Re: [council] Repost: a process to review/evaluate whether SSAC recommendations warrant action by the GNSO

["Mike O'Connor" <mike@xxxxxxxxxx>]

hi Jonathan,

yes, the SSAC-liaison idea would fit nicely in this discussion, in my view.  
i’m sorry to have missed/forgotten about that idea — i’d have thrown it into 
this pile if i’d remembered.

thanks,

mikey


On Jan 10, 2014, at 8:45 AM, Jonathan Robinson <jrobinson@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Thanks Mikey,
>  
> Personally, I am receptive but would like to make sure we understand the why 
> and how as well as possible.
>  
> One question, does this (or could it) link with the tentative proposal I 
> mentioned in our Council meeting with the Board in BA where I suggested that 
> SSAC consider appointing a liaison to the GNSO Council.
> 
> Informal conversations after that somewhat off-the-cuff suggestion led me to 
> understand that this was well received.
>  
> Additional thoughts from others?
>  
> Jonathan
>  
> From: Mike O'Connor [mailto:mike@xxxxxxxxxx] 
> Sent: 10 January 2014 12:59
> To: Council
> Subject: [council] Repost: a process to review/evaluate whether SSAC 
> recommendations warrant action by the GNSO
>  
> hi all,
>  
> welcome back from the holidays — i’m reposting this because i’d like to 
> request a slot on the agenda of our upcoming meeting for this topic.  the 
> first time around, this note met with resounding silence from the Council, 
> which i’m thinking was due to the pre-holiday crush.
>  
> so i’m trying again.  and making a formal request for an agenda slot.
>  
> thanks,
>  
> mikey
>  
>  
>  
> Begin forwarded message:
> 
> 
> From: "Mike O'Connor" <mike@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: [council] what about a process to review/evaluate whether SSAC 
> recommendations warrant action by the GNSO
> Date: December 19, 2013 at 10:53:13 AM CST
> To: "council@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx GNSO" <council@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Patrik Fältström <patrik@xxxxxxxxxx>
>  
> dear all,
>  
> i would like to introduce a gap-closing proposal for the GNSO -- namely, to 
> take a hard look at SSAC reports and determine whether any of their 
> recommendations bear on GNSO Consensus Policy.
>  
> this gap between what the SSAC says and the GNSO does has been an issue for 
> me for quite some time, and i think one easy way to close it would be to 
> routinely take up each SSAC report and make that determination.  there would 
> likely be cases where we review the reports among the stakeholder groups and 
> conclude that:
>  
> -- there are NO recommendations that require PDPs
> -- there ARE recommendations that require PDPs, or
> -- there are recommendations that we would like to know more about before we 
> decided whether a PDP is in order.  
>  
> i'll give an example of the reason why this is on my mind.  in 2005 the SSAC 
> produced an extensive report that addressed the issue of domain-name 
> hijacking.  in 2011, six years later, the members of the IRTP-B working group 
> stumbled across the following observation in that ancient report and realized 
> that it would be a good idea
>  
> Collect emergency contact information from registrants, registrars, and 
> resellers for parties who are suited to assist in responding to an urgent 
> restoration of domain name incident. Define escalation processes (emergency 
> procedures) that all parties agree can be instituted in events where 
> emergency contacts are not available.
>  
> it took six years for that very common-sense idea to find it's way into 
> Consensus Policy.  and it probably took another year or two to implement.  
> and it was all practically by accident.  
>  
> what if we:
>  
> -- discuss this "formally review SSAC reports" idea with our stakeholders and 
> on the Council list for a while
>  
> -- put an agenda item on our next call to share what we've heard and test a 
> way forward
>  
> -- get started, presuming nobody thinks this is a horrible idea
>  
> i've attached the recommendations from the three (count 'em, three) SSAC 
> reports that were released in Buenos Aires.  just to give you an idea of the 
> substantive reports that the SSAC is producing.  i think it would be really 
> helpful to run these through a process to decide which, if any, of these 
> recommendations warrant action via PDP.  there are plenty more SSAC reports 
> to review in the backlog.
>  
> thanks,
>  
> mikey
>  
>  
>  
>  
> SAC061:  SSAC Comment on ICANN’s Initial Report from the Expert Working Group 
> on gTLD Directory Services
>  
> http://www.icann.org/en/groups/ssac/documents/sac-061-en.pdf
>  
> Recommendation 1: SSAC reiterates its recommendation from SAC055: The ICANN 
> Board should explicitly defer any other activity (within ICANN’s remit) 
> directed at finding a ‘solution’ to ‘the WHOIS problem’ until the 
> registration data policy has been developed and accepted in the community. 
> The EWG should clearly state its proposal for the purpose of registration 
> data, and focus on policy issues over specific implementations.
>  
> Recommendation 2: The ICANN Board should ensure that a formal security risk 
> assessment of the registration data policy be conducted as an input into the 
> Policy Development Process.
>  
> Recommendation 3: SSAC recommends that the EWG state more clearly its 
> positions on the following questions of data availability:
>  
> A. Why is a change to public access justified?
> This explanation should describe the potential impact upon ordinary Internet 
> users and casual or occasional users of the directory service.
>  
> B. Does the EWG believe that access to data currently accessible in generic 
> Top Level Domain (gTLD) WHOIS output should become restricted?
> If so, what fields and to what extent exactly? Under the EWG proposal, 
> queries from non- authenticated requestors would return only “public data 
> available to anyone, for
>  
> C. Should all gTLD registries be required to provision their contact data 
> into the Aggregated Registration Data Service (ARDS)?  
> There may be jurisdictions that prohibit by law the export of personally 
> identifiable information outside the jurisdiction. If so, the ARDS may not be 
> a viable way to deliver data accuracy and compliance across all gTLDs.
>  
> D. Does the EWG propose more types of sensitive registration data be 
> provisioned into ARDS than are found in current gTLD WHOIS output? 
>  
> Recommendation 4: The SSAC suggests that the EWG address this recommendation 
> from SAC058: “SSAC Report on Domain Name Registration Data Validation”3:
> As the ICANN community discusses validating contact information, the SSAC 
> recommends that the following meta-questions regarding the costs and benefits 
> of registration data validation should be answered:
>  
> • What data elements need to be added or validated to comply with 
> requirements or expectations of different stakeholders?
> • Is additional registration processing overhead and delay an acceptable cost 
> for improving accuracy and quality of registration data?
> • Is higher cost an acceptable outcome for improving accuracy and quality?
> • Would accuracy improve if the registration process were to provide natural 
> persons with privacy protection upon completion of multi-factored validation?
>  
>  
> SAC062:  SSAC Advisory Concerning the Mitigation of Name Collision Risk
>  
> http://www.icann.org/en/groups/ssac/documents/sac-062-en.pdf
>  
> Recommendation 1: ICANN should work with the wider Internet community, 
> including at least the IAB and the IETF, to identify (1) what strings are 
> appropriate to reserve for private namespace use and (2) what type of private 
> namespace use is appropriate (i.e., at the TLD level only or at any 
> additional lower level).
>  
> Recommendation 2: ICANN should explicitly consider the following questions 
> regarding trial delegation and clearly articulate what choices have been made 
> and why as part of its decision as to whether or not to delegate any TLD on a 
> trial basis:
>  
> -- Purpose of the trial: What type of trial is to be conducted? What data are 
> to be collected?
>  
> -- Operation of the trial: Should ICANN (or a designated agent) operate the 
> trial or should the applicant operate it?
>  
> -- Emergency Rollback: What are the emergency rollback decision and execution 
> procedures for any delegation in the root, and have the root zone partners 
> exercised these capabilities?
>  
> -- Termination of the trial: What are the criteria for terminating the trial 
> (both normal and emergency criteria)? What is to be done with the data 
> collected? Who makes the decision on what the next step in the delegation 
> process is?
>  
> Recommendation 3: ICANN should explicitly consider under what circumstances 
> un-delegation of a TLD is the appropriate mitigation for a security or 
> stability issue. In the case where a TLD has an established namespace, ICANN 
> should clearly identify why the risk and harm of the TLD remaining in the 
> root zone is greater than the risk and harm of removing a viable and in-use 
> namespace from the DNS. Finally, ICANN should work in consultation with the 
> community, in particular the root zone management partners, to create 
> additional processes or update existing processes to accommodate the 
> potential need for rapid reversal of the delegation of a TLD.
>  
> SAC063:  SSAC Advisory on DNSSEC Key Rollover in the Root Zone
>  
> http://www.icann.org/en/groups/ssac/documents/sac-063-en.pdf
>  
> Recommendations:
>  
> Recommendation 1: Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
> staff, in coordination with the other Root Zone Management Partners (United 
> States Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information 
> Administration (NTIA), and Verisign), should immediately undertake a 
> significant, worldwide communications effort to publicize the root zone KSK 
> rollover motivation and process as widely as possible.
>  
> Recommendation 2: ICANN staff should lead, coordinate, or otherwise encourage 
> the creation of a collaborative, representative testbed for the purpose of 
> analyzing behaviors of various validating resolver implementations, their 
> versions, and their network environments (e.g., middle boxes) that may affect 
> or be affected by a root KSK rollover, such that potential problem areas can 
> be identified, communicated, and addressed.
>  
> Recommendation 3: ICANN staff should lead, coordinate, or otherwise encourage 
> the creation of clear and objective metrics for acceptable levels of 
> “breakage” resulting from a key rollover.
>  
> Recommendation 4: ICANN staff should lead, coordinate, or otherwise encourage 
> the development of rollback procedures to be executed when a rollover has 
> affected operational stability beyond a reasonable boundary.
>  
> Recommendation 5: ICANN staff should lead, coordinate, or otherwise encourage 
> the collection of as much information as possible about the impact of a KSK 
> rollover to provide input to planning for future rollovers.
> 
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>  
>  
> 
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>  


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