: I propose to include the five CEO's of the (inaudible): Axel, Paul, Raoul, Adiel and John Curran. I think they are key persons and probaly I can give you the name of one person of each representation of the continental representation. Let's say from Latin American probably you can ask Sebastien Bella Gamba. From North American probably will be Louie Lee, ICNICS, from Europe probably you can ask Demetri, he is Board Member for RIPE.

Simon McCalla: Your contact list, can you send those across?

Hartmut Glaser: I can send you their names.

Simon McCalla: That would be great, yes.

EN

Hartmut Glaser: Okay, good. Probably for LAT-TLD will be let me select two or three countries. Mexico, Brazil, Oscar Robles; Brazil will be Dami or Frederico, not myself; and probably Chile, Patricio, yes.

Simon McCalla: Of the TLDs would they not come through the ccNSO response?

Hartmut Glaser   Probably yes, but they are key players in the ccTLD so they need to have all the – the have the risk management, they have all the security.

Simon McCalla: Probably just being a point of order, I'm just thinking if we're going to down the ccNSO we should probably let the ccNSO decide who are their key, rather than us pick. I think that might be, does that make sense.

Alejandro Pisanty: I think we have to, for many of these instances which have a corporate grouping we have to go both through the top and direct. I mean that's the approach that we're taking for the root server operations. We go to the RSAC but we go also to individual root servers.

Hartmut Glaser: We are not thinking of face-to-face interviews, we can do it by email, the same questionnaire.

Alejandro Pisanty: Or maybe having the interviews scheduled for Senegal or other meetings where we meet. Or for example, some of you could have interview with ccTLD managers in a center meeting which you are attending anyway, you and they are attending and some of them as you say by email and telephone. But the choice only through Councils, only through CEOs or let's say through chairs, like going through Leslie and the Council are good, but maybe we will still be curious about specific people so either we negotiate with Leslie or go direct.

Simon McCalla: I'm just nervous that that becomes so political, that's all. People will say well why wasn't I included, why wasn't I spoken to directly. There are an awful lot of CC's and a lot of people who will have an opinion on this and might get a little upset. I'm just thinking, just trying to be fair to everyone, that's all.

Alejandro Pisanty: Let's say our first approach is to the Council and it will also mean.

Hartmut Glaser: Simon, the other way, we have the complete list of all the names. We can send and for sure if we receive 10% of the answers so then

you don't have the political side. You send to everyone and then we have only 10 or 15% of the responses. I don't see any problem. You can do this way.

Alejandro Pisanty: What else, Hartmut?

Hartmut Glaser: Probably you need to include former Board members. Some of the former Board members related to – I remember Ramundo Becker, he was very active in the area of IP addresses and probably others. Alejandro, you can help us with former Board members. You know the history, you know the background.

Alejandro Pisanty: Certainly add to that. David.

David Cake: We do need to include, I think we do need to reach out to the GNSO, I'm not sure what's the best way to do that but I mean I don't think reaching, I don't thinking talking to the GNSO directly is going to get us much of what we need. I mean there be a little bit about process but that's it so, I mean should we just approach all the GSNO constituency?

Simon McCalla: Your thoughts on that, Jeff?

Jeff Brueggeman: The WHOIS Working Group met with, at least met with the commercial stakeholders. That might be more productive, I don't know, it might be more productive to go down a layer below the GNSO and just offer in Dakar to meet with each of the constituencies and see who is interested.

David Cake: Yes, do it at stakeholder or constituency level. Well it doesn't make sense to have some levels assigned. I mean some of the others are the same so. In fact, it is probably really the commercial is the group where it matters whether you talk to the stakeholders or the constituencies so I don't know.

Jeff Brueggeman: At least the business filed comments and think I'm reporting out to them on what's happening, so I think they're very interested in...

David Cake: Constituency level then.

Alejandro Pisanty: Simon.

Simon McCalla: Okay, so there's quite a lot covered here. I think sort of groups and thinking of folk like the DNSSEC work shop groups so like Steve

Croker and Russ Monday and co. That's the one that I sit on, I suspect that they'll have a comment on this and want to comment as that group although they're not a specific constituency they're kind of a reactive group within ICANN and so I think they would be useful to capture. The other piece. I'm just wondering whether we want to go out to NTIA, or is that going out too wide?

Alejandro Pisanty: No it is not going out too wide, it is absolutely irrenounceable. We will have to find a way to formally take the questions and process to get there that gives us some standing and some hope of either getting a response or loyally recording that we that we didn't get one.

Jeff Brueggeman: I can talk to Fiona about that.

Alejandro Pisanty: We have to have an official route through.

Bill Manning: An apocryphal, it's just an observation if you're thinking of going through NTIA, that you might want to go through Suzanne, the designated GAC representative for the United States if you're going to ask for information. Just an observation.

Alejandro Pisanty: I think it's Suzanne with a Z, right? Who else Simon?

Simon McCalla: I've done drawing for the moment, let's move around.

Jeff Brueggeman: You know the discussion about the GNSO triggered a broader question which is, we've already put a set of questions out for comment, and if we're going to send these questions out to individual people, are we going to post them generally – I mean I guess two questions.

     One is, I got some general feedback that the questions were very broad, which has benefits, but now if this is kind of the second round of the questions do we maybe that's just something to think about as we craft the question so it looks different from what we've already asked and then in the interests of transparency we might want to post them so that anybody could comment as well so it doesn't look like we're being exclusive.

Simon McCalla: Yes, just a comment on that actually, so when I drafted, I literally drafted those questions before jumping on a plane so there were two things about them. They weren't desperately well crafted as Bill pointed out and they were very Team 1 centric because I was fresh off writing the status report and everything else and summing up prior to coming here, so I think there are probably two activities

we want to do anyway, which is tighten them up where they need to be tightened up.

And I think Bill's comment about for example question 1 needs to say the SSR of the DNS and not just SSR. So things like that need to be done now and then I think as you say, they're brought, the cover the full range of topics we want to ask. Because at the moment I think they're very governance, like I said they're skewed toward the governance implementation side.

Jeff Brueggeman: It might also be helpful to pull some framing of the groups of issues as you did Alejandro. You kind of did this verbally in the meetings, but to kind of say, you know, so it looks like this an order of process to say, here's how we're structuring the questions according to the issues. Might help give people a context for answering the questions as well.

Alejandro Pisanty: Let's go through the list first, but yes you're right. Who else do you have in mind?

Jeff Brueggeman: I was going to bring up the GNSO and I think offering to do some more meetings in Dakar with whoever we have available at this time would make sense.

EN

|	
Bill Manning:	And what about the DSSA Working Group?
David Cake?	The meetings, I think the WHOIS did meetings with each of the GNSO constituencies or stakeholder groups this time around that would be something we could aim for in Dakar.
	The WHOIS review team did meetings with each constituency, we should do the same thing next time.
Alejandro Pisanty:	In the car we'll have to set up times to go to each constituency and make a brief presentation and see who comes up with replies, whether it's their specifically, anything else Jeff in your mind right now? Xiaodong Li.
Xiaodong Li:	I suggest maybe we can give this some carriers. Because these ones are currently servers. So for example (inaudible), or Comcast, and we also need to.
Alejandro Pisanty:	For being ISPs and carriers put there.

EN

Xiaodong Li: Maybe is ISP is really accurate more than carriers. I also suggest we can interview with the registrar, because maybe (inaudible) they run also reseller. You know you have maybe so many big registrars run minis, dozens of mini-domains.

Jeff Brueggeman: I mean a suggestion might be that some of us from these constituencies can help to try and get the questions out and encourage so we can go to the ISP or the Registry of Registrars to try to encourage people to respond.

Simon McCalla: I guess that's the beauty of this group is because we've by and large, apart from the attrition side of things, we've got folk from each of the constituencies, so it would make sense for a couple of us to go champion those questions to the ccNSO where we know the members and we can kind of cajole them and the same for the GNSO and so forth.

Alejandro Pisanty: What else would you have in mind, Xiaodong?

Xiaodong Li: No, no more.

Alejandro Pisanty: Okay, Bill.

Bill Manning: I actually think that you missed the first point, that Xiaodong pointed which was the carriers, telcos. You got the key registrars but the first one was the telcos the people that do the transport so you should probably put that in for Xiaodong.

I can think of a couple of them. We don't have anybody up there from the law enforcement or security communities and so we should probably engage with some folks, I'm pretty sure there are some, I know that there is one guy from the US government law enforcement that comes to all of these meetings, primarily looking at WHOIS.

Simon McCalla: Bobby Flame.

Bill Manning: Bobby, yes. So we could probably touch him, but giving him a heads up to let him know that we want to talk to him in Senegal. We might need to also talk to, or it would be instructive to get the historical perspective from people like Ira Magaziner at the creation of ICANN and what their expectations were, and whether or not they think ICANN is still headed in the right direction.

Alejandro Pisanty: So historical perspectives, Magaziner.

EN

Bill Manning: The historical perspective before NTIA, it's not NTIA it is sort of the precursor to NTIA.

Alejandro Pisanty: Former NTIA players.

Bill Manning: Yes the authors of the Green Paper. Well, it's not just, Ira is not a former NTIA, but that's okay. No you can leave the former NTIA players in there, that's perfectly fine. What we found when we did the root scalability study and then tried to interview NTIA about the root zone process, was a flat out refusal until they could get it through their legal department. So we went and talked to former members of NTIA and they were more forthcoming. That's an apocryphal, that's some apocryphal data. The other sets of people that would be of interest are the first DNS CERT community, the people that actually, they're not law enforcement but they do computer security.

Alejandro Pisanty: Repeat please?

Bill Manning: The first DNS CERT community, the people who actually deal with computer and network.

EN

Alejandro Pisanty: That's in my response as well first DNS CERTs.

David Cake: On that it would be interesting, I know there's overlap with SSAC but the DNSO ARC.

Bill Manning: Yes, I kind of would actually put that into telcos and infrastructure, that's where I was thinking of them, because that's where they meet.

Hartmut Glaser: Bill when you say at first in that community, you include (inaudible), CERT.

Bill Manning: Let me answer Jeff's question first. Jeff asked me to repeat and there was the DNSO ARC which is where most of the infrastructure and telco kinds of people that run DNS big caching servers already sit. So that was what, when I said that piece, when I heard Xiaodong say it, that's what I understood it to be.

David Cake: I think it would be worth getting not just their view as a telco but also particularly how DNSO ARC feels about the coordination role of ICANN and so on.

Bill Manning: Sure, calling them out is, I think is fine.

David Cake: DNSO ARC as a group as well as individuals.

Bill Manning: And Hartmut, it was not only the Software Engineering Institute thing at Carnegie Mellon, but also National certs. So basically that CERT community when you talk about them it's not just picking the US guys, it's actually more interesting to pick the Brazilian CERT or the Australian CERT. Or the Japanese CERT or the Kenyan CERT.

Hartmut Glaser: Probably I included you really, anti-phishing Working Group.

Anders Rafting: I just wanted to add, I'm DNS Board Member so I can help with contacting those guys if you wish and I think although it is included in all those groups I think we could have probably a specific question for VeriSign, so maybe it should be pointed out as a separate thing. And I was also thinking about the people that are involved in this DNSSAC ceremonies, those key holders. Because they might be independent experts from various regions that, many of them are included in all those groups but they might some specialty use on there.

Simon McCalla: I've got the trusted, there's the trusted, the TCRs trusted TCRs.

Anders Rafting: Yes, TCRs and backup key holder, I don't know the exact terminology but it's roughly.

Hartmut Glaser: Most of them are in this list.

Anders Rafting: But not all of them actually so...

Alejandro Pisanty: I would add IETFIAB, or we'll find that through the IAB Chair and so forth. See who are the people who want to speak about this. Who are the group leaders and so forth who are appropriate for us to look at after and also those who actually just want to speak about this.

Hartmut Glaser: I don't know the best way to approach, but we are not including or list governments. How we can do it to have key persons from the government. Regulators, backbone, well we have some.

Alejandro Pisanty: Since we are within the ICANN sphere, we'll go through the GAC and ask them for specifics that we want to elicite the views from specific types of function within governmnets. As you mentioned regulators, minutes of the communications, Security Ministries and so forth.

Hartmut Glaser: Only to remember, Alice you probably, she is preparing for the IGF in Nairobi, a high level Minister meeting, if we have something ready we can distribute this in Kenya. Do you see the possibility there?

Alice Munuya: You mean just Ministers? Well, I 'm not sure that they'll be that valuable in terms of responding to questionnaires, unless we develop them in a way that makes sense. But worth a try. And that's why I was suggesting that it might be easier to work through structures like the GAC, if you want to get to that level of people, it's easier because then they are also provided the level of, I mean the quality of responses that they are looking for.

Alejandro Pisanty: Rod Beckstrom.

Male: Ooh, contentious.

Alejandro Pisanty: Jeff Moss.

Male: Paul Toomey.

Alejandro Pisanty: Paul Toomey.

Patrick Jones: You should talk to Greg [Rattray] because he was Jeff's predecessor and helped put the structure together for the current SSR Plan. If there is other staff that you are thinking of then Denise and I can talk and provide some suggestions. I just have one other suggestion and you can choose to talk to this person or not but Lyman Chapin is not on your list and he has been chair of the Registry Services Technical Panel since the beginning and former Board Member as well as so is someone who might have some observations that would be useful.

Simon McCalla: Sorry, Patrick, who was that I didn't catch his name.

Hartmut Glaser: He is a former Board Member, he was elected by the ASO.

Patrick Jones: He also chaired the root scalability study.

| Alejandro Pisanty: | And structural, he was with me in the Evolutionary Reform Committee so has very, very valuable knowledge and insights about stability and security. |

That looks like a pretty good list to start. We could easily, I mean this list already is 50 people. It's 23 line items, but many of them are more people. They will begin to overlap with things that we think otherwise. Now, I think at this point that we it would be very tempting to match these people to specific issues, or at least the three big areas, but I think that will tire us enormously and we won't even finish.

That's more something that we can do as we go, later on. So we can stop this task for now, we'll add people whom you think of and send by email, because there are some very interesting questions to be asked, but these things won't come up immediately.

So I think that our last item of work for today will be to get organized for the following weeks. I think that the structure for getting organized now may change from what we were doing as mentioned on Monday. Maybe we can move away from the mother-lode, the three functional sub-teams by areas and better get organized around the fact that people will be available and able to commit to the.

There's a lot of detailed writing that has to be done to flesh our report out and to see whether we have already answers. Like these statements that we can test, or we really need to do an investigation in order to fill in the text after the placeholders we already have.

I'm mostly available in the coming months all the way through the Dakar meeting at the level of availability I have had up to now which I think is, I hope you find it reasonable. I hope that Simon and Jeff continue to be available to be part of this drafting team, I hope Xiaodong you have the extra resource of time and availability to join, because I think that to have to divide our team now in only two parts; one part which will be doing the drafting, writing, planning for research, assigning the interviewees to issues and so forth, and those who cannot commit that much of their time so we can count on you for example that to send you some of the products of the work of the drafting team and say either in small pieces that you can respond promptly to areas that are within your knowledge or interest. Or that you have let's a week to look through the whole report and make comments or changes and so forth.

So the question, I mean if you agree with this structure, then internally in the core drafting team we will of course split tasks. I mean we don't want everybody to be doing everything, but divided by sections or by you know, we'll find a way to divide it that's rational and logical and doable. But I want to know first if this makes sense to all of you? Any reactions here?

Bill Manning: It makes sense to me. Basically I have time and even though I'm prickly and offensive, if you persist it will wear down and I'll agree with you eventually, maybe, so …

Alejandro Pisanty: I know you'll agree with me when I say you were right with what you said originally. No fine. So first, does the structure make sense to you?   Then who are volunteers for the drafting team. Bill Manning. Xiadong, if you are able to do it. Jeff, can you? Simon, myself. David, how much do you feel available for the drafting team? Very good, David Cake. Hartmut, how is your work load? So we don't include you right now, Hartmut. There's no offense and there is no obligation.

What we mean is we're mostly picking up this task in a way that can be done. It can be done means that we have to commit sometime and therefore it's not going to be full-time, nowhere close to full-time because we cannot do it. It's not going to be always on the 24 cycles because no one can really commit to be available on a 24 call availability basis, but it is get the work load promised, get it done and fulfill the promise.

David Cake: I'm hoping all be more available the second half of the year than the first, so... I'm hoping I'll be more available in the second half of the year than the first so. So Anders, how do you feel?

Anders Rafting: I'm the same as David, I'm company CEO so I'm pretty busy but I believe I would be able to have some time for drafting.

Alice Munyua: I'm not really sure, so Chairman if you would...

Alejandro Pisanty: Let's make this in a very positive and easy way. You have the IGF commitment so we're not taking badly from anyone the fact that you're not able to commit. I mean this is not. There are two levels of commitment here.   One is the level of commitment that everybody said they would have by joining the team and that's fine, that the general calculation.

What we're asking is for people who considering that now is June, the work is for October, so you are considering things like summer vacation, having two weeks with the family, stuff like that. Or a specific workloads like you have for the IGF, or people may have half year reports, there's anything. So we're not trying to shame anyone by not being able to put in the extra. The thing is who has the extra availability and then we'll get organized. And we'll have to ask people who are not present here but may be available. Anders, you are on the bridge? Anders, can you hear us?

Anders Rafting: I am.

Alejandro Pisanty: How do you feel, do... I mean it is mid-summer for you, sorry its the solstice and so forth. How do you feel, do you think you can put in the extra and be in the drafting group?

Anders Rafting: Yes I think I can be in the drafting group, but starting in the work after (inaudible), because I'm rather at the moment on summer holiday. Otherwise I can be there during.

Alejandro Pisanty: Okay, so what we'll do is also that we'll, what I'll try to do with this drafting team is to spread the load in such a way also that if people suddenly find, I mean everybody is exposed to surprises and going back home you'll find your wife already has the tickets for two weeks in a place with no internet, so I mean that may happen to everybody or your job suddenly has something, so we'll not make it like a production line, but just test it so if someone can, let's say divide the work in chunks for like two weeks so you can walk out from a specific task for two weeks without any problem for the rest of the team.

Simon McCalla: Just make an observation from working with Team 1, what's really useful is just that kind of regular communication   and people saying the next two weeks I'm only going to do an hour's work or the next two weeks I've got quite a lot of time so I can take, it's that

communication so you can plan that's really important. I think the worst thing is, where it's most difficult when you're planning stuff, is when you say yest I can do it and then nothing comes back, because actually you could reallocate that work to somebody else who has got the time. I think the trick is as you say, nobody needs to feel proud or not proud about it. It is just a question of being honest about what you can and can't achieve and then it's easy to plan. I think that made our lives a lot easier on Team 1 when we got into that working method.

Alejandro Pisanty: So I think we have a resolution for how we're going to proceed and we'll do the details. If you all agree, I'll try to start doing the more detailed work break down for the drafting team together with Jeff and Simon who are already very much in-depth into this, and we'll discuss everything on the email list for everybody to be able to join, adopt a task or say that you can't adopt a task. But let's first work this private for a couple of days and then send it out. We'll have to to clean up the report a little bit and so forth.

So I think, I mean we are basically in good shape for going forward, we have to check with the members who have not yet taken part today. Again thanking Anders for his really heroic performance. What else do we have to do? What else is in your minds. Mr. Nordling, please.

Olof Nordling:

When Denise left for other meetings a little earlier, she reminded me that what ICANN staff would dearly have is a list of additional documents that you would like to be produced and delivered to you, if anything. Maybe the collection is complete, but it may be so that you would like to have other documents following today's discussion. That would be much appreciated.

Alejandro Pisanty:

Thank you, our next task for the organizing team, for Jeff, Simon and myself, will be to go through the document we have produced today, go through the list of documents, see where we have matches. The next tasks actually will not just be writing. I mean the tasks that are forthcoming, the work that we will be distributing and reorganizing among ourselves now will be going back to some of the documents that have already been rated but have not been evaluated in detail.

So we'll ask some one or two people to run evaluation of the bylaws and evaluation of specific contracts, I mean you have all these documents and we will certainly see if some specific ones are needed that are not on the list or that have to be produced and talk to you guys, Patrick and Denise for that rest assured.

If we need to understand the nature of the task that is coming, it's take a document and tear it to pieces, find all that is important. Basically the question will be for each of them and let's not just go and say everything you can think about it. It is find the three most important statements that can be made about the document in favor

of how it, about how it favors stability and how it endangers stability. And understanding stability and security and resiliency of the DNS.

So it's focusing on the real highlights of these things and we'll try for all of them to be substantial. I think that we can do something which is for example, as Xiaodong Li has already done a great work with some of these documents that we will ask you for the more extensive reviews of some of those. It is a heap of work so you won't have to do it all, some of us will take from you. But certainly we'll try to use the familiarity you already have with them to build upon the previous work instead of inventing new work. Okay?

Also as we go, you will be doing thing like looking at the escrow agreement too, ccTLDs accountability framework. We have to set something in the document in the draft, we'll have to ask the questions how do we explore the document further. How do we prove or disprove our null hypothesis that it's dangerous or beneficial, and that will give us the questions and the interviews. So it's a substantial but very concrete work that should gather speed pretty fast. I don't know if anyone has comments on the tasks to be done. Jeff, sir.

Jeff Brueggeman: I do think it's worth as part of our follow up discussion this question of resource assistance on maybe some part of the drafting. Without, I think Simon raised a good point about not delegating

the analysis, but if there is a way to help organize the information I do think that it is, let's try and think about ways to do that.

Alejandro Pisanty: Other comments, yeah, Bill.

Bill Manning: I was looking at the stream from the public forum and Leslie Crowley pointed out from a budgetary perspective that the ATRT mandated reviews are costing ICANN something around three point something million dollars. So I don't think we are quite spending that kind of money.

Simon McCalla: I think a bit bigger, I think.

Olof Nordling: I that must relate not to the expenditure for performing the review but to implement the results.

Jeff Brueggeman: If that's the case some of our recommendations, if they implement them might be equally or more expensive.

David Cake: We can still shoot for $3 million.

Alejandro Pisanty:	Thank you, Alice for sending the list of interviewees that Anders considers necessary. I will look, Bill, at the I've been meaning to do this earlier but didn't get there to see how we're doing with respect to the budget assigned to this group. Certainly not 3.5 million, you remember it's around $300,000. Let's just see how much our tickets, stays and meals have already cost. I will be surprised if it's not a six figure number already. Alice Jansen, please.
Alice Jansen:	Would you like to continue your cycle of bi-weekly calls?
Alejandro Pisanty:	I think that we need to continue with bi-weekly calls, to extend them to the whole drafting team. We may need to alternate them with bi-weekly calls among Simon, Jeff and myself and anyone else wanting to join this core-core planning. There is a drafting team and there's sort of planning team which will have to meet so I think we'll do them and try to keep them through the summer, through the arboreal summer which is usually very difficult but let's assume we do have them, we keep having them on Wednesdays as we have had them. Schedules have been more or less working for the central coordination team and we'll have to look at the times for including David so we'll rotate the pain.
David Cake:	I can usually stay up pretty late.

Jeff Brueggeman: I will point out that for Review Team 2 we had some issues with timing for Asian participants and so considering alternating times is probably reasonable.

Alejandro Pisanty: So Olof, Alice, you're much more mindful of lots of logistic things we may still be missing. What do you think we still have?

Alice Jansen: You had mentioned the possibility of meeting face to face at some point.

Alejandro Pisanty: We have that possibility for Jeff, myself and Simon and maybe someone else joining to meet in Washington, DC the week of July 18, more specifically like on July 21.

Alice Jansen: Could you let us know if this will happen as soon as possible so we can ask for security trappings.

Alejandro Pisanty: Yes, and we will ask you for your support for logistics and so forth. This is basically defined and we will invite, I mean this would be a face-to-face meeting where we already have a lot of written stuff and to really parse and date it and spend like a full day

meeting and I think Jeff has offered office space, right? Meeting space, or we'll ask you for something really simple in the hotel otherwise.

Alice Jansen: We also have an office.

Alejandro Pisanty: Oh and you have the office of course.

Bill Manning: We actually have conference space in the new DC office and that's certainly open to use with video conferencing capabilities so if there is someone who is interested that wants to participate we could patch them in through our usual ways.

Alejandro Pisanty: So we'll work on that in the coming few days. Thank you very much, make sure that it's a useful meeting. It's not intended to be a full team meeting, it's intended to be more organizational and let's say to create material that supports the whole group's team work, but it's not exclusionary in any way. It's just, you know, have a day to spend working hard on that date, that's great. We try to keep it small in order to be very efficient.

Okay, any other issues, business?

Simon McCalla:	Just something we discussed. It might be too early to talk about it but there's just the possibility of hosting something, possible in Oxford would be again depending on how work progress goes over the summer and depending on whether people wanted to do it, we'd be very happy to host a kind of SSRT for want of a better phrase, Boot Camp, where you can just sit down and spend two or three days working through, doing work, not sitting and not discussing but actually getting on, you know being able to work together, have food and drink and everything else provided so that you can just focus on the work.
	You know sometimes when you get a few heads together you can really motor through some of that work. Sometimes, particularly if you've got a complex analysis task to do, having two of you or three of you to bounce those ideas off as you work through it can be really useful. So very happy to host that prior to Senegal as well if we felt that would be beneficial. People felt that they could space two or three days, be very, very happy to host that in Oxford and look after people and put people up and everything else in order to get that work done. So there's an open offer there is people would like it.
Alejandro Pisanty:	And I do have plans to be there in September, I think it's 21st because there's the Oxford internet Institute Tenure and Bursary and I've been invited to one of the events. So this is very like, again this is not excluding anybody, I'm not trying to create opportunities for others not to do the work, it is just putting two

people together, two or more to roll up our sleeves, not officially creating meetings.

Simon McCalla: It would be open to everybody and anybody who wanted to come, absolutely, it would just be an opportunity to just to get our heads together and work on stuff, even if we could choose work depending on who was able to come and so forth.

Alejandro Pisanty: Work on that and see if it can be budgeted and supported. We're not assuming anything without first asking.

Bill Manning: If you could send those dates around, because they sound okay but I have to check with the cruise director to make sure that I'm not stepping on somebody's toes.

Alejandro Pisanty: Very good. Anything else any work questions? I understand we're sending your emails and questions and on people to interview. And for all your efforts staying with us overnight it's fantastic your, it seems you love jet-lag so you have to have it even if you're staying home.

Anders Rafting: Exactly. It gets taken into the discussions.

Alejandro Pisanty: Please Anders, sorry to interrupt, again, it seems useful if you speak in longer syllables, that get through the decoding.

Anders Rafting: Yes I said that us not so problematic, it's just early morning for me and have been listening to a very interesting session here and I understand and know that we have made lots of progress today. I have good feeling for the future.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you Anders, I'm really proud to be allowed to be part of a team like this, this has been a fantastic productive day with lots of depth, idea exchanges, lots of pragmatism, it's like, what else do you want for work than a team of smart committed people with good nature and good will and great support from staff and it's fantastic. Thanks everybody. Hat's off to all of you.

So we adjourn. Anders you are free, you can enjoy your jet lag now.

[End of Transcript]