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RE: [ga] RE: issues that are long closed?

  • To: "'Karl Auerbach'" <karl@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Subject: RE: [ga] RE: issues that are long closed?
  • From: "Roberto Gaetano" <roberto@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sat, 7 Jul 2007 12:16:19 +0200
  • Cc: <ga@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • In-reply-to: <468AD449.8060307@cavebear.com>
  • Sender: owner-ga@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Thread-index: Ace9yxdIp0mV2WObRr+Ca+GduDay2gCmRFvQ

Karl,

> 
> I represented approximately 330,000,000 people.  I maintained 
> a website, published a diary (it now would be called a blog) 
> of what I was doing, and I spent a lot of time doing email, 
> both one-to-one, and also on lists such as this.  It took a 
> lot work, and not every email was answered, but it is quite feasible.

I acknowledge that. My point was that not all five elected directors did the
same effort. Actually, quite frankly, you have been the only one.
I don't think that the matter of continuity of communication between a
Director and the AtLarge community that has elected him/her can be left to
the good will of the person, and not be institutionalized.


> 
> Moreover, I have long advocated that ICANN start doing 
> something that is common elsewhere - director stipends.  If 
> ICANN were to cover up to $50,000 each year of expenses for 
> each director, it would be possible for each director to 
> obtain, at least on a part time basis, some resources to help 
> with the load. 
> Now that would have an affect on the volunteer status of 
> directors and thus upon their legal vulnerabilities, so each 
> director would have to decide whether to accept it or not.

Again, the financial issue can be solved, but a mechanism should be put in
place. I simply do not buy the fact that the only accountability mechanism
for Directors is the possibility for the voters to change person three years
after.


> 
> A director has to always keep in mind that he/she is not the 
> representative of the people who elected him/her to office - 
> a director's position is not a political position.

I partly agree with you, in the sense that an elected director has to act in
the best interest of the Corporation, not following the petty interests of
his/her constituency, but I would not go to the extreme that an elected
Director would not have the duty of communication with his/her electorate.
Otherwise, why bother electing? The "power" that the AtLarge community will
have under this hypothesis will be a very small thing.


> 
> It does take a bit of chutzpah, not to mention some 
> suspension of a sense of personal humility to say "I speak on 
> behalf of 330,000,000 people."  (Indeed, once before the US 
> Senate I said "I represent more people than does the 
> President of the United States."  [The senator in question 
> was clearly of the "wind bag" variety - his voters threw him 
> out of office last year.]  ;-)

IMHO, you can claim to represent 330,000,000 people only if you keep the
communication going, and keep your actions connected with the opinions of
those people. Which does not mean at all to vote always in the same way [the
majority of] those people would have voted, but at least ot explain why you
voted differently, if your loyalty to the Corporation forced you to vote in
a way that was not in line with the [corporative] interest of your
constituency.
If you don't do that, your claim loses its basis, IMHO.
Again, this was not your case.


> 
> While that may be a useful mental construct, it does contain 
> more than a small grain of paternalism.  Queen Victoria of 
> England and King Leopold of Belgium tried to justify their 
> denial of political power to the people of their African 
> colonies on a basis that could be considered as similar, if 
> perhaps extremely more concentrated, than your notion that 
> the power to say what is in the public interest is limited to 
> those who have some special status.

The difference in our way of thinking is in the different appreciation of
what is "power". I might have mentioned that before, but I don't feel to
have much more "power" now that I am a voting member of the Board vs. what I
used to have as a non-voting Liaison from ALAC. My vote is one out of 15,
and I can't do anything alone. If what I say makes sense, I might be able to
bring more people on my position. And this is by and large independent from
whether I do have one vote or not.


> 
> The power, using a US colloquial phrase, "to throw the bums 
> out" lies at the heart of accountability.  There are many of 
> us who are very glad that in early November of next year we 
> will be able to cast our votes to throw out our current 
> executive officers.  What you express is an idea under which 
> one might justify the removal of my (and my fellow citizens 
> in my country) right to vote to change our President and 
> members of Congress.

No, what I say is that this is not sufficient.
My position in Cairo and Yokohama, when the matter has been discussed and
decided by the Board, was that the direct election of Board members without
a mechanism to involve the AtLarge community in the decision making process
was insufficient and would have been a loser. I have not changed my mind
yet: the proposal (from Alan Davidson?) to eliminate the AtLarge Council,
because it was an unnecessary layer that would have limited direct
democracy, was the single biggest mistake the AtLarge community has made. Of
course, I recognize that we have different opinions on that.


> 
> Democracy does not require a direct path to vote directly on 
> each issue - a layer of intermediate representation is 
> acceptable.  But that intermediate layer (i.e. the ICANN 
> board of directors) must be subject to recall by the electors 
> at the next scheduled election.  Otherwise there is no 
> accountability. 
>   And all the transparency in the world is worthless unless 
> there is a mechanism of accountability through which the 
> affected community - the community of internet users - can 
> replace their representatives.

I am not claiming "a direct path to vote", but "a way to communicate".
Failing to give an institutional response to this need, the possibility to
replace the representatives every three years is very little (although non
negligeable) thing.

> 
> The ALAC, because it is structured as layer upon layer and 
> ultimately leads to a mere nominating/appointing committee, 
> is more of a mechanism of insulation rather than a mechanism 
> of accountability.

My point was that the ALAC has direct influence to the Board decisions via
its Liaison, directly elected (every year, not every three years) by the
Committee, who, on top of that, has the power to recall the Director at any
time with a qualified vote.


> 
> I would suggest that the ALAC be evaluated using no less 
> stringent tests than were applied to the system of elections 
> in year 2000.
> 
> And by those metrics, which are those of the number of active 
> participants and the broadness of discourse, the ALAC long 
> ago failed as not even coming close to the vibrancy of 
> discourse or the scope of participation that we had in year 2000.

You are talking about the debate before the elections, in other words about
the electoral campaign. You are right. However, if your yardstick is the
debate in the three years following the election, there hasn't been much,
and the little that has been done was concentrated in one, maximum two
regions. You are wwelcome to show me evidence of the contrary, and I will
stand corrected, but I can't recall any one single position paper by the
AtLarge community while the 5 elected Directors were seated.


> 
> It seems to work OK in my state of 30,000,000 people and my 
> country of 300,000,000 people.  (I'm not going to go down the 
> tangent that might suggest that we had a failure in the US in 
> year 2000 - occasional failures ought to be
> expected.)
> 
> I seriously doubt that the ICANN universe will ever attract 
> even 1% of those numbers.

And in fact it did not, even in that case. To represent 300+M people is a
figure of speech, the vast majority of them had never heard about ICANN, let
alone cared about it.


> 
> I routinely vote in corporate elections where the number of 
> shareholders are numbered in the hundreds of thousands if not 
> in the millions.
> 
> The ultimate question is this: How is ICANN to be made accountable?
> 
> I see no answer except to give the community of internet 
> users the ultimate authority to select who will be given the 
> authority, for a clearly limited period of time, to speak and 
> make decisions on their behalf.
> 
> And I see the issue being one is in desperate need of an 
> answer because of the huge damage that is being done to the 
> collective pocketbook of internet users - as much as 
> $400,000,000 (US) every year, due to ICANN's decisions to 
> favor certain selected industrial interests (intellectual 
> property collectors [as opposed to intellectual property 
> creators], and domain name registrars) over the general body 
> of internet users.

Of course, the system needs improvement. My point is only that the simple
voting power every 3 years to the AtLarge community, absent other measures,
while it would improve formal accountability it would do little if anything
at all about increasing participation. Except during the period of the
electoral campaign.

I believe that, with all due respect I have for your positions, and with my
full understanding that you have been there before me and know much more
than me, I cannot share the consequences you draw from your analysis, and I
have to live with the fact that we have a disagreement.

Best regards,
Roberto




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