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Re: [council] Fast Flux Hosting - re stated motions

  • To: Mike Rodenbaugh <mxrodenbaugh@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Subject: Re: [council] Fast Flux Hosting - re stated motions
  • From: Avri Doria <avri@xxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2008 13:02:07 -0400
  • Cc: "'Council GNSO'" <council@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • In-reply-to: <008101c89f95$c8fdf850$e601a8c0@PSEVO>
  • List-id: council@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • References: <20080411040845.4a871ae7d05d2c98d9abb595d392cd69.f4143b6916.wbe@email.secureserver.net> <00aa01c89bc7$d26041e0$0202fea9@united.domain> <012101c89be2$e1b50430$a51f0c90$@com> <013001c89be8$4d2cf8d0$0202fea9@united.domain> <FA76116C-A18C-44DB-A3C0-9008E0D3D05E@psg.com> <008101c89f95$c8fdf850$e601a8c0@PSEVO>
  • Sender: owner-council@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx


Hi,

Mike:  Do you support this rewriting of your motions(s).

And is there  seconder?

a.

On 16 Apr 2008, at 03:45, Philip Sheppard wrote:


Avri,
you are right and the situation is no different to any PDP. I suggest this:

MOTION 1
Whereas, "fast flux" DNS changes are increasingly being used to commit crime
and frustrate law enforcement efforts to combat crime, with criminals
rapidly modifying IP addresses and/or nameservers in effort to evade
detection and shutdown of their criminal website;

Whereas, the Security and Stability Advisory Committee has reported on this
trend in its Advisory SAC 025, dated January 2008:
http://www.icann.org/committees/security/sac025.pdf/

Whereas, the SSAC Advisory describes the technical aspects of fast flux hosting, explains how DNS is being exploited to abet criminal activities, discusses current and possible methods of mitigating this activity, and
recommends that appropriate bodies consider policies that would make
practical mitigation methods universally available to all registrants, ISPs,
registrars and registries,

Whereas, the GNSO resolved on March 6, 2008 to request an Issues Report from ICANN Staff, to consider the SAC Advisory and outline potential next steps for GNSO policy development designed to mitigate the current ability for criminals to exploit the NS via "fast flux" IP and/or nameserver changes;

Whereas, the ICANN Staff has prepared an Issues Report dated March 25, 2008,
http://gnso.icann.org/issues/fast-flux-hosting/gnso-issues-report-fast-flux-
25mar08.pdf, recommending that the GNSO sponsor additional fact- finding and research to develop best practices guidelines concerning fast flux `hosting, and to provide data to assist policy development and illuminate potential
policy options.;

Whereas, ICANN should consider whether and how it might encourage registry operators and registrars to take steps that would help to reduce the damage done by cybercriminals, by curtailing the effectiveness of these fast flux
hosting exploits.

The GNSO Council RESOLVES:
To initiate a Policy Development Process uniquely on the issues deemed in scope in the
Issues report.
(This will require a 33% vote)


MOTION 2
Whereas Council has decided to launch a PDP on fast flux hosting;

The GNSO Council RESOLVES:
To form a Task Force of interested stakeholders and Constituency
representatives, to collaborate broadly with knowledgeable individuals and organizations, in order to develop potential policy options to curtail the
criminal use of fast flux hosting.

The Task Force initially shall consider the following questions:

..Who benefits from fast flux, and who is harmed?
..Who would benefit from cessation of the practice and who would be harmed?
..How are registry operators involved in fast flux hosting activities?
..How are registrars involved in fast flux hosting activities?
..How are registrants affected by fast flux hosting?
..How are Internet users affected by fast flux hosting?
..What measures could be implemented by registries and registrars to mitigate
the negative effects of fast flux?
..What would be the impact (positive or negative) of establishing
limitations, guidelines, or restrictions on registrants, registrars and/or registries with respect to practices that enable or facilitate fast flux
hosting?

The Task Force shall report back to Council within 90 days, with a report discussing these questions and the range of possible answers developed by the Task Force members. The Task Force report also shall outline potential
next steps for Council deliberation.

(This will require a 50% vote)








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