[council] Revised Resolution regarding Verisign Registry Site Finder Service
- To: "Grant Forsyth (E-mail)" <grant.forsyth@xxxxxxxxxxx>, "Bruce Tonkin (E-mail)" <bruce.tonkin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "Dan Halloran (E-mail)" <halloran@xxxxxxxxx>, "Council (E-mail)" <council@xxxxxxxx>
- Subject: [council] Revised Resolution regarding Verisign Registry Site Finder Service
- From: "Cade,Marilyn S - LGCRP" <mcade@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2003 00:05:44 -0400
- Cc: "John Jeffrey (E-mail)" <jeffrey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Sender: owner-council@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Thread-index: AcN+O182CH5VAWHzTbG+V913fxhQQAAA7dYAAATaY+AAAyXxcAAdLOhAAQ4FdHA=
- Thread-topic: Final Motion for Balloting
Dear fellow Councilors and liaisons
Given input from some other councilors, other events of relevance, I am
submitting a modified version of my earlier resolution to Council. The intent
of the resolution is to establish Council's interest and concern; to show the
Council's support to Board and President, and to the Security and Stability
Advisory Committee for their actions to date, and to indicate the Council's
commitment to participate fully in all processes to better understand the
impact of new registry level service on the DNS and Internet, and to advise the
Board of the intent of Council to undertake any relevant and appropriate work
related policy development.
"Whereas, the primary and overriding imperative to ICANN's mission is the
stability and reliability of the global DNS and the Internet. All entities of
ICANN share responsibility to consider reliable, predictable, secure, and
stable operation of the DNS and the Internet infrastructure in the development
of any policies, or any changes in operations or introduction of new services.
Whereas, the global Internet is dependent upon standards and design principles
and practices that are undertaken and agreed to by the private sector through
collegial and bottom up, consensus based processes.
Whereas, on September 15, 2003, VeriSign Registry introduced a wild card
registry service into .com and .net zones that creates a registry-synthesized
address record in response to look ups of domain names that are not present in
the zone. This registry service changes the routing of traffic by directing
traffic that would have otherwise resulted in a 'no domain' notification to the
"sender" to a VeriSign operated web site with search results and links to paid
Whereas this change creates the appearance that any possible string of letters
is a "live" domain, a significant operational change with many implications
that are not yet fully understood. The VeriSign server also substantially
changes the way email is queued, routed, and responded to in the .com and .net
domains; presenting burdens on ISPs and network connectivity providers of all
Whereas applications developed to rely on a RCODE 3 response for a non existing
domain have been negatively affected by this change.
Whereas work around at the routing and at the DNS level have been deployed by
various members of the community to stop the effect of the wildcards.
Whereas, concerns have been expressed by many in the community that wildcards
in such significant zones negatively affects the stability of the DNS.
Whereas complaints have been received about the service and its harmful and
burdensome impact on other service providers and including but not limited to:
anti-Spam software is being negatively affected.
Whereas, there was no notice, comment, nor consultation with affected
infrastructure entities by Verisign Registry.
Whereas, significant questions of harm to the stability and reliability of the
Internet are raised in a variety of technical forums
Whereas the IAB commentary published its architectural Concerns on the use of
DNS wildcards on 19 September 2003.
Whereas VeriSign Registry on 21 September 2003, responded to Paul Twomey,
President and CEO, ICANN, acknowledging ICANN's advisory and declining to
suspend the service until they (VeriSign) has an opportunity to collect and
review available data.
Whereas the Security and Stability Advisory Committee, 22 September 2003,has
published its recommendations related to the service advising that the
stability of the Internet has been considerably weakened through the
introduction of ambiguous and inaccurate responses in the DNS, calling on
Verisign to voluntarily suspend the service and participate in the various
review processes now underway and on ICANN to examine the procedures of change
in service, including provisions to protect users from abrupt changes in
Therefore, the gNSO Council:
Supports ICANN's actions to
1) monitor community reaction and experiences with the new registry service
2) request advice from the Security and Stability Advisory Committee and from
the IAB on the impact of change introduced by the registry service of VeriSign
3) encourages broad participation by the community in the upcoming meeting
hosted by the Security and Stability Advisory Committee
4) pledges its members support for the upcoming meeting
Requests that ICANN
1) provide a ruling of whether this service is a registry level service, in
violation of existing accreditation agreements and if so, take immediate
appropriate steps to end the service until required process is undertaken;
4) in any event, obtain a suspension of the service until the various reviews
on the service are completed and presented to ICANN, whether through voluntary
or involuntary means
1) work cooperatively to ensure full opportunity to fully understand the
service, its implications for the DNS, and what steps are needed for
retroactively addressing service introduction, and proactively present a
recommendation regarding the need for a formal notice and comment process in
the introduction of new services at the registry level via undertaking a PDP.